[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A8PMRG75HSMMGS1Q5X1NEP":3,"skill-same:01M7A8PMRG75HSMMGS1Q5X1NEP":144},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":40,"commitSha":41,"skillDirectory":42,"forksCount":43,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":46,"updatedAt":47,"install":48,"resources":61},"01M7A8PMRG75HSMMGS1Q5X1NEP","glue-crawler-job-auditor",null,"Audits AWS Glue crawlers and jobs (plus their data-catalog encryption, JDBC connections, IAM execution roles, security configurations, job bookmarks, and S3 source encryption) for data-at-rest exposure, over-permissive pass-role blast radius, and configuration gaps. Emits a deterministic verdict — NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK — per crawler or job with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing Glue crawlers\u002Fjobs before production, checking catalog encryption, validating JDBC SSL, tightening the execution role, or hardening ETL security posture.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: glue-crawler-job-auditor\ndescription: Audits AWS Glue crawlers and jobs (plus their data-catalog encryption, JDBC connections, IAM execution roles, security configurations, job bookmarks, and S3 source encryption) for data-at-rest exposure, over-permissive pass-role blast radius, and configuration gaps. Emits a deterministic verdict — NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK — per crawler or job with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing Glue crawlers\u002Fjobs before production, checking catalog encryption, validating JDBC SSL, tightening the execution role, or hardening ETL security posture.\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline config classification. Live-account audits use aws glue get-data-catalog-encryption-settings, get-security- configuration, get-job, get-crawler, get-connection, and aws s3api get-bucket-encryption (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '2'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: Analytics\n  verdict_shape: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\n  when_to_use: Reviewing a Glue crawler or job before production deployment, checking data-catalog encryption (EncryptionAtRest \u002F ConnectionPasswordEncryption), validating JDBC connection SSL, auditing the execution role for pass-role or wildcard blast radius, inspecting a SecurityConfiguration for log \u002F bookmark \u002F spill encryption, flagging an EOL Glue version, or hardening ETL security posture across an account.\n  activation_triggers: audit this Glue crawler, audit this Glue job, is my Glue catalog encrypted, check JDBC SSL on the Glue connection, Glue execution role too permissive, is the SecurityConfiguration set on the job, are Glue bookmarks encrypted, is the S3 source encrypted, harden Glue ETL, Glue 0.9 end of life\n  invocation_schema: 'Input: either (a) a Glue crawler or job configuration (JSON \u002F describe output) plus the DataCatalogEncryptionSettings, SecurityConfiguration, Connection, and IAM role policy documents, OR (b) a crawler \u002F job name for live-account audit. Output: deterministic RESOURCE\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002F FINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per crawler or job, where VERDICT is in {NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.'\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  keywords: Glue, crawler, Glue job, data catalog encryption, EncryptionAtRest, SecurityConfiguration, JDBC SSL, JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL, job bookmarks, S3 source encryption, execution role, PassRole, glue:CreateJob, glue:CreateCrawler, over-permissive role, Glue 0.9, EOL runtime, CloudWatch encryption, S3Encryptions, LakeFormation, ConnectionPasswordEncryption, ETL audit\n  tags: glue, analytics, security, encryption, iam-role, jdbc, bookmarks, security-configuration, audit\n---\n\n# Glue Crawler & Job Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and three Glue concepts are routinely misjudged —\n**`EncryptionAtRest` leaks catalog *metadata*, not processed data**,\n**`SecurityConfiguration` does NOT encrypt the source** (it covers logs,\nspills, and bookmarks), and **`glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` are\nsilent pass-role vectors** just like `iam:PassRole`.\n\nA Glue ETL pipeline has five independent security surfaces that operators\nfrequently conflate:\n\n1. **Data Catalog encryption** (`EncryptionAtRest`, `ConnectionPasswordEncryption`)\n   — two SEPARATE KMS-gated toggles. `EncryptionAtRest` encrypts catalog\n   metadata (database \u002F table \u002F column names, partition values, schema JSON).\n   `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` encrypts the JDBC password stored on the\n   Connection object. Enabling one does NOT enable the other.\n2. **SecurityConfiguration on the resource** — a named Glue resource that\n   encrypts CloudWatch logs, S3 spill \u002F temp writes, and job bookmarks. It\n   does NOT encrypt the source data the job reads — that is the *source\n   bucket's* own SSE setting.\n3. **JDBC Connection transport** — `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL` on the Connection's\n   `ConnectionProperties`. Without it, Glue-to-DB traffic is cleartext.\n4. **IAM execution role** — the role attached to the crawler \u002F job. Its\n   identity-based policy is the real blast radius; `glue:*` and `s3:*` on `*`\n   are common and dangerous.\n5. **Source S3 bucket encryption** — SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS on the bucket the\n   crawler \u002F job reads. This is the bucket's setting, not Glue's. Glue\n   inherits; it does not control it.\n\n## Quick reference — severity thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Rule |\n|---|---|---|\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode: DISABLED` (catalog metadata in plaintext) | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| S3 source bucket with no SSE (no bucket-encryption config) | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 2 |\n| `SecurityConfiguration` missing AND `JobBookmarksEncryption` needed but absent | (no verdict alone — Step 4) | — |\n| Role has admin wildcard (`Action: \"*\"` `Resource: \"*\"`) | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| Role has `glue:*` \u002F `s3:*` \u002F `iam:PassRole` on `*` | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| Role grants `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` on `*` + `iam:PassRole` on `*` | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| JDBC Connection with `ConnectionType: JDBC` and no `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: true` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Job with no `SecurityConfiguration` (logs \u002F spills \u002F bookmarks unencrypted) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Job on Glue version `0.9` or `1.0` (EOL, no security patches) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| `JobBookmarksEncryption.JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: DISABLED` on enabled bookmarks | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| All dimensions clean (catalog SSE-KMS, role least-privilege, SSL enforced, sec config present, Glue 2.0+, source encrypted) | **OK** | Step 5 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. The non-obvious Glue behaviors\nthat drive classification live in Step 0.\n\n## Pre-flight: resource metadata gate (run before classification)\n\nBefore evaluating the configuration, classify the resource and its dependent\nartifacts. Several attributes **short-circuit** the audit — misclassifying\nthem produces false positives that erode trust.\n\nLive-account pre-flight commands moved to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — load on demand before a live audit.\n\n| Attribute | Value | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|---|\n| Resource type | `Crawler` | Crawlers do not have a `GlueVersion`; skip the EOL check (Step 4d). Crawlers have `Targets` (S3Targets, JdbcTargets) instead of `Connections` on the job; map JdbcTargets to the JDBC Connection audit path. |\n| Resource type | `Job` | Full audit including GlueVersion and SecurityConfiguration. |\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` | `DISABLED` | Catalog metadata is plaintext. Proceed to Step 1. |\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` | `SSE-KMS` | Catalog metadata is encrypted. OK for this dimension. |\n| `ConnectionPasswordEncryption.ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted` | `false` | JDBC connection passwords are retrievable in plaintext. Treat as CONFIG_GAP (Step 4) even if `EncryptionAtRest` is SSE-KMS — they are independent. |\n| `SecurityConfiguration` (on job) | absent \u002F null | Logs, S3 spills, and bookmarks are unencrypted. CONFIG_GAP (Step 4b). |\n| Named SecurityConfiguration | deleted \u002F `EntityNotFoundException` | Same as absent — CONFIG_GAP. The job holds a dangling reference. |\n| `GlueVersion` | `0.9`, `1.0` | **EOL.** No security patches. CONFIG_GAP (Step 4d). |\n| `GlueVersion` | `2.0`, `3.0`, `4.0` | Supported. OK for this dimension. |\n| LakeFormation governance | `TRUE` on target database | IAM `glue:*` permissions are NEUTRALIZED for LF-governed tables — the crawler \u002F job needs BOTH IAM and LakeFormation grants. Note in REMEDIATION; do not downgrade the IAM verdict (a removed LF grant re-exposes IAM). |\n\n**If the input config is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing `Role`, missing\n`Targets` on a crawler), output:\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Glue configuration is malformed or missing required fields — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Re-fetch with `aws glue get-job --job-name \u003Cname>` or `aws glue get-crawler --name \u003Cname>` and re-audit.\n```\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\nThe verdict priority order is **NO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE >\nCONFIG_GAP > OK**. NO_ENCRYPTION is the headline because it is a confirmed\ncurrent-state data \u002F metadata exposure; OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE is a potential\nescalation path that requires an actor to exploit; CONFIG_GAP is a\nconfiguration weakness that raises exposure but is not itself a breach.\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious Glue behaviors that change classification\n\nEach of these changes a verdict if ignored:\n\nAll 17 non-obvious-behaviour deep dives moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand before classifying edge findings.\n\n### Step 1: Data Catalog EncryptionAtRest (highest priority — metadata exposure)\n\nIf `DataCatalogEncryptionSettings.EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` is\n`DISABLED` (or the field is absent, which Glue treats as DISABLED), the\ncatalog stores metadata in plaintext: database names, table names, column\nnames, partition values, and schema JSON. This is a metadata leak, not a\ndata leak — but column names frequently reveal PII attributes (`ssn`,\n`email`, `date_of_birth`) and partition values can leak business structure.\n\n- **EncryptionAtRest DISABLED** → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. This is the worst\n  verdict because it is a confirmed current-state exposure of catalog\n  metadata, including any sensitive column names.\n\n- **EncryptionAtRest SSE-KMS (with or without a customer key)** → OK for\n  this dimension. If `SseAwsKmsKeyId` is absent, Glue uses the\n  AWS-managed `aws\u002Fglue` key — still encrypted, but note the key-ownership\n  trade-off in REMEDIATION.\n\n### Step 2: S3 source bucket encryption (data-at-rest on the source)\n\nFor each S3 target \u002F source the crawler or job reads, check the bucket's\nserver-side encryption configuration (`aws s3api get-bucket-encryption`).\n\n- **No bucket-encryption configuration (no SSE)** → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. The\n  processed data is plaintext at rest on S3. This is independent of catalog\n  encryption — a job can read an unencrypted bucket into an encrypted\n  catalog (and vice versa).\n\n- **SSE-S3 (AES256)** → OK for this dimension. SSE-S3 is the AWS default\n  and provides at-rest encryption. Do NOT require SSE-KMS — SSE-S3 is a\n  valid security posture for non-CMK-gated workloads.\n\n- **SSE-KMS** → OK for this dimension. If a customer-managed CMK is used,\n  note that the execution role needs `kms:Decrypt` on the key to read the\n  source — otherwise the job fails at read time.\n\n**Glue SecurityConfiguration does NOT cover the source.** Do NOT let a\npresent SecurityConfiguration on the job mask a Step 2 finding. The\nSecurityConfiguration encrypts Glue's own writes (logs, spills, bookmarks),\nnot the source bucket.\n\n### Step 3: IAM execution role blast radius\n\nClassify the role's identity-based policy attached to the crawler \u002F job\n(`Role` field). The role is the real blast radius — Glue executes under it.\n\n- **Admin wildcard** (`Action: \"*\"` `Resource: \"*\"`) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**.\n  Equivalent to `AdministratorAccess`.\n\n- **Service wildcard on `*`** (`glue:*`, `s3:*`, or any privilege-escalation-\n  service wildcard on `Resource: \"*\"`) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. `s3:*` on\n  `*` grants read \u002F write to every bucket in the account; `glue:*` on `*`\n  grants catalog mutation including `glue:DeleteTable`.\n\n- **`iam:PassRole` on `\"*\"`** → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. Combined with\n  `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` on `*` (Step 0), this is a\n  privilege-escalation vector — the principal can attach any role to a new\n  Glue resource and execute under it.\n\n- **`NotAction` \u002F `NotResource`** (inverse wildcards) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**.\n  These grant everything except the listed values; new Glue \u002F S3 APIs are\n  automatically included.\n\n- **Named actions on specific resources** (e.g., `glue:BatchCreatePartition`\n  on `arn:aws:glue:us-east-1:111:catalog` \u002F `arn:aws:glue:...:database\u002Fprod`,\n  `s3:GetObject` on `arn:aws:s3:::etl-source\u002F*`) → least-privilege. OK for\n  this dimension.\n\nThe role verdict is the worst statement (OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE if any\nstatement is over-permissive). Apply the same logic as the\n`iam-least-privilege-advisor` skill for the role policy.\n\n### Step 4: Configuration gaps (no single gap is NO_ENCRYPTION, but each raises risk)\n\nEach of these is CONFIG_GAP. They do not expose data directly but weaken the\nsecurity posture:\n\n**4a. JDBC Connection SSL not enforced.** If the crawler \u002F job references a\nJDBC Connection (`ConnectionType: JDBC`) and the Connection's\n`ConnectionProperties` does NOT include `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: \"true\"`, the\nGlue-to-DB transport is cleartext. CONFIG_GAP. If `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: \"true\"`\nis set but the DB uses a self-signed cert and no `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT` \u002F\n`JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT_CHAIN` is configured, flag as CONFIG_GAP (CA trust gap).\n\n**4b. SecurityConfiguration missing on job.** If the job has no\n`SecurityConfiguration` field (or the named configuration was deleted),\nCloudWatch logs, S3 spill \u002F temp writes, and job bookmarks are all\nunencrypted. CONFIG_GAP. For crawlers, this is less critical (crawlers\nproduce fewer spill writes) but logs and bookmarks still apply — flag\nequally.\n\n**4c. Job bookmarks unencrypted.** If the job has bookmarks enabled\n(`JobBookmarksEncryption` present in the SecurityConfiguration but\n`JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: DISABLED`), the bookmark state (source offsets,\nprocessed partitions) is stored in plaintext. CONFIG_GAP. Bookmarks are\nregional state — same job name in different regions has independent\nbookmark state.\n\n**4d. EOL Glue version.** If the job's `GlueVersion` is `0.9` or `1.0`,\nthe runtime is end-of-life with no security patches. CONFIG_GAP. Crawlers\ndo not have a `GlueVersion` — skip this check for crawler resources.\n\n**4e. Connection password encryption disabled.** If\n`ConnectionPasswordEncryption.ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted: false`,\nJDBC connection passwords are retrievable in plaintext via\n`glue:GetConnection`. CONFIG_GAP. This is independent of EncryptionAtRest\n(Step 1).\n\n### Step 5: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where\nNO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > CONFIG_GAP > OK:\n\n```text\nverdict = max(catalog_encryption, s3_source_encryption, role_blast_radius, config_gap_findings)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions OK), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per resource)\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: \u003Ccrawler-or-job-name>\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step 4x)>\n  - [OK] \u003Cdimension that passed>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Worked example — catalog DISABLED + role wildcard\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: no-encryption-catalog-disabled\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION\nREASON: DataCatalogEncryptionSettings.EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode is\nDISABLED (Step 1) — catalog metadata including column names is stored in\nplaintext. The execution role also grants s3:* on * (Step 3).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode is DISABLED — catalog metadata is plaintext (Step 1)\n  - [OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE] Execution role grants s3:* on Resource \"*\" (Step 3)\n  - [OK] S3 source bucket has SSE-S3 enabled (Step 2)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Enable catalog encryption:\n     aws glue put-data-catalog-encryption-settings \\\n       --data-catalog-encryption-settings EncryptionAtRest={EncryptionMode=SSE-KMS},ConnectionPasswordEncryption={ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted=true}\n     NOTE: this is a breaking change — verify all catalog readers have kms:Decrypt on the catalog key first.\n  2. Scope the role's s3:* to the specific source bucket ARN(s).\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case catalog (malformed config, crawler vs job, multi-source, cross-account, LF-governed) moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER treat `SecurityConfiguration` as source-data encryption. It encrypts\n  CloudWatch logs, S3 spills \u002F temps, and bookmarks — NOT the S3 source the\n  job reads. A job with a perfect SecurityConfiguration can still read an\n  unencrypted source. Audit the source bucket separately (Step 2).\n\n- NEVER treat `EncryptionAtRest` and `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` as one\n  setting. They are independent API fields with independent KMS keys.\n  Enabling one and leaving the other disabled is a partial-config gap\n  (CONFIG_GAP, Step 4e), not OK.\n\n- NEVER flag `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` with no `AwsKmsKeyId` as a\n  vulnerability. Glue falls back to the AWS-managed `aws\u002Fglue` key — the\n  password is still encrypted-at-rest. Note the key-ownership trade-off but\n  do NOT downgrade the verdict for this alone.\n\n- NEVER treat SSE-S3 as insufficient. SSE-S3 (AES256) is a valid at-rest\n  encryption posture. Requiring SSE-KMS for every bucket is a false\n  positive. Only flag the ABSENCE of SSE (no bucket-encryption config) as\n  NO_ENCRYPTION.\n\n- NEVER overlook `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` as pass-role\n  vectors. Combined with `iam:PassRole` on `\"*\"`, these let a principal\n  execute under any role in the account — a direct privilege-escalation\n  path, structurally identical to the `iam:PassRole` + EC2 \u002F Lambda pattern.\n\n- NEVER assume the named `SecurityConfiguration` exists. A job may\n  reference a deleted configuration; Glue silently treats a missing\n  reference as no encryption on logs \u002F spills \u002F bookmarks. Always\n  `aws glue get-security-configuration --name \u003Cname>` and treat\n  `EntityNotFoundException` as CONFIG_GAP.\n\n- NEVER flag a crawler for a missing `GlueVersion`. Crawlers do not have a\n  `GlueVersion` field — only jobs do. Flagging EOL version on a crawler is\n  a false positive (Step 4d applies to jobs only).\n\n- NEVER enable catalog encryption without verifying catalog readers have\n  `kms:Decrypt` on the catalog key. Enabling `EncryptionAtRest: SSE-KMS` on\n  a previously-DISABLED catalog is a breaking change — cross-account\n  readers, Athena workgroups, and downstream ETL without the KMS grant\n  silently break. Surface this in REMEDIATION as a migration step.\n\n- NEVER treat `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: true` as sufficient alone for self-signed\n  certificates. The Glue runtime must trust the DB's CA. For RDS the\n  bundled CA suffices; for private-CA databases, `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT` \u002F\n  `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT_CHAIN` must be set. A connection with SSL enforced but\n  an untrusted CA fails at runtime.\n\n- NEVER evaluate `S3Encryptions` as a multi-layer array. Glue uses only the\n  FIRST element. Multiple entries do not layer encryption — auditing\n  `S3Encryptions[1+]` produces false confidence.\n\n- NEVER downgrade the IAM role verdict when LakeFormation is enabled. LF\n  neutralizes IAM for governed tables, but a removed LF grant re-exposes the\n  IAM over-permission. The IAM policy is the classification truth; LF is a\n  defense-in-depth layer, not a replacement.\n\n- NEVER assume the Data Catalog encryption setting is global. It is\n  regional. A multi-region pipeline must enable encryption in EACH region\n  with `--region \u003Cr>`. A us-east-1 SSE-KMS setting does not propagate.\n\n- NEVER treat `ConnectionPasswordEncryption: false` as a benign config gap.\n  `glue:GetConnection` returns the JDBC password in plaintext in the API\n  response when `ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted: false`. Any principal\n  with `glue:GetConnection` on the connection ARN is one CLI call away from\n  the live database password. Flag the role's `glue:GetConnection` grant as\n  part of the blast-radius evaluation — the password is retrievable, not\n  just stored.\n\n- NEVER audit the catalog encryption setting without auditing the KMS key\n  policy behind it. Unlike S3 (where a bucket policy can enforce a CMK),\n  the Glue Data Catalog has NO resource-based policy — the catalog key's KMS\n  policy is the ONLY access-control layer for cross-account readers. A\n  cross-account reader returning `AccessDenied` after SSE-KMS enablement\n  almost always has a key-policy gap, not an IAM gap.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting a Glue job or crawler as remediation without\n  first confirming no downstream consumers (Athena views, QuickSight\n  datasets, downstream ETL) depend on it. Catalog table drops cascade.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\n- **MANDATORY CONFIRMATION GATE.** Before any state-changing operation\n  (`UpdateJob`, `UpdateCrawler`, `PutDataCatalogEncryptionSettings`,\n  `CreateSecurityConfiguration`, `DeleteCrawler`), the auditor MUST emit:\n  `CONFIRM: About to \u003Caction> on \u003Cresource> in account \u003Caccount>. This\n  affects \u003Cconsequence>. Proceed? (yes\u002Fno)` Do NOT execute the CLI command\n  until the operator confirms.\n- **Verify remediation permissions.** Before emitting `UpdateJob` \u002F\n  `UpdateCrawler` remediation, confirm the caller's role has\n  `glue:UpdateJob` \u002F `glue:UpdateCrawler`. Most read-only auditor roles\n  CANNOT — the command will fail with `AccessDeniedException`.\n- **Catalog encryption migration is a breaking change.** Before enabling\n  `EncryptionAtRest: SSE-KMS` on a DISABLED catalog, enumerate every\n  principal that reads the catalog (Athena workgroups, cross-account\n  readers, downstream ETL) and verify each has `kms:Decrypt` on the\n  catalog key. Enabling encryption without this coordination produces a\n  silent multi-workload outage.\n- **Capture current config for rollback.**\n  `aws glue get-job --job-name \u003Cname> > \u002Ftmp\u002F\u003Cname>-backup-$(date +%s).json`\n  BEFORE any modification. Glue job \u002F crawler configs are not versioned —\n  there is no undo without a backup.\n- **Bookmark encryption role check.** Before setting\n  `JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: CSE-KMS`, verify the execution role has\n  `kms:Decrypt` \u002F `kms:GenerateDataKey` on the bookmark KMS key. A bookmark\n  key the role cannot decrypt is an operational break (job fails at bookmark\n  read).\n- **Prefer additive changes.** Adding a SecurityConfiguration to a job is\n  reversible; dropping a wildcard statement may break the workload.\n  Sequence: (1) back up, (2) add the SecurityConfiguration, (3) verify the\n  job runs, (4) only then tighten the role policy.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation CLI (NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK) moved to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — load on demand when emitting REMEDIATION.\n\n## Deep reference: Glue encryption layers\n\nEncryption-layer deep reference (five surfaces, authorization layering, bookmark state semantics) moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent feature notes moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step 0 expert-knowledge deep dives, edge-case catalog, Glue encryption-layer deep reference, recent AWS features.\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — remediation CLI per verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK) with breaking-change and rollback notes.\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — live-account pre-flight checks (permissions, SecurityConfiguration existence, connection password encryption).\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F Glue Analytics Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS Glue Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fwhat-is-glue.html\n- **Glue Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **Glue API Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Faws-glue-api.html\n- **Glue CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fglue\u002F\n- **Glue Data Quality** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fdata-quality.html\n","# Glue Crawler & Job Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and three Glue concepts are routinely misjudged —\n**`EncryptionAtRest` leaks catalog *metadata*, not processed data**,\n**`SecurityConfiguration` does NOT encrypt the source** (it covers logs,\nspills, and bookmarks), and **`glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` are\nsilent pass-role vectors** just like `iam:PassRole`.\n\nA Glue ETL pipeline has five independent security surfaces that operators\nfrequently conflate:\n\n1. **Data Catalog encryption** (`EncryptionAtRest`, `ConnectionPasswordEncryption`)\n   — two SEPARATE KMS-gated toggles. `EncryptionAtRest` encrypts catalog\n   metadata (database \u002F table \u002F column names, partition values, schema JSON).\n   `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` encrypts the JDBC password stored on the\n   Connection object. Enabling one does NOT enable the other.\n2. **SecurityConfiguration on the resource** — a named Glue resource that\n   encrypts CloudWatch logs, S3 spill \u002F temp writes, and job bookmarks. It\n   does NOT encrypt the source data the job reads — that is the *source\n   bucket's* own SSE setting.\n3. **JDBC Connection transport** — `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL` on the Connection's\n   `ConnectionProperties`. Without it, Glue-to-DB traffic is cleartext.\n4. **IAM execution role** — the role attached to the crawler \u002F job. Its\n   identity-based policy is the real blast radius; `glue:*` and `s3:*` on `*`\n   are common and dangerous.\n5. **Source S3 bucket encryption** — SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS on the bucket the\n   crawler \u002F job reads. This is the bucket's setting, not Glue's. Glue\n   inherits; it does not control it.\n\n## Quick reference — severity thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Rule |\n|---|---|---|\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode: DISABLED` (catalog metadata in plaintext) | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| S3 source bucket with no SSE (no bucket-encryption config) | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 2 |\n| `SecurityConfiguration` missing AND `JobBookmarksEncryption` needed but absent | (no verdict alone — Step 4) | — |\n| Role has admin wildcard (`Action: \"*\"` `Resource: \"*\"`) | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| Role has `glue:*` \u002F `s3:*` \u002F `iam:PassRole` on `*` | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| Role grants `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` on `*` + `iam:PassRole` on `*` | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 3 |\n| JDBC Connection with `ConnectionType: JDBC` and no `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: true` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Job with no `SecurityConfiguration` (logs \u002F spills \u002F bookmarks unencrypted) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Job on Glue version `0.9` or `1.0` (EOL, no security patches) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| `JobBookmarksEncryption.JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: DISABLED` on enabled bookmarks | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| All dimensions clean (catalog SSE-KMS, role least-privilege, SSL enforced, sec config present, Glue 2.0+, source encrypted) | **OK** | Step 5 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. The non-obvious Glue behaviors\nthat drive classification live in Step 0.\n\n## Pre-flight: resource metadata gate (run before classification)\n\nBefore evaluating the configuration, classify the resource and its dependent\nartifacts. Several attributes **short-circuit** the audit — misclassifying\nthem produces false positives that erode trust.\n\nLive-account pre-flight commands moved to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — load on demand before a live audit.\n\n| Attribute | Value | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|---|\n| Resource type | `Crawler` | Crawlers do not have a `GlueVersion`; skip the EOL check (Step 4d). Crawlers have `Targets` (S3Targets, JdbcTargets) instead of `Connections` on the job; map JdbcTargets to the JDBC Connection audit path. |\n| Resource type | `Job` | Full audit including GlueVersion and SecurityConfiguration. |\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` | `DISABLED` | Catalog metadata is plaintext. Proceed to Step 1. |\n| `EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` | `SSE-KMS` | Catalog metadata is encrypted. OK for this dimension. |\n| `ConnectionPasswordEncryption.ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted` | `false` | JDBC connection passwords are retrievable in plaintext. Treat as CONFIG_GAP (Step 4) even if `EncryptionAtRest` is SSE-KMS — they are independent. |\n| `SecurityConfiguration` (on job) | absent \u002F null | Logs, S3 spills, and bookmarks are unencrypted. CONFIG_GAP (Step 4b). |\n| Named SecurityConfiguration | deleted \u002F `EntityNotFoundException` | Same as absent — CONFIG_GAP. The job holds a dangling reference. |\n| `GlueVersion` | `0.9`, `1.0` | **EOL.** No security patches. CONFIG_GAP (Step 4d). |\n| `GlueVersion` | `2.0`, `3.0`, `4.0` | Supported. OK for this dimension. |\n| LakeFormation governance | `TRUE` on target database | IAM `glue:*` permissions are NEUTRALIZED for LF-governed tables — the crawler \u002F job needs BOTH IAM and LakeFormation grants. Note in REMEDIATION; do not downgrade the IAM verdict (a removed LF grant re-exposes IAM). |\n\n**If the input config is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing `Role`, missing\n`Targets` on a crawler), output:\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Glue configuration is malformed or missing required fields — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Re-fetch with `aws glue get-job --job-name \u003Cname>` or `aws glue get-crawler --name \u003Cname>` and re-audit.\n```\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\nThe verdict priority order is **NO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE >\nCONFIG_GAP > OK**. NO_ENCRYPTION is the headline because it is a confirmed\ncurrent-state data \u002F metadata exposure; OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE is a potential\nescalation path that requires an actor to exploit; CONFIG_GAP is a\nconfiguration weakness that raises exposure but is not itself a breach.\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious Glue behaviors that change classification\n\nEach of these changes a verdict if ignored:\n\nAll 17 non-obvious-behaviour deep dives moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand before classifying edge findings.\n\n### Step 1: Data Catalog EncryptionAtRest (highest priority — metadata exposure)\n\nIf `DataCatalogEncryptionSettings.EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode` is\n`DISABLED` (or the field is absent, which Glue treats as DISABLED), the\ncatalog stores metadata in plaintext: database names, table names, column\nnames, partition values, and schema JSON. This is a metadata leak, not a\ndata leak — but column names frequently reveal PII attributes (`ssn`,\n`email`, `date_of_birth`) and partition values can leak business structure.\n\n- **EncryptionAtRest DISABLED** → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. This is the worst\n  verdict because it is a confirmed current-state exposure of catalog\n  metadata, including any sensitive column names.\n\n- **EncryptionAtRest SSE-KMS (with or without a customer key)** → OK for\n  this dimension. If `SseAwsKmsKeyId` is absent, Glue uses the\n  AWS-managed `aws\u002Fglue` key — still encrypted, but note the key-ownership\n  trade-off in REMEDIATION.\n\n### Step 2: S3 source bucket encryption (data-at-rest on the source)\n\nFor each S3 target \u002F source the crawler or job reads, check the bucket's\nserver-side encryption configuration (`aws s3api get-bucket-encryption`).\n\n- **No bucket-encryption configuration (no SSE)** → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. The\n  processed data is plaintext at rest on S3. This is independent of catalog\n  encryption — a job can read an unencrypted bucket into an encrypted\n  catalog (and vice versa).\n\n- **SSE-S3 (AES256)** → OK for this dimension. SSE-S3 is the AWS default\n  and provides at-rest encryption. Do NOT require SSE-KMS — SSE-S3 is a\n  valid security posture for non-CMK-gated workloads.\n\n- **SSE-KMS** → OK for this dimension. If a customer-managed CMK is used,\n  note that the execution role needs `kms:Decrypt` on the key to read the\n  source — otherwise the job fails at read time.\n\n**Glue SecurityConfiguration does NOT cover the source.** Do NOT let a\npresent SecurityConfiguration on the job mask a Step 2 finding. The\nSecurityConfiguration encrypts Glue's own writes (logs, spills, bookmarks),\nnot the source bucket.\n\n### Step 3: IAM execution role blast radius\n\nClassify the role's identity-based policy attached to the crawler \u002F job\n(`Role` field). The role is the real blast radius — Glue executes under it.\n\n- **Admin wildcard** (`Action: \"*\"` `Resource: \"*\"`) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**.\n  Equivalent to `AdministratorAccess`.\n\n- **Service wildcard on `*`** (`glue:*`, `s3:*`, or any privilege-escalation-\n  service wildcard on `Resource: \"*\"`) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. `s3:*` on\n  `*` grants read \u002F write to every bucket in the account; `glue:*` on `*`\n  grants catalog mutation including `glue:DeleteTable`.\n\n- **`iam:PassRole` on `\"*\"`** → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. Combined with\n  `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` on `*` (Step 0), this is a\n  privilege-escalation vector — the principal can attach any role to a new\n  Glue resource and execute under it.\n\n- **`NotAction` \u002F `NotResource`** (inverse wildcards) → **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**.\n  These grant everything except the listed values; new Glue \u002F S3 APIs are\n  automatically included.\n\n- **Named actions on specific resources** (e.g., `glue:BatchCreatePartition`\n  on `arn:aws:glue:us-east-1:111:catalog` \u002F `arn:aws:glue:...:database\u002Fprod`,\n  `s3:GetObject` on `arn:aws:s3:::etl-source\u002F*`) → least-privilege. OK for\n  this dimension.\n\nThe role verdict is the worst statement (OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE if any\nstatement is over-permissive). Apply the same logic as the\n`iam-least-privilege-advisor` skill for the role policy.\n\n### Step 4: Configuration gaps (no single gap is NO_ENCRYPTION, but each raises risk)\n\nEach of these is CONFIG_GAP. They do not expose data directly but weaken the\nsecurity posture:\n\n**4a. JDBC Connection SSL not enforced.** If the crawler \u002F job references a\nJDBC Connection (`ConnectionType: JDBC`) and the Connection's\n`ConnectionProperties` does NOT include `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: \"true\"`, the\nGlue-to-DB transport is cleartext. CONFIG_GAP. If `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: \"true\"`\nis set but the DB uses a self-signed cert and no `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT` \u002F\n`JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT_CHAIN` is configured, flag as CONFIG_GAP (CA trust gap).\n\n**4b. SecurityConfiguration missing on job.** If the job has no\n`SecurityConfiguration` field (or the named configuration was deleted),\nCloudWatch logs, S3 spill \u002F temp writes, and job bookmarks are all\nunencrypted. CONFIG_GAP. For crawlers, this is less critical (crawlers\nproduce fewer spill writes) but logs and bookmarks still apply — flag\nequally.\n\n**4c. Job bookmarks unencrypted.** If the job has bookmarks enabled\n(`JobBookmarksEncryption` present in the SecurityConfiguration but\n`JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: DISABLED`), the bookmark state (source offsets,\nprocessed partitions) is stored in plaintext. CONFIG_GAP. Bookmarks are\nregional state — same job name in different regions has independent\nbookmark state.\n\n**4d. EOL Glue version.** If the job's `GlueVersion` is `0.9` or `1.0`,\nthe runtime is end-of-life with no security patches. CONFIG_GAP. Crawlers\ndo not have a `GlueVersion` — skip this check for crawler resources.\n\n**4e. Connection password encryption disabled.** If\n`ConnectionPasswordEncryption.ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted: false`,\nJDBC connection passwords are retrievable in plaintext via\n`glue:GetConnection`. CONFIG_GAP. This is independent of EncryptionAtRest\n(Step 1).\n\n### Step 5: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where\nNO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > CONFIG_GAP > OK:\n\n```text\nverdict = max(catalog_encryption, s3_source_encryption, role_blast_radius, config_gap_findings)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions OK), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per resource)\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: \u003Ccrawler-or-job-name>\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step 4x)>\n  - [OK] \u003Cdimension that passed>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Worked example — catalog DISABLED + role wildcard\n\n```text\nRESOURCE: no-encryption-catalog-disabled\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION\nREASON: DataCatalogEncryptionSettings.EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode is\nDISABLED (Step 1) — catalog metadata including column names is stored in\nplaintext. The execution role also grants s3:* on * (Step 3).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] EncryptionAtRest.EncryptionMode is DISABLED — catalog metadata is plaintext (Step 1)\n  - [OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE] Execution role grants s3:* on Resource \"*\" (Step 3)\n  - [OK] S3 source bucket has SSE-S3 enabled (Step 2)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Enable catalog encryption:\n     aws glue put-data-catalog-encryption-settings \\\n       --data-catalog-encryption-settings EncryptionAtRest={EncryptionMode=SSE-KMS},ConnectionPasswordEncryption={ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted=true}\n     NOTE: this is a breaking change — verify all catalog readers have kms:Decrypt on the catalog key first.\n  2. Scope the role's s3:* to the specific source bucket ARN(s).\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case catalog (malformed config, crawler vs job, multi-source, cross-account, LF-governed) moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER treat `SecurityConfiguration` as source-data encryption. It encrypts\n  CloudWatch logs, S3 spills \u002F temps, and bookmarks — NOT the S3 source the\n  job reads. A job with a perfect SecurityConfiguration can still read an\n  unencrypted source. Audit the source bucket separately (Step 2).\n\n- NEVER treat `EncryptionAtRest` and `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` as one\n  setting. They are independent API fields with independent KMS keys.\n  Enabling one and leaving the other disabled is a partial-config gap\n  (CONFIG_GAP, Step 4e), not OK.\n\n- NEVER flag `ConnectionPasswordEncryption` with no `AwsKmsKeyId` as a\n  vulnerability. Glue falls back to the AWS-managed `aws\u002Fglue` key — the\n  password is still encrypted-at-rest. Note the key-ownership trade-off but\n  do NOT downgrade the verdict for this alone.\n\n- NEVER treat SSE-S3 as insufficient. SSE-S3 (AES256) is a valid at-rest\n  encryption posture. Requiring SSE-KMS for every bucket is a false\n  positive. Only flag the ABSENCE of SSE (no bucket-encryption config) as\n  NO_ENCRYPTION.\n\n- NEVER overlook `glue:CreateJob` \u002F `glue:CreateCrawler` as pass-role\n  vectors. Combined with `iam:PassRole` on `\"*\"`, these let a principal\n  execute under any role in the account — a direct privilege-escalation\n  path, structurally identical to the `iam:PassRole` + EC2 \u002F Lambda pattern.\n\n- NEVER assume the named `SecurityConfiguration` exists. A job may\n  reference a deleted configuration; Glue silently treats a missing\n  reference as no encryption on logs \u002F spills \u002F bookmarks. Always\n  `aws glue get-security-configuration --name \u003Cname>` and treat\n  `EntityNotFoundException` as CONFIG_GAP.\n\n- NEVER flag a crawler for a missing `GlueVersion`. Crawlers do not have a\n  `GlueVersion` field — only jobs do. Flagging EOL version on a crawler is\n  a false positive (Step 4d applies to jobs only).\n\n- NEVER enable catalog encryption without verifying catalog readers have\n  `kms:Decrypt` on the catalog key. Enabling `EncryptionAtRest: SSE-KMS` on\n  a previously-DISABLED catalog is a breaking change — cross-account\n  readers, Athena workgroups, and downstream ETL without the KMS grant\n  silently break. Surface this in REMEDIATION as a migration step.\n\n- NEVER treat `JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL: true` as sufficient alone for self-signed\n  certificates. The Glue runtime must trust the DB's CA. For RDS the\n  bundled CA suffices; for private-CA databases, `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT` \u002F\n  `JDBC_CUSTOM_CERT_CHAIN` must be set. A connection with SSL enforced but\n  an untrusted CA fails at runtime.\n\n- NEVER evaluate `S3Encryptions` as a multi-layer array. Glue uses only the\n  FIRST element. Multiple entries do not layer encryption — auditing\n  `S3Encryptions[1+]` produces false confidence.\n\n- NEVER downgrade the IAM role verdict when LakeFormation is enabled. LF\n  neutralizes IAM for governed tables, but a removed LF grant re-exposes the\n  IAM over-permission. The IAM policy is the classification truth; LF is a\n  defense-in-depth layer, not a replacement.\n\n- NEVER assume the Data Catalog encryption setting is global. It is\n  regional. A multi-region pipeline must enable encryption in EACH region\n  with `--region \u003Cr>`. A us-east-1 SSE-KMS setting does not propagate.\n\n- NEVER treat `ConnectionPasswordEncryption: false` as a benign config gap.\n  `glue:GetConnection` returns the JDBC password in plaintext in the API\n  response when `ReturnConnectionPasswordEncrypted: false`. Any principal\n  with `glue:GetConnection` on the connection ARN is one CLI call away from\n  the live database password. Flag the role's `glue:GetConnection` grant as\n  part of the blast-radius evaluation — the password is retrievable, not\n  just stored.\n\n- NEVER audit the catalog encryption setting without auditing the KMS key\n  policy behind it. Unlike S3 (where a bucket policy can enforce a CMK),\n  the Glue Data Catalog has NO resource-based policy — the catalog key's KMS\n  policy is the ONLY access-control layer for cross-account readers. A\n  cross-account reader returning `AccessDenied` after SSE-KMS enablement\n  almost always has a key-policy gap, not an IAM gap.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting a Glue job or crawler as remediation without\n  first confirming no downstream consumers (Athena views, QuickSight\n  datasets, downstream ETL) depend on it. Catalog table drops cascade.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\n- **MANDATORY CONFIRMATION GATE.** Before any state-changing operation\n  (`UpdateJob`, `UpdateCrawler`, `PutDataCatalogEncryptionSettings`,\n  `CreateSecurityConfiguration`, `DeleteCrawler`), the auditor MUST emit:\n  `CONFIRM: About to \u003Caction> on \u003Cresource> in account \u003Caccount>. This\n  affects \u003Cconsequence>. Proceed? (yes\u002Fno)` Do NOT execute the CLI command\n  until the operator confirms.\n- **Verify remediation permissions.** Before emitting `UpdateJob` \u002F\n  `UpdateCrawler` remediation, confirm the caller's role has\n  `glue:UpdateJob` \u002F `glue:UpdateCrawler`. Most read-only auditor roles\n  CANNOT — the command will fail with `AccessDeniedException`.\n- **Catalog encryption migration is a breaking change.** Before enabling\n  `EncryptionAtRest: SSE-KMS` on a DISABLED catalog, enumerate every\n  principal that reads the catalog (Athena workgroups, cross-account\n  readers, downstream ETL) and verify each has `kms:Decrypt` on the\n  catalog key. Enabling encryption without this coordination produces a\n  silent multi-workload outage.\n- **Capture current config for rollback.**\n  `aws glue get-job --job-name \u003Cname> > \u002Ftmp\u002F\u003Cname>-backup-$(date +%s).json`\n  BEFORE any modification. Glue job \u002F crawler configs are not versioned —\n  there is no undo without a backup.\n- **Bookmark encryption role check.** Before setting\n  `JobBookmarksEncryptionMode: CSE-KMS`, verify the execution role has\n  `kms:Decrypt` \u002F `kms:GenerateDataKey` on the bookmark KMS key. A bookmark\n  key the role cannot decrypt is an operational break (job fails at bookmark\n  read).\n- **Prefer additive changes.** Adding a SecurityConfiguration to a job is\n  reversible; dropping a wildcard statement may break the workload.\n  Sequence: (1) back up, (2) add the SecurityConfiguration, (3) verify the\n  job runs, (4) only then tighten the role policy.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation CLI (NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK) moved to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — load on demand when emitting REMEDIATION.\n\n## Deep reference: Glue encryption layers\n\nEncryption-layer deep reference (five surfaces, authorization layering, bookmark state semantics) moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent feature notes moved to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — load on demand.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step 0 expert-knowledge deep dives, edge-case catalog, Glue encryption-layer deep reference, recent AWS features.\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — remediation CLI per verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK) with breaking-change and rollback notes.\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — live-account pre-flight checks (permissions, SecurityConfiguration existence, connection password encryption).\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F Glue Analytics Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS Glue Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fwhat-is-glue.html\n- **Glue Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **Glue API Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Faws-glue-api.html\n- **Glue CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fglue\u002F\n- **Glue Data Quality** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fglue\u002Flatest\u002Fdg\u002Fdata-quality.html\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":39},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"complexity":32,"entry_point":33,"when_to_use":34,"requires_llm":35,"verdict_shape":36,"invocation_schema":37,"supports_pipeline":35,"activation_triggers":38},"glue, analytics, security, encryption, iam-role, jdbc, bookmarks, security-configuration, audit","2","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","Analytics","0.1.0","Glue, crawler, Glue job, data catalog encryption, EncryptionAtRest, SecurityConfiguration, JDBC SSL, JDBC_ENFORCE_SSL, job bookmarks, S3 source encryption, execution role, PassRole, glue:CreateJob, glue:CreateCrawler, over-permissive role, Glue 0.9, EOL runtime, CloudWatch encryption, S3Encryptions, LakeFormation, ConnectionPasswordEncryption, ETL audit","high","false","Reviewing a Glue crawler or job before production deployment, checking data-catalog encryption (EncryptionAtRest \u002F ConnectionPasswordEncryption), validating JDBC connection SSL, auditing the execution role for pass-role or wildcard blast radius, inspecting a SecurityConfiguration for log \u002F bookmark \u002F spill encryption, flagging an EOL Glue version, or hardening ETL security posture across an account.","true","NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | CONFIG_GAP | OK","Input: either (a) a Glue crawler or job configuration (JSON \u002F describe output) plus the DataCatalogEncryptionSettings, SecurityConfiguration, Connection, and IAM role policy documents, OR (b) a crawler \u002F job name for live-account audit. Output: deterministic RESOURCE\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002F FINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per crawler or job, where VERDICT is in {NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.","audit this Glue crawler, audit this Glue job, is my Glue catalog encrypted, check JDBC SSL on the Glue connection, Glue execution role too permissive, is the SecurityConfiguration set on the job, are Glue bookmarks encrypted, is the S3 source encrypted, harden Glue ETL, Glue 0.9 end of life","Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline config classification. Live-account audits use aws glue get-data-catalog-encryption-settings, get-security- configuration, get-job, get-crawler, get-connection, and aws s3api get-bucket-encryption (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. Technopreneur + Infornographer.","2026-09-24 08:54:10",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill glue-crawler-job-auditor",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill glue-crawler-job-auditor",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill glue-crawler-job-auditor","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",true,[62,68,72,76,80,84,88,92,96,100,104,108,112,116,120,124,128,132,136,140],{"path":63,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":67},"eval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",15942,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Feval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml",{"path":69,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fconfig-gap-bookmarks-eol.md",523,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fconfig-gap-bookmarks-eol.md",{"path":73,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fconfig-gap-jdbc-no-ssl.md",652,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fconfig-gap-jdbc-no-ssl.md",{"path":77,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-catalog-disabled.md",729,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-catalog-disabled.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-s3-source-unencrypted.md",473,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-s3-source-unencrypted.md",{"path":85,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fok-clean-posture.md",536,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fok-clean-posture.md",{"path":89,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":90,"sourceHtmlUrl":91},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Foverpermissive-role-admin-wildcard.md",565,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Foverpermissive-role-admin-wildcard.md",{"path":93,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"evals\u002Feval_config.yaml",1963,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Feval_config.yaml",{"path":97,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"evals\u002Fevals.json",5061,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fevals.json",{"path":101,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fconfig-gap-bookmarks-eol.md",1580,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fconfig-gap-bookmarks-eol.md",{"path":105,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fconfig-gap-jdbc-no-ssl.md",1609,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fconfig-gap-jdbc-no-ssl.md",{"path":109,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-catalog-disabled.md",1425,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-catalog-disabled.md",{"path":113,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":114,"sourceHtmlUrl":115},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-s3-source-unencrypted.md",1601,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-s3-source-unencrypted.md",{"path":117,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":118,"sourceHtmlUrl":119},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fok-clean-posture.md",2178,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fglue-crawler-job-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fok-clean-posture.md",{"path":121,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":122,"sourceHtmlUrl":123},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Foverpermissive-role-admin-wildcard.md",1444,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub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AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":153,"name":154,"nameZh":6,"description":155,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":156,"categories":157,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":160,"name":161,"nameZh":6,"description":162,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":163,"categories":164,"keywords":165,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":167,"name":168,"nameZh":6,"description":169,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":170,"categories":171,"keywords":172,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":174,"name":175,"nameZh":6,"description":176,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":177,"categories":178,"keywords":179,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor","Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":181,"name":182,"nameZh":6,"description":183,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":184,"categories":185,"keywords":186,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]