[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A649W0KM4R8CR44DJSGVYY":3,"skill-same:01M7A649W0KM4R8CR44DJSGVYY":141},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":39,"commitSha":40,"skillDirectory":41,"forksCount":42,"repositoryHtmlUrl":43,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":44,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":45,"updatedAt":46,"install":47,"resources":60},"01M7A649W0KM4R8CR44DJSGVYY","cognito-idp-user-pool-auditor",null,"Audits Amazon Cognito user pools for security posture — MFA enforcement, password policy strength, app-client auth-flow safety (SRP vs password vs admin), OAuth flow exposure (implicit vs code+PKCE), token validity, PreventUserExistenceErrors, Advanced Security Features mode, account recovery, and deletion protection — then provides specific remediation. Use when reviewing a Cognito user pool configuration, auditing app-client auth flows, checking MFA enforcement, validating OAuth settings, or hardening an identity provider before production. Triggers: Cognito, user pool, identity provider, IdP, MFA, MfaConfiguration, password policy, app client, ExplicitAuthFlows, USER_SRP_AUTH, USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH, ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, OAuth, implicit flow, code flow, PKCE, PreventUserExistenceErrors, AdvancedSecurityMode, token revocation, RefreshTokenValidity, account takeover, user enumeration, hosted UI, Cognito domain, cognito-idp.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: cognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\ndescription: 'Audits Amazon Cognito user pools for security posture — MFA enforcement, password policy strength, app-client auth-flow safety (SRP vs password vs admin), OAuth flow exposure (implicit vs code+PKCE), token validity, PreventUserExistenceErrors, Advanced Security Features mode, account recovery, and deletion protection — then provides specific remediation. Use when reviewing a Cognito user pool configuration, auditing app-client auth flows, checking MFA enforcement, validating OAuth settings, or hardening an identity provider before production. Triggers: Cognito, user pool, identity provider, IdP, MFA, MfaConfiguration, password policy, app client, ExplicitAuthFlows, USER_SRP_AUTH, USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH, ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, OAuth, implicit flow, code flow, PKCE, PreventUserExistenceErrors, AdvancedSecurityMode, token revocation, RefreshTokenValidity, account takeover, user enumeration, hosted UI, Cognito domain, cognito-idp.'\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline configuration classification. Live-account audits use aws cognito-idp describe-user-pool, describe-user-pool-client, and list-user-pools (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '2'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: Security\n  verdict_shape: INSECURE | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\n  when_to_use: Reviewing a Cognito user pool configuration before production, auditing app-client auth flows for credential exposure, checking MFA enforcement, validating OAuth settings (implicit vs code flow), hardening an identity provider against account takeover, or checking PreventUserExistenceErrors for user-enumeration risk.\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  keywords: Cognito, user pool, identity provider, IdP, MFA, MfaConfiguration, password policy, app client, ExplicitAuthFlows, USER_SRP_AUTH, USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH, ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, OAuth, implicit flow, PKCE, PreventUserExistenceErrors, AdvancedSecurityMode, token revocation, RefreshTokenValidity, account takeover, user enumeration, hosted UI, cognito-idp\n  tags: cognito, security, identity, mfa, oauth, auth-flows, user-pool, audit, compliance\n  dependencies: aws-orchestrator\n---\n\n# Cognito User Pool Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\nClassify a Cognito user pool configuration against identity-security best\npractices and provide specific remediation. The goal is not just \"is MFA on?\"\n— it is to evaluate the **complete attack surface** of the identity layer:\nhow users authenticate (SRP vs password vs admin), how tokens are issued\n(code vs implicit), whether user enumeration is possible, whether adaptive\nthreat protection is active, and whether the password policy creates a\nmeaningful barrier.\n\nA pool with `MfaConfiguration: ON` looks secure until you notice the app\nclient exposes `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` (bypasses SRP) or the OAuth\nflow is `implicit` (tokens leaked via URL fragment). The classification must\ncatch both the obvious gaps (MFA OFF) and the subtle misconfigurations that\nundermine an otherwise hardened pool.\n\n## Quick reference\n\nIf MFA is OFF and the password policy is weak, the pool is INSECURE. If OAuth\nimplicit flow is enabled, the pool is INSECURE regardless of other settings.\nIf `PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `LEGACY`, the pool is INSECURE (user\nenumeration). If MFA is OPTIONAL, the pool is WEAK (users can skip MFA). If\nMFA is ON but AdvancedSecurityMode is OFF or AUDIT (not ENFORCED), the pool\nis ADEQUATE at best. See the steps below for the full ordered decision tree.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order)\n\nThe classification evaluates four control layers in the order they gate an\nattacker. The first matching severity wins — a single critical deficiency\nmakes the entire pool INSECURE, regardless of how well other layers are\nconfigured. This mirrors how Cognito evaluates a sign-in request: the auth\nflow is checked first (what credential path is open), then MFA (is a second\nfactor required), then the password policy (how hard is the first factor to\ncrack), then adaptive controls (does ASF block suspicious patterns).\n\n### Step 0: Validate input\n\nIf the pool configuration is missing required fields (`MfaConfiguration` or\n`Policies.PasswordPolicy`), output:\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Configuration is incomplete — MfaConfiguration or PasswordPolicy missing.\nREMEDIATION: Run aws cognito-idp describe-user-pool --user-pool-id \u003Cid> and provide the full output.\n```\n\nDo not attempt classification on incomplete input.\n\n### Step 1: INSECURE — critical deficiencies (any one match → INSECURE)\n\nEvaluate each condition below. If **any one** matches, the pool is INSECURE\nwith **CRITICAL** risk. These are single-point-of-failure controls — one\nmissing control opens a direct path to account compromise or mass credential\nexposure.\n\n**1a. MFA OFF + weak password policy.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` AND the password policy has `MinimumLength` \u003C 8\nOR fewer than 2 of the 4 `Require*` flags set to true. No second factor and a\ntrivially crackable first factor — the account is protected by a password\nthat modern GPUs can brute-force in minutes. Cite \"Rule 1a: no MFA + weak\npassword\".\n\n**1b. OAuth implicit flow enabled.**\n`AllowedOAuthFlows` includes `\"implicit\"`. The implicit grant type returns\nthe access token directly in the URL fragment (`#access_token=...`). This\ntoken is accessible via:\n- Browser history (persists across sessions).\n- The `Referer` header on the callback page (leaked to any third-party\n  script or analytics tag on that page).\n- Browser extensions with `tabs` or `webRequest` permissions.\n\nOAuth 2.1 (the in-progress consolidation of OAuth 2.0) **removes implicit\nflow entirely**. Cite \"Rule 1b: OAuth implicit flow — token leakage\".\n\n**1c. PreventUserExistenceErrors is LEGACY.**\n`PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `\"LEGACY\"` (or `false` in older pools).\nCognito returns different error messages for non-existent users\n(`UserNotFoundException`) vs wrong passwords\n(`NotAuthorizedException`). An attacker scripts the login endpoint to\nenumerate valid usernames or email addresses, then targets those accounts\nwith credential stuffing. When set to `ENABLED` (`true`), Cognito returns\nthe same generic error and runs the full authentication flow even for\nnon-existent users (preventing timing-based enumeration). Cite \"Rule 1c:\nuser enumeration via legacy error responses\".\n\n**1d. Admin auth flow on a public client.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` (or the\nlegacy name `\"ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH\"`) AND `GenerateSecret` is `false`. The\nadmin auth flow sends the username and password directly to the\n`AdminInitiateAuth` API, bypassing SRP entirely. On a public client (no\nsecret), this is exploitable by any caller — no server-side credential is\nrequired. Cite \"Rule 1d: admin auth flow on public client\".\n\n**1e. MFA OFF + AdvancedSecurityMode OFF + no compensating control.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` AND `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` is\n`OFF`. Even if the password policy is strong, the pool has zero adaptive\nprotection — no compromised-credential checking, no impossible-travel\ndetection, no bot detection. This is the \"all eggs in the password basket\"\npattern. Cite \"Rule 1e: no MFA + no ASF — zero adaptive defense\".\n\n**Severity within INSECURE:** all Rule-1 conditions map to **CRITICAL** risk.\nA pool that matches Rule 1b (implicit OAuth) or 1d (admin auth on public\nclient) is the most dangerous — these are directly exploitable from the\nclient side without any brute-force effort.\n\n### Step 2: WEAK — missing important hardening\n\nIf no Step-1 condition matched, evaluate these. If **any one** matches, the\npool is WEAK with **HIGH** risk. These are configurations that do not open an\nimmediate exploit path but leave the pool vulnerable to targeted attacks.\n\n**2a. MfaConfiguration is OPTIONAL.**\nMFA is available but not required. Users can skip enrollment, leaving their\naccounts protected by password alone. In practice, most users skip optional\nMFA — adoption rates are typically below 20% without enforcement. Cite\n\"Rule 2a: MFA optional — users can skip\".\n\n**2b. MFA OFF but strong password policy + ASF.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` but `MinimumLength` >= 12 with all 4\n`Require*` flags true AND `AdvancedSecurityMode` is `ENFORCED`. This is the\nweakest acceptable posture for MFA-off pools — compensating controls (strong\npasswords + adaptive protection) reduce but do not eliminate risk. Cite\n\"Rule 2b: MFA off with compensating controls\".\n\n**2c. Password policy at minimum compliance.**\n`MinimumLength` is exactly 8 (the NIST SP 800-63B minimum) with fewer than\n4 of the complexity flags set, OR `MinimumLength` is >= 8 but\n`TemporaryPasswordValidityDays` > 7 (temp passwords valid too long). Cite\n\"Rule 2c: minimum-compliance password policy\".\n\n**2d. USER_PASSWORD_AUTH enabled without SRP.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` but NOT\n`\"ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH\"`. The password is sent directly to the API in\nplaintext (over TLS, but exposed to the application layer). SRP (Secure\nRemote Password) never transmits the password — it uses a zero-knowledge\nproof. Without SRP, a compromised API endpoint or a TLS-terminating proxy\ncan capture passwords. Cite \"Rule 2d: non-SRP auth flow\".\n\n**2e. Refresh token validity excessive.**\n`RefreshTokenValidity` > 30 days (with `TokenValidityUnits.RefreshToken` =\n`\"days\"`). A stolen refresh token remains valid for over a month, allowing\npersistent access. Cognito does not natively support refresh token rotation\n— shortening validity is the only mitigation. Cite \"Rule 2e: long-lived\nrefresh tokens\".\n\n**2f. AdvancedSecurityMode is OFF (or AUDIT) when MFA is ON.**\nMFA is enforced but there is no adaptive threat detection. Compromised\ncredentials (from breaches) will pass MFA if the attacker has the second\nfactor (via SIM-swap for SMS, or device theft for TOTP). ASF's\ncompromised-credential detection blocks these. `AUDIT` mode logs suspicious\nactivity but does not block it — it is monitoring, not protection. Cite\n\"Rule 2f: ASF not enforced\".\n\n**2g. Admin auth flow present (ANY client).**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` (or legacy\n`\"ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH\"`). This ALWAYS triggers WEAK — regardless of\n`GenerateSecret` or other flows present alongside it. The admin auth flow\nbypasses SRP and sends the password to the `AdminInitiateAuth` API, which\nrequires AWS credentials (expanding the attack surface). The presence of\n`ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` alongside the admin flow does NOT mitigate this.\nCite \"Rule 2g: admin auth flow present\".\n\n**2h. OAuth redirect URLs insecure.**\n`AllowedOAuthFlows` includes `\"code\"` (good) but `CallbackURLs` contains an\n`http:\u002F\u002F` URL (not HTTPS) or a wildcard domain (`https:\u002F\u002F*.example.com`).\nHTTP redirects leak the authorization code in transit. Wildcard redirects\nallow any subdomain to receive the code — if any subdomain is compromised\nor has an open redirect, the code can be intercepted. Cite \"Rule 2h:\ninsecure OAuth redirect\".\n\n**Severity within WEAK:** all Rule-2 conditions map to **HIGH** risk. A pool\nthat matches Rule 2d (non-SRP auth) or 2a (optional MFA) is the most common\nreal-world weakness.\n\n### Step 3: ADEQUATE — reasonable security with minor gaps\n\nIf no Step-2 condition matched on ANY app client, the pool has MFA enforced\nwith a reasonable password policy and no weak auth flows on any client.\nEvaluate whether the remaining controls meet the OK bar. If any gap remains,\nthe pool is ADEQUATE with **MODERATE** risk.\n\n**3a. AdvancedSecurityMode is AUDIT (not ENFORCED).**\nMFA is ON, password policy is strong, but ASF is in AUDIT mode. Suspicious\nactivity is logged but not blocked. AUDIT is appropriate during a phased\nrollout (monitor for false positives before enforcing) but should transition\nto ENFORCED within a defined period. Cite \"Rule 3a: ASF in audit mode\".\n\n**3b. Password policy meets minimum but not maximum.**\n`MinimumLength` is 8-11 with all 4 `Require*` flags true. This meets NIST\nSP 800-63B minimum but does not provide the 12+ character length that\nsignificantly increases crack resistance. Cite \"Rule 3b: adequate password\nlength\".\n\n**3c. Refresh token validity at boundary.**\n`RefreshTokenValidity` is exactly 30 days. This is the Cognito default and\nis acceptable for most consumer apps, but sensitive applications (financial,\nhealthcare) should use 1-7 days. Cite \"Rule 3c: default refresh token\nvalidity\".\n\n**3d. USER_PASSWORD_AUTH alongside SRP.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes both `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` AND\n`ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. SRP is the primary flow (good), but the\npassword flow is also available. This is common — some SDKs (older\nAmazon Cognito Amplify versions before v6, native mobile SDKs using\ndirect authentication) require `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. Flag it as ADEQUATE\nbecause the SRP path exists, but recommend migrating clients to SRP-only\nwhen feasible. Cite \"Rule 3d: password auth alongside SRP\".\n\n**3e. MFA is ON with SMS only (no TOTP).**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `ON` but `EnabledMfas` includes only `\"SMS\"`, not\n`\"SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA\"`. SMS MFA is vulnerable to SIM-swapping attacks.\nTOTP (authenticator apps) is significantly more secure. SMS MFA is still\nbetter than no MFA, but the pool should enable TOTP as well. Cite \"Rule\n3e: SMS-only MFA — SIM-swap risk\".\n\n### Step 4: OK — all controls properly configured\n\nIf no Step-3 condition matched, the pool meets all of the following:\n\n- `MfaConfiguration` is `ON` (enforced for all users).\n- `EnabledMfas` includes `\"SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA\"` (TOTP available; SMS may\n  also be present as fallback).\n- `PasswordPolicy.MinimumLength` >= 12 with all 4 `Require*` flags true.\n- `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` is `ENFORCED`.\n- All app clients use `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` and\u002For\n  `ALLOW_REFRESH_TOKEN_AUTH` only (no `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`, no admin\n  auth flows) — or `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` is present only on a client that\n  has `GenerateSecret: true` AND a documented legacy-SDK justification.\n- `PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `ENABLED`.\n- `EnableTokenRevocation` is `true`.\n- `RefreshTokenValidity` \u003C= 30 days.\n- OAuth (if configured) uses `code` flow only with HTTPS callback URLs and\n  no wildcard domains.\n- `DeletionProtection` is `ACTIVE`.\n\nCite \"Rule 4: all controls met — hardened pool\".\n\n### Step 5: Risk-level mapping\n\n**Risk level per verdict (emit exactly one RISK):**\n\n- `INSECURE` → **CRITICAL** — directly exploitable: account takeover, token\n  leakage, user enumeration, or credential capture.\n- `WEAK` → **HIGH** — not immediately exploitable but vulnerable to targeted\n  attacks: optional MFA, non-SRP flows, long-lived tokens, no adaptive\n  protection.\n- `ADEQUATE` → **MODERATE** — MFA is enforced with reasonable controls, but\n  defense-in-depth gaps remain (ASF not enforced, SMS-only MFA, password\n  policy at minimum).\n- `OK` → **LOW** — all controls properly configured.\n\n### Step 6: Multi-client aggregation\n\nA user pool typically has multiple app clients (e.g., a web client, a mobile\nclient, a backend service client). Each client has its own\n`ExplicitAuthFlows`, `GenerateSecret`, `RefreshTokenValidity`, and OAuth\nsettings. The pool-level verdict is the **worst** verdict across all app\nclients, evaluated on the same INSECURE > WEAK > ADEQUATE > OK scale.\n\nEvaluate each client independently against Steps 1-4, then aggregate:\n\n- If any client is INSECURE, the pool is INSECURE.\n- If any client is WEAK (and none is INSECURE), the pool is WEAK.\n- If any client is ADEQUATE (and none is WEAK\u002FINSECURE), the pool is ADEQUATE.\n- Only if all clients are OK is the pool OK.\n\nPool-level controls (`MfaConfiguration`, `PasswordPolicy`,\n`AdvancedSecurityMode`, `PreventUserExistenceErrors`) are evaluated once and\napply to all clients.\n\n## Auth-flow strength matrix\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## OAuth flow strength matrix\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Multi-client and edge-case handling\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Output format (per user pool)\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: INSECURE | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the specific rule and config>\nRISK: CRITICAL | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Multi-client aggregation example\n\nA pool with two app clients — one hardened, one with admin auth flow:\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: my-app-pool\nVERDICT: WEAK\nREASON: Pool-level controls are strong (MFA ON, password policy 12+ chars,\n        ASF ENFORCED, PreventUserExistenceErrors ENABLED). However, app client\n        'legacy-backend' has ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH with GenerateSecret\n        true (Rule 2g — admin auth flow on confidential client). Pool verdict\n        is the worst client verdict.\nRISK: HIGH\nREMEDIATION: Evaluate whether the 'legacy-backend' client still needs the\n             admin auth flow. If it does, scope it to a dedicated\n             infrastructure client with restrictive IAM policies. If it does\n             not, remove ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH from ExplicitAuthFlows\n             and migrate to ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH.\n```\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify a pool with `MfaConfiguration: OFF` as ADEQUATE or OK.\n  Without MFA, the pool is at best WEAK (Step 2b — only if password policy\n  is strong AND ASF is ENFORCED). MFA is the single most effective control\n  against credential stuffing and account takeover. Classifying an MFA-off\n  pool as ADEQUATE is a false sense of security.\n\n- NEVER classify a pool with `AllowedOAuthFlows: [\"implicit\"]` as anything\n  other than INSECURE. The implicit flow returns tokens in the URL fragment,\n  accessible to any script on the callback page. OAuth 2.1 deprecates it\n  entirely. This is not a \"style preference\" — it is a token-leakage\n  vulnerability.\n\n- NEVER treat `PreventUserExistenceErrors: LEGACY` as a minor issue. User\n  enumeration is the reconnaissance step that precedes credential stuffing.\n  An attacker who knows which email addresses have accounts can target them\n  with breached passwords. This is INSECURE.\n\n- NEVER assume `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` and `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` are\n  different flows. They are the same — `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` was renamed to\n  `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` in the 2019 API update. Older\n  tutorials and Terraform modules still use the legacy name. Treat both\n  identically.\n\n- NEVER recommend SMS MFA as the sole MFA method without noting SIM-swap\n  risk. SMS interception via SIM-swapping is a well-documented attack\n  vector. TOTP (authenticator apps) is significantly more secure. If\n  `EnabledMfas` includes only `\"SMS\"`, flag as ADEQUATE (Rule 3e) — SMS MFA\n  is better than no MFA, but TOTP should also be enabled.\n\n- NEVER conflate `AdvancedSecurityMode: AUDIT` with `ENFORCED`. AUDIT mode\n  logs suspicious activity (compromised credentials, impossible travel,\n  bot detection) but does **not** block it. ENFORCED blocks the request.\n  AUDIT is appropriate for a transition period, not as an end state.\n\n- NEVER assume a strong password policy compensates for MFA being OFF.\n  Password policies are a speed bump — they increase the cost of brute-force\n  attacks. MFA is a wall — it blocks the attack entirely even when the\n  password is known (which it often is, from breach datasets). ASF's\n  compromised-credential detection is the only control that catches\n  breached passwords at sign-in, and it requires `ENFORCED` mode.\n\n- NEVER classify `ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` as equivalent to\n  `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH`. SRP never transmits the password — it uses a\n  zero-knowledge proof. `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` sends the password to the\n  API. While TLS protects the transport, the password is exposed to the\n  application layer (API Gateway, WAF rules, access logs). If SRP is\n  available for the client SDK, `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` should be removed.\n\n- NEVER ignore `RefreshTokenValidity`. A refresh token with 365-day\n  validity means a stolen token grants access for a year. Cognito does not\n  support refresh token rotation (the OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 best practice) —\n  shortening validity is the only mitigation. Check `TokenValidityUnits` to\n  confirm the unit is `days`, not `hours`.\n\n- NEVER treat `RefreshTokenValidity` > 30 days with `EnableTokenRevocation:\n  false` as merely a minor gap. This combination is the worst-case token-\n  theft scenario: the token is long-lived AND cannot be revoked. A stolen\n  refresh token grants persistent access until natural expiry with no\n  remediation path short of disabling the app client (which invalidates\n  ALL users' tokens). Always recommend enabling token revocation before\n  shortening refresh token validity.\n\n- NEVER recommend `client_credentials` OAuth flow for user-authentication\n  clients. `client_credentials` is machine-to-machine (service-to-service)\n  authentication with no user context. If a user-facing app client has only\n  `client_credentials`, the configuration is broken.\n\n- NEVER modify MFA configuration (`OFF` to `ON`) without warning about user\n  lockout. Changing `MfaConfiguration` to `ON` immediately requires all\n  users to have an MFA factor enrolled. Users without an enrolled factor\n  will be unable to sign in. Always recommend a phased rollout:\n  `OPTIONAL` first (with communication), then `ON` after adoption metrics\n  confirm enrollment.\n\n- NEVER assume `DeletionProtection: ACTIVE` protects against attackers.\n  Deletion protection prevents accidental pool deletion (operational safety),\n  not malicious deletion — an attacker with sufficient IAM permissions can\n  disable it first. It is defense-in-depth for operations, not a security\n  control against compromise.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting or recreating a user pool as a remediation step.\n  Pool deletion is irreversible and destroys all user accounts, attributes,\n  MFA enrollments, and group memberships. Always use `update-user-pool` and\n  `update-user-pool-client` for remediation. If the pool must be rebuilt\n  (e.g., region migration), export users first via `list-users` and plan a\n  parallel-run migration — never delete and recreate as a quick fix.\n\n- NEVER recommend removing `ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` without confirming the\n  client SDK supports SRP. Older Amazon Cognito Amplify SDKs (before v6),\n  some native iOS\u002FAndroid integrations, and custom API callers may depend on\n  `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. Removing it will break those clients. Test the\n  migration in a staging environment first.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## References\n\nSee the AWS Cognito Identity Provider documentation for:\n- `describe-user-pool` \u002F `update-user-pool` CLI reference.\n- `describe-user-pool-client` \u002F `update-user-pool-client` CLI reference.\n- User pool auth flows (SRP, password, admin, custom).\n- OAuth scopes and flows in the Hosted UI.\n- Advanced Security Features (ASF) modes and capabilities.\n- NIST SP 800-63B (password guidance) and OAuth 2.1 (implicit flow\n  deprecation).\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - auth-flow \u002F OAuth strength matrices, multi-client edge cases, recent AWS features\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - pre-flight safety checks before remediation CLIs\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) - remediation guidance per risk tier\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F Cognito Identity Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **Service documentation** — [Amazon Cognito Developer Guide](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fwhat-is-amazon-cognito.html)\n- **Security** — [Security in Amazon Cognito](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fsecurity.html)\n- **API reference** — [Amazon Cognito Identity Provider API Reference](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito-user-identity-pools\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F)\n- **CLI reference** — [AWS CLI Command Reference: cognito-idp](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcognito-idp\u002F)\n- **Blog: Passwordless auth with WebAuthn** — https:\u002F\u002Faws.amazon.com\u002Fblogs\u002Fsecurity\u002Fintroducing-passwordless-authentication-with-webauthn-for-amazon-cognito\u002F\n","# Cognito User Pool Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\nClassify a Cognito user pool configuration against identity-security best\npractices and provide specific remediation. The goal is not just \"is MFA on?\"\n— it is to evaluate the **complete attack surface** of the identity layer:\nhow users authenticate (SRP vs password vs admin), how tokens are issued\n(code vs implicit), whether user enumeration is possible, whether adaptive\nthreat protection is active, and whether the password policy creates a\nmeaningful barrier.\n\nA pool with `MfaConfiguration: ON` looks secure until you notice the app\nclient exposes `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` (bypasses SRP) or the OAuth\nflow is `implicit` (tokens leaked via URL fragment). The classification must\ncatch both the obvious gaps (MFA OFF) and the subtle misconfigurations that\nundermine an otherwise hardened pool.\n\n## Quick reference\n\nIf MFA is OFF and the password policy is weak, the pool is INSECURE. If OAuth\nimplicit flow is enabled, the pool is INSECURE regardless of other settings.\nIf `PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `LEGACY`, the pool is INSECURE (user\nenumeration). If MFA is OPTIONAL, the pool is WEAK (users can skip MFA). If\nMFA is ON but AdvancedSecurityMode is OFF or AUDIT (not ENFORCED), the pool\nis ADEQUATE at best. See the steps below for the full ordered decision tree.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order)\n\nThe classification evaluates four control layers in the order they gate an\nattacker. The first matching severity wins — a single critical deficiency\nmakes the entire pool INSECURE, regardless of how well other layers are\nconfigured. This mirrors how Cognito evaluates a sign-in request: the auth\nflow is checked first (what credential path is open), then MFA (is a second\nfactor required), then the password policy (how hard is the first factor to\ncrack), then adaptive controls (does ASF block suspicious patterns).\n\n### Step 0: Validate input\n\nIf the pool configuration is missing required fields (`MfaConfiguration` or\n`Policies.PasswordPolicy`), output:\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Configuration is incomplete — MfaConfiguration or PasswordPolicy missing.\nREMEDIATION: Run aws cognito-idp describe-user-pool --user-pool-id \u003Cid> and provide the full output.\n```\n\nDo not attempt classification on incomplete input.\n\n### Step 1: INSECURE — critical deficiencies (any one match → INSECURE)\n\nEvaluate each condition below. If **any one** matches, the pool is INSECURE\nwith **CRITICAL** risk. These are single-point-of-failure controls — one\nmissing control opens a direct path to account compromise or mass credential\nexposure.\n\n**1a. MFA OFF + weak password policy.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` AND the password policy has `MinimumLength` \u003C 8\nOR fewer than 2 of the 4 `Require*` flags set to true. No second factor and a\ntrivially crackable first factor — the account is protected by a password\nthat modern GPUs can brute-force in minutes. Cite \"Rule 1a: no MFA + weak\npassword\".\n\n**1b. OAuth implicit flow enabled.**\n`AllowedOAuthFlows` includes `\"implicit\"`. The implicit grant type returns\nthe access token directly in the URL fragment (`#access_token=...`). This\ntoken is accessible via:\n- Browser history (persists across sessions).\n- The `Referer` header on the callback page (leaked to any third-party\n  script or analytics tag on that page).\n- Browser extensions with `tabs` or `webRequest` permissions.\n\nOAuth 2.1 (the in-progress consolidation of OAuth 2.0) **removes implicit\nflow entirely**. Cite \"Rule 1b: OAuth implicit flow — token leakage\".\n\n**1c. PreventUserExistenceErrors is LEGACY.**\n`PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `\"LEGACY\"` (or `false` in older pools).\nCognito returns different error messages for non-existent users\n(`UserNotFoundException`) vs wrong passwords\n(`NotAuthorizedException`). An attacker scripts the login endpoint to\nenumerate valid usernames or email addresses, then targets those accounts\nwith credential stuffing. When set to `ENABLED` (`true`), Cognito returns\nthe same generic error and runs the full authentication flow even for\nnon-existent users (preventing timing-based enumeration). Cite \"Rule 1c:\nuser enumeration via legacy error responses\".\n\n**1d. Admin auth flow on a public client.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` (or the\nlegacy name `\"ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH\"`) AND `GenerateSecret` is `false`. The\nadmin auth flow sends the username and password directly to the\n`AdminInitiateAuth` API, bypassing SRP entirely. On a public client (no\nsecret), this is exploitable by any caller — no server-side credential is\nrequired. Cite \"Rule 1d: admin auth flow on public client\".\n\n**1e. MFA OFF + AdvancedSecurityMode OFF + no compensating control.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` AND `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` is\n`OFF`. Even if the password policy is strong, the pool has zero adaptive\nprotection — no compromised-credential checking, no impossible-travel\ndetection, no bot detection. This is the \"all eggs in the password basket\"\npattern. Cite \"Rule 1e: no MFA + no ASF — zero adaptive defense\".\n\n**Severity within INSECURE:** all Rule-1 conditions map to **CRITICAL** risk.\nA pool that matches Rule 1b (implicit OAuth) or 1d (admin auth on public\nclient) is the most dangerous — these are directly exploitable from the\nclient side without any brute-force effort.\n\n### Step 2: WEAK — missing important hardening\n\nIf no Step-1 condition matched, evaluate these. If **any one** matches, the\npool is WEAK with **HIGH** risk. These are configurations that do not open an\nimmediate exploit path but leave the pool vulnerable to targeted attacks.\n\n**2a. MfaConfiguration is OPTIONAL.**\nMFA is available but not required. Users can skip enrollment, leaving their\naccounts protected by password alone. In practice, most users skip optional\nMFA — adoption rates are typically below 20% without enforcement. Cite\n\"Rule 2a: MFA optional — users can skip\".\n\n**2b. MFA OFF but strong password policy + ASF.**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `OFF` but `MinimumLength` >= 12 with all 4\n`Require*` flags true AND `AdvancedSecurityMode` is `ENFORCED`. This is the\nweakest acceptable posture for MFA-off pools — compensating controls (strong\npasswords + adaptive protection) reduce but do not eliminate risk. Cite\n\"Rule 2b: MFA off with compensating controls\".\n\n**2c. Password policy at minimum compliance.**\n`MinimumLength` is exactly 8 (the NIST SP 800-63B minimum) with fewer than\n4 of the complexity flags set, OR `MinimumLength` is >= 8 but\n`TemporaryPasswordValidityDays` > 7 (temp passwords valid too long). Cite\n\"Rule 2c: minimum-compliance password policy\".\n\n**2d. USER_PASSWORD_AUTH enabled without SRP.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` but NOT\n`\"ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH\"`. The password is sent directly to the API in\nplaintext (over TLS, but exposed to the application layer). SRP (Secure\nRemote Password) never transmits the password — it uses a zero-knowledge\nproof. Without SRP, a compromised API endpoint or a TLS-terminating proxy\ncan capture passwords. Cite \"Rule 2d: non-SRP auth flow\".\n\n**2e. Refresh token validity excessive.**\n`RefreshTokenValidity` > 30 days (with `TokenValidityUnits.RefreshToken` =\n`\"days\"`). A stolen refresh token remains valid for over a month, allowing\npersistent access. Cognito does not natively support refresh token rotation\n— shortening validity is the only mitigation. Cite \"Rule 2e: long-lived\nrefresh tokens\".\n\n**2f. AdvancedSecurityMode is OFF (or AUDIT) when MFA is ON.**\nMFA is enforced but there is no adaptive threat detection. Compromised\ncredentials (from breaches) will pass MFA if the attacker has the second\nfactor (via SIM-swap for SMS, or device theft for TOTP). ASF's\ncompromised-credential detection blocks these. `AUDIT` mode logs suspicious\nactivity but does not block it — it is monitoring, not protection. Cite\n\"Rule 2f: ASF not enforced\".\n\n**2g. Admin auth flow present (ANY client).**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes `\"ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH\"` (or legacy\n`\"ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH\"`). This ALWAYS triggers WEAK — regardless of\n`GenerateSecret` or other flows present alongside it. The admin auth flow\nbypasses SRP and sends the password to the `AdminInitiateAuth` API, which\nrequires AWS credentials (expanding the attack surface). The presence of\n`ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` alongside the admin flow does NOT mitigate this.\nCite \"Rule 2g: admin auth flow present\".\n\n**2h. OAuth redirect URLs insecure.**\n`AllowedOAuthFlows` includes `\"code\"` (good) but `CallbackURLs` contains an\n`http:\u002F\u002F` URL (not HTTPS) or a wildcard domain (`https:\u002F\u002F*.example.com`).\nHTTP redirects leak the authorization code in transit. Wildcard redirects\nallow any subdomain to receive the code — if any subdomain is compromised\nor has an open redirect, the code can be intercepted. Cite \"Rule 2h:\ninsecure OAuth redirect\".\n\n**Severity within WEAK:** all Rule-2 conditions map to **HIGH** risk. A pool\nthat matches Rule 2d (non-SRP auth) or 2a (optional MFA) is the most common\nreal-world weakness.\n\n### Step 3: ADEQUATE — reasonable security with minor gaps\n\nIf no Step-2 condition matched on ANY app client, the pool has MFA enforced\nwith a reasonable password policy and no weak auth flows on any client.\nEvaluate whether the remaining controls meet the OK bar. If any gap remains,\nthe pool is ADEQUATE with **MODERATE** risk.\n\n**3a. AdvancedSecurityMode is AUDIT (not ENFORCED).**\nMFA is ON, password policy is strong, but ASF is in AUDIT mode. Suspicious\nactivity is logged but not blocked. AUDIT is appropriate during a phased\nrollout (monitor for false positives before enforcing) but should transition\nto ENFORCED within a defined period. Cite \"Rule 3a: ASF in audit mode\".\n\n**3b. Password policy meets minimum but not maximum.**\n`MinimumLength` is 8-11 with all 4 `Require*` flags true. This meets NIST\nSP 800-63B minimum but does not provide the 12+ character length that\nsignificantly increases crack resistance. Cite \"Rule 3b: adequate password\nlength\".\n\n**3c. Refresh token validity at boundary.**\n`RefreshTokenValidity` is exactly 30 days. This is the Cognito default and\nis acceptable for most consumer apps, but sensitive applications (financial,\nhealthcare) should use 1-7 days. Cite \"Rule 3c: default refresh token\nvalidity\".\n\n**3d. USER_PASSWORD_AUTH alongside SRP.**\n`ExplicitAuthFlows` includes both `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` AND\n`ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. SRP is the primary flow (good), but the\npassword flow is also available. This is common — some SDKs (older\nAmazon Cognito Amplify versions before v6, native mobile SDKs using\ndirect authentication) require `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. Flag it as ADEQUATE\nbecause the SRP path exists, but recommend migrating clients to SRP-only\nwhen feasible. Cite \"Rule 3d: password auth alongside SRP\".\n\n**3e. MFA is ON with SMS only (no TOTP).**\n`MfaConfiguration` is `ON` but `EnabledMfas` includes only `\"SMS\"`, not\n`\"SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA\"`. SMS MFA is vulnerable to SIM-swapping attacks.\nTOTP (authenticator apps) is significantly more secure. SMS MFA is still\nbetter than no MFA, but the pool should enable TOTP as well. Cite \"Rule\n3e: SMS-only MFA — SIM-swap risk\".\n\n### Step 4: OK — all controls properly configured\n\nIf no Step-3 condition matched, the pool meets all of the following:\n\n- `MfaConfiguration` is `ON` (enforced for all users).\n- `EnabledMfas` includes `\"SOFTWARE_TOKEN_MFA\"` (TOTP available; SMS may\n  also be present as fallback).\n- `PasswordPolicy.MinimumLength` >= 12 with all 4 `Require*` flags true.\n- `UserPoolAddOns.AdvancedSecurityMode` is `ENFORCED`.\n- All app clients use `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH` and\u002For\n  `ALLOW_REFRESH_TOKEN_AUTH` only (no `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`, no admin\n  auth flows) — or `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` is present only on a client that\n  has `GenerateSecret: true` AND a documented legacy-SDK justification.\n- `PreventUserExistenceErrors` is `ENABLED`.\n- `EnableTokenRevocation` is `true`.\n- `RefreshTokenValidity` \u003C= 30 days.\n- OAuth (if configured) uses `code` flow only with HTTPS callback URLs and\n  no wildcard domains.\n- `DeletionProtection` is `ACTIVE`.\n\nCite \"Rule 4: all controls met — hardened pool\".\n\n### Step 5: Risk-level mapping\n\n**Risk level per verdict (emit exactly one RISK):**\n\n- `INSECURE` → **CRITICAL** — directly exploitable: account takeover, token\n  leakage, user enumeration, or credential capture.\n- `WEAK` → **HIGH** — not immediately exploitable but vulnerable to targeted\n  attacks: optional MFA, non-SRP flows, long-lived tokens, no adaptive\n  protection.\n- `ADEQUATE` → **MODERATE** — MFA is enforced with reasonable controls, but\n  defense-in-depth gaps remain (ASF not enforced, SMS-only MFA, password\n  policy at minimum).\n- `OK` → **LOW** — all controls properly configured.\n\n### Step 6: Multi-client aggregation\n\nA user pool typically has multiple app clients (e.g., a web client, a mobile\nclient, a backend service client). Each client has its own\n`ExplicitAuthFlows`, `GenerateSecret`, `RefreshTokenValidity`, and OAuth\nsettings. The pool-level verdict is the **worst** verdict across all app\nclients, evaluated on the same INSECURE > WEAK > ADEQUATE > OK scale.\n\nEvaluate each client independently against Steps 1-4, then aggregate:\n\n- If any client is INSECURE, the pool is INSECURE.\n- If any client is WEAK (and none is INSECURE), the pool is WEAK.\n- If any client is ADEQUATE (and none is WEAK\u002FINSECURE), the pool is ADEQUATE.\n- Only if all clients are OK is the pool OK.\n\nPool-level controls (`MfaConfiguration`, `PasswordPolicy`,\n`AdvancedSecurityMode`, `PreventUserExistenceErrors`) are evaluated once and\napply to all clients.\n\n## Auth-flow strength matrix\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## OAuth flow strength matrix\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Multi-client and edge-case handling\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Output format (per user pool)\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: \u003Cname>\nVERDICT: INSECURE | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the specific rule and config>\nRISK: CRITICAL | HIGH | MODERATE | LOW\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Multi-client aggregation example\n\nA pool with two app clients — one hardened, one with admin auth flow:\n\n```text\nUSER POOL: my-app-pool\nVERDICT: WEAK\nREASON: Pool-level controls are strong (MFA ON, password policy 12+ chars,\n        ASF ENFORCED, PreventUserExistenceErrors ENABLED). However, app client\n        'legacy-backend' has ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH with GenerateSecret\n        true (Rule 2g — admin auth flow on confidential client). Pool verdict\n        is the worst client verdict.\nRISK: HIGH\nREMEDIATION: Evaluate whether the 'legacy-backend' client still needs the\n             admin auth flow. If it does, scope it to a dedicated\n             infrastructure client with restrictive IAM policies. If it does\n             not, remove ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH from ExplicitAuthFlows\n             and migrate to ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH.\n```\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify a pool with `MfaConfiguration: OFF` as ADEQUATE or OK.\n  Without MFA, the pool is at best WEAK (Step 2b — only if password policy\n  is strong AND ASF is ENFORCED). MFA is the single most effective control\n  against credential stuffing and account takeover. Classifying an MFA-off\n  pool as ADEQUATE is a false sense of security.\n\n- NEVER classify a pool with `AllowedOAuthFlows: [\"implicit\"]` as anything\n  other than INSECURE. The implicit flow returns tokens in the URL fragment,\n  accessible to any script on the callback page. OAuth 2.1 deprecates it\n  entirely. This is not a \"style preference\" — it is a token-leakage\n  vulnerability.\n\n- NEVER treat `PreventUserExistenceErrors: LEGACY` as a minor issue. User\n  enumeration is the reconnaissance step that precedes credential stuffing.\n  An attacker who knows which email addresses have accounts can target them\n  with breached passwords. This is INSECURE.\n\n- NEVER assume `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` and `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` are\n  different flows. They are the same — `ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH` was renamed to\n  `ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` in the 2019 API update. Older\n  tutorials and Terraform modules still use the legacy name. Treat both\n  identically.\n\n- NEVER recommend SMS MFA as the sole MFA method without noting SIM-swap\n  risk. SMS interception via SIM-swapping is a well-documented attack\n  vector. TOTP (authenticator apps) is significantly more secure. If\n  `EnabledMfas` includes only `\"SMS\"`, flag as ADEQUATE (Rule 3e) — SMS MFA\n  is better than no MFA, but TOTP should also be enabled.\n\n- NEVER conflate `AdvancedSecurityMode: AUDIT` with `ENFORCED`. AUDIT mode\n  logs suspicious activity (compromised credentials, impossible travel,\n  bot detection) but does **not** block it. ENFORCED blocks the request.\n  AUDIT is appropriate for a transition period, not as an end state.\n\n- NEVER assume a strong password policy compensates for MFA being OFF.\n  Password policies are a speed bump — they increase the cost of brute-force\n  attacks. MFA is a wall — it blocks the attack entirely even when the\n  password is known (which it often is, from breach datasets). ASF's\n  compromised-credential detection is the only control that catches\n  breached passwords at sign-in, and it requires `ENFORCED` mode.\n\n- NEVER classify `ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` as equivalent to\n  `ALLOW_USER_SRP_AUTH`. SRP never transmits the password — it uses a\n  zero-knowledge proof. `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` sends the password to the\n  API. While TLS protects the transport, the password is exposed to the\n  application layer (API Gateway, WAF rules, access logs). If SRP is\n  available for the client SDK, `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` should be removed.\n\n- NEVER ignore `RefreshTokenValidity`. A refresh token with 365-day\n  validity means a stolen token grants access for a year. Cognito does not\n  support refresh token rotation (the OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749 best practice) —\n  shortening validity is the only mitigation. Check `TokenValidityUnits` to\n  confirm the unit is `days`, not `hours`.\n\n- NEVER treat `RefreshTokenValidity` > 30 days with `EnableTokenRevocation:\n  false` as merely a minor gap. This combination is the worst-case token-\n  theft scenario: the token is long-lived AND cannot be revoked. A stolen\n  refresh token grants persistent access until natural expiry with no\n  remediation path short of disabling the app client (which invalidates\n  ALL users' tokens). Always recommend enabling token revocation before\n  shortening refresh token validity.\n\n- NEVER recommend `client_credentials` OAuth flow for user-authentication\n  clients. `client_credentials` is machine-to-machine (service-to-service)\n  authentication with no user context. If a user-facing app client has only\n  `client_credentials`, the configuration is broken.\n\n- NEVER modify MFA configuration (`OFF` to `ON`) without warning about user\n  lockout. Changing `MfaConfiguration` to `ON` immediately requires all\n  users to have an MFA factor enrolled. Users without an enrolled factor\n  will be unable to sign in. Always recommend a phased rollout:\n  `OPTIONAL` first (with communication), then `ON` after adoption metrics\n  confirm enrollment.\n\n- NEVER assume `DeletionProtection: ACTIVE` protects against attackers.\n  Deletion protection prevents accidental pool deletion (operational safety),\n  not malicious deletion — an attacker with sufficient IAM permissions can\n  disable it first. It is defense-in-depth for operations, not a security\n  control against compromise.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting or recreating a user pool as a remediation step.\n  Pool deletion is irreversible and destroys all user accounts, attributes,\n  MFA enrollments, and group memberships. Always use `update-user-pool` and\n  `update-user-pool-client` for remediation. If the pool must be rebuilt\n  (e.g., region migration), export users first via `list-users` and plan a\n  parallel-run migration — never delete and recreate as a quick fix.\n\n- NEVER recommend removing `ALLOW_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH` without confirming the\n  client SDK supports SRP. Older Amazon Cognito Amplify SDKs (before v6),\n  some native iOS\u002FAndroid integrations, and custom API callers may depend on\n  `USER_PASSWORD_AUTH`. Removing it will break those clients. Test the\n  migration in a staging environment first.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nMoved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - load on demand (see References below).\n\n\n## References\n\nSee the AWS Cognito Identity Provider documentation for:\n- `describe-user-pool` \u002F `update-user-pool` CLI reference.\n- `describe-user-pool-client` \u002F `update-user-pool-client` CLI reference.\n- User pool auth flows (SRP, password, admin, custom).\n- OAuth scopes and flows in the Hosted UI.\n- Advanced Security Features (ASF) modes and capabilities.\n- NIST SP 800-63B (password guidance) and OAuth 2.1 (implicit flow\n  deprecation).\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) - auth-flow \u002F OAuth strength matrices, multi-client edge cases, recent AWS features\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) - pre-flight safety checks before remediation CLIs\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) - remediation guidance per risk tier\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F Cognito Identity Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **Service documentation** — [Amazon Cognito Developer Guide](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fwhat-is-amazon-cognito.html)\n- **Security** — [Security in Amazon Cognito](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito\u002Flatest\u002Fdeveloperguide\u002Fsecurity.html)\n- **API reference** — [Amazon Cognito Identity Provider API Reference](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcognito-user-identity-pools\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F)\n- **CLI reference** — [AWS CLI Command Reference: cognito-idp](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcognito-idp\u002F)\n- **Blog: Passwordless auth with WebAuthn** — https:\u002F\u002Faws.amazon.com\u002Fblogs\u002Fsecurity\u002Fintroducing-passwordless-authentication-with-webauthn-for-amazon-cognito\u002F\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":38},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"complexity":32,"entry_point":33,"when_to_use":34,"dependencies":35,"requires_llm":36,"verdict_shape":37,"supports_pipeline":36},"cognito, security, identity, mfa, oauth, auth-flows, user-pool, audit, compliance","2","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","Security","0.1.0","Cognito, user pool, identity provider, IdP, MFA, MfaConfiguration, password policy, app client, ExplicitAuthFlows, USER_SRP_AUTH, USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, ADMIN_NO_SRP_AUTH, ALLOW_ADMIN_USER_PASSWORD_AUTH, OAuth, implicit flow, PKCE, PreventUserExistenceErrors, AdvancedSecurityMode, token revocation, RefreshTokenValidity, account takeover, user enumeration, hosted UI, cognito-idp","high","false","Reviewing a Cognito user pool configuration before production, auditing app-client auth flows for credential exposure, checking MFA enforcement, validating OAuth settings (implicit vs code flow), hardening an identity provider against account takeover, or checking PreventUserExistenceErrors for user-enumeration risk.","aws-orchestrator","true","INSECURE | WEAK | ADEQUATE | OK","Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline configuration classification. Live-account audits use aws cognito-idp describe-user-pool, describe-user-pool-client, and list-user-pools (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. Technopreneur + Infornographer.","2026-09-24 08:54:10",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill cognito-idp-user-pool-auditor",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill cognito-idp-user-pool-auditor",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill 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hkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-optional-mfa.md",{"path":122,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":123,"sourceHtmlUrl":124},"example\u002Fend-to-end-audit.md",9440,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Fexample\u002Fend-to-end-audit.md",{"path":126,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":127,"sourceHtmlUrl":128},"references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md",9793,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Freferences\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md",{"path":130,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":131,"sourceHtmlUrl":132},"references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md",2143,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Freferences\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md",{"path":134,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":135,"sourceHtmlUrl":136},"references\u002Ferror-handling.md",3520,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Freferences\u002Ferror-handling.md",{"path":138,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":139,"sourceHtmlUrl":140},"skill.usf.yaml",4045,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcognito-idp-user-pool-auditor\u002Fskill.usf.yaml",[142,149,156,163,170,177],{"skillNo":143,"name":144,"nameZh":6,"description":145,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":146,"categories":147,"keywords":148,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADVD60X4PCAPKSE58P9NDC","xray-tracing-deployer","Deploys AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":150,"name":151,"nameZh":6,"description":152,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":153,"categories":154,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":157,"name":158,"nameZh":6,"description":159,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":160,"categories":161,"keywords":162,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":164,"name":165,"nameZh":6,"description":166,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":167,"categories":168,"keywords":169,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":171,"name":172,"nameZh":6,"description":173,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":174,"categories":175,"keywords":176,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor","Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":178,"name":179,"nameZh":6,"description":180,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":181,"categories":182,"keywords":183,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]