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Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\ndescription: Hunt AADGraphActivityLogs and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs in Microsoft Sentinel\u002FLog Analytics using KQL to fingerprint offensive Entra ID enumeration tools such as ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound, including User-Agent signatures, roadrecon endpoint sweeps, and sign-in correlation. Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- entra-id\n- microsoft-graph\n- kql\n- sentinel\n- roadtools\n- aadinternals\n- detection-engineering\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-09\nmitre_attack:\n- T1078.004\n---\n# Detecting Entra Offensive Tools in Graph Logs\n\n## Overview\n\nFor nearly a decade the legacy **Azure AD Graph API** (`graph.windows.net`) was a defender blind spot: requests to it produced no first-class activity log, so tools like ROADtools (`roadrecon`) and AADInternals — which lean heavily on AAD Graph — could enumerate an entire tenant with little trace. That changed when Microsoft shipped **AADGraphActivityLogs** (general availability in 2026), the counterpart to the already-available **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** (`graph.microsoft.com`). Together these two tables give SOCs request-level visibility into directory API traffic: the caller identity, app, source IP, HTTP method, request URI, and crucially the **User-Agent**.\n\nThis skill is the defensive complement to offensive Entra tooling. It hunts the two Graph activity tables for the behavioral and string fingerprints those tools leave behind. Many operators forget to spoof the User-Agent, so ROADtools (built on Python's `aiohttp`) emits a User-Agent like `Python\u002F3.12 aiohttp\u002F3.10.4`, and AADInternals frequently leaves `AADInternals` or library strings in the agent. Even when the agent is spoofed, the tools betray themselves through a characteristic **endpoint-sweep pattern**: `roadrecon gather` pulls `users`, `groups`, `applications`, `serviceprincipals`, `devices`, `directoryroles`, `roledefinitions`, `oauth2permissiongrants`, and more within a tight time window — a signature that survives header spoofing.\n\nThe activity being detected maps to MITRE ATT&CK **T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts**: an adversary using legitimate (often phished or token-stolen) cloud credentials to enumerate and operate against the tenant via the Graph APIs. These detections both surface live intrusions and validate that the offensive techniques in the companion red-team skills are observable.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building or tuning detections for Microsoft Sentinel \u002F Log Analytics covering Entra ID\n- Threat hunting after suspected credential theft, device-code phishing, or OAuth consent abuse\n- Purple-team exercises validating that ROADtools\u002FAADInternals\u002FAzureHound activity is detectable\n- Investigating an alert and needing to correlate Graph API calls back to a sign-in\u002Fsession\n- Closing the legacy Azure AD Graph visibility gap after enabling AADGraphActivityLogs\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A Microsoft Sentinel workspace (or Log Analytics) ingesting:\n  - **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> graph.microsoft.com)\n  - **AADGraphActivityLogs** (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> legacy Azure AD Graph)\n- `SigninLogs` and `AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` for correlation\n- Microsoft Sentinel Reader\u002FResponder (or Log Analytics Reader) RBAC to run KQL\n- Familiarity with Kusto Query Language (KQL)\n- Enable the diagnostic settings (Azure Portal -> Microsoft Entra ID -> Diagnostic settings -> send `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` and `AADGraphActivityLogs` to your workspace), or via CLI:\n  ```bash\n  az monitor diagnostic-settings create \\\n    --name \"entra-graph-logs\" \\\n    --resource \"\u002Fproviders\u002Fmicrosoft.aadiam\u002FdiagnosticSettings\" \\\n    --logs '[{\"category\":\"MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\",\"enabled\":true},{\"category\":\"AADGraphActivityLogs\",\"enabled\":true}]' \\\n    --workspace \"\u003Clog-analytics-workspace-id>\"\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Confirm both Graph activity tables are flowing into the workspace\n- Detect User-Agent string fingerprints of ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound\n- Detect the endpoint-sweep behavioral fingerprint that survives User-Agent spoofing\n- Correlate suspicious Graph activity back to a sign-in\u002Fsession and source identity\n- Operationalize the best queries as scheduled analytics rules\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Detecting adversaries using valid cloud credentials\u002Ftokens to enumerate the tenant via the Microsoft Graph and legacy Azure AD Graph APIs |\n\nRelated techniques surfaced by these hunts: **T1087.004** Account Discovery: Cloud Account, **T1069.003** Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups, **T1526** Cloud Service Discovery.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Confirm both tables are ingesting\nBefore hunting, verify the data exists and inspect the schema fields you will pivot on.\n\n```kusto\nunion withsource=Tbl MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| summarize Records=count(), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Tbl\n```\n\n### Step 2: Hunt User-Agent fingerprints (ROADtools \u002F aiohttp)\nROADtools uses `aiohttp`; an un-spoofed run shows `python` + `aiohttp` in the User-Agent.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where UserAgent contains \"python\" and UserAgent contains \"aiohttp\"\n| summarize RequestCount = count() by CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserAgent, UserId\n| sort by RequestCount desc\n```\n\n### Step 3: Hunt AADInternals and AzureHound agents\nAADInternals leaves toolkit\u002Flibrary strings; AzureHound's Go HTTP client and BloodHound tooling have distinctive agents.\n\n```kusto\nunion MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where UserAgent has_any (\"AADInternals\", \"aad-internals\", \"azurehound\",\n                           \"BloodHound\", \"python-requests\", \"Go-http-client\")\n| project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserId, RequestUri\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Step 4: Behavioral hunt — the roadrecon endpoint sweep (spoof-resistant)\nEven with a spoofed agent, `roadrecon gather` touches a recognizable set of directory resources in a short window. Bucket by user and 5 minutes; alert when one identity hits the full sweep.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| extend TopLevelResource = tolower(tostring(split(split(RequestUri, \"?\")[0], \"\u002F\")[3]))\n| summarize\n    TopLevelResources = make_set(TopLevelResource),\n    AppIds = make_set(AppId),\n    CallerIPs = make_set(CallerIpAddress),\n    UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent),\n    StartTime = min(TimeGenerated),\n    EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n    by UserId, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)\n| where TopLevelResources has_all (\"users\", \"tenantdetails\", \"groups\", \"applications\",\n    \"serviceprincipals\", \"devices\", \"directoryroles\", \"roledefinitions\", \"contacts\",\n    \"oauth2permissiongrants\", \"authorizationpolicy\")\n| project StartTime, EndTime, UserId, AppIds, CallerIPs, UserAgents\n```\n\n### Step 5: High-volume enumeration outliers\nCatch tooling that simply makes far more directory reads than a human in a short window.\n\n```kusto\nMicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where RequestUri has_any (\"\u002Fusers\", \"\u002Fgroups\", \"\u002FservicePrincipals\", \"\u002Fapplications\",\n                            \"\u002FdirectoryRoles\", \"\u002FroleManagement\")\n| summarize Reads=count(), Resources=dcount(RequestUri) by UserId, AppId, CallerIpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)\n| where Reads > 200\n| sort by Reads desc\n```\n\n### Step 6: Correlate Graph activity to the originating sign-in\nPivot a suspicious Graph caller back to the sign-in to recover device, location, MFA, and conditional-access result. Note the `SignInActivityId` in AADGraphActivityLogs may carry `==` padding versus `SigninLogs.UniqueTokenIdentifier`.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where UserAgent contains \"aiohttp\"\n| extend TokenId = trim_end(\"=\", tostring(SignInActivityId))\n| join kind=leftouter (\n    SigninLogs\n    | extend TokenId = tostring(UniqueTokenIdentifier)\n    | project TokenId, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, DeviceDetail\n) on TokenId\n| project TimeGenerated, UserId, UserPrincipalName, CallerIpAddress, IPAddress,\n          AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, UserAgent\n```\n\n### Step 7: Operationalize as analytics rules\nPromote the highest-fidelity queries (Steps 2-4) to scheduled analytics rules. Set a query period\u002Ffrequency (e.g., run every 1h over 1d), map the rule to T1078.004, and configure entity mappings (Account = UserId, IP = CallerIpAddress, Host\u002FApp = AppId) so incidents enrich automatically. Tune out known automation\u002Fservice-principal App IDs and approved scanner IPs via a watchlist before enabling.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Source |\n|----------|---------|--------|\n| AADGraphActivityLogs reference | Schema and field meaning | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fentra\u002Fidentity\u002Fmonitoring-health\u002Fconcept-aad-graph-activity-logs |\n| MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | Graph API activity schema | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fgraph\u002Fmicrosoft-graph-activity-logs-overview |\n| Invictus-IR writeup | AADGraphActivityLogs hunting queries | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.invictus-ir.com\u002Fnews\u002Fthe-missing-link-aadgraphactivitylogs-finally-arrives |\n| Cloudbrothers analysis | Behavioral fingerprinting of ROADtools | https:\u002F\u002Fcloudbrothers.info\u002Fen\u002Faadgraphactivitylogs\u002F |\n| ROADtools | The offensive tool being detected | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FROADtools |\n| MITRE T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1078\u002F004\u002F |\n\n## Detection Fingerprint Reference\n\n| Tool | Primary fingerprint | Table |\n|------|---------------------|-------|\n| ROADtools (roadrecon) | `python` + `aiohttp` UA; full directory endpoint sweep in 5 min | AADGraphActivityLogs |\n| AADInternals | `AADInternals` \u002F toolkit strings in UA; AAD Graph reads | AADGraphActivityLogs |\n| AzureHound | Go HTTP client UA; broad MS Graph enumeration | MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs |\n| Generic recon | High GET volume across users\u002Fgroups\u002Fapps\u002FSPs in short window | both |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Both MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs and AADGraphActivityLogs confirmed ingesting\n- [ ] User-Agent fingerprint hunt for ROADtools\u002Faiohttp executed\n- [ ] AADInternals\u002FAzureHound agent hunt executed\n- [ ] Behavioral endpoint-sweep hunt executed and tuned for false positives\n- [ ] High-volume enumeration outlier query executed\n- [ ] At least one finding correlated back to a sign-in\u002Fsession and source identity\n- [ ] Best queries promoted to scheduled analytics rules with T1078.004 mapping and entity mappings\n- [ ] Known-good service principals\u002FIPs excluded via watchlist to control false positives\n","# Detecting Entra Offensive Tools in Graph Logs\n\n## Overview\n\nFor nearly a decade the legacy **Azure AD Graph API** (`graph.windows.net`) was a defender blind spot: requests to it produced no first-class activity log, so tools like ROADtools (`roadrecon`) and AADInternals — which lean heavily on AAD Graph — could enumerate an entire tenant with little trace. That changed when Microsoft shipped **AADGraphActivityLogs** (general availability in 2026), the counterpart to the already-available **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** (`graph.microsoft.com`). Together these two tables give SOCs request-level visibility into directory API traffic: the caller identity, app, source IP, HTTP method, request URI, and crucially the **User-Agent**.\n\nThis skill is the defensive complement to offensive Entra tooling. It hunts the two Graph activity tables for the behavioral and string fingerprints those tools leave behind. Many operators forget to spoof the User-Agent, so ROADtools (built on Python's `aiohttp`) emits a User-Agent like `Python\u002F3.12 aiohttp\u002F3.10.4`, and AADInternals frequently leaves `AADInternals` or library strings in the agent. Even when the agent is spoofed, the tools betray themselves through a characteristic **endpoint-sweep pattern**: `roadrecon gather` pulls `users`, `groups`, `applications`, `serviceprincipals`, `devices`, `directoryroles`, `roledefinitions`, `oauth2permissiongrants`, and more within a tight time window — a signature that survives header spoofing.\n\nThe activity being detected maps to MITRE ATT&CK **T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts**: an adversary using legitimate (often phished or token-stolen) cloud credentials to enumerate and operate against the tenant via the Graph APIs. These detections both surface live intrusions and validate that the offensive techniques in the companion red-team skills are observable.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building or tuning detections for Microsoft Sentinel \u002F Log Analytics covering Entra ID\n- Threat hunting after suspected credential theft, device-code phishing, or OAuth consent abuse\n- Purple-team exercises validating that ROADtools\u002FAADInternals\u002FAzureHound activity is detectable\n- Investigating an alert and needing to correlate Graph API calls back to a sign-in\u002Fsession\n- Closing the legacy Azure AD Graph visibility gap after enabling AADGraphActivityLogs\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A Microsoft Sentinel workspace (or Log Analytics) ingesting:\n  - **MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs** (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> graph.microsoft.com)\n  - **AADGraphActivityLogs** (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> legacy Azure AD Graph)\n- `SigninLogs` and `AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` for correlation\n- Microsoft Sentinel Reader\u002FResponder (or Log Analytics Reader) RBAC to run KQL\n- Familiarity with Kusto Query Language (KQL)\n- Enable the diagnostic settings (Azure Portal -> Microsoft Entra ID -> Diagnostic settings -> send `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` and `AADGraphActivityLogs` to your workspace), or via CLI:\n  ```bash\n  az monitor diagnostic-settings create \\\n    --name \"entra-graph-logs\" \\\n    --resource \"\u002Fproviders\u002Fmicrosoft.aadiam\u002FdiagnosticSettings\" \\\n    --logs '[{\"category\":\"MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\",\"enabled\":true},{\"category\":\"AADGraphActivityLogs\",\"enabled\":true}]' \\\n    --workspace \"\u003Clog-analytics-workspace-id>\"\n  ```\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Confirm both Graph activity tables are flowing into the workspace\n- Detect User-Agent string fingerprints of ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound\n- Detect the endpoint-sweep behavioral fingerprint that survives User-Agent spoofing\n- Correlate suspicious Graph activity back to a sign-in\u002Fsession and source identity\n- Operationalize the best queries as scheduled analytics rules\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |\n|----|-----------|---------------------------|\n| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Detecting adversaries using valid cloud credentials\u002Ftokens to enumerate the tenant via the Microsoft Graph and legacy Azure AD Graph APIs |\n\nRelated techniques surfaced by these hunts: **T1087.004** Account Discovery: Cloud Account, **T1069.003** Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups, **T1526** Cloud Service Discovery.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Confirm both tables are ingesting\nBefore hunting, verify the data exists and inspect the schema fields you will pivot on.\n\n```kusto\nunion withsource=Tbl MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| summarize Records=count(), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Tbl\n```\n\n### Step 2: Hunt User-Agent fingerprints (ROADtools \u002F aiohttp)\nROADtools uses `aiohttp`; an un-spoofed run shows `python` + `aiohttp` in the User-Agent.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where UserAgent contains \"python\" and UserAgent contains \"aiohttp\"\n| summarize RequestCount = count() by CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserAgent, UserId\n| sort by RequestCount desc\n```\n\n### Step 3: Hunt AADInternals and AzureHound agents\nAADInternals leaves toolkit\u002Flibrary strings; AzureHound's Go HTTP client and BloodHound tooling have distinctive agents.\n\n```kusto\nunion MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)\n| where UserAgent has_any (\"AADInternals\", \"aad-internals\", \"azurehound\",\n                           \"BloodHound\", \"python-requests\", \"Go-http-client\")\n| project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserId, RequestUri\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Step 4: Behavioral hunt — the roadrecon endpoint sweep (spoof-resistant)\nEven with a spoofed agent, `roadrecon gather` touches a recognizable set of directory resources in a short window. Bucket by user and 5 minutes; alert when one identity hits the full sweep.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| extend TopLevelResource = tolower(tostring(split(split(RequestUri, \"?\")[0], \"\u002F\")[3]))\n| summarize\n    TopLevelResources = make_set(TopLevelResource),\n    AppIds = make_set(AppId),\n    CallerIPs = make_set(CallerIpAddress),\n    UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent),\n    StartTime = min(TimeGenerated),\n    EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n    by UserId, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)\n| where TopLevelResources has_all (\"users\", \"tenantdetails\", \"groups\", \"applications\",\n    \"serviceprincipals\", \"devices\", \"directoryroles\", \"roledefinitions\", \"contacts\",\n    \"oauth2permissiongrants\", \"authorizationpolicy\")\n| project StartTime, EndTime, UserId, AppIds, CallerIPs, UserAgents\n```\n\n### Step 5: High-volume enumeration outliers\nCatch tooling that simply makes far more directory reads than a human in a short window.\n\n```kusto\nMicrosoftGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where RequestMethod == \"GET\"\n| where RequestUri has_any (\"\u002Fusers\", \"\u002Fgroups\", \"\u002FservicePrincipals\", \"\u002Fapplications\",\n                            \"\u002FdirectoryRoles\", \"\u002FroleManagement\")\n| summarize Reads=count(), Resources=dcount(RequestUri) by UserId, AppId, CallerIpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)\n| where Reads > 200\n| sort by Reads desc\n```\n\n### Step 6: Correlate Graph activity to the originating sign-in\nPivot a suspicious Graph caller back to the sign-in to recover device, location, MFA, and conditional-access result. Note the `SignInActivityId` in AADGraphActivityLogs may carry `==` padding versus `SigninLogs.UniqueTokenIdentifier`.\n\n```kusto\nAADGraphActivityLogs\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n| where UserAgent contains \"aiohttp\"\n| extend TokenId = trim_end(\"=\", tostring(SignInActivityId))\n| join kind=leftouter (\n    SigninLogs\n    | extend TokenId = tostring(UniqueTokenIdentifier)\n    | project TokenId, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, DeviceDetail\n) on TokenId\n| project TimeGenerated, UserId, UserPrincipalName, CallerIpAddress, IPAddress,\n          AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, UserAgent\n```\n\n### Step 7: Operationalize as analytics rules\nPromote the highest-fidelity queries (Steps 2-4) to scheduled analytics rules. Set a query period\u002Ffrequency (e.g., run every 1h over 1d), map the rule to T1078.004, and configure entity mappings (Account = UserId, IP = CallerIpAddress, Host\u002FApp = AppId) so incidents enrich automatically. Tune out known automation\u002Fservice-principal App IDs and approved scanner IPs via a watchlist before enabling.\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Resource | Purpose | Source |\n|----------|---------|--------|\n| AADGraphActivityLogs reference | Schema and field meaning | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fentra\u002Fidentity\u002Fmonitoring-health\u002Fconcept-aad-graph-activity-logs |\n| MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | Graph API activity schema | https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fgraph\u002Fmicrosoft-graph-activity-logs-overview |\n| Invictus-IR writeup | AADGraphActivityLogs hunting queries | https:\u002F\u002Fwww.invictus-ir.com\u002Fnews\u002Fthe-missing-link-aadgraphactivitylogs-finally-arrives |\n| Cloudbrothers analysis | Behavioral fingerprinting of ROADtools | https:\u002F\u002Fcloudbrothers.info\u002Fen\u002Faadgraphactivitylogs\u002F |\n| ROADtools | The offensive tool being detected | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdirkjanm\u002FROADtools |\n| MITRE T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1078\u002F004\u002F |\n\n## Detection Fingerprint Reference\n\n| Tool | Primary fingerprint | Table |\n|------|---------------------|-------|\n| ROADtools (roadrecon) | `python` + `aiohttp` UA; full directory endpoint sweep in 5 min | AADGraphActivityLogs |\n| AADInternals | `AADInternals` \u002F toolkit strings in UA; AAD Graph reads | AADGraphActivityLogs |\n| AzureHound | Go HTTP client UA; broad MS Graph enumeration | MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs |\n| Generic recon | High GET volume across users\u002Fgroups\u002Fapps\u002FSPs in short window | both |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Both MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs and AADGraphActivityLogs confirmed ingesting\n- [ ] User-Agent fingerprint hunt for ROADtools\u002Faiohttp executed\n- [ ] AADInternals\u002FAzureHound agent hunt executed\n- [ ] Behavioral endpoint-sweep hunt executed and tuned for false positives\n- [ ] High-volume enumeration outlier query executed\n- [ ] At least one finding correlated back to a sign-in\u002Fsession and source identity\n- [ ] Best queries promoted to scheduled analytics rules with T1078.004 mapping and entity mappings\n- [ ] Known-good service principals\u002FIPs excluded via watchlist to control false positives\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":39,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"threat-hunting","entra-id","microsoft-graph","kql","sentinel","roadtools","aadinternals","detection-engineering","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38],"DE.CM-09","soc-operations",[41],"T1078.004","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":50,"prompt":60,"zipAvailable":61},[51,54,57],{"tool":52,"command":53},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs",{"tool":55,"command":56},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs",{"tool":58,"command":59},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002FSKILL.md",true,[63,67,73,77],{"path":64,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":68,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":71,"sourceHtmlUrl":72},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2525,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":74,"resourceType":69,"resourceTypeDesc":70,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1353,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5349,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[84,91,98,105,112,119],{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACCCVNCFKMA9X6D15X6G98","runpodctl","Runpod CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":95,"categories":96,"keywords":97,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":99,"name":100,"nameZh":6,"description":101,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":102,"categories":103,"keywords":104,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":113,"name":114,"nameZh":6,"description":115,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":116,"categories":117,"keywords":118,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]