detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs
Hunt AADGraphActivityLogs and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs in Microsoft Sentinel/Log Analytics using KQL to fingerprint offensive Entra ID enumeration tools such as ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound, including User-Agent signatures, roadrecon endpoint sweeps, and sign-in correlation. Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-11
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- ★ 0
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- detecting-entra-offensive-tools-in-graph-logs
- tags
- [ "threat-hunting", "entra-id", "microsoft-graph", "kql", "sentinel", "roadtools", "aadinternals", "detection-engineering" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.CM-09" ]
- subdomain
- soc-operations
- description
- Hunt AADGraphActivityLogs and MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs in Microsoft Sentinel/Log Analytics using KQL to fingerprint offensive Entra ID enumeration tools such as ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound, including User-Agent signatures, roadrecon endpoint sweeps, and sign-in correlation. Use when investigating suspicious Microsoft Graph API activity, Entra ID reconnaissance, or building Sentinel analytics rules to detect these tools.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1078.004" ]
02 资源文件 4
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.5 KB
- 参考文档references/standards.md1.3 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py5.2 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Detecting Entra Offensive Tools in Graph Logs
Overview
For nearly a decade the legacy Azure AD Graph API (graph.windows.net) was a defender blind spot: requests to it produced no first-class activity log, so tools like ROADtools (roadrecon) and AADInternals — which lean heavily on AAD Graph — could enumerate an entire tenant with little trace. That changed when Microsoft shipped AADGraphActivityLogs (general availability in 2026), the counterpart to the already-available MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs (graph.microsoft.com). Together these two tables give SOCs request-level visibility into directory API traffic: the caller identity, app, source IP, HTTP method, request URI, and crucially the User-Agent.
This skill is the defensive complement to offensive Entra tooling. It hunts the two Graph activity tables for the behavioral and string fingerprints those tools leave behind. Many operators forget to spoof the User-Agent, so ROADtools (built on Python's aiohttp) emits a User-Agent like Python/3.12 aiohttp/3.10.4, and AADInternals frequently leaves AADInternals or library strings in the agent. Even when the agent is spoofed, the tools betray themselves through a characteristic endpoint-sweep pattern: roadrecon gather pulls users, groups, applications, serviceprincipals, devices, directoryroles, roledefinitions, oauth2permissiongrants, and more within a tight time window — a signature that survives header spoofing.
The activity being detected maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004 – Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts: an adversary using legitimate (often phished or token-stolen) cloud credentials to enumerate and operate against the tenant via the Graph APIs. These detections both surface live intrusions and validate that the offensive techniques in the companion red-team skills are observable.
When to Use
- Building or tuning detections for Microsoft Sentinel / Log Analytics covering Entra ID
- Threat hunting after suspected credential theft, device-code phishing, or OAuth consent abuse
- Purple-team exercises validating that ROADtools/AADInternals/AzureHound activity is detectable
- Investigating an alert and needing to correlate Graph API calls back to a sign-in/session
- Closing the legacy Azure AD Graph visibility gap after enabling AADGraphActivityLogs
Prerequisites
- A Microsoft Sentinel workspace (or Log Analytics) ingesting:
- MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> graph.microsoft.com)
- AADGraphActivityLogs (diagnostic setting on Microsoft Entra ID -> legacy Azure AD Graph)
SigninLogsandAADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogsfor correlation- Microsoft Sentinel Reader/Responder (or Log Analytics Reader) RBAC to run KQL
- Familiarity with Kusto Query Language (KQL)
- Enable the diagnostic settings (Azure Portal -> Microsoft Entra ID -> Diagnostic settings -> send
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogsandAADGraphActivityLogsto your workspace), or via CLI:az monitor diagnostic-settings create \ --name "entra-graph-logs" \ --resource "/providers/microsoft.aadiam/diagnosticSettings" \ --logs '[{"category":"MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs","enabled":true},{"category":"AADGraphActivityLogs","enabled":true}]' \ --workspace "<log-analytics-workspace-id>"
Objectives
- Confirm both Graph activity tables are flowing into the workspace
- Detect User-Agent string fingerprints of ROADtools, AADInternals, and AzureHound
- Detect the endpoint-sweep behavioral fingerprint that survives User-Agent spoofing
- Correlate suspicious Graph activity back to a sign-in/session and source identity
- Operationalize the best queries as scheduled analytics rules
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Technique | Application in this skill |
|---|---|---|
| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Detecting adversaries using valid cloud credentials/tokens to enumerate the tenant via the Microsoft Graph and legacy Azure AD Graph APIs |
Related techniques surfaced by these hunts: T1087.004 Account Discovery: Cloud Account, T1069.003 Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups, T1526 Cloud Service Discovery.
Workflow
Step 1: Confirm both tables are ingesting
Before hunting, verify the data exists and inspect the schema fields you will pivot on.
union withsource=Tbl MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| summarize Records=count(), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Tbl
Step 2: Hunt User-Agent fingerprints (ROADtools / aiohttp)
ROADtools uses aiohttp; an un-spoofed run shows python + aiohttp in the User-Agent.
AADGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RequestMethod == "GET"
| where UserAgent contains "python" and UserAgent contains "aiohttp"
| summarize RequestCount = count() by CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserAgent, UserId
| sort by RequestCount desc
Step 3: Hunt AADInternals and AzureHound agents
AADInternals leaves toolkit/library strings; AzureHound's Go HTTP client and BloodHound tooling have distinctive agents.
union MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs, AADGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where UserAgent has_any ("AADInternals", "aad-internals", "azurehound",
"BloodHound", "python-requests", "Go-http-client")
| project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, CallerIpAddress, AppId, UserId, RequestUri
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
Step 4: Behavioral hunt — the roadrecon endpoint sweep (spoof-resistant)
Even with a spoofed agent, roadrecon gather touches a recognizable set of directory resources in a short window. Bucket by user and 5 minutes; alert when one identity hits the full sweep.
AADGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where RequestMethod == "GET"
| extend TopLevelResource = tolower(tostring(split(split(RequestUri, "?")[0], "/")[3]))
| summarize
TopLevelResources = make_set(TopLevelResource),
AppIds = make_set(AppId),
CallerIPs = make_set(CallerIpAddress),
UserAgents = make_set(UserAgent),
StartTime = min(TimeGenerated),
EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
by UserId, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where TopLevelResources has_all ("users", "tenantdetails", "groups", "applications",
"serviceprincipals", "devices", "directoryroles", "roledefinitions", "contacts",
"oauth2permissiongrants", "authorizationpolicy")
| project StartTime, EndTime, UserId, AppIds, CallerIPs, UserAgents
Step 5: High-volume enumeration outliers
Catch tooling that simply makes far more directory reads than a human in a short window.
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where RequestMethod == "GET"
| where RequestUri has_any ("/users", "/groups", "/servicePrincipals", "/applications",
"/directoryRoles", "/roleManagement")
| summarize Reads=count(), Resources=dcount(RequestUri) by UserId, AppId, CallerIpAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where Reads > 200
| sort by Reads desc
Step 6: Correlate Graph activity to the originating sign-in
Pivot a suspicious Graph caller back to the sign-in to recover device, location, MFA, and conditional-access result. Note the SignInActivityId in AADGraphActivityLogs may carry == padding versus SigninLogs.UniqueTokenIdentifier.
AADGraphActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where UserAgent contains "aiohttp"
| extend TokenId = trim_end("=", tostring(SignInActivityId))
| join kind=leftouter (
SigninLogs
| extend TokenId = tostring(UniqueTokenIdentifier)
| project TokenId, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, DeviceDetail
) on TokenId
| project TimeGenerated, UserId, UserPrincipalName, CallerIpAddress, IPAddress,
AppDisplayName, ConditionalAccessStatus, UserAgent
Step 7: Operationalize as analytics rules
Promote the highest-fidelity queries (Steps 2-4) to scheduled analytics rules. Set a query period/frequency (e.g., run every 1h over 1d), map the rule to T1078.004, and configure entity mappings (Account = UserId, IP = CallerIpAddress, Host/App = AppId) so incidents enrich automatically. Tune out known automation/service-principal App IDs and approved scanner IPs via a watchlist before enabling.
Tools and Resources
| Resource | Purpose | Source |
|---|---|---|
| AADGraphActivityLogs reference | Schema and field meaning | https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-aad-graph-activity-logs |
| MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs | Graph API activity schema | https://learn.microsoft.com/graph/microsoft-graph-activity-logs-overview |
| Invictus-IR writeup | AADGraphActivityLogs hunting queries | https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/the-missing-link-aadgraphactivitylogs-finally-arrives |
| Cloudbrothers analysis | Behavioral fingerprinting of ROADtools | https://cloudbrothers.info/en/aadgraphactivitylogs/ |
| ROADtools | The offensive tool being detected | https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools |
| MITRE T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/ |
Detection Fingerprint Reference
| Tool | Primary fingerprint | Table |
|---|---|---|
| ROADtools (roadrecon) | python + aiohttp UA; full directory endpoint sweep in 5 min |
AADGraphActivityLogs |
| AADInternals | AADInternals / toolkit strings in UA; AAD Graph reads |
AADGraphActivityLogs |
| AzureHound | Go HTTP client UA; broad MS Graph enumeration | MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs |
| Generic recon | High GET volume across users/groups/apps/SPs in short window | both |
Validation Criteria
- [ ] Both MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs and AADGraphActivityLogs confirmed ingesting
- [ ] User-Agent fingerprint hunt for ROADtools/aiohttp executed
- [ ] AADInternals/AzureHound agent hunt executed
- [ ] Behavioral endpoint-sweep hunt executed and tuned for false positives
- [ ] High-volume enumeration outlier query executed
- [ ] At least one finding correlated back to a sign-in/session and source identity
- [ ] Best queries promoted to scheduled analytics rules with T1078.004 mapping and entity mappings
- [ ] Known-good service principals/IPs excluded via watchlist to control false positives
04 同仓库更多 Skills
runpodctl
Runpod CLI for managing GPU/CPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send/receive). Use for terminal/CI/scripting, Hub browse/deploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.
runpod
Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU/CPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.
runpod-usage
How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU/VRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv/apt). Use to answer "how does X work", "which GPU", "how do I build a container", or "how do I stand up a workload on a pod". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.
runpod-templates
Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says "run <X> on a pod" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.
runpod-migrate
Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.
runpod-mcp
Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU/CPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.