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Use when onboarding a repo to a supply-chain security program, auditing lockfiles\u002Fmanifests for confusable dependencies, or after an incident that may have leaked internal package names.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-dependency-confusion\ndescription: Detect and prevent dependency confusion (public-over-private package name resolution) in npm, PyPI, and Maven by enumerating claimable internal package names with tools like `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan`, then enforcing source restrictions via `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`\u002F`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `settings.xml`. Use when onboarding a repo to a supply-chain security program, auditing lockfiles\u002Fmanifests for confusable dependencies, or after an incident that may have leaked internal package names.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: supply-chain-security\ntags:\n- supply-chain-security\n- dependency-confusion\n- npm\n- pypi\n- maven\n- package-management\n- devsecops\n- namespace-hijacking\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- ID.RA-09\nmitre_attack:\n- T1195.001\n---\n# Detecting Dependency Confusion\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing, defensive engineering, and educational purposes only. Registering or claiming package namespaces you do not own, or testing build pipelines without written authorization, may be illegal and may violate the terms of service of public registries. Only run namespace-claiming or resolution-testing activities against names and infrastructure you control or are explicitly authorized to assess.\n\n## Overview\n\nDependency confusion (also called a substitution or namespace-shadowing attack) was popularized by Alex Birsan in 2021 when he forced malicious code into the internal build systems of Apple, Microsoft, PayPal, and dozens of others. The root cause is that many package managers, when configured to resolve from both an internal\u002Fprivate registry and a public one, will prefer whichever copy has the **higher version number** rather than honoring the source. An attacker who learns the name of a private package (`@acme\u002Finternal-utils`, `acme-billing-sdk`) can publish a malicious package of the **same name** to the public registry (npmjs.com, PyPI, Maven Central) with a very high version (e.g. `99.0.0`). When the victim's CI\u002FCD runner or a developer machine resolves dependencies, it pulls the attacker's public package, executes its install scripts, and the supply chain is compromised.\n\nThis skill covers both halves of the problem: **detection** — enumerating internal package names that are not registered (squatted defensively) on public registries and are therefore claimable, using `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan` — and **prevention** — pinning scopes\u002Fnamespaces to private registries, registering placeholder packages, and enforcing source restrictions in `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`\u002F`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `settings.xml`. Internal package names leak constantly: in committed lockfiles, sourcemaps, public JS bundles, Docker layers, and error stack traces, so this is treated as an attack-surface management problem, not a one-time check.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When onboarding a repository or organization to a supply-chain security program and you need to baseline which internal packages are claimable on public registries.\n- When CI\u002FCD pipelines resolve dependencies from both private and public registries (mixed\u002Fhybrid feeds).\n- After any incident where internal package names may have been exposed (leaked source, public bundle, breached repo).\n- When auditing `package.json`, `requirements.txt`, `pom.xml`, `composer.json`, or `Gemfile.lock` files for confusable dependencies.\n- As a recurring scheduled control to detect newly added internal packages that have not yet been defensively registered.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Go 1.20+ to install `confused`:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused@latest\n  # binary lands in $(go env GOPATH)\u002Fbin\u002Fconfused\n  ```\n- Python 3.10+ for OWASP dep-scan:\n  ```bash\n  pip install owasp-depscan\n  # or container: docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fowasp-dep-scan\u002Fdep-scan\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (for `.npmrc` and `npm config` remediation) and access to your private registry (Artifactory, Nexus, Azure Artifacts, GitHub Packages, AWS CodeArtifact).\n- Read access to the repositories \u002F lockfiles being assessed and write access to your private registry for defensive registration.\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Enumerate every internal dependency declared in project manifests across npm, PyPI, Maven, Composer, and RubyGems.\n- Determine which internal names are **not** present on the corresponding public registry and are therefore claimable.\n- Distinguish true exposure from false positives (scoped packages, already-mirrored names).\n- Apply registry-pinning and scope-restriction controls that make public substitution impossible.\n- Defensively register placeholder packages for unclaimed internal names.\n- Establish a recurring detection control in CI to catch newly introduced confusable dependencies.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.001 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | Core technique — attacker substitutes a malicious public package for an internal dependency. |\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Broader category covering the compromised build artifacts produced once confusion succeeds. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | npm `preinstall`\u002F`postinstall` lifecycle scripts execute attacker JavaScript on resolution. |\n| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Substituted package beacons stolen environment\u002Fcredentials to attacker HTTP(S) endpoint. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Inventory manifests across the codebase\nLocate every dependency manifest so nothing is missed.\n```bash\n# Find all supported manifests in a monorepo\nfind . -type f \\( \\\n  -name package.json -o \\\n  -name requirements.txt -o \\\n  -name pom.xml -o \\\n  -name composer.json -o \\\n  -name Gemfile.lock \\\n\\) -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' -print\n```\n\n### 2. Scan npm manifests with confused\n`confused` reads the manifest and reports every dependency name **not found** on the public registry — those are candidates for confusion.\n```bash\n# npm (default language is npm)\nconfused -l npm package.json\n\n# Treat your known-good scopes as secure to suppress false positives (supports wildcards)\nconfused -l npm -s '@acme\u002F*,@acme-internal\u002F*' package.json\n\n# Verbose, to see each lookup\nconfused -l npm -v package.json\n```\n\n### 3. Scan PyPI, Maven, Composer, and RubyGems manifests\nThe `-l` flag selects the ecosystem; each maps to its standard manifest file.\n```bash\nconfused -l pip requirements.txt          # PyPI  -> requirements.txt\nconfused -l mvn pom.xml                    # Maven -> pom.xml\nconfused -l composer composer.json        # PHP   -> composer.json\nconfused -l rubygems Gemfile.lock         # Ruby  -> Gemfile.lock\n```\n\n### 4. Cross-check with OWASP dep-scan private-namespace mode\ndep-scan confirms confusion exposure for declared private namespaces and folds it into a broader risk audit.\n```bash\n# Flag private namespaces accidentally claimable on public registries\ndepscan --src $PWD --reports-dir .\u002Freports \\\n  --private-ns acme,acme_internal,@acme\n\n# Enable deep package risk audit (npm + pypi): typosquats, takeover risk, etc.\ndepscan --src $PWD --reports-dir .\u002Freports --risk-audit\n```\n\n### 5. Triage candidates and confirm claimability\nFor each flagged name, verify it is genuinely absent on the public registry (a 404 means claimable).\n```bash\n# npm: a 404 status means the name is unregistered on the public registry\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F@acme%2finternal-utils\n\n# PyPI: 404 from the JSON API means the project name is free\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fpypi\u002Facme-billing-sdk\u002Fjson\n```\n\n### 6. Remediate npm with scope-to-registry pinning\nBind every internal scope to the private registry so a public package of the same name can never be resolved.\n```ini\n# .npmrc (project root, committed)\n@acme:registry=https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-internal\u002F\n\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-internal\u002F:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}\n\n# Force the default registry to a single proxy that does NOT merge public + private\nregistry=https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-virtual\u002F\n```\nVerify the resolution source before installing:\n```bash\nnpm config get @acme:registry\nnpm install --dry-run   # confirm @acme\u002F* resolves from the private host\n```\n\n### 7. Remediate PyPI and Maven\nPin Python index resolution and Maven mirroring so public sources cannot shadow internal artifacts.\n```toml\n# pyproject.toml (PEP 621 \u002F pip >= 23): explicit index pinning\n[tool.pip]\nindex-url = \"https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fpypi\u002Fpypi-internal\u002Fsimple\u002F\"\n# Do NOT use extra-index-url for internal packages — pip merges and picks highest version.\n```\n```xml\n\u003C!-- ~\u002F.m2\u002Fsettings.xml: mirror everything through a single virtual repo -->\n\u003Cmirrors>\n  \u003Cmirror>\n    \u003Cid>internal-virtual\u003C\u002Fid>\n    \u003CmirrorOf>*\u003C\u002FmirrorOf>\n    \u003Curl>https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fartifactory\u002Fmaven-virtual\u003C\u002Furl>\n  \u003C\u002Fmirror>\n\u003C\u002Fmirrors>\n```\n\n### 8. Defensively register placeholder packages\nFor names you cannot fully isolate, claim the public name yourself with an empty, non-functional placeholder so an attacker cannot.\n```bash\n# npm placeholder claim (scoped, public)\nmkdir acme-internal-utils && cd acme-internal-utils\nnpm init -y\nnpm pkg set version=0.0.1-placeholder description=\"Reserved internal name. Do not use.\"\nnpm publish --access public\n```\n\n### 9. Wire detection into CI\nFail the pipeline if any new confusable dependency appears.\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdepconfusion.yml\nname: dependency-confusion\non: [push, pull_request]\njobs:\n  confused:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - uses: actions\u002Fsetup-go@v5\n        with: { go-version: '1.22' }\n      - run: go install github.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused@latest\n      - name: Scan npm manifest\n        run: $(go env GOPATH)\u002Fbin\u002Fconfused -l npm -s '@acme\u002F*' package.json\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled helper for batch triage\nUse the included `agent.py` to scan a tree and emit a structured report combining `confused` and live registry probes.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --path . --ecosystem npm \\\n  --secure-namespaces '@acme\u002F*,@acme-internal\u002F*' \\\n  --output report.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| confused | Detect lingering free namespaces for declared dependencies | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused |\n| ConfusedDotnet | Same check for NuGet\u002F.NET | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002FConfusedDotnet |\n| OWASP dep-scan | Risk audit incl. `--private-ns` confusion check | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fowasp-dep-scan\u002Fdep-scan |\n| OWASP CI\u002FCD Top 10 | CICD-SEC-03 Dependency Chain Abuse | https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks\u002F |\n| Birsan research | Original dependency confusion writeup | https:\u002F\u002Fmedium.com\u002F@alex.birsan\u002Fdependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610 |\n| npm scopes docs | Scope-to-registry pinning reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscope |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] All dependency manifests in the codebase enumerated.\n- [ ] `confused` run for every relevant ecosystem with secure namespaces supplied.\n- [ ] OWASP dep-scan `--private-ns` run and reconciled with `confused` output.\n- [ ] Each flagged name confirmed claimable (404) or dismissed as a false positive.\n- [ ] Internal scopes pinned to the private registry in `.npmrc` \u002F `pip` config \u002F Maven mirror.\n- [ ] `extra-index-url` and merged virtual feeds reviewed for highest-version pull risk.\n- [ ] Placeholder packages registered for names that cannot be isolated.\n- [ ] CI job enforces the check on every push\u002FPR.\n- [ ] Findings documented with owner and remediation status.\n","# Detecting Dependency Confusion\n\n> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing, defensive engineering, and educational purposes only. Registering or claiming package namespaces you do not own, or testing build pipelines without written authorization, may be illegal and may violate the terms of service of public registries. Only run namespace-claiming or resolution-testing activities against names and infrastructure you control or are explicitly authorized to assess.\n\n## Overview\n\nDependency confusion (also called a substitution or namespace-shadowing attack) was popularized by Alex Birsan in 2021 when he forced malicious code into the internal build systems of Apple, Microsoft, PayPal, and dozens of others. The root cause is that many package managers, when configured to resolve from both an internal\u002Fprivate registry and a public one, will prefer whichever copy has the **higher version number** rather than honoring the source. An attacker who learns the name of a private package (`@acme\u002Finternal-utils`, `acme-billing-sdk`) can publish a malicious package of the **same name** to the public registry (npmjs.com, PyPI, Maven Central) with a very high version (e.g. `99.0.0`). When the victim's CI\u002FCD runner or a developer machine resolves dependencies, it pulls the attacker's public package, executes its install scripts, and the supply chain is compromised.\n\nThis skill covers both halves of the problem: **detection** — enumerating internal package names that are not registered (squatted defensively) on public registries and are therefore claimable, using `confused` and OWASP `dep-scan` — and **prevention** — pinning scopes\u002Fnamespaces to private registries, registering placeholder packages, and enforcing source restrictions in `.npmrc`, `pip.conf`\u002F`pyproject.toml`, and Maven `settings.xml`. Internal package names leak constantly: in committed lockfiles, sourcemaps, public JS bundles, Docker layers, and error stack traces, so this is treated as an attack-surface management problem, not a one-time check.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When onboarding a repository or organization to a supply-chain security program and you need to baseline which internal packages are claimable on public registries.\n- When CI\u002FCD pipelines resolve dependencies from both private and public registries (mixed\u002Fhybrid feeds).\n- After any incident where internal package names may have been exposed (leaked source, public bundle, breached repo).\n- When auditing `package.json`, `requirements.txt`, `pom.xml`, `composer.json`, or `Gemfile.lock` files for confusable dependencies.\n- As a recurring scheduled control to detect newly added internal packages that have not yet been defensively registered.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Go 1.20+ to install `confused`:\n  ```bash\n  go install github.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused@latest\n  # binary lands in $(go env GOPATH)\u002Fbin\u002Fconfused\n  ```\n- Python 3.10+ for OWASP dep-scan:\n  ```bash\n  pip install owasp-depscan\n  # or container: docker pull ghcr.io\u002Fowasp-dep-scan\u002Fdep-scan\n  ```\n- Node.js + npm (for `.npmrc` and `npm config` remediation) and access to your private registry (Artifactory, Nexus, Azure Artifacts, GitHub Packages, AWS CodeArtifact).\n- Read access to the repositories \u002F lockfiles being assessed and write access to your private registry for defensive registration.\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Enumerate every internal dependency declared in project manifests across npm, PyPI, Maven, Composer, and RubyGems.\n- Determine which internal names are **not** present on the corresponding public registry and are therefore claimable.\n- Distinguish true exposure from false positives (scoped packages, already-mirrored names).\n- Apply registry-pinning and scope-restriction controls that make public substitution impossible.\n- Defensively register placeholder packages for unclaimed internal names.\n- Establish a recurring detection control in CI to catch newly introduced confusable dependencies.\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance |\n|--------------|----------------|-----------|\n| T1195.001 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | Core technique — attacker substitutes a malicious public package for an internal dependency. |\n| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Broader category covering the compromised build artifacts produced once confusion succeeds. |\n| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | npm `preinstall`\u002F`postinstall` lifecycle scripts execute attacker JavaScript on resolution. |\n| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Substituted package beacons stolen environment\u002Fcredentials to attacker HTTP(S) endpoint. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1. Inventory manifests across the codebase\nLocate every dependency manifest so nothing is missed.\n```bash\n# Find all supported manifests in a monorepo\nfind . -type f \\( \\\n  -name package.json -o \\\n  -name requirements.txt -o \\\n  -name pom.xml -o \\\n  -name composer.json -o \\\n  -name Gemfile.lock \\\n\\) -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' -print\n```\n\n### 2. Scan npm manifests with confused\n`confused` reads the manifest and reports every dependency name **not found** on the public registry — those are candidates for confusion.\n```bash\n# npm (default language is npm)\nconfused -l npm package.json\n\n# Treat your known-good scopes as secure to suppress false positives (supports wildcards)\nconfused -l npm -s '@acme\u002F*,@acme-internal\u002F*' package.json\n\n# Verbose, to see each lookup\nconfused -l npm -v package.json\n```\n\n### 3. Scan PyPI, Maven, Composer, and RubyGems manifests\nThe `-l` flag selects the ecosystem; each maps to its standard manifest file.\n```bash\nconfused -l pip requirements.txt          # PyPI  -> requirements.txt\nconfused -l mvn pom.xml                    # Maven -> pom.xml\nconfused -l composer composer.json        # PHP   -> composer.json\nconfused -l rubygems Gemfile.lock         # Ruby  -> Gemfile.lock\n```\n\n### 4. Cross-check with OWASP dep-scan private-namespace mode\ndep-scan confirms confusion exposure for declared private namespaces and folds it into a broader risk audit.\n```bash\n# Flag private namespaces accidentally claimable on public registries\ndepscan --src $PWD --reports-dir .\u002Freports \\\n  --private-ns acme,acme_internal,@acme\n\n# Enable deep package risk audit (npm + pypi): typosquats, takeover risk, etc.\ndepscan --src $PWD --reports-dir .\u002Freports --risk-audit\n```\n\n### 5. Triage candidates and confirm claimability\nFor each flagged name, verify it is genuinely absent on the public registry (a 404 means claimable).\n```bash\n# npm: a 404 status means the name is unregistered on the public registry\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" https:\u002F\u002Fregistry.npmjs.org\u002F@acme%2finternal-utils\n\n# PyPI: 404 from the JSON API means the project name is free\ncurl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\\n\" https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fpypi\u002Facme-billing-sdk\u002Fjson\n```\n\n### 6. Remediate npm with scope-to-registry pinning\nBind every internal scope to the private registry so a public package of the same name can never be resolved.\n```ini\n# .npmrc (project root, committed)\n@acme:registry=https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-internal\u002F\n\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-internal\u002F:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}\n\n# Force the default registry to a single proxy that does NOT merge public + private\nregistry=https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fnpm\u002Fnpm-virtual\u002F\n```\nVerify the resolution source before installing:\n```bash\nnpm config get @acme:registry\nnpm install --dry-run   # confirm @acme\u002F* resolves from the private host\n```\n\n### 7. Remediate PyPI and Maven\nPin Python index resolution and Maven mirroring so public sources cannot shadow internal artifacts.\n```toml\n# pyproject.toml (PEP 621 \u002F pip >= 23): explicit index pinning\n[tool.pip]\nindex-url = \"https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fpypi\u002Fpypi-internal\u002Fsimple\u002F\"\n# Do NOT use extra-index-url for internal packages — pip merges and picks highest version.\n```\n```xml\n\u003C!-- ~\u002F.m2\u002Fsettings.xml: mirror everything through a single virtual repo -->\n\u003Cmirrors>\n  \u003Cmirror>\n    \u003Cid>internal-virtual\u003C\u002Fid>\n    \u003CmirrorOf>*\u003C\u002FmirrorOf>\n    \u003Curl>https:\u002F\u002Fartifactory.example.com\u002Fartifactory\u002Fmaven-virtual\u003C\u002Furl>\n  \u003C\u002Fmirror>\n\u003C\u002Fmirrors>\n```\n\n### 8. Defensively register placeholder packages\nFor names you cannot fully isolate, claim the public name yourself with an empty, non-functional placeholder so an attacker cannot.\n```bash\n# npm placeholder claim (scoped, public)\nmkdir acme-internal-utils && cd acme-internal-utils\nnpm init -y\nnpm pkg set version=0.0.1-placeholder description=\"Reserved internal name. Do not use.\"\nnpm publish --access public\n```\n\n### 9. Wire detection into CI\nFail the pipeline if any new confusable dependency appears.\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fdepconfusion.yml\nname: dependency-confusion\non: [push, pull_request]\njobs:\n  confused:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - uses: actions\u002Fsetup-go@v5\n        with: { go-version: '1.22' }\n      - run: go install github.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused@latest\n      - name: Scan npm manifest\n        run: $(go env GOPATH)\u002Fbin\u002Fconfused -l npm -s '@acme\u002F*' package.json\n```\n\n### 10. Run the bundled helper for batch triage\nUse the included `agent.py` to scan a tree and emit a structured report combining `confused` and live registry probes.\n```bash\npython scripts\u002Fagent.py --path . --ecosystem npm \\\n  --secure-namespaces '@acme\u002F*,@acme-internal\u002F*' \\\n  --output report.json\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| confused | Detect lingering free namespaces for declared dependencies | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002Fconfused |\n| ConfusedDotnet | Same check for NuGet\u002F.NET | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fvisma-prodsec\u002FConfusedDotnet |\n| OWASP dep-scan | Risk audit incl. `--private-ns` confusion check | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fowasp-dep-scan\u002Fdep-scan |\n| OWASP CI\u002FCD Top 10 | CICD-SEC-03 Dependency Chain Abuse | https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks\u002F |\n| Birsan research | Original dependency confusion writeup | https:\u002F\u002Fmedium.com\u002F@alex.birsan\u002Fdependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610 |\n| npm scopes docs | Scope-to-registry pinning reference | https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.npmjs.com\u002Fcli\u002Fv10\u002Fusing-npm\u002Fscope |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] All dependency manifests in the codebase enumerated.\n- [ ] `confused` run for every relevant ecosystem with secure namespaces supplied.\n- [ ] OWASP dep-scan `--private-ns` run and reconciled with `confused` output.\n- [ ] Each flagged name confirmed claimable (404) or dismissed as a false positive.\n- [ ] Internal scopes pinned to the private registry in `.npmrc` \u002F `pip` config \u002F Maven mirror.\n- [ ] `extra-index-url` and merged virtual feeds reviewed for highest-version pull risk.\n- [ ] Placeholder packages registered for names that cannot be isolated.\n- [ ] CI job enforces the check on every push\u002FPR.\n- [ ] Findings documented with owner and remediation status.\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":39},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"supply-chain-security","dependency-confusion","npm","pypi","maven","package-management","devsecops","namespace-hijacking","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38],"ID.RA-09",[40],"T1195.001","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dependency-confusion",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dependency-confusion",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dependency-confusion","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002FSKILL.md",true,[62,66,72,76],{"path":63,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":65,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":67,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2275,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":73,"resourceType":68,"resourceTypeDesc":69,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"references\u002Fstandards.md",1643,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":77,"resourceType":78,"resourceTypeDesc":79,"sizeBytes":80,"sourceHtmlUrl":81},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5913,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dependency-confusion\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[83,90,97,104,111,118],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACCCVNCFKMA9X6D15X6G98","runpodctl","Runpod CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":112,"name":113,"nameZh":6,"description":114,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":115,"categories":116,"keywords":117,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":119,"name":120,"nameZh":6,"description":121,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":122,"categories":123,"keywords":124,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]