[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A60AXR1M7Q3HFJRXGCD12N":3,"skill-same:01M7A60AXR1M7Q3HFJRXGCD12N":108},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":53,"commitSha":54,"skillDirectory":55,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":56,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":58,"updatedAt":59,"install":60,"resources":73},"01M7A60AXR1M7Q3HFJRXGCD12N","detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",null,"Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\ndescription: Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- active-directory\n- dcsync\n- credential-theft\n- mitre-t1003-006\n- mimikatz\n- kerberos\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\n---\n\n# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n","# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"d3fend_techniques":47},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"threat-hunting","active-directory","dcsync","credential-theft","mitre-t1003-006","mimikatz","kerberos","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[42,43,44,45,46],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003",[48,49,50,51,52],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform Monitoring","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":61,"prompt":71,"zipAvailable":72},[62,65,68],{"tool":63,"command":64},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",{"tool":66,"command":67},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",{"tool":69,"command":70},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FSKILL.md",true,[74,80,84,90,94,98,104],{"path":75,"resourceType":76,"resourceTypeDesc":77,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",1674,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":81,"resourceTypeDesc":82,"sizeBytes":83,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":85,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":88,"sourceHtmlUrl":89},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2081,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":91,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":92,"sourceHtmlUrl":93},"references\u002Fstandards.md",2372,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":95,"resourceType":86,"resourceTypeDesc":87,"sizeBytes":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3106,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":99,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6252,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":105,"resourceType":100,"resourceTypeDesc":101,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",5977,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[109,116,123,130,137,144],{"skillNo":110,"name":111,"nameZh":6,"description":112,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":113,"categories":114,"keywords":115,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACCCVNCFKMA9X6D15X6G98","runpodctl","Runpod CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":117,"name":118,"nameZh":6,"description":119,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":120,"categories":121,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":127,"categories":128,"keywords":129,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":131,"name":132,"nameZh":6,"description":133,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":134,"categories":135,"keywords":136,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":138,"name":139,"nameZh":6,"description":140,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":141,"categories":142,"keywords":143,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":145,"name":146,"nameZh":6,"description":147,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":148,"categories":149,"keywords":150,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]