[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A600DZC48W8XPRF0ZAPDS7":3,"skill-same:01M7A600DZC48W8XPRF0ZAPDS7":140},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":40,"commitSha":41,"skillDirectory":42,"forksCount":43,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":46,"updatedAt":47,"install":48,"resources":61},"01M7A600DZC48W8XPRF0ZAPDS7","codepipeline-pipeline-auditor",null,"Audits AWS CodePipeline pipelines for artifact-store encryption (KMS CMK presence), cross-account or over-permissive action roles, disabled stage transitions, source-action credential posture (GitHub v1 OAuth vs CodeStar Connection), and manual-approval gate coverage. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per pipeline with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing pipeline definitions, checking for unencrypted artifact buckets, validating cross-account deployment roles, detecting disabled stages, auditing source credential strength, or verifying production approval gates.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: codepipeline-pipeline-auditor\ndescription: Audits AWS CodePipeline pipelines for artifact-store encryption (KMS CMK presence), cross-account or over-permissive action roles, disabled stage transitions, source-action credential posture (GitHub v1 OAuth vs CodeStar Connection), and manual-approval gate coverage. Emits a deterministic verdict (NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per pipeline with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing pipeline definitions, checking for unencrypted artifact buckets, validating cross-account deployment roles, detecting disabled stages, auditing source credential strength, or verifying production approval gates.\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline pipeline-definition classification. Live-account audits use aws codepipeline get-pipeline, get-pipeline-state, list-pipelines, and disable\u002Fenable-stage-transition (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '2'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: DevTools\n  verdict_shape: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\n  when_to_use: Reviewing a CodePipeline pipeline definition before production deployment, checking for unencrypted artifact stores, auditing cross-account deploy roles, detecting disabled stage transitions, validating source-action credential strength (GitHub v1 vs CodeStar Connection), or verifying manual-approval gate coverage.\n  activation_triggers: audit this codepipeline, is my pipeline artifact store encrypted, check for disabled stage transitions, cross-account deploy role in pipeline, github v1 source deprecated, missing manual approval gate, pipeline security audit, over-permissive pipeline role, codestar connection check\n  invocation_schema: 'Input: either (a) a CodePipeline pipeline definition JSON (from get-pipeline), optionally paired with get-pipeline-state output for transition status, OR (b) a pipeline name\u002FARN for live-account audit. Output: deterministic PIPELINE\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002FFINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per pipeline, where VERDICT is one of {NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, DISABLED_STAGE, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.'\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  keywords: CodePipeline, pipeline audit, artifact store, KMS encryption, cross-account role, over-permissive role, disabled stage, stage transition, GitHub v1 source, CodeStar Connection, manual approval, approval gate, artifact bucket, deployment pipeline, CI\u002FCD security\n  tags: codepipeline, security, devtools, ci-cd, encryption, cross-account, pipeline, audit\n---\n\n# CodePipeline Pipeline Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and an unencrypted artifact store is the highest-severity finding\nbecause pipeline artifacts frequently contain source code, build outputs,\nCloudFormation templates, and embedded secrets — all stored in plaintext S3\nobjects when no KMS key is configured.\n\nCodePipeline is the orchestration spine of CI\u002FCD. Five audit dimensions matter:\n\n1. **Artifact store encryption** — the S3 bucket that stores stage input\u002Foutput\n   artifacts across every stage. Without a customer-managed KMS key, artifacts\n   are only as protected as the bucket's default SSE — which may be nothing.\n2. **Action roles** — each deploy action assumes an IAM role (`RoleArn` in\n   `configuration`) that determines the blast radius of that deployment. A\n   cross-account role widens that blast radius to another AWS account.\n3. **Stage transitions** — a disabled transition (`DisableStageTransition`)\n   silently blocks all executions from advancing past that stage. It is an\n   active operational freeze, not a configuration preference.\n4. **Source credentials** — GitHub v1 source actions use a persistent OAuth\n   token that grants access to every repository the authorizer owns. CodeStar\n   Connections are scoped to specific repositories and rotate automatically.\n5. **Manual approval gates** — a production pipeline without an approval gate\n   deploys without human verification. An approval gate without an SNS topic\n   silently drops notifications — approvers never know they are needed.\n\n## Quick reference — verdict thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| Artifact store has no `encryptionKey` + bucket SSE is none\u002FSSE-S3 only | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| Cross-region: any regional `artifactStores` entry lacks `encryptionKey` | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| Any action `configuration.RoleArn` account ID differs from pipeline owner | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 2 |\n| Pipeline state shows a stage inbound transition `enabled: false` | **DISABLED_STAGE** | Step 3 |\n| Source action uses `ThirdParty\u002FGitHub` (v1 OAuth, deprecated) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| `PollForSourceChanges: false` with no EventBridge trigger | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Production pipeline (Deploy\u002FProd stage) with no `ManualApproval` action | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 5 |\n| `ManualApproval` action with no `NotificationArn` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 5 |\n| CMK encryption + same-account roles + all transitions enabled + secure source + approval gate | **OK** | Step 6 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. Deep CodePipeline internals\n(cross-region replication, polling quotas, artifact lifecycle) are in the\n[Deep reference](#deep-reference-codepipeline-internals) section at the end.\n\n## Pre-flight: pipeline structure validation\n\nBefore classifying, verify the pipeline definition is well-formed. Several\nstructural issues short-circuit the audit:\n\n| Attribute | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|\n| Missing `pipeline` key | **ERROR** — cannot classify. Emit ERROR block. |\n| Missing `stages` or empty stages array | **ERROR** — a pipeline with zero stages is invalid. |\n| Missing `artifactStore` AND `artifactStores` | **ERROR** — no artifact storage defined. |\n| `artifactStore` present AND `artifactStores` present | Use `artifactStores` (cross-region mode takes precedence). |\n| Single stage (Source only, no downstream) | Classify normally — a source-only pipeline is valid but limited. Flag lack of approval as CONFIG_GAP if the pipeline name implies production. |\n\n**If the pipeline definition is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing required\nkeys), output:\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: \u003Cname or \"unknown\">\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Pipeline definition is not valid JSON or is missing required fields (pipeline, stages, artifactStore) — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical definition with `aws codepipeline get-pipeline --name \u003Cname> --output json` and re-audit.\n```\n\n**Pipeline-state data requirement (Step 3 prerequisite):** the pipeline\ndefinition from `get-pipeline` does NOT contain transition states — only\n`get-pipeline-state` does. If the input lacks pipeline-state data, note that\ndisabled-stage detection is limited: you can flag stages that appear\nintentionally frozen from metadata context, but you cannot definitively confirm\na transition is enabled without the state output. Always request\n`get-pipeline-state` alongside `get-pipeline` for a complete audit.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious CodePipeline behaviors\n\nAll sixteen non-obvious behaviors (service vs action roles, encryptionKey absence, get-pipeline transition blind spot, GitHub v1 deprecation, polling without EventBridge, cross-region artifactStores, silent approval gates, artifact lifecycle, alias ARN fragility, unvalidated RoleArns, CodeBuild project keys, webhook secrets, retry vs re-enable, UpdatePipeline atomicity, per-pipeline encryption, sourceRevisions override, SUPERSEDED mode): [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n### Step 1: Artifact store encryption (highest priority — plaintext artifacts)\n\nCheck the artifact store configuration for KMS encryption:\n\n**Single-region pipeline (`artifactStore`):**\n- If `encryptionKey` field is absent → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. The pipeline does\n  not manage encryption; artifacts are UNENCRYPTED at rest (or rely entirely on\n  the bucket's default SSE, which may be none). If the input includes bucket\n  SSE metadata and it is `none` or SSE-S3 only, this is confirmed NO_ENCRYPTION.\n  If bucket metadata is not provided, still flag as NO_ENCRYPTION — the absence\n  of `encryptionKey` in the pipeline definition means no customer-managed key\n  governs artifact access.\n- If `encryptionKey.type` is `\"KMS\"` and `encryptionKey.id` is present → pass\n  (encrypted with a CMK). Note whether the `id` is a bare key ID, key ARN, or\n  alias ARN — alias ARNs are fragile (remappable).\n\n**Cross-region pipeline (`artifactStores`):**\n- Check EACH regional store independently. If ANY store lacks `encryptionKey`\n  → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. A common gap: primary region has a CMK, secondary\n  region does not.\n\n**Severity rationale:** artifacts transit the S3 bucket at every stage\nboundary. They contain source archives, compiled binaries, CloudFormation\u002FSAM\ntemplates, Terraform state files, and sometimes environment-specific parameter\noverrides. Unencrypted artifacts are a data-exfiltration vector via S3 bucket\npolicy misconfiguration or IAM escalation on the bucket — anyone with\n`s3:GetObject` on the artifact bucket can read every pipeline artifact without\never touching KMS.\n\n### Step 2: Cross-account \u002F over-permissive action roles\n\nExtract the pipeline owning account from `pipeline.roleArn` (the 12-digit\naccount ID in the ARN). For each action that has a `configuration.RoleArn`\nfield (typically CloudFormation, ECS, Lambda, S3 deploy, Service Catalog,\nand Alex Skills Kit deploy actions):\n\n- If any action `RoleArn` account ID differs from the pipeline owner account →\n  **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. The pipeline deploys into or assumes a CROSS_ACCOUNT\n  role in a different AWS account. This is sometimes intentional (hub-and-spoke\n  deployment, cross-account CI\u002FCD) but is a privilege-escalation risk: if the\n  external account is compromised, the attacker can use the pipeline to deploy\n  arbitrary resources via the trusted action role.\n\n- If all action `RoleArn` values are same-account → pass for this dimension.\n  Note: the action role's own IAM policy may still be over-permissive (e.g.,\n  `AdministratorAccess`), but that requires an IAM policy lookup beyond the\n  pipeline JSON. Flag as a note: \"Action role IAM policy not auditable from\n  pipeline definition — recommend `iam-least-privilege-advisor` on the role.\"\n\n**Special case — the pipeline service role itself:**\n- `pipeline.roleArn` with a trust policy allowing `Principal: \"*\"` is a\n  CRITICAL privilege escalation. However, this trust policy is not visible in\n  the pipeline definition — it requires `iam:get-role` on the pipeline role.\n  If the input includes the pipeline role's trust policy and it allows `\"*\"`,\n  flag as OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE regardless of action roles.\n\n### Step 3: Stage transition state (operational freeze)\n\n**Requires `get-pipeline-state` output.** If only the pipeline definition is\navailable (no state), this step cannot definitively classify — note this as a\nlimitation and skip to Step 4.\n\nFor each stage in the pipeline state (`stageStates`):\n- Check `inboundTransitionState.enabled`. If `false` for any stage →\n  **DISABLED_STAGE**. The stage name and the disabled transition reason\n  (`disabledReason`) should be captured in the findings.\n- A disabled transition means the pipeline is operationally frozen at that\n  point. No execution can advance past it until `EnableStageTransition` is\n  called. This may be intentional (production freeze, incident lockdown) or\n  accidental (operator forgot to re-enable).\n\n**Expert note:** `DisableStageTransition` does NOT stop in-flight executions\nalready running in the disabled stage — it only blocks NEW executions from\nentering. An execution already in progress when the transition is disabled\nwill complete normally.\n\n### Step 4: Source action credential posture\n\nFor each action with `actionTypeId.category: \"Source\"`:\n\n| Provider | Owner | Credential model | Verdict impact |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `CodeStarConnection` | `AWS` | Scoped connection ARN, auto-rotated, repository-restrictable | Pass (secure) |\n| `CodeCommit` | `AWS` | IAM-native (uses pipeline role credentials) | Pass (secure) |\n| `S3` | `AWS` | Uses pipeline role to read bucket | Pass, but check bucket exposure separately |\n| `GitHub` | `ThirdParty` | Persistent OAuth token in Secrets Manager; grants access to ALL repos under the authorizing user | **CONFIG_GAP** (DEPRECATED, credential-exposure vector) |\n| `GitLab` \u002F `Bitbucket` (self-managed) | `ThirdParty` | Varies — typically personal access token | **CONFIG_GAP** (DEPRECATED, same pattern as GitHub v1) |\n\nIf any source action uses `ThirdParty\u002FGitHub` (v1) → **CONFIG_GAP**. The v1\nintegration is DEPRECATED by AWS and should be migrated to CodeStar Connections.\n\n**Polling vs event trigger:**\n- `PollForSourceChanges: true` → the pipeline polls the source every 60\n  seconds. This works but generates excess API calls and has higher latency\n  than event-based detection.\n- `PollForSourceChanges: false` with no EventBridge rule configured →\n  **CONFIG_GAP**. The pipeline will never auto-trigger. If this is paired\n  with a ManualApproval gate downstream, it may be intentional (gated\n  releases) — downgrade to a note instead of a finding. If there is no\n  approval gate and `PollForSourceChanges: false`, flag as CONFIG_GAP (the\n  pipeline silently stops reacting to source changes).\n\n### Step 5: Manual approval gate coverage\n\nCheck for `ManualApproval` actions in the pipeline:\n\n- **No `ManualApproval` action found AND the pipeline has a Deploy\u002FProd stage**\n  → **CONFIG_GAP**. A production deployment pipeline without a human approval\n  gate deploys automatically on every source change. This is risky for\n  production environments where a faulty commit can cause an outage.\n  Heuristic for \"production pipeline\": any stage name containing \"Deploy\",\n  \"Prod\", \"Release\", \"Production\", or any action with `category: \"Deploy\"`.\n\n- **`ManualApproval` action found but `configuration.NotificationArn` is\n  absent or empty** → **CONFIG_GAP**. The approval gate exists but no SNS\n  notification is sent. Approvers are never alerted — the pipeline sits in\n  `InProgress` until someone manually checks the console.\n\n- **`ManualApproval` action found with a valid `NotificationArn`** → pass.\n  The approval gate is properly wired.\n\n### Step 6: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where:\n\n```\nNO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > DISABLED_STAGE > CONFIG_GAP > OK\n```\n\n```text\nverdict = max(all_finding_verdicts)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions pass), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per pipeline)\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: \u003Cpipeline-name>\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n**FINDINGS keyword convention:** each finding description MUST include the\nuppercase concept keyword for the finding category — `UNENCRYPTED` for\nartifact-store encryption gaps, `CROSS_ACCOUNT` for cross-account roles,\n`DISABLED` for disabled transitions, `DEPRECATED` for GitHub v1 \u002F legacy\nsource credentials. This enables deterministic search and alerting on\nfinding categories across pipeline fleets.\n\n### Worked example — unencrypted artifacts with deprecated source\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: prod-deploy-pipeline\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION\nREASON: Artifact store has no encryptionKey — pipeline artifacts (source code,\nbuild outputs, templates) are UNENCRYPTED at rest without a customer-managed KMS\nkey (Step 1). Source also uses DEPRECATED GitHub v1 OAuth credentials (Step 4).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] artifactStore.encryptionKey is absent; artifacts are UNENCRYPTED at rest (Step 1)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] Source action uses ThirdParty\u002FGitHub (v1) — DEPRECATED OAuth token model (Step 4)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Add a customer-managed KMS key to the artifact store:\n     aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fpipeline-with-cmk.json\n  2. Migrate the GitHub source to CodeStar Connection:\n     aws codestar-connections create-connection --connection-type GH --name prod-gh-connection\n     Then update the source action provider to CodeStarConnection.\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge cases (partially malformed definition, mixed cross-region encryption, source-only pipelines, mixed role ARNs, non-production approval): [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify a pipeline with no `encryptionKey` as OK or CONFIG_GAP. The\n  absence of a customer-managed KMS key means artifacts are stored without\n  KMS-managed access control — anyone with S3 access to the bucket can read\n  every artifact without touching KMS. This is NO_ENCRYPTION.\n\n- NEVER confuse the pipeline service role (`pipeline.roleArn`) with action\n  roles (`configuration.RoleArn` inside actions). The pipeline role\n  orchestrates; action roles deploy. An over-permissive pipeline role can\n  modify the pipeline itself; an over-permissive action role can create or\n  destroy any resource the action supports. Audit both, but classify\n  OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE based on action roles (they have the deployment blast\n  radius).\n\n- NEVER assume a disabled stage transition is visible in the pipeline\n  definition JSON. `get-pipeline` does NOT return transition states — only\n  `get-pipeline-state` does. An audit that checks only the definition\n  silently misses every disabled transition.\n\n- NEVER treat GitHub v1 (`ThirdParty\u002FGitHub`) as equivalent to CodeStar\n  Connection. The v1 integration uses a persistent OAuth token that grants\n  access to every repository under the authorizing user. CodeStar Connections\n  are scoped and auto-rotated. v1 is deprecated — always flag it as\n  CONFIG_GAP.\n\n- NEVER recommend removing a ManualApproval gate as remediation. The gate is\n  a safety control — the fix for a missing notification is to add an SNS\n  topic, not to remove the gate. Removing the gate silently makes the pipeline\n  auto-deploy without approval.\n\n- NEVER assume `PollForSourceChanges: false` is always a misconfiguration. If\n  the pipeline has a ManualApproval gate downstream, disabling polling may be\n  intentional (operator-triggered gated releases). Only flag as CONFIG_GAP\n  when there is no approval gate AND no EventBridge trigger configured.\n\n- NEVER overlook cross-region artifact stores. A pipeline with `artifactStores`\n  (plural) has independent stores per region. Auditing only the primary\n  region's store misses encryption gaps in secondary regions where\n  cross-region deploy actions stage their artifacts.\n\n- NEVER classify a same-account-only pipeline with a CMK, secure source, and\n  approval gate as anything other than OK. Same-account action roles are\n  governed by IAM policies (a second authorization layer). The pipeline\n  definition alone does not show over-permission unless the role is\n  cross-account.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting a pipeline as remediation without first verifying\n  no production workloads depend on it. `DeletePipeline` is irreversible — the\n  entire definition, including stage configurations and artifact history, is\n  permanently removed.\n\n- NEVER assume the artifact bucket policy is managed by CodePipeline. The\n  customer creates and manages the bucket policy independently. A pipeline\n  with a CMK can still have artifacts exposed via a permissive bucket policy\n  that grants `s3:GetObject` to `\"*\"`. Note this as a cross-service gap.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nConfirmation gate, snapshot, fail-closed verification, transition re-enable caution, CMK role permissions, additive-change preference: [Diagnostic commands](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\n### For NO_ENCRYPTION — artifact store without CMK\n\n1. Create or identify a customer-managed KMS key in the pipeline's region:\n   `aws kms create-key --description \"CodePipeline artifact encryption\" --profile \u003Cp>`\n2. Grant the pipeline service role KMS permissions:\n   `kms:Encrypt`, `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:ReEncrypt*`, `kms:GenerateDataKey*`,\n   `kms:DescribeKey` on the new key.\n3. Update the pipeline definition to include the `encryptionKey`:\n   ```json\n   \"artifactStore\": {\n     \"type\": \"S3\",\n     \"location\": \"\u003Cbucket-name>\",\n     \"encryptionKey\": {\n       \"id\": \"\u003Ckey-arn>\",\n       \"type\": \"KMS\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n4. Apply: `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fupdated-pipeline.json`\n5. For cross-region pipelines, repeat for each regional `artifactStores` entry.\n6. Enable key rotation: `aws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id \u003Ckey-id>`\n\n### For OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE — cross-account action role\n\n1. Determine if the cross-account deployment is intentional. If it is a\n   hub-and-spoke or cross-account CI\u002FCD pattern, document the trust\n   relationship and add an `ExternalId` condition to the action role's trust\n   policy.\n2. If the cross-account role is NOT intentional, update the action's\n   `configuration.RoleArn` to a same-account role:\n   `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Ffixed-pipeline.json`\n3. Audit the cross-account role's IAM policy using\n   `iam-least-privilege-advisor` to verify it does not grant\n   `AdministratorAccess` or wildcard permissions.\n\n### For DISABLED_STAGE — disabled stage transition\n\n1. Verify the reason for the disabled transition:\n   `aws codepipeline get-pipeline-state --name \u003Cname>` — check\n   `inboundTransitionState.disabledReason`.\n2. If the freeze is no longer needed:\n   `aws codepipeline enable-stage-transition --name \u003Cpipeline> --stage-name \u003Cstage> --transition-type Inbound`\n3. If the freeze is intentional (incident lockdown), document it and add a\n   calendar reminder to review — disabled transitions are frequently forgotten\n   and left in place long after the incident resolves.\n\n### For CONFIG_GAP — deprecated source credentials\n\n1. Create a CodeStar Connection:\n   `aws codestar-connections create-connection --connection-type GH --name \u003Cname> --providers-type GitHub`\n2. Complete the connection handshake in the AWS Console (OAuth against GitHub,\n   scope to specific repositories).\n3. Update the source action in the pipeline definition:\n   - Change `owner` from `ThirdParty` to `AWS`\n   - Change `provider` from `GitHub` to `CodeStarConnection`\n   - Replace `Owner`\u002F`Repo`\u002F`Branch` configuration with `ConnectionArn`,\n     `FullRepositoryId`, `BranchName`\n4. Apply: `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fupdated-pipeline.json`\n\n### For CONFIG_GAP — missing manual approval gate\n\n1. Add a `ManualApproval` action before the Deploy stage:\n   ```json\n   {\n     \"name\": \"Approval\",\n     \"actionTypeId\": {\n       \"category\": \"Approval\",\n       \"owner\": \"AWS\",\n       \"provider\": \"Manual\",\n       \"version\": \"1\"\n     },\n     \"configuration\": {\n       \"NotificationArn\": \"arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:\u003Caccount>:pipeline-approval\",\n       \"CustomData\": \"Review and approve production deployment\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n2. Create the SNS topic and subscribe the deployment team:\n   `aws sns create-topic --name pipeline-approval`\n   `aws sns subscribe --topic-arn \u003Carn> --protocol email --notification-endpoint \u003Cteam-email>`\n\n### For OK\n\n1. No remediation required for the current posture.\n2. Recommend auditing the artifact bucket policy separately for public access.\n3. Recommend verifying the pipeline role's IAM policy is least-privilege.\n4. For cross-region pipelines, verify each regional KMS key has rotation\n   enabled.\n\n## Deep reference: CodePipeline internals\n\nCross-region replication, polling quotas, definition-vs-state, artifact lifecycle: [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent features — V2 pipelines, EC2 runners, cross-account role chaining: [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step-0 expert knowledge, edge-case catalog, CodePipeline internals, recent features\n- [Diagnostic commands](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — remediation pre-flight safety checks and snapshot commands\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F CodePipeline CI\u002FCD Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS CodePipeline User Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fwelcome.html\n- **CodePipeline API Reference (v2)** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **CodePipeline V2 type** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fpipeline-types.html\n- **CodePipeline Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **AWS CLI CodePipeline reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcodepipeline\u002F\n","# CodePipeline Pipeline Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and an unencrypted artifact store is the highest-severity finding\nbecause pipeline artifacts frequently contain source code, build outputs,\nCloudFormation templates, and embedded secrets — all stored in plaintext S3\nobjects when no KMS key is configured.\n\nCodePipeline is the orchestration spine of CI\u002FCD. Five audit dimensions matter:\n\n1. **Artifact store encryption** — the S3 bucket that stores stage input\u002Foutput\n   artifacts across every stage. Without a customer-managed KMS key, artifacts\n   are only as protected as the bucket's default SSE — which may be nothing.\n2. **Action roles** — each deploy action assumes an IAM role (`RoleArn` in\n   `configuration`) that determines the blast radius of that deployment. A\n   cross-account role widens that blast radius to another AWS account.\n3. **Stage transitions** — a disabled transition (`DisableStageTransition`)\n   silently blocks all executions from advancing past that stage. It is an\n   active operational freeze, not a configuration preference.\n4. **Source credentials** — GitHub v1 source actions use a persistent OAuth\n   token that grants access to every repository the authorizer owns. CodeStar\n   Connections are scoped to specific repositories and rotate automatically.\n5. **Manual approval gates** — a production pipeline without an approval gate\n   deploys without human verification. An approval gate without an SNS topic\n   silently drops notifications — approvers never know they are needed.\n\n## Quick reference — verdict thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| Artifact store has no `encryptionKey` + bucket SSE is none\u002FSSE-S3 only | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| Cross-region: any regional `artifactStores` entry lacks `encryptionKey` | **NO_ENCRYPTION** | Step 1 |\n| Any action `configuration.RoleArn` account ID differs from pipeline owner | **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE** | Step 2 |\n| Pipeline state shows a stage inbound transition `enabled: false` | **DISABLED_STAGE** | Step 3 |\n| Source action uses `ThirdParty\u002FGitHub` (v1 OAuth, deprecated) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| `PollForSourceChanges: false` with no EventBridge trigger | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 4 |\n| Production pipeline (Deploy\u002FProd stage) with no `ManualApproval` action | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 5 |\n| `ManualApproval` action with no `NotificationArn` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 5 |\n| CMK encryption + same-account roles + all transitions enabled + secure source + approval gate | **OK** | Step 6 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. Deep CodePipeline internals\n(cross-region replication, polling quotas, artifact lifecycle) are in the\n[Deep reference](#deep-reference-codepipeline-internals) section at the end.\n\n## Pre-flight: pipeline structure validation\n\nBefore classifying, verify the pipeline definition is well-formed. Several\nstructural issues short-circuit the audit:\n\n| Attribute | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|\n| Missing `pipeline` key | **ERROR** — cannot classify. Emit ERROR block. |\n| Missing `stages` or empty stages array | **ERROR** — a pipeline with zero stages is invalid. |\n| Missing `artifactStore` AND `artifactStores` | **ERROR** — no artifact storage defined. |\n| `artifactStore` present AND `artifactStores` present | Use `artifactStores` (cross-region mode takes precedence). |\n| Single stage (Source only, no downstream) | Classify normally — a source-only pipeline is valid but limited. Flag lack of approval as CONFIG_GAP if the pipeline name implies production. |\n\n**If the pipeline definition is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing required\nkeys), output:\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: \u003Cname or \"unknown\">\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Pipeline definition is not valid JSON or is missing required fields (pipeline, stages, artifactStore) — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical definition with `aws codepipeline get-pipeline --name \u003Cname> --output json` and re-audit.\n```\n\n**Pipeline-state data requirement (Step 3 prerequisite):** the pipeline\ndefinition from `get-pipeline` does NOT contain transition states — only\n`get-pipeline-state` does. If the input lacks pipeline-state data, note that\ndisabled-stage detection is limited: you can flag stages that appear\nintentionally frozen from metadata context, but you cannot definitively confirm\na transition is enabled without the state output. Always request\n`get-pipeline-state` alongside `get-pipeline` for a complete audit.\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious CodePipeline behaviors\n\nAll sixteen non-obvious behaviors (service vs action roles, encryptionKey absence, get-pipeline transition blind spot, GitHub v1 deprecation, polling without EventBridge, cross-region artifactStores, silent approval gates, artifact lifecycle, alias ARN fragility, unvalidated RoleArns, CodeBuild project keys, webhook secrets, retry vs re-enable, UpdatePipeline atomicity, per-pipeline encryption, sourceRevisions override, SUPERSEDED mode): [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n### Step 1: Artifact store encryption (highest priority — plaintext artifacts)\n\nCheck the artifact store configuration for KMS encryption:\n\n**Single-region pipeline (`artifactStore`):**\n- If `encryptionKey` field is absent → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. The pipeline does\n  not manage encryption; artifacts are UNENCRYPTED at rest (or rely entirely on\n  the bucket's default SSE, which may be none). If the input includes bucket\n  SSE metadata and it is `none` or SSE-S3 only, this is confirmed NO_ENCRYPTION.\n  If bucket metadata is not provided, still flag as NO_ENCRYPTION — the absence\n  of `encryptionKey` in the pipeline definition means no customer-managed key\n  governs artifact access.\n- If `encryptionKey.type` is `\"KMS\"` and `encryptionKey.id` is present → pass\n  (encrypted with a CMK). Note whether the `id` is a bare key ID, key ARN, or\n  alias ARN — alias ARNs are fragile (remappable).\n\n**Cross-region pipeline (`artifactStores`):**\n- Check EACH regional store independently. If ANY store lacks `encryptionKey`\n  → **NO_ENCRYPTION**. A common gap: primary region has a CMK, secondary\n  region does not.\n\n**Severity rationale:** artifacts transit the S3 bucket at every stage\nboundary. They contain source archives, compiled binaries, CloudFormation\u002FSAM\ntemplates, Terraform state files, and sometimes environment-specific parameter\noverrides. Unencrypted artifacts are a data-exfiltration vector via S3 bucket\npolicy misconfiguration or IAM escalation on the bucket — anyone with\n`s3:GetObject` on the artifact bucket can read every pipeline artifact without\never touching KMS.\n\n### Step 2: Cross-account \u002F over-permissive action roles\n\nExtract the pipeline owning account from `pipeline.roleArn` (the 12-digit\naccount ID in the ARN). For each action that has a `configuration.RoleArn`\nfield (typically CloudFormation, ECS, Lambda, S3 deploy, Service Catalog,\nand Alex Skills Kit deploy actions):\n\n- If any action `RoleArn` account ID differs from the pipeline owner account →\n  **OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE**. The pipeline deploys into or assumes a CROSS_ACCOUNT\n  role in a different AWS account. This is sometimes intentional (hub-and-spoke\n  deployment, cross-account CI\u002FCD) but is a privilege-escalation risk: if the\n  external account is compromised, the attacker can use the pipeline to deploy\n  arbitrary resources via the trusted action role.\n\n- If all action `RoleArn` values are same-account → pass for this dimension.\n  Note: the action role's own IAM policy may still be over-permissive (e.g.,\n  `AdministratorAccess`), but that requires an IAM policy lookup beyond the\n  pipeline JSON. Flag as a note: \"Action role IAM policy not auditable from\n  pipeline definition — recommend `iam-least-privilege-advisor` on the role.\"\n\n**Special case — the pipeline service role itself:**\n- `pipeline.roleArn` with a trust policy allowing `Principal: \"*\"` is a\n  CRITICAL privilege escalation. However, this trust policy is not visible in\n  the pipeline definition — it requires `iam:get-role` on the pipeline role.\n  If the input includes the pipeline role's trust policy and it allows `\"*\"`,\n  flag as OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE regardless of action roles.\n\n### Step 3: Stage transition state (operational freeze)\n\n**Requires `get-pipeline-state` output.** If only the pipeline definition is\navailable (no state), this step cannot definitively classify — note this as a\nlimitation and skip to Step 4.\n\nFor each stage in the pipeline state (`stageStates`):\n- Check `inboundTransitionState.enabled`. If `false` for any stage →\n  **DISABLED_STAGE**. The stage name and the disabled transition reason\n  (`disabledReason`) should be captured in the findings.\n- A disabled transition means the pipeline is operationally frozen at that\n  point. No execution can advance past it until `EnableStageTransition` is\n  called. This may be intentional (production freeze, incident lockdown) or\n  accidental (operator forgot to re-enable).\n\n**Expert note:** `DisableStageTransition` does NOT stop in-flight executions\nalready running in the disabled stage — it only blocks NEW executions from\nentering. An execution already in progress when the transition is disabled\nwill complete normally.\n\n### Step 4: Source action credential posture\n\nFor each action with `actionTypeId.category: \"Source\"`:\n\n| Provider | Owner | Credential model | Verdict impact |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `CodeStarConnection` | `AWS` | Scoped connection ARN, auto-rotated, repository-restrictable | Pass (secure) |\n| `CodeCommit` | `AWS` | IAM-native (uses pipeline role credentials) | Pass (secure) |\n| `S3` | `AWS` | Uses pipeline role to read bucket | Pass, but check bucket exposure separately |\n| `GitHub` | `ThirdParty` | Persistent OAuth token in Secrets Manager; grants access to ALL repos under the authorizing user | **CONFIG_GAP** (DEPRECATED, credential-exposure vector) |\n| `GitLab` \u002F `Bitbucket` (self-managed) | `ThirdParty` | Varies — typically personal access token | **CONFIG_GAP** (DEPRECATED, same pattern as GitHub v1) |\n\nIf any source action uses `ThirdParty\u002FGitHub` (v1) → **CONFIG_GAP**. The v1\nintegration is DEPRECATED by AWS and should be migrated to CodeStar Connections.\n\n**Polling vs event trigger:**\n- `PollForSourceChanges: true` → the pipeline polls the source every 60\n  seconds. This works but generates excess API calls and has higher latency\n  than event-based detection.\n- `PollForSourceChanges: false` with no EventBridge rule configured →\n  **CONFIG_GAP**. The pipeline will never auto-trigger. If this is paired\n  with a ManualApproval gate downstream, it may be intentional (gated\n  releases) — downgrade to a note instead of a finding. If there is no\n  approval gate and `PollForSourceChanges: false`, flag as CONFIG_GAP (the\n  pipeline silently stops reacting to source changes).\n\n### Step 5: Manual approval gate coverage\n\nCheck for `ManualApproval` actions in the pipeline:\n\n- **No `ManualApproval` action found AND the pipeline has a Deploy\u002FProd stage**\n  → **CONFIG_GAP**. A production deployment pipeline without a human approval\n  gate deploys automatically on every source change. This is risky for\n  production environments where a faulty commit can cause an outage.\n  Heuristic for \"production pipeline\": any stage name containing \"Deploy\",\n  \"Prod\", \"Release\", \"Production\", or any action with `category: \"Deploy\"`.\n\n- **`ManualApproval` action found but `configuration.NotificationArn` is\n  absent or empty** → **CONFIG_GAP**. The approval gate exists but no SNS\n  notification is sent. Approvers are never alerted — the pipeline sits in\n  `InProgress` until someone manually checks the console.\n\n- **`ManualApproval` action found with a valid `NotificationArn`** → pass.\n  The approval gate is properly wired.\n\n### Step 6: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where:\n\n```\nNO_ENCRYPTION > OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE > DISABLED_STAGE > CONFIG_GAP > OK\n```\n\n```text\nverdict = max(all_finding_verdicts)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions pass), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per pipeline)\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: \u003Cpipeline-name>\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n**FINDINGS keyword convention:** each finding description MUST include the\nuppercase concept keyword for the finding category — `UNENCRYPTED` for\nartifact-store encryption gaps, `CROSS_ACCOUNT` for cross-account roles,\n`DISABLED` for disabled transitions, `DEPRECATED` for GitHub v1 \u002F legacy\nsource credentials. This enables deterministic search and alerting on\nfinding categories across pipeline fleets.\n\n### Worked example — unencrypted artifacts with deprecated source\n\n```text\nPIPELINE: prod-deploy-pipeline\nVERDICT: NO_ENCRYPTION\nREASON: Artifact store has no encryptionKey — pipeline artifacts (source code,\nbuild outputs, templates) are UNENCRYPTED at rest without a customer-managed KMS\nkey (Step 1). Source also uses DEPRECATED GitHub v1 OAuth credentials (Step 4).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [NO_ENCRYPTION] artifactStore.encryptionKey is absent; artifacts are UNENCRYPTED at rest (Step 1)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] Source action uses ThirdParty\u002FGitHub (v1) — DEPRECATED OAuth token model (Step 4)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Add a customer-managed KMS key to the artifact store:\n     aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fpipeline-with-cmk.json\n  2. Migrate the GitHub source to CodeStar Connection:\n     aws codestar-connections create-connection --connection-type GH --name prod-gh-connection\n     Then update the source action provider to CodeStarConnection.\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge cases (partially malformed definition, mixed cross-region encryption, source-only pipelines, mixed role ARNs, non-production approval): [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify a pipeline with no `encryptionKey` as OK or CONFIG_GAP. The\n  absence of a customer-managed KMS key means artifacts are stored without\n  KMS-managed access control — anyone with S3 access to the bucket can read\n  every artifact without touching KMS. This is NO_ENCRYPTION.\n\n- NEVER confuse the pipeline service role (`pipeline.roleArn`) with action\n  roles (`configuration.RoleArn` inside actions). The pipeline role\n  orchestrates; action roles deploy. An over-permissive pipeline role can\n  modify the pipeline itself; an over-permissive action role can create or\n  destroy any resource the action supports. Audit both, but classify\n  OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE based on action roles (they have the deployment blast\n  radius).\n\n- NEVER assume a disabled stage transition is visible in the pipeline\n  definition JSON. `get-pipeline` does NOT return transition states — only\n  `get-pipeline-state` does. An audit that checks only the definition\n  silently misses every disabled transition.\n\n- NEVER treat GitHub v1 (`ThirdParty\u002FGitHub`) as equivalent to CodeStar\n  Connection. The v1 integration uses a persistent OAuth token that grants\n  access to every repository under the authorizing user. CodeStar Connections\n  are scoped and auto-rotated. v1 is deprecated — always flag it as\n  CONFIG_GAP.\n\n- NEVER recommend removing a ManualApproval gate as remediation. The gate is\n  a safety control — the fix for a missing notification is to add an SNS\n  topic, not to remove the gate. Removing the gate silently makes the pipeline\n  auto-deploy without approval.\n\n- NEVER assume `PollForSourceChanges: false` is always a misconfiguration. If\n  the pipeline has a ManualApproval gate downstream, disabling polling may be\n  intentional (operator-triggered gated releases). Only flag as CONFIG_GAP\n  when there is no approval gate AND no EventBridge trigger configured.\n\n- NEVER overlook cross-region artifact stores. A pipeline with `artifactStores`\n  (plural) has independent stores per region. Auditing only the primary\n  region's store misses encryption gaps in secondary regions where\n  cross-region deploy actions stage their artifacts.\n\n- NEVER classify a same-account-only pipeline with a CMK, secure source, and\n  approval gate as anything other than OK. Same-account action roles are\n  governed by IAM policies (a second authorization layer). The pipeline\n  definition alone does not show over-permission unless the role is\n  cross-account.\n\n- NEVER recommend deleting a pipeline as remediation without first verifying\n  no production workloads depend on it. `DeletePipeline` is irreversible — the\n  entire definition, including stage configurations and artifact history, is\n  permanently removed.\n\n- NEVER assume the artifact bucket policy is managed by CodePipeline. The\n  customer creates and manages the bucket policy independently. A pipeline\n  with a CMK can still have artifacts exposed via a permissive bucket policy\n  that grants `s3:GetObject` to `\"*\"`. Note this as a cross-service gap.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nConfirmation gate, snapshot, fail-closed verification, transition re-enable caution, CMK role permissions, additive-change preference: [Diagnostic commands](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\n### For NO_ENCRYPTION — artifact store without CMK\n\n1. Create or identify a customer-managed KMS key in the pipeline's region:\n   `aws kms create-key --description \"CodePipeline artifact encryption\" --profile \u003Cp>`\n2. Grant the pipeline service role KMS permissions:\n   `kms:Encrypt`, `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:ReEncrypt*`, `kms:GenerateDataKey*`,\n   `kms:DescribeKey` on the new key.\n3. Update the pipeline definition to include the `encryptionKey`:\n   ```json\n   \"artifactStore\": {\n     \"type\": \"S3\",\n     \"location\": \"\u003Cbucket-name>\",\n     \"encryptionKey\": {\n       \"id\": \"\u003Ckey-arn>\",\n       \"type\": \"KMS\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n4. Apply: `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fupdated-pipeline.json`\n5. For cross-region pipelines, repeat for each regional `artifactStores` entry.\n6. Enable key rotation: `aws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id \u003Ckey-id>`\n\n### For OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE — cross-account action role\n\n1. Determine if the cross-account deployment is intentional. If it is a\n   hub-and-spoke or cross-account CI\u002FCD pattern, document the trust\n   relationship and add an `ExternalId` condition to the action role's trust\n   policy.\n2. If the cross-account role is NOT intentional, update the action's\n   `configuration.RoleArn` to a same-account role:\n   `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Ffixed-pipeline.json`\n3. Audit the cross-account role's IAM policy using\n   `iam-least-privilege-advisor` to verify it does not grant\n   `AdministratorAccess` or wildcard permissions.\n\n### For DISABLED_STAGE — disabled stage transition\n\n1. Verify the reason for the disabled transition:\n   `aws codepipeline get-pipeline-state --name \u003Cname>` — check\n   `inboundTransitionState.disabledReason`.\n2. If the freeze is no longer needed:\n   `aws codepipeline enable-stage-transition --name \u003Cpipeline> --stage-name \u003Cstage> --transition-type Inbound`\n3. If the freeze is intentional (incident lockdown), document it and add a\n   calendar reminder to review — disabled transitions are frequently forgotten\n   and left in place long after the incident resolves.\n\n### For CONFIG_GAP — deprecated source credentials\n\n1. Create a CodeStar Connection:\n   `aws codestar-connections create-connection --connection-type GH --name \u003Cname> --providers-type GitHub`\n2. Complete the connection handshake in the AWS Console (OAuth against GitHub,\n   scope to specific repositories).\n3. Update the source action in the pipeline definition:\n   - Change `owner` from `ThirdParty` to `AWS`\n   - Change `provider` from `GitHub` to `CodeStarConnection`\n   - Replace `Owner`\u002F`Repo`\u002F`Branch` configuration with `ConnectionArn`,\n     `FullRepositoryId`, `BranchName`\n4. Apply: `aws codepipeline update-pipeline --cli-input-json file:\u002F\u002Fupdated-pipeline.json`\n\n### For CONFIG_GAP — missing manual approval gate\n\n1. Add a `ManualApproval` action before the Deploy stage:\n   ```json\n   {\n     \"name\": \"Approval\",\n     \"actionTypeId\": {\n       \"category\": \"Approval\",\n       \"owner\": \"AWS\",\n       \"provider\": \"Manual\",\n       \"version\": \"1\"\n     },\n     \"configuration\": {\n       \"NotificationArn\": \"arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:\u003Caccount>:pipeline-approval\",\n       \"CustomData\": \"Review and approve production deployment\"\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n2. Create the SNS topic and subscribe the deployment team:\n   `aws sns create-topic --name pipeline-approval`\n   `aws sns subscribe --topic-arn \u003Carn> --protocol email --notification-endpoint \u003Cteam-email>`\n\n### For OK\n\n1. No remediation required for the current posture.\n2. Recommend auditing the artifact bucket policy separately for public access.\n3. Recommend verifying the pipeline role's IAM policy is least-privilege.\n4. For cross-region pipelines, verify each regional KMS key has rotation\n   enabled.\n\n## Deep reference: CodePipeline internals\n\nCross-region replication, polling quotas, definition-vs-state, artifact lifecycle: [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent features — V2 pipelines, EC2 runners, cross-account role chaining: [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [Advanced patterns](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step-0 expert knowledge, edge-case catalog, CodePipeline internals, recent features\n- [Diagnostic commands](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — remediation pre-flight safety checks and snapshot commands\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F CodePipeline CI\u002FCD Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **AWS CodePipeline User Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fwelcome.html\n- **CodePipeline API Reference (v2)** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **CodePipeline V2 type** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fpipeline-types.html\n- **CodePipeline Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcodepipeline\u002Flatest\u002Fuserguide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **AWS CLI CodePipeline reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcodepipeline\u002F\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":39},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"complexity":32,"entry_point":33,"when_to_use":34,"requires_llm":35,"verdict_shape":36,"invocation_schema":37,"supports_pipeline":35,"activation_triggers":38},"codepipeline, security, devtools, ci-cd, encryption, cross-account, pipeline, audit","2","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","DevTools","0.1.0","CodePipeline, pipeline audit, artifact store, KMS encryption, cross-account role, over-permissive role, disabled stage, stage transition, GitHub v1 source, CodeStar Connection, manual approval, approval gate, artifact bucket, deployment pipeline, CI\u002FCD security","high","false","Reviewing a CodePipeline pipeline definition before production deployment, checking for unencrypted artifact stores, auditing cross-account deploy roles, detecting disabled stage transitions, validating source-action credential strength (GitHub v1 vs CodeStar Connection), or verifying manual-approval gate coverage.","true","NO_ENCRYPTION | OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE | DISABLED_STAGE | CONFIG_GAP | OK","Input: either (a) a CodePipeline pipeline definition JSON (from get-pipeline), optionally paired with get-pipeline-state output for transition status, OR (b) a pipeline name\u002FARN for live-account audit. Output: deterministic PIPELINE\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002FFINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per pipeline, where VERDICT is one of {NO_ENCRYPTION, OVERPERMISSIVE_ROLE, DISABLED_STAGE, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.","audit this codepipeline, is my pipeline artifact store encrypted, check for disabled stage transitions, cross-account deploy role in pipeline, github v1 source deprecated, missing manual approval gate, pipeline security audit, over-permissive pipeline role, codestar connection check","Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline pipeline-definition classification. Live-account audits use aws codepipeline get-pipeline, get-pipeline-state, list-pipelines, and disable\u002Fenable-stage-transition (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. Technopreneur + Infornographer.","2026-09-24 08:54:10",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill codepipeline-pipeline-auditor",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill codepipeline-pipeline-auditor",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill codepipeline-pipeline-auditor","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",true,[62,68,72,76,80,84,88,92,96,100,104,108,112,116,120,124,128,132,136],{"path":63,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":67},"eval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",18891,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Feval\u002Ftest-cases.yaml",{"path":69,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":70,"sourceHtmlUrl":71},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fdisabled-stage-transition.md",621,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fdisabled-stage-transition.md",{"path":73,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmultiple-findings-encryption-wins.md",718,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fmultiple-findings-encryption-wins.md",{"path":77,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":78,"sourceHtmlUrl":79},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-artifact-store.md",786,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fno-encryption-artifact-store.md",{"path":81,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Foverpermissive-cross-account-role.md",708,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Foverpermissive-cross-account-role.md",{"path":85,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-source-no-approval.md",632,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fweak-source-no-approval.md",{"path":89,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":90,"sourceHtmlUrl":91},"evals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fwell-configured-pipeline.md",495,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fbaselines\u002Fwell-configured-pipeline.md",{"path":93,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":94,"sourceHtmlUrl":95},"evals\u002Feval_config.yaml",1992,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Feval_config.yaml",{"path":97,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":98,"sourceHtmlUrl":99},"evals\u002Fevals.json",5105,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fevals.json",{"path":101,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":102,"sourceHtmlUrl":103},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fdisabled-stage-transition.md",2315,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fdisabled-stage-transition.md",{"path":105,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmultiple-findings-encryption-wins.md",2222,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fmultiple-findings-encryption-wins.md",{"path":109,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-artifact-store.md",1955,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fno-encryption-artifact-store.md",{"path":113,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":114,"sourceHtmlUrl":115},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Foverpermissive-cross-account-role.md",2081,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Foverpermissive-cross-account-role.md",{"path":117,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":118,"sourceHtmlUrl":119},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-source-no-approval.md",2105,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fweak-source-no-approval.md",{"path":121,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":122,"sourceHtmlUrl":123},"evals\u002Fprompts\u002Fwell-configured-pipeline.md",2576,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fevals\u002Fprompts\u002Fwell-configured-pipeline.md",{"path":125,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":126,"sourceHtmlUrl":127},"examples\u002Fend-to-end.md",4331,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fexamples\u002Fend-to-end.md",{"path":129,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":130,"sourceHtmlUrl":131},"references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md",12495,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Freferences\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md",{"path":133,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":134,"sourceHtmlUrl":135},"references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md",1842,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Freferences\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md",{"path":137,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":138,"sourceHtmlUrl":139},"skill.usf.yaml",4076,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcodepipeline-pipeline-auditor\u002Fskill.usf.yaml",[141,148,155,162,169,176],{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":147,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADVD60X4PCAPKSE58P9NDC","xray-tracing-deployer","Deploys AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":156,"name":157,"nameZh":6,"description":158,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":159,"categories":160,"keywords":161,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":163,"name":164,"nameZh":6,"description":165,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":166,"categories":167,"keywords":168,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":170,"name":171,"nameZh":6,"description":172,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":173,"categories":174,"keywords":175,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor","Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":177,"name":178,"nameZh":6,"description":179,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":180,"categories":181,"keywords":182,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]