[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A5Z8NHYVJMEVG43JC9APF2":3,"skill-same:01M7A5Z8NHYVJMEVG43JC9APF2":83},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":42,"commitSha":43,"skillDirectory":44,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":45,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":46,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":47,"updatedAt":48,"install":49,"resources":62},"01M7A5Z8NHYVJMEVG43JC9APF2","detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco",null,"Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords: Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falcosidekick, runtime security, syscall. Do not use for authoring individual escape rules - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco\ndescription: >-\n  Deploys and operates Falco with the modern eBPF driver in Kubernetes and Docker, covering\n  driver selection, Helm installation, output channels, and the built-in ruleset that detects\n  container escape, namespace abuse, privileged mounts, and anomalous syscalls. Use when\n  standing Falco up on a cluster, choosing between the eBPF and kernel-module drivers, routing\n  Falco alerts into a SIEM or Falcosidekick, or upgrading an existing deployment. Keywords:\n  Falco, modern_ebpf, kernel module, Helm, Falcosidekick, runtime security, syscall. Do not\n  use for authoring individual escape rules - use detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: container-security\ntags:\n- falco\n- runtime-security\n- ebpf\n- container-escape\n- syscall-monitoring\n- detection-engineering\n- kubernetes\n- threat-detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1611\n---\n# Detecting Container Runtime Threats with Falco\n\n## Overview\n\nFalco is the CNCF graduated runtime-security project (originally by Sysdig) that consumes Linux kernel syscalls and Kubernetes audit events through a driver, evaluates them against a YAML rule engine, and emits real-time alerts. It is the de facto open-source detection tool for runtime threats inside containers, including container escape (MITRE ATT&CK T1611, Escape to Host), namespace manipulation (`setns`), privileged mounts, reverse shells, and unexpected outbound connections.\n\nFalco supports three drivers: the **modern eBPF** probe (preferred default, requires kernel >= 5.8, shipped directly inside the Falco binary so no init container is needed), the legacy eBPF probe, and the kernel module (`kmod`). Driver selection is handled by `falcoctl driver config --type {kmod|ebpf|modern_ebpf}` or `driver.kind=modern_ebpf` in the Helm chart. On Kubernetes, Falco runs as a DaemonSet so every node is monitored, and `falcoctl` automatically installs and updates rule artifacts from the Falco rules registry.\n\nThis skill covers authoring and deploying custom Falco rules to detect the container-escape primitives and anomalous-behavior signals that the breakout techniques in this collection produce. Each Falco rule has the fields `rule`, `desc`, `condition`, `output`, `priority`, and optional `tags`; reusable logic is factored into `macro` and `list` objects. Source: falco.org official documentation; falcosecurity\u002Frules repository; Sysdig Falco detection research (e.g., CVE-2025-22224).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building runtime detections for a Kubernetes or Docker environment\n- Validating that container-escape and lateral-movement attempts generate alerts (purple-team)\n- Adding coverage for a newly disclosed runtime CVE\n- Hardening a SOC's container telemetry pipeline (Falco -> Falcosidekick -> SIEM)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A Linux host (kernel >= 5.8 for modern eBPF) or Kubernetes cluster you administer\n- Falco install:\n  ```bash\n  # Helm (Kubernetes, modern eBPF, JSON output for SIEM ingest)\n  helm repo add falcosecurity https:\u002F\u002Ffalcosecurity.github.io\u002Fcharts\n  helm repo update\n  helm install falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco \\\n    --namespace falco --create-namespace \\\n    --set driver.kind=modern_ebpf \\\n    --set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \\\n    --set falco.json_output=true \\\n    --set tty=true\n\n  # Linux package install (Debian\u002FUbuntu)\n  curl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org\u002Frepo\u002Ffalcosecurity-packages.asc | \\\n    sudo gpg --dearmor -o \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg\n  echo \"deb [signed-by=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg] \\\n    https:\u002F\u002Fdownload.falco.org\u002Fpackages\u002Fdeb stable main\" | \\\n    sudo tee \u002Fetc\u002Fapt\u002Fsources.list.d\u002Ffalcosecurity.list\n  sudo apt-get update -y && sudo apt-get install -y falco\n  ```\n- Basic familiarity with Falco fields (`evt.type`, `proc.name`, `container.id`, `fd.name`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Falco with the modern eBPF driver\n- Understand the rule\u002Fmacro\u002Flist schema and key Falco filter fields\n- Author custom rules for container escape, `setns`, privileged mounts, sensitive-file reads, and reverse shells\n- Load custom rules and validate syntax\n- Trigger and confirm detections (purple-team validation)\n- Forward alerts to a SIEM via Falcosidekick\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |\n|--------------|------|--------|\n| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |\n| T1059.004 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Execution |\n| T1610 | Deploy Container | Defense Evasion \u002F Execution |\n| T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Persistence |\n| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Install Falco and Confirm the Driver\n\n```bash\n# Kubernetes: confirm the DaemonSet is running on every node\nkubectl get pods -n falco -o wide\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco | grep -i \"driver\"\n\n# Linux host: configure driver and start\nsudo falcoctl driver config --type modern_ebpf\nsudo systemctl enable --now falco-modern-bpf.service\nsudo systemctl status falco-modern-bpf.service\n```\n\n### Step 2: Learn the Rule, Macro, and List Schema\n\nCustom rules live in `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco_rules.local.yaml` or `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002F`, referenced from `rules_files` in `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.yaml`.\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n- list: shell_binaries\n  items: [bash, sh, zsh, dash, ash, ksh]\n\n- macro: spawned_process\n  condition: evt.type in (execve, execveat) and evt.dir = \u003C\n\n- macro: container\n  condition: container.id != host\n```\n\n### Step 3: Write a Container-Escape Detection Rule (release_agent \u002F cgroup)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Escape via cgroup release_agent\n  desc: >\n    Detect a process inside a container writing to a cgroup release_agent or\n    notify_on_release file, a classic privileged-container breakout primitive.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and spawned_process\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2) or evt.type=write)\n    and (fd.name endswith \"release_agent\"\n         or fd.name endswith \"notify_on_release\")\n    and evt.is_open_write=true\n  output: >\n    Container escape attempt via cgroup release_agent\n    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name\n     container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect Namespace Breakout (setns \u002F nsenter)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Namespace Change via setns to Host\n  desc: >\n    Detect setns\u002Fnsenter used to enter the host namespace (e.g. nsenter -t 1),\n    a common container-to-host escape technique.\n  condition: >\n    evt.type = setns\n    and container\n    and proc.name in (nsenter, unshare)\n  output: >\n    Namespace breakout via setns\u002Fnsenter\n    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name cmd=%proc.cmdline\n     container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n```\n\n### Step 5: Detect Privileged Mount and Docker Socket Abuse\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Mount Launched in Privileged Container\n  desc: Detect the mount binary running inside a privileged container.\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process\n    and container\n    and container.privileged = true\n    and proc.name = mount\n  output: >\n    Mount executed in privileged container\n    (cmd=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n\n- rule: Docker Socket Accessed From Container\n  desc: A container process reads\u002Fwrites the host Docker daemon socket.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2, connect))\n    and fd.name = \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n  output: >\n    Container touched docker.sock - possible daemon-API escape\n    (proc=%proc.name cmd=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_execution, T1610]\n```\n\n### Step 6: Detect Reverse Shells and Sensitive File Reads\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Reverse Shell From Container\n  desc: A shell in a container with stdin\u002Fstdout wired to a network socket.\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process\n    and container\n    and proc.name in (shell_binaries)\n    and (fd.num in (0, 1, 2))\n    and fd.type in (ipv4, ipv6)\n  output: >\n    Reverse shell detected in container\n    (proc=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container=%container.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_execution, T1059.004]\n\n- rule: Read Sensitive Host File From Container\n  desc: Container reads \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or similar after a likely escape.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2))\n    and evt.is_open_read=true\n    and fd.name in (\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow, \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers, \u002Froot\u002F.ssh\u002Fid_rsa)\n  output: >\n    Sensitive file read from container (file=%fd.name proc=%proc.cmdline\n     container=%container.name)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, mitre_credential_access]\n```\n\n### Step 7: Validate Rule Syntax and Load\n\n```bash\n# Dry-run validate a rules file without starting the engine\nsudo falco --validate \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n\n# Run Falco with only the custom rules to test\nsudo falco -r \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n\n# Helm: ship custom rules via values (mounted into \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d)\nhelm upgrade falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco -n falco --reuse-values \\\n  --set-file \"customRules.custom-escape\\.yaml\"=.\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n```\n\n### Step 8: Trigger and Confirm (Purple-Team)\n\n```bash\n# In a test container, trigger the setns rule\nkubectl run pwn --rm -it --image=alpine --overrides='\n{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"pwn\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\n\"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true},\"stdin\":true,\"tty\":true,\n\"command\":[\"sh\"]}]}}' -- sh -c 'nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- id'\n\n# Confirm the alert fired\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco | grep -i \"Namespace breakout\"\n```\n\n### Step 9: Forward Alerts to a SIEM\n\n```bash\n# Deploy Falcosidekick to fan out alerts (Elastic, Slack, Splunk, etc.)\nhelm upgrade falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco -n falco --reuse-values \\\n  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \\\n  --set falcosidekick.config.elasticsearch.hostport=https:\u002F\u002Felastic:9200 \\\n  --set falcosidekick.config.elasticsearch.index=falco\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| Falco | Runtime syscall detection engine | https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org |\n| falcoctl | Driver + rules artifact manager | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Ffalcoctl |\n| falcosecurity\u002Frules | Maintained default ruleset | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Frules |\n| Falcosidekick | Alert fan-out to SIEM\u002Fchat | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Ffalcosidekick |\n| Falco Helm chart | Kubernetes DaemonSet deploy | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Fcharts |\n\n## Key Falco Filter Fields\n\n| Field | Meaning |\n|-------|---------|\n| `evt.type` | Syscall name (execve, setns, open, connect) |\n| `evt.dir` | Event direction (`\u003C` exit, `>` enter) |\n| `proc.name` \u002F `proc.cmdline` | Process name \u002F full command line |\n| `container.id` \u002F `container.privileged` | Container identity \u002F privileged flag |\n| `container.image.repository` | Image name |\n| `fd.name` \u002F `fd.type` | File\u002Fsocket path \u002F type (ipv4, ipv6) |\n| `evt.is_open_write` \u002F `evt.is_open_read` | Open intent |\n| `user.name` | Acting user |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Falco installed with the modern eBPF driver (DaemonSet on all nodes)\n- [ ] Custom rules file validated with `falco --validate`\n- [ ] release_agent \u002F setns \u002F privileged-mount \u002F docker.sock rules loaded\n- [ ] Reverse-shell and sensitive-file-read rules loaded\n- [ ] Each rule triggered in a lab and the alert confirmed in logs\n- [ ] Priorities set appropriately (CRITICAL for escape primitives)\n- [ ] Alerts forwarded to the SIEM via Falcosidekick\n- [ ] Rule tags include the relevant MITRE technique IDs\n","# Detecting Container Runtime Threats with Falco\n\n## Overview\n\nFalco is the CNCF graduated runtime-security project (originally by Sysdig) that consumes Linux kernel syscalls and Kubernetes audit events through a driver, evaluates them against a YAML rule engine, and emits real-time alerts. It is the de facto open-source detection tool for runtime threats inside containers, including container escape (MITRE ATT&CK T1611, Escape to Host), namespace manipulation (`setns`), privileged mounts, reverse shells, and unexpected outbound connections.\n\nFalco supports three drivers: the **modern eBPF** probe (preferred default, requires kernel >= 5.8, shipped directly inside the Falco binary so no init container is needed), the legacy eBPF probe, and the kernel module (`kmod`). Driver selection is handled by `falcoctl driver config --type {kmod|ebpf|modern_ebpf}` or `driver.kind=modern_ebpf` in the Helm chart. On Kubernetes, Falco runs as a DaemonSet so every node is monitored, and `falcoctl` automatically installs and updates rule artifacts from the Falco rules registry.\n\nThis skill covers authoring and deploying custom Falco rules to detect the container-escape primitives and anomalous-behavior signals that the breakout techniques in this collection produce. Each Falco rule has the fields `rule`, `desc`, `condition`, `output`, `priority`, and optional `tags`; reusable logic is factored into `macro` and `list` objects. Source: falco.org official documentation; falcosecurity\u002Frules repository; Sysdig Falco detection research (e.g., CVE-2025-22224).\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building runtime detections for a Kubernetes or Docker environment\n- Validating that container-escape and lateral-movement attempts generate alerts (purple-team)\n- Adding coverage for a newly disclosed runtime CVE\n- Hardening a SOC's container telemetry pipeline (Falco -> Falcosidekick -> SIEM)\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- A Linux host (kernel >= 5.8 for modern eBPF) or Kubernetes cluster you administer\n- Falco install:\n  ```bash\n  # Helm (Kubernetes, modern eBPF, JSON output for SIEM ingest)\n  helm repo add falcosecurity https:\u002F\u002Ffalcosecurity.github.io\u002Fcharts\n  helm repo update\n  helm install falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco \\\n    --namespace falco --create-namespace \\\n    --set driver.kind=modern_ebpf \\\n    --set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \\\n    --set falco.json_output=true \\\n    --set tty=true\n\n  # Linux package install (Debian\u002FUbuntu)\n  curl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org\u002Frepo\u002Ffalcosecurity-packages.asc | \\\n    sudo gpg --dearmor -o \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg\n  echo \"deb [signed-by=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg] \\\n    https:\u002F\u002Fdownload.falco.org\u002Fpackages\u002Fdeb stable main\" | \\\n    sudo tee \u002Fetc\u002Fapt\u002Fsources.list.d\u002Ffalcosecurity.list\n  sudo apt-get update -y && sudo apt-get install -y falco\n  ```\n- Basic familiarity with Falco fields (`evt.type`, `proc.name`, `container.id`, `fd.name`)\n\n## Objectives\n\n- Install Falco with the modern eBPF driver\n- Understand the rule\u002Fmacro\u002Flist schema and key Falco filter fields\n- Author custom rules for container escape, `setns`, privileged mounts, sensitive-file reads, and reverse shells\n- Load custom rules and validate syntax\n- Trigger and confirm detections (purple-team validation)\n- Forward alerts to a SIEM via Falcosidekick\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique ID | Name | Tactic |\n|--------------|------|--------|\n| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |\n| T1059.004 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Execution |\n| T1610 | Deploy Container | Defense Evasion \u002F Execution |\n| T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Persistence |\n| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control |\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Install Falco and Confirm the Driver\n\n```bash\n# Kubernetes: confirm the DaemonSet is running on every node\nkubectl get pods -n falco -o wide\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco | grep -i \"driver\"\n\n# Linux host: configure driver and start\nsudo falcoctl driver config --type modern_ebpf\nsudo systemctl enable --now falco-modern-bpf.service\nsudo systemctl status falco-modern-bpf.service\n```\n\n### Step 2: Learn the Rule, Macro, and List Schema\n\nCustom rules live in `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco_rules.local.yaml` or `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002F`, referenced from `rules_files` in `\u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.yaml`.\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n- list: shell_binaries\n  items: [bash, sh, zsh, dash, ash, ksh]\n\n- macro: spawned_process\n  condition: evt.type in (execve, execveat) and evt.dir = \u003C\n\n- macro: container\n  condition: container.id != host\n```\n\n### Step 3: Write a Container-Escape Detection Rule (release_agent \u002F cgroup)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Escape via cgroup release_agent\n  desc: >\n    Detect a process inside a container writing to a cgroup release_agent or\n    notify_on_release file, a classic privileged-container breakout primitive.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and spawned_process\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2) or evt.type=write)\n    and (fd.name endswith \"release_agent\"\n         or fd.name endswith \"notify_on_release\")\n    and evt.is_open_write=true\n  output: >\n    Container escape attempt via cgroup release_agent\n    (user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline file=%fd.name\n     container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect Namespace Breakout (setns \u002F nsenter)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Namespace Change via setns to Host\n  desc: >\n    Detect setns\u002Fnsenter used to enter the host namespace (e.g. nsenter -t 1),\n    a common container-to-host escape technique.\n  condition: >\n    evt.type = setns\n    and container\n    and proc.name in (nsenter, unshare)\n  output: >\n    Namespace breakout via setns\u002Fnsenter\n    (user=%user.name proc=%proc.name cmd=%proc.cmdline\n     container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n```\n\n### Step 5: Detect Privileged Mount and Docker Socket Abuse\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Mount Launched in Privileged Container\n  desc: Detect the mount binary running inside a privileged container.\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process\n    and container\n    and container.privileged = true\n    and proc.name = mount\n  output: >\n    Mount executed in privileged container\n    (cmd=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, mitre_privilege_escalation, T1611]\n\n- rule: Docker Socket Accessed From Container\n  desc: A container process reads\u002Fwrites the host Docker daemon socket.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2, connect))\n    and fd.name = \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n  output: >\n    Container touched docker.sock - possible daemon-API escape\n    (proc=%proc.name cmd=%proc.cmdline container=%container.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_execution, T1610]\n```\n\n### Step 6: Detect Reverse Shells and Sensitive File Reads\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Reverse Shell From Container\n  desc: A shell in a container with stdin\u002Fstdout wired to a network socket.\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process\n    and container\n    and proc.name in (shell_binaries)\n    and (fd.num in (0, 1, 2))\n    and fd.type in (ipv4, ipv6)\n  output: >\n    Reverse shell detected in container\n    (proc=%proc.cmdline connection=%fd.name container=%container.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, mitre_execution, T1059.004]\n\n- rule: Read Sensitive Host File From Container\n  desc: Container reads \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or similar after a likely escape.\n  condition: >\n    container\n    and (evt.type in (open, openat, openat2))\n    and evt.is_open_read=true\n    and fd.name in (\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow, \u002Fetc\u002Fsudoers, \u002Froot\u002F.ssh\u002Fid_rsa)\n  output: >\n    Sensitive file read from container (file=%fd.name proc=%proc.cmdline\n     container=%container.name)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, mitre_credential_access]\n```\n\n### Step 7: Validate Rule Syntax and Load\n\n```bash\n# Dry-run validate a rules file without starting the engine\nsudo falco --validate \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n\n# Run Falco with only the custom rules to test\nsudo falco -r \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n\n# Helm: ship custom rules via values (mounted into \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d)\nhelm upgrade falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco -n falco --reuse-values \\\n  --set-file \"customRules.custom-escape\\.yaml\"=.\u002Fcustom-escape.yaml\n```\n\n### Step 8: Trigger and Confirm (Purple-Team)\n\n```bash\n# In a test container, trigger the setns rule\nkubectl run pwn --rm -it --image=alpine --overrides='\n{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true,\"containers\":[{\"name\":\"pwn\",\"image\":\"alpine\",\n\"securityContext\":{\"privileged\":true},\"stdin\":true,\"tty\":true,\n\"command\":[\"sh\"]}]}}' -- sh -c 'nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- id'\n\n# Confirm the alert fired\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco | grep -i \"Namespace breakout\"\n```\n\n### Step 9: Forward Alerts to a SIEM\n\n```bash\n# Deploy Falcosidekick to fan out alerts (Elastic, Slack, Splunk, etc.)\nhelm upgrade falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco -n falco --reuse-values \\\n  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \\\n  --set falcosidekick.config.elasticsearch.hostport=https:\u002F\u002Felastic:9200 \\\n  --set falcosidekick.config.elasticsearch.index=falco\n```\n\n## Tools and Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Source |\n|------|---------|--------|\n| Falco | Runtime syscall detection engine | https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org |\n| falcoctl | Driver + rules artifact manager | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Ffalcoctl |\n| falcosecurity\u002Frules | Maintained default ruleset | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Frules |\n| Falcosidekick | Alert fan-out to SIEM\u002Fchat | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Ffalcosidekick |\n| Falco Helm chart | Kubernetes DaemonSet deploy | https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffalcosecurity\u002Fcharts |\n\n## Key Falco Filter Fields\n\n| Field | Meaning |\n|-------|---------|\n| `evt.type` | Syscall name (execve, setns, open, connect) |\n| `evt.dir` | Event direction (`\u003C` exit, `>` enter) |\n| `proc.name` \u002F `proc.cmdline` | Process name \u002F full command line |\n| `container.id` \u002F `container.privileged` | Container identity \u002F privileged flag |\n| `container.image.repository` | Image name |\n| `fd.name` \u002F `fd.type` | File\u002Fsocket path \u002F type (ipv4, ipv6) |\n| `evt.is_open_write` \u002F `evt.is_open_read` | Open intent |\n| `user.name` | Acting user |\n\n## Validation Criteria\n\n- [ ] Falco installed with the modern eBPF driver (DaemonSet on all nodes)\n- [ ] Custom rules file validated with `falco --validate`\n- [ ] release_agent \u002F setns \u002F privileged-mount \u002F docker.sock rules loaded\n- [ ] Reverse-shell and sensitive-file-read rules loaded\n- [ ] Each rule triggered in a lab and the alert confirmed in logs\n- [ ] Priorities set appropriately (CRITICAL for escape primitives)\n- [ ] Alerts forwarded to the SIEM via Falcosidekick\n- [ ] Rule tags include the relevant MITRE technique IDs\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":34,"domain":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":39,"description":7,"mitre_attack":40},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"falco","runtime-security","ebpf","container-escape","syscall-monitoring","detection-engineering","kubernetes","threat-detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[38],"DE.CM-01","container-security",[41],"T1611","main","7540bbccf0c1ded6156a467b02c95b61ad62413f",".agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena","Currently exploring the intersection of tech","2026-09-11 03:02:31",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":50,"prompt":60,"zipAvailable":61},[51,54,57],{"tool":52,"command":53},"npx","npx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco",{"tool":55,"command":56},"bunx","bunx skills add NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu --skill 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CLI for managing GPU\u002FCPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send\u002Freceive). Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":94,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":95,"categories":96,"keywords":97,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":99,"name":100,"nameZh":6,"description":101,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":102,"categories":103,"keywords":104,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). Use to answer \"how does X work\", \"which GPU\", \"how do I build a container\", or \"how do I stand up a workload on a pod\". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-usage\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBRPE345GF5GM5B8P8RRC","runpod-templates","Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says \"run \u003CX> on a pod\" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-templates\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":113,"name":114,"nameZh":6,"description":115,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":116,"categories":117,"keywords":118,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBJATHKVX1TWES2F44GY8","runpod-migrate","Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-migrate\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACBC7GHVH6T9YEAPCG2AP8","runpod-mcp","Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU\u002FCPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod-mcp\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]