[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A5YWQ17KH2PXMNMCK4CVDS":3,"skill-same:01M7A5YWQ17KH2PXMNMCK4CVDS":108},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":53,"commitSha":54,"skillDirectory":55,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":56,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":57,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":58,"updatedAt":59,"install":60,"resources":73},"01M7A5YWQ17KH2PXMNMCK4CVDS","detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules",null,"Writes and tunes Falco rule syntax for container escape detection - conditions, macros, lists, priorities, and output fields - covering host filesystem mounts, sensitive host path access, kernel module loading, and privileged capability abuse, including how to drive down false positives. Use when authoring or tuning a specific Falco rule for breakout behaviour, or triaging a noisy escape-related Falco alert. Keywords: Falco rule, macro, list, condition, priority, falco_rules.local.yaml, tuning, false positive. Do not use for deploying and operating Falco itself - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco; for tool-agnostic escape signals use detecting-container-escape-attempts.","NeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu","NeelakshSaxena","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F87892838?v=4","01M7A3B9YFS6F6N9DD1787DT86","Neelaksh Saxena","01M7A3B9ZKBT09MNMPX2XN69BY",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.agents\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: detecting-container-escape-with-falco-rules\ndescription: >-\n  Writes and tunes Falco rule syntax for container escape detection - conditions, macros,\n  lists, priorities, and output fields - covering host filesystem mounts, sensitive host path\n  access, kernel module loading, and privileged capability abuse, including how to drive down\n  false positives. Use when authoring or tuning a specific Falco rule for breakout behaviour,\n  or triaging a noisy escape-related Falco alert. Keywords: Falco rule, macro, list,\n  condition, priority, falco_rules.local.yaml, tuning, false positive. Do not use for\n  deploying and operating Falco itself - use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco;\n  for tool-agnostic escape signals use detecting-container-escape-attempts.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: container-security\ntags:\n- falco\n- container-escape\n- runtime-security\n- syscall-monitoring\n- kubernetes\n- detection\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Token Binding\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Restore Access\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- DE.CM-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1610\n- T1611\n- T1609\n- T1525\n- T1068\n---\n\n# Detecting Container Escape with Falco Rules\n\n## Overview\n\nFalco is a CNCF-graduated runtime security tool that monitors Linux syscalls to detect anomalous container behavior. It uses a rules engine to identify container escape techniques such as mounting host filesystems, accessing sensitive host paths, loading kernel modules, and exploiting privileged container capabilities.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting container escape with falco rules\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux host with kernel 5.8+ (for eBPF driver) or kernel module support\n- Kubernetes cluster (v1.24+) or standalone Docker\u002Fcontainerd\n- Helm 3 for Kubernetes deployment\n- Root or privileged access for driver installation\n\n## Installing Falco\n\n### Kubernetes Deployment with Helm\n\n```bash\n# Add Falco Helm chart\nhelm repo add falcosecurity https:\u002F\u002Ffalcosecurity.github.io\u002Fcharts\nhelm repo update\n\n# Install Falco with eBPF driver\nhelm install falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco \\\n  --namespace falco --create-namespace \\\n  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \\\n  --set falcosidekick.webui.enabled=true \\\n  --set driver.kind=ebpf \\\n  --set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \\\n  --set collectors.containerd.socket=\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock\n\n# Verify\nkubectl get pods -n falco\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco --tail=20\n```\n\n### Standalone Installation (Debian\u002FUbuntu)\n\n```bash\n# Add Falco GPG key and repo\ncurl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org\u002Frepo\u002Ffalcosecurity-packages.asc | \\\n  sudo gpg --dearmor -o \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg\n\necho \"deb [signed-by=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg] https:\u002F\u002Fdownload.falco.org\u002Fpackages\u002Fdeb stable main\" | \\\n  sudo tee \u002Fetc\u002Fapt\u002Fsources.list.d\u002Ffalcosecurity.list\n\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get install -y falco\n\n# Start Falco\nsudo systemctl enable falco\nsudo systemctl start falco\n```\n\n## Container Escape Detection Rules\n\n### Rule 1: Detect Host Mount from Container\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Mounting Host Filesystem\n  desc: Detect a container attempting to mount the host filesystem\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    proc.name = mount and\n    (proc.args contains \"\u002Fhost\" or proc.args contains \"nsenter\")\n  output: >\n    Container mounting host filesystem\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name\n     image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline %evt.args)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 2: Detect nsenter Usage (Namespace Escape)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Nsenter Execution in Container\n  desc: Detect nsenter being used to escape container namespaces\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and proc.name = nsenter\n  output: >\n    nsenter executed in container - potential escape attempt\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, namespace, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 3: Detect Privileged Container Launch\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Launch Privileged Container\n  desc: Detect a privileged container being launched\n  condition: >\n    container_started and container and container.privileged=true\n  output: >\n    Privileged container started\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name\n     image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privileged, T1610]\n```\n\n### Rule 4: Detect \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger Write\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Write to Sysrq Trigger\n  desc: Detect writes to \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger which can crash or control the host\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and fd.name = \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger\n  output: >\n    Write to \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger from container\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, host-manipulation]\n```\n\n### Rule 5: Detect Kernel Module Loading from Container\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Loading Kernel Module\n  desc: Detect a container attempting to load a kernel module\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    (proc.name in (insmod, modprobe) or\n     (proc.name = init_module))\n  output: >\n    Kernel module loading from container\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, kernel, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 6: Detect Container Breakout via cgroups\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Write to Cgroup Release Agent\n  desc: Detect writes to cgroup release_agent which is a known container escape vector\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and\n    fd.name endswith release_agent\n  output: >\n    Container writing to cgroup release_agent - escape attempt\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, cgroup, CVE-2022-0492]\n```\n\n### Rule 7: Detect Access to Host \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Reading Host Shadow File\n  desc: Detect a container reading \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow on the host via mounted volume\n  condition: >\n    open_read and container and\n    (fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or fd.name startswith \u002Fhost\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow)\n  output: >\n    Container reading host shadow file\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, credential-access, T1003]\n```\n\n### Rule 8: Detect Docker Socket Access\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Accessing Docker Socket\n  desc: Detect a container accessing the Docker socket which allows host control\n  condition: >\n    (open_read or open_write) and container and\n    fd.name = \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n  output: >\n    Container accessing Docker socket\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, docker-socket, T1610]\n```\n\n## Complete Custom Rules File\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcontainer-escape.yaml\n- list: escape_binaries\n  items: [nsenter, chroot, unshare, mount, umount, pivot_root]\n\n- macro: container_escape_attempt\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    proc.name in (escape_binaries)\n\n- rule: Container Escape Binary Execution\n  desc: Detect execution of binaries commonly used for container escape\n  condition: container_escape_attempt\n  output: >\n    Escape-related binary executed in container\n    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pid=%proc.pid)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, mitre_T1611]\n\n- rule: Sensitive File Access from Container\n  desc: Detect container access to sensitive host files\n  condition: >\n    (open_read or open_write) and container and\n    (fd.name startswith \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002F or\n     fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or\n     fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fadmin.conf or\n     fd.name startswith \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002F)\n  output: >\n    Sensitive file accessed from container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, sensitive-file, mitre_T1005]\n```\n\n## Falco Configuration\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.yaml (key settings)\nrules_files:\n  - \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco_rules.yaml\n  - \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcontainer-escape.yaml\n\njson_output: true\njson_include_output_property: true\njson_include_tags_property: true\n\nlog_stderr: true\nlog_syslog: true\nlog_level: info\n\npriority: WARNING\n\nstdout_output:\n  enabled: true\n\nsyslog_output:\n  enabled: true\n\nhttp_output:\n  enabled: true\n  url: http:\u002F\u002Ffalcosidekick:2801\n  insecure: true\n\ngrpc:\n  enabled: true\n  bind_address: \"unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Frun\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.sock\"\n  threadiness: 8\n\ngrpc_output:\n  enabled: true\n```\n\n## Alert Integration\n\n### Forward to Slack via Falcosidekick\n\n```yaml\n# Falcosidekick values.yaml\nconfig:\n  slack:\n    webhookurl: \"https:\u002F\u002Fhooks.slack.com\u002Fservices\u002FXXXXX\"\n    minimumpriority: \"warning\"\n    messageformat: |\n      *{{.Priority}}* - {{.Rule}}\n      Container: {{.OutputFields.container_name}}\n      Image: {{.OutputFields.container_image_repository}}\n      Command: {{.OutputFields.proc_cmdline}}\n```\n\n## Testing Rules\n\n```bash\n# Simulate container escape attempt (in a test container)\nkubectl run test-escape --image=alpine --restart=Never -- sh -c \"cat \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\"\n\n# Simulate nsenter\nkubectl run test-nsenter --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true}}' -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -- cat \u002Fetc\u002Fhostname\n\n# Check Falco alerts\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco --tail=50 | grep -i escape\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Deploy Falco as DaemonSet** to ensure coverage on all nodes\n2. **Use eBPF driver** over kernel module for safer operation\n3. **Start with default rules** (maturity_stable) then add custom rules\n4. **Forward alerts** to SIEM\u002FSOAR via Falcosidekick\n5. **Tag rules with MITRE ATT&CK** technique IDs for correlation\n6. **Test rules** in permissive mode before enforcing\n7. **Tune false positives** by adding exception lists for known good processes\n8. **Monitor Falco health** with Prometheus metrics endpoint\n","# Detecting Container Escape with Falco Rules\n\n## Overview\n\nFalco is a CNCF-graduated runtime security tool that monitors Linux syscalls to detect anomalous container behavior. It uses a rules engine to identify container escape techniques such as mounting host filesystems, accessing sensitive host paths, loading kernel modules, and exploiting privileged container capabilities.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting container escape with falco rules\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Linux host with kernel 5.8+ (for eBPF driver) or kernel module support\n- Kubernetes cluster (v1.24+) or standalone Docker\u002Fcontainerd\n- Helm 3 for Kubernetes deployment\n- Root or privileged access for driver installation\n\n## Installing Falco\n\n### Kubernetes Deployment with Helm\n\n```bash\n# Add Falco Helm chart\nhelm repo add falcosecurity https:\u002F\u002Ffalcosecurity.github.io\u002Fcharts\nhelm repo update\n\n# Install Falco with eBPF driver\nhelm install falco falcosecurity\u002Ffalco \\\n  --namespace falco --create-namespace \\\n  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \\\n  --set falcosidekick.webui.enabled=true \\\n  --set driver.kind=ebpf \\\n  --set collectors.containerd.enabled=true \\\n  --set collectors.containerd.socket=\u002Frun\u002Fcontainerd\u002Fcontainerd.sock\n\n# Verify\nkubectl get pods -n falco\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco --tail=20\n```\n\n### Standalone Installation (Debian\u002FUbuntu)\n\n```bash\n# Add Falco GPG key and repo\ncurl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Ffalco.org\u002Frepo\u002Ffalcosecurity-packages.asc | \\\n  sudo gpg --dearmor -o \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg\n\necho \"deb [signed-by=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fkeyrings\u002Ffalco-archive-keyring.gpg] https:\u002F\u002Fdownload.falco.org\u002Fpackages\u002Fdeb stable main\" | \\\n  sudo tee \u002Fetc\u002Fapt\u002Fsources.list.d\u002Ffalcosecurity.list\n\nsudo apt-get update\nsudo apt-get install -y falco\n\n# Start Falco\nsudo systemctl enable falco\nsudo systemctl start falco\n```\n\n## Container Escape Detection Rules\n\n### Rule 1: Detect Host Mount from Container\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Mounting Host Filesystem\n  desc: Detect a container attempting to mount the host filesystem\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    proc.name = mount and\n    (proc.args contains \"\u002Fhost\" or proc.args contains \"nsenter\")\n  output: >\n    Container mounting host filesystem\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name\n     image=%container.image.repository command=%proc.cmdline %evt.args)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 2: Detect nsenter Usage (Namespace Escape)\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Nsenter Execution in Container\n  desc: Detect nsenter being used to escape container namespaces\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and proc.name = nsenter\n  output: >\n    nsenter executed in container - potential escape attempt\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, namespace, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 3: Detect Privileged Container Launch\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Launch Privileged Container\n  desc: Detect a privileged container being launched\n  condition: >\n    container_started and container and container.privileged=true\n  output: >\n    Privileged container started\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id container_name=%container.name\n     image=%container.image.repository)\n  priority: WARNING\n  tags: [container, privileged, T1610]\n```\n\n### Rule 4: Detect \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger Write\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Write to Sysrq Trigger\n  desc: Detect writes to \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger which can crash or control the host\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and fd.name = \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger\n  output: >\n    Write to \u002Fproc\u002Fsysrq-trigger from container\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, host-manipulation]\n```\n\n### Rule 5: Detect Kernel Module Loading from Container\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Loading Kernel Module\n  desc: Detect a container attempting to load a kernel module\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    (proc.name in (insmod, modprobe) or\n     (proc.name = init_module))\n  output: >\n    Kernel module loading from container\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, kernel, T1611]\n```\n\n### Rule 6: Detect Container Breakout via cgroups\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Write to Cgroup Release Agent\n  desc: Detect writes to cgroup release_agent which is a known container escape vector\n  condition: >\n    open_write and container and\n    fd.name endswith release_agent\n  output: >\n    Container writing to cgroup release_agent - escape attempt\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, cgroup, CVE-2022-0492]\n```\n\n### Rule 7: Detect Access to Host \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Reading Host Shadow File\n  desc: Detect a container reading \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow on the host via mounted volume\n  condition: >\n    open_read and container and\n    (fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or fd.name startswith \u002Fhost\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow)\n  output: >\n    Container reading host shadow file\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, credential-access, T1003]\n```\n\n### Rule 8: Detect Docker Socket Access\n\n```yaml\n- rule: Container Accessing Docker Socket\n  desc: Detect a container accessing the Docker socket which allows host control\n  condition: >\n    (open_read or open_write) and container and\n    fd.name = \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock\n  output: >\n    Container accessing Docker socket\n    (user=%user.name container_id=%container.id image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, docker-socket, T1610]\n```\n\n## Complete Custom Rules File\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcontainer-escape.yaml\n- list: escape_binaries\n  items: [nsenter, chroot, unshare, mount, umount, pivot_root]\n\n- macro: container_escape_attempt\n  condition: >\n    spawned_process and container and\n    proc.name in (escape_binaries)\n\n- rule: Container Escape Binary Execution\n  desc: Detect execution of binaries commonly used for container escape\n  condition: container_escape_attempt\n  output: >\n    Escape-related binary executed in container\n    (user=%user.name container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     command=%proc.cmdline parent=%proc.pname pid=%proc.pid)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, escape, mitre_T1611]\n\n- rule: Sensitive File Access from Container\n  desc: Detect container access to sensitive host files\n  condition: >\n    (open_read or open_write) and container and\n    (fd.name startswith \u002Fproc\u002F1\u002F or\n     fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow or\n     fd.name = \u002Fetc\u002Fkubernetes\u002Fadmin.conf or\n     fd.name startswith \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002F)\n  output: >\n    Sensitive file accessed from container\n    (container=%container.name image=%container.image.repository\n     file=%fd.name command=%proc.cmdline user=%user.name)\n  priority: CRITICAL\n  tags: [container, sensitive-file, mitre_T1005]\n```\n\n## Falco Configuration\n\n```yaml\n# \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.yaml (key settings)\nrules_files:\n  - \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco_rules.yaml\n  - \u002Fetc\u002Ffalco\u002Frules.d\u002Fcontainer-escape.yaml\n\njson_output: true\njson_include_output_property: true\njson_include_tags_property: true\n\nlog_stderr: true\nlog_syslog: true\nlog_level: info\n\npriority: WARNING\n\nstdout_output:\n  enabled: true\n\nsyslog_output:\n  enabled: true\n\nhttp_output:\n  enabled: true\n  url: http:\u002F\u002Ffalcosidekick:2801\n  insecure: true\n\ngrpc:\n  enabled: true\n  bind_address: \"unix:\u002F\u002F\u002Frun\u002Ffalco\u002Ffalco.sock\"\n  threadiness: 8\n\ngrpc_output:\n  enabled: true\n```\n\n## Alert Integration\n\n### Forward to Slack via Falcosidekick\n\n```yaml\n# Falcosidekick values.yaml\nconfig:\n  slack:\n    webhookurl: \"https:\u002F\u002Fhooks.slack.com\u002Fservices\u002FXXXXX\"\n    minimumpriority: \"warning\"\n    messageformat: |\n      *{{.Priority}}* - {{.Rule}}\n      Container: {{.OutputFields.container_name}}\n      Image: {{.OutputFields.container_image_repository}}\n      Command: {{.OutputFields.proc_cmdline}}\n```\n\n## Testing Rules\n\n```bash\n# Simulate container escape attempt (in a test container)\nkubectl run test-escape --image=alpine --restart=Never -- sh -c \"cat \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\"\n\n# Simulate nsenter\nkubectl run test-nsenter --image=alpine --restart=Never --overrides='{\"spec\":{\"hostPID\":true}}' -- nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -- cat \u002Fetc\u002Fhostname\n\n# Check Falco alerts\nkubectl logs -n falco -l app.kubernetes.io\u002Fname=falco --tail=50 | grep -i escape\n```\n\n## Best Practices\n\n1. **Deploy Falco as DaemonSet** to ensure coverage on all nodes\n2. **Use eBPF driver** over kernel module for safer operation\n3. **Start with default rules** (maturity_stable) then add custom rules\n4. **Forward alerts** to SIEM\u002FSOAR via Falcosidekick\n5. **Tag rules with MITRE ATT&CK** technique IDs for correlation\n6. **Test rules** in permissive mode before enforcing\n7. **Tune false positives** by adding exception lists for known good processes\n8. **Monitor Falco health** with Prometheus metrics endpoint\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"license":15,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":40,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"d3fend_techniques":47},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"falco","container-escape","runtime-security","syscall-monitoring","kubernetes","detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0",[36,37,38,39],"PR.PS-01","PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","DE.CM-01","container-security",[42,43,44,45,46],"T1610","T1611","T1609","T1525","T1068",[48,49,50,51,52],"Token Binding","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Restore Access","Application Protocol Command 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Use for terminal\u002FCI\u002Fscripting, Hub browse\u002Fdeploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpodctl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":117,"name":118,"nameZh":6,"description":119,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":120,"categories":121,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC63SRHEA5KMCHSMZK2TC","runpod","Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU\u002FCPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FNeelakshSaxena\u002FVayu\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Frunpod\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":127,"categories":128,"keywords":129,"publishedAt":20},"01M7ACC0Q1C89N9BZBV91CTQTF","runpod-usage","How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU\u002FVRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv\u002Fapt). 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