detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog
Scan source code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and configuration files for exposed AWS credentials using TruffleHog, git-secrets, and AWS-native detection. Use when integrating secrets scanning into CI/CD, auditing repositories (including git history) for historically committed AWS keys, responding to a GuardDuty alert about credential use from an unexpected location, or verifying credential rotation removed all exposed keys.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-11
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog
- tags
- [ "cloud-security", "aws", "credential-exposure", "trufflehog", "secrets-detection", "devsecops" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- mitre_f3
- { "tactics": [ "reconnaissance", "initial-access" ], "version": "1.1", "techniques": [ { "id": "T1593", "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains", "source": "attack", "tactic": "reconnaissance" }, { "id": "F1006", "name": "Account Takeover", "source": "f3", "tactic": "initial-access" }, { "id": "F1006.001", "name": "Account Takeover: Exposed API Key", "source": "f3", "tactic": "initial-access" }, { "id": "F1006.002", "name": "Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential", "source": "f3", "tactic": "initial-access" }, { "id": "T1550.001", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token", "source": "attack", "tactic": "initial-access" } ] }
- nist_csf
- [ "PR.IR-01", "ID.AM-08", "GV.SC-06", "DE.CM-01" ]
- subdomain
- cloud-security
- description
- Scan source code repositories, CI/CD pipelines, and configuration files for exposed AWS credentials using TruffleHog, git-secrets, and AWS-native detection. Use when integrating secrets scanning into CI/CD, auditing repositories (including git history) for historically committed AWS keys, responding to a GuardDuty alert about credential use from an unexpected location, or verifying credential rotation removed all exposed keys.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1552.001", "T1552", "T1078.004", "T1589.001" ]
02 资源文件 3
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md2.1 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.6 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Detecting AWS Credential Exposure with TruffleHog
When to Use
- When integrating secrets detection into CI/CD pipelines to prevent credential commits reaching production
- When performing a security audit of existing repositories for historically committed AWS credentials
- When responding to an AWS GuardDuty alert about credential usage from an unexpected IP or region
- When onboarding repositories from acquired companies or third-party vendors
- When validating that credential rotation processes have removed all references to old access keys
Do not use for real-time credential monitoring (use AWS GuardDuty or Amazon Macie), for managing secrets (use AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault), or for detecting non-credential sensitive data like PII (use Amazon Macie or DLP tools).
Prerequisites
- TruffleHog v3 installed (
brew install trufflehogorpip install trufflehog) - git-secrets installed for pre-commit hook integration (
brew install git-secrets) - Access to source code repositories (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, or local git repos)
- AWS CLI configured with permissions to check key status (
iam:ListAccessKeys,iam:GetAccessKeyLastUsed) - GitHub or GitLab API token for scanning organization-wide repositories
Workflow
Step 1: Install and Configure TruffleHog
Install TruffleHog v3 and verify it can detect the AWS credential patterns.
# Install TruffleHog v3
pip install trufflehog
# Or install from binary release
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/trufflesecurity/trufflehog/main/scripts/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
# Verify installation
trufflehog --version
# Test with a known test repository
trufflehog git https://github.com/trufflesecurity/test_keys --only-verified
Step 2: Scan Git Repositories for Exposed Credentials
Scan entire git history including all branches and commits for AWS access keys, secret keys, and session tokens.
# Scan a local git repository (full history)
trufflehog git file:///path/to/repo --only-verified --json > trufflehog-results.json
# Scan a GitHub organization's repositories
trufflehog github --org=your-organization --token=$GITHUB_TOKEN --only-verified
# Scan a specific GitHub repository with all branches
trufflehog git https://github.com/org/repo.git --only-verified --branch=main
# Scan a GitLab group
trufflehog gitlab --group=your-group --token=$GITLAB_TOKEN --only-verified
# Scan filesystem paths for credentials in config files
trufflehog filesystem /path/to/project --only-verified
Step 3: Analyze and Validate Detected Credentials
Parse TruffleHog results to identify verified (still-active) credentials versus rotated or test keys.
# Parse TruffleHog JSON output for AWS findings
cat trufflehog-results.json | python3 -c "
import json, sys
for line in sys.stdin:
finding = json.loads(line)
if 'AWS' in finding.get('DetectorName', ''):
print(f\"Detector: {finding['DetectorName']}\")
print(f\"Verified: {finding.get('Verified', False)}\")
print(f\"Source: {finding.get('SourceMetadata', {})}\")
print(f\"Commit: {finding.get('SourceMetadata', {}).get('Data', {}).get('Git', {}).get('commit', 'N/A')}\")
print(f\"File: {finding.get('SourceMetadata', {}).get('Data', {}).get('Git', {}).get('file', 'N/A')}\")
print('---')
"
# Check if a detected access key is still active
aws iam get-access-key-last-used --access-key-id AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
# List all access keys for a user to find active keys
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name target-user \
--query 'AccessKeyMetadata[*].[AccessKeyId,Status,CreateDate]' --output table
Step 4: Set Up Pre-Commit Hooks with git-secrets
Prevent credentials from being committed in the first place using git-secrets as a pre-commit hook.
# Install git-secrets
git secrets --install # In each repository
# Register AWS credential patterns
git secrets --register-aws
# Add custom patterns for internal credential formats
git secrets --add 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}'
git secrets --add 'aws_secret_access_key\s*=\s*.{40}'
git secrets --add 'aws_session_token\s*=\s*.+'
# Scan entire repository history
git secrets --scan-history
# Add to global git template for all new repos
git secrets --install ~/.git-templates/git-secrets
git config --global init.templateDir ~/.git-templates/git-secrets
Step 5: Integrate TruffleHog into CI/CD Pipeline
Add TruffleHog scanning as a CI/CD gate to block deployments containing exposed credentials.
# GitHub Actions workflow (.github/workflows/secrets-scan.yml)
name: Secrets Scan
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
trufflehog:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: TruffleHog Scan
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@main
with:
extra_args: --only-verified --results=verified
# GitLab CI (.gitlab-ci.yml)
secrets_scan:
stage: test
image: trufflesecurity/trufflehog:latest
script:
- trufflehog git file://$CI_PROJECT_DIR --since-commit $CI_COMMIT_BEFORE_SHA --only-verified --fail
allow_failure: false
Step 6: Respond to Detected Credential Exposure
Execute incident response procedures when verified credentials are found exposed.
# IMMEDIATE: Deactivate the exposed access key
aws iam update-access-key \
--user-name compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456 \
--status Inactive
# Generate new credentials
aws iam create-access-key --user-name compromised-user
# Review CloudTrail for unauthorized usage of the exposed key
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=AccessKeyId,AttributeValue=AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456 \
--start-time 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z \
--query 'Events[*].[EventTime,EventName,EventSource,SourceIPAddress]' \
--output table
# Delete the exposed key after rotation is confirmed
aws iam delete-access-key \
--user-name compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIAEXPOSEDKEY123456
# Remove the credential from git history using BFG Repo Cleaner
java -jar bfg.jar --replace-text credentials.txt repo.git
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| TruffleHog | Open-source secrets detection tool that scans git history, filesystems, and cloud services for exposed credentials using regex patterns and verification APIs |
| Verified Secret | A credential that TruffleHog has confirmed is still active by making an API call to the target service (e.g., AWS STS GetCallerIdentity) |
| git-secrets | AWS Labs pre-commit hook tool that prevents committing strings matching AWS credential patterns to git repositories |
| Access Key Rotation | The practice of regularly replacing AWS access key pairs to limit the window of exposure if a key is compromised |
| BFG Repo Cleaner | Tool for removing sensitive data from git history without rewriting the entire repository, faster than git filter-branch |
| GitHub Secret Scanning | GitHub-native feature that scans public repositories for known credential patterns and notifies the credential provider |
Tools & Systems
- TruffleHog v3: Primary scanning engine supporting git, filesystem, S3, and CI/CD integration with verified credential detection
- git-secrets: AWS Labs pre-commit hook for preventing credential commits at the developer workstation level
- BFG Repo Cleaner: Fast tool for removing credentials from git history after exposure is detected
- AWS GuardDuty: Threat detection service that alerts on anomalous usage of AWS credentials from unexpected locations
- GitHub Advanced Security: Platform-native secret scanning for GitHub repositories with push protection
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Developer Commits AWS Credentials to a Public GitHub Repository
Context: GitHub secret scanning notifies that an AWS access key was pushed to a public repository. The key belongs to a developer with production S3 and DynamoDB access.
Approach:
- Immediately deactivate the access key using
aws iam update-access-key --status Inactive - Run
aws cloudtrail lookup-eventsfiltering by the exposed AccessKeyId to check for unauthorized usage - Scan the full repository history with
trufflehog gitto find any other exposed credentials - Generate a new access key for the developer and deliver it through Secrets Manager
- Remove the credential from git history using BFG Repo Cleaner
- Install git-secrets pre-commit hook on the developer's workstation
- Add TruffleHog to the repository's CI/CD pipeline to prevent recurrence
Pitfalls: Simply deleting the commit or force-pushing does not remove credentials from GitHub's cache or forks. The key must be deactivated at the AWS level immediately. GitHub secret scanning may have already notified AWS, triggering automated key deactivation.
Output Format
AWS Credential Exposure Scan Report
======================================
Scan Target: github.com/acme-corp (42 repositories)
Scan Date: 2026-02-23
Tool: TruffleHog v3.63.0
Mode: Full git history scan with verification
VERIFIED FINDINGS (Active Credentials):
[CRED-001] AWS Access Key - VERIFIED ACTIVE
Key ID: AKIA...WXYZ
Repository: acme-corp/backend-api
File: deploy/config.env
Commit: a1b2c3d (2025-08-15)
Author: developer@acme.com
IAM User: svc-backend-deploy
Permissions: S3, DynamoDB, SQS (production)
Status: CRITICAL - Key active and used from 3 IP addresses
Action Required: Immediate deactivation and rotation
[CRED-002] AWS Secret Key - VERIFIED ACTIVE
Repository: acme-corp/data-pipeline
File: scripts/etl_config.py
Commit: d4e5f6g (2025-11-22)
Author: data-engineer@acme.com
Status: HIGH - Key active, last used 2 days ago
UNVERIFIED FINDINGS (Potential Credentials):
Total pattern matches: 15
Likely test/example keys: 12
Requires manual review: 3
SUMMARY:
Repositories scanned: 42
Commits analyzed: 125,847
Verified active credentials: 2
Unverified credential patterns: 15
Repositories with pre-commit hooks: 8 / 42
04 同仓库更多 Skills
runpodctl
Runpod CLI for managing GPU/CPU workloads from the terminal — pods, serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, Hub deploys, models, SSH, and file transfer (send/receive). Use for terminal/CI/scripting, Hub browse/deploy, SSH setup, `doctor`, or when the Runpod MCP tools are not connected. For structured tool calls in an MCP-enabled session, prefer runpod-mcp.
runpod
Start here for any Runpod task — running GPU/CPU pods, deploying serverless endpoints, templates, network volumes, building images, or understanding how Runpod works. Routes to the right skill (runpod-mcp, runpodctl, flash, companion-clis, runpod-usage, runpod-templates, runpod-migrate) and indexes two dozen live-verified end-to-end examples (golden paths) — use it when the lane is unclear, and for any multi-step or provisioning task even when it is not.
runpod-usage
How Runpod works and how to work it — pods vs serverless, GPU/VRAM selection, storage, building a container, networking, plus the agentic pod development loop (provision → ssh-exec → set up → poll readiness) and on-pod install hygiene (uv/apt). Use to answer "how does X work", "which GPU", "how do I build a container", or "how do I stand up a workload on a pod". Guidance, not a tool — execute with runpodctl, runpod-mcp, or flash.
runpod-templates
Runpod's official prebuilt pod templates (ComfyUI, PyTorch, and others): what each image ships, which ports and paths it uses, how to pick one, how to pin a version, and what is missing on first boot. Use when a task says "run <X> on a pod" and an official template already covers it, instead of building an image — and when a user needs help with or wants to fix something about a Runpod template they are already running (won't boot, can't reach the UI, missing models, wrong CUDA line, broken ComfyUI workflow metadata on imported workflows): start here and route onward. Deploy with runpodctl or runpod-mcp; end-to-end walkthroughs live in the runpod router's golden paths.
runpod-migrate
Migrate a codebase from the Runpod GraphQL API or REST v1 to REST v2 — inventory which parts use which API version, rewrite the call sites, flag breaking changes, and verify. Use when someone asks to move to v2, asks what v2 would change, or asks which Runpod API their code is on. For managing infrastructure rather than migrating code, use runpod-mcp or runpodctl.
runpod-mcp
Manage Runpod infrastructure — pods, serverless endpoints, jobs, templates, network volumes, container-registry auth, GPU/CPU catalog, and billing — via the Runpod MCP server's structured tool calls. Use when the Runpod MCP tools (create-pod, list-endpoints, …) are connected in this session, or to connect them (hosted OAuth or local npx). Prefer this over runpodctl for plain infra CRUD when MCP is available; use runpodctl for the terminal, file transfer, or SSH setup.