[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7A4SWR4RX3R1WXCEDHNE48X":3,"skill-same:01M7A4SWR4RX3R1WXCEDHNE48X":144},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":40,"commitSha":41,"skillDirectory":42,"forksCount":43,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":46,"updatedAt":47,"install":48,"resources":61},"01M7A4SWR4RX3R1WXCEDHNE48X","cloudfront-distribution-auditor",null,"Audits AWS CloudFront distributions for insecure TLS viewer minimum protocol versions and viewer protocol policies, missing Origin Access Control (OAC) on S3 origins, missing WAF Web ACL association, disabled access logging, absent geographic restrictions, and default-cache-behavior misconfigurations. Emits a deterministic verdict (INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per distribution with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS posture, validating OAC on S3 origins, verifying WAF coverage, auditing logging status, or hardening edge security.","jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","jhkchan","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F1083902?v=4","01M7A2SVQYP9GQTPTDXP5JKYQ4","Jacky Chan","01M7A2SVS117YWCTZABB75HZR1",4,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloudfront-distribution-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: cloudfront-distribution-auditor\ndescription: Audits AWS CloudFront distributions for insecure TLS viewer minimum protocol versions and viewer protocol policies, missing Origin Access Control (OAC) on S3 origins, missing WAF Web ACL association, disabled access logging, absent geographic restrictions, and default-cache-behavior misconfigurations. Emits a deterministic verdict (INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per distribution with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS posture, validating OAC on S3 origins, verifying WAF coverage, auditing logging status, or hardening edge security.\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline distribution-config classification. Live-account audits use aws cloudfront get-distribution-config, aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control, and aws cloudfront list-distributions (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).\nmetadata:\n  domain: aws-cloudops\n  complexity: high\n  requires_llm: 'true'\n  phase: '2'\n  supports_pipeline: 'true'\n  entry_point: 'false'\n  family: Networking\n  verdict_shape: INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK\n  when_to_use: Reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS minimum protocol version, validating Origin Access Control on S3 origins, verifying WAF Web ACL association, auditing access logging, inspecting geographic restrictions, or hardening edge security posture across distributions.\n  activation_triggers: audit this CloudFront distribution, is my CloudFront TLS secure, check CloudFront OAC, is OAC configured on my S3 origin, does my distribution have a WAF, CloudFront logging disabled, geo restriction CloudFront, ViewerProtocolPolicy allow-all, hardening CloudFront before production, OriginProtocolPolicy http-only\n  invocation_schema: 'Input: either (a) a CloudFront distribution config JSON, optionally paired with origin-access-control metadata, OR (b) a distribution id for live-account audit. Output: deterministic DISTRIBUTION\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002F FINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per distribution, where VERDICT belongs to {INSECURE_TLS, NO_OAC, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.'\n  version: 0.1.0\n  author: Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder\n  keywords: CloudFront, distribution audit, TLS minimum protocol, TLSv1.2_2021, Origin Access Control, OAC, OAI, ViewerProtocolPolicy, OriginProtocolPolicy, WAF association, Web ACL, access logging, geographic restrictions, geo restriction, default cache behavior, default root object, S3 website endpoint, edge security, HTTPS enforcement, distribution hardening\n  tags: cloudfront, security, tls, oac, waf, logging, geo-restriction, networking, audit\n---\n\n# CloudFront Distribution Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and three CloudFront misconfigurations dominate real-world\nincidents — weak TLS minimum protocol (cipher-suite downgrade), missing OAC on\nS3 origins (direct bucket bypass), and absent WAF at the edge (no L7 filtering).\n\nCloudFront is the public edge of your infrastructure. Every request from every\nuser touches it before reaching origins.\n- **TLS minimum protocol** is the weakest cipher a viewer may negotiate. A\n  weak policy silently downgrades connections even when the browser supports\n  stronger ciphers — the server picks the floor, not the ceiling.\n- **Missing OAC on an S3 origin** means the bucket must be publicly readable\n  for CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront entirely and\n  hit the bucket directly — WAF, geo restrictions, and signed URLs all\n  evaporate.\n- **No WAF at the edge** means OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, path traversal)\n  reach the origin unfiltered. The origin must defend itself, which defeats\n  the purpose of an edge security layer.\n\n## Quick reference — verdict thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| `MinimumProtocolVersion` \u003C `TLSv1.2_2021` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 2 |\n| `ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all` on default cache behavior | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 1 |\n| Custom origin `OriginProtocolPolicy: http-only` or `match-viewer` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 3 |\n| Origin domain is S3 website endpoint (`s3-website-*`) | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 4 |\n| S3 REST origin with no OAC AND no legacy OAI | **NO_OAC** | Step 5 |\n| No WAF Web ACL associated (`WebACLId` empty) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 6 |\n| `Logging.Enabled: false` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 7 |\n| `GeoRestriction.RestrictionType: none` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 8 |\n| Empty `DefaultRootObject` on S3 origin | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 9 |\n| All dimensions pass | **OK** | Step 10 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. The verdict priority is\nINSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK.\n\n## Pre-flight: distribution metadata gate\n\nBefore evaluating the distribution config, classify the distribution itself.\nSeveral attributes **short-circuit** the audit.\n\n**Multi-distribution sweep note (pagination):** when auditing every\ndistribution in an account, `aws cloudfront list-distributions` returns at\nmost 200 per page. Use `--marker` from the prior `NextMarker` to page through\nall distributions; iterating only the first page silently skips stale or\nforgotten distributions (the ones most likely to be misconfigured).\n\n| Attribute | Value | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|---|\n| `Enabled` | `false` | **Disabled distribution** — serves no traffic. Note as operational but still audit the config (it may be re-enabled). |\n| `Enabled` | `true` | Proceed with full audit. |\n| Origin type | S3 REST (`*.s3.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`) | Evaluate OAC\u002FOAI (Step 5). |\n| Origin type | S3 website (`*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`) | **Critical** — jump to Step 4. Forces public bucket. |\n| Origin type | Custom (`api.example.com`, ALB, etc.) | Evaluate OriginProtocolPolicy (Step 3). Skip OAC check. |\n| `ViewerCertificate.Certificate` | ACM cert not in us-east-1 | Note as deployment risk — CloudFront requires ACM certs in us-east-1. |\n\n**If the distribution config JSON is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing\n`Origins` or `DefaultCacheBehavior`), output:\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: \u003Cid>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Distribution config is not valid JSON or is missing required fields — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical config with `aws cloudfront get-distribution-config --id \u003Cid> --output json` and re-audit.\n```\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious CloudFront behaviors that change classification\n\nStep 0 expert knowledge (cipher-suite year suffixes, redirect-to-https caveat, match-viewer exposure, OAC vs OAI, website endpoints, us-east-1 WAF, WebACLId ARN, root-object listings, log-delivery ACLs, FLE deprecation, TrustedKeyGroups) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand before classifying any dimension.\n\n### Step 1: Viewer protocol policy (TLS exposure to the viewer)\n\nEvaluate `DefaultCacheBehavior.ViewerProtocolPolicy`:\n\n- **`allow-all`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. CloudFront serves content over both\n  HTTP and HTTPS. HTTP traffic between viewer and edge is sniffable,\n  modifiable (MITM), and never encrypted. This is the most severe TLS finding\n  because it actively serves unencrypted content.\n\n- **`redirect-to-https`** → OK for this dimension (note the initial-HTTP\n  caveat from Step 0). Acceptable for most workloads.\n\n- **`https-only`** → OK. CloudFront rejects all HTTP requests at the edge.\n\n### Step 2: TLS minimum protocol version\n\nEvaluate `ViewerCertificate.MinimumProtocolVersion`. The threshold is\n`TLSv1.2_2021` — anything below is INSECURE_TLS:\n\n| Value | Verdict | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SSLv3` | **INSECURE_TLS** | POODLE attack — completely broken protocol. |\n| `TLSv1` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Deprecated (RFC 8996). Enables BEAST, CRIME variants. |\n| `TLSv1_2016` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Allows TLS 1.0 negotiation; weak cipher suite. |\n| `TLSv1.1_2016` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Allows TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 negotiation; deprecated protocols. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2018` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Includes CBC-mode ciphers vulnerable to padding oracles. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2019` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Still permits `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256` (CBC); weaker than 2021. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2021` | **OK** | AEAD-only cipher suite (GCM); minimum acceptable posture. |\n\nIf there is no `ViewerCertificate` block (the distribution uses the default\nCloudFront certificate), this only applies if the distribution has alternate\ndomain names. A distribution with no alternate domain names uses the default\n`*.cloudfront.net` certificate, which is always TLS 1.2+ — skip this check.\n\n### Step 3: Origin protocol policy (custom origins only)\n\nFor origins with `CustomOriginConfig`, evaluate `OriginProtocolPolicy`:\n\n- **`http-only`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. CloudFront connects to the origin over\n  plaintext HTTP. All traffic between edge and origin (including custom\n  headers with secrets) is unencrypted.\n\n- **`match-viewer`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. If the viewer used HTTP (before a\n  redirect), CloudFront connects to the origin over HTTP too. The origin\n  traffic inherits the viewer's (potentially insecure) protocol.\n\n- **`https-only`** → OK. CloudFront always uses HTTPS to the origin.\n\nSkip this step for S3 origins — CloudFront-to-S3 traffic uses S3's internal\nprotocol and is encrypted in transit by AWS infrastructure.\n\n### Step 4: S3 website endpoint origin (forces public bucket)\n\nIf any origin's `DomainName` matches the S3 website endpoint pattern\n(`*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`), classify as **INSECURE_TLS**. The website\nendpoint requires the bucket to be publicly readable — it bypasses S3 access\npolicies entirely. Users can enumerate and read objects directly from the\nbucket, bypassing CloudFront, WAF, and geo restrictions.\n\nThe remediation is to switch the origin to the REST endpoint\n(`bucket.s3.amazonaws.com`) and configure OAC. This is Step 4 (before OAC\ncheck) because it is both an origin exposure AND a TLS issue (website\nendpoints do not support HTTPS on the origin connection).\n\n### Step 5: Origin Access Control (S3 REST origins)\n\nFor each S3 REST origin (`*.s3.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`,\n`*.s3.dualstack.*.amazonaws.com`):\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is present and non-empty** → OK for this\n  dimension. The OAC is configured (verify the OAC exists via\n  `aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control --id \u003Cid>`).\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is empty AND\n  `S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity` is empty** → **NO_OAC**. Neither OAC\n  nor legacy OAI is configured. The S3 bucket must be publicly readable for\n  CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront and access the\n  bucket directly.\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is empty AND\n  `S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity` is non-empty** → **CONFIG_GAP**\n  (not NO_OAC). The legacy OAI keeps the bucket private (not an exposure),\n  but OAI is deprecated and does not support SSE-KMS. Flag for migration to\n  OAC.\n\nA distribution with multiple S3 origins where ANY origin lacks OAC is\nclassified by the **worst** origin — one origin without OAC means NO_OAC for\nthe whole distribution.\n\n### Step 6: WAF Web ACL association\n\nEvaluate `WebACLId`:\n\n- **`WebACLId` is empty or absent** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No WAF at the edge.\n  OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, bot, path traversal) reach the origin unfiltered.\n  The origin must defend itself, defeating the purpose of edge security.\n\n- **`WebACLId` contains a Web ACL ARN** → OK for this dimension. The WAF is\n  associated. Note: verify the Web ACL has rules (an empty Web ACL provides\n  no protection) — but this audit checks association, not rule quality (use\n  the `wafv2-web-acl-auditor` skill for rule-level analysis).\n\n### Step 7: Access logging\n\nEvaluate `Logging.Enabled`:\n\n- **`Logging.Enabled: false`** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No access logs. Breach\n  forensics, anomaly detection, and compliance auditing have no signal. For\n  PCI\u002FHIPAA\u002FSOC2, logging is a control requirement.\n\n- **`Logging.Enabled: true`** → OK for this dimension. Note: verify the\n  logging bucket has the correct ACL grant for `awslogsdelivery` (Step 0\n  expert note). Enabled logging with a misconfigured bucket silently drops\n  logs.\n\n### Step 8: Geographic restrictions\n\nEvaluate `Restrictions.GeoRestriction.RestrictionType`:\n\n- **`none`** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No geo restriction. The distribution serves\n  all countries. For workloads with regulatory or compliance boundaries\n  (GDPR data residency, OFAC sanctions), this is a control gap.\n\n- **`whitelist`** → OK. Only listed countries can access.\n- **`blacklist`** → OK. Listed countries are blocked.\n\n### Step 9: Default root object\n\nEvaluate `DefaultRootObject`:\n\n- **Empty string AND origin is S3** → **CONFIG_GAP**. Requests to the\n  distribution root return the S3 XML object listing — information disclosure\n  of object keys and metadata.\n\n- **Non-empty** → OK for this dimension.\n- **Empty AND origin is custom** → note but do not flag (custom origins\n  handle root requests per their own logic).\n\n### Step 10: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where\nINSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK:\n\n```text\nverdict = max(all_step_severities)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions pass), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per distribution)\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: \u003Cdistribution-id>\nVERDICT: INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [INSECURE_TLS] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [OK] \u003Cdimension that passed>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Worked example — weak TLS and missing OAC\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: E1A2B3C4D5\nVERDICT: INSECURE_TLS\nREASON: MinimumProtocolVersion is TLSv1.2_2019 (below TLSv1.2_2021 — CBC-mode\nciphers still permitted) (Step 2). S3 origin also has no OAC (Step 5).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [INSECURE_TLS] MinimumProtocolVersion TLSv1.2_2019 includes CBC-mode ciphers\n    vulnerable to padding-oracle variants (Step 2) — TLSv1.2_2021 removes them\n  - [NO_OAC] S3 origin \"app-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com\" has no OAC and no legacy\n    OAI — bucket must be publicly readable (Step 5)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] No WAF Web ACL associated (Step 6)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] Logging.Enabled is false (Step 7)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Update MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021.\n  2. Create OAC and attach to the S3 origin; update bucket policy.\n  3. Associate a Web ACL (must be in us-east-1).\n  4. Enable access logging to an S3 bucket with awslogsdelivery ACL grant.\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case catalog (partial configs, multi-behavior, multi-origin, mixed origins, ACM region, real-time vs standard logging) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when the distribution shape is non-trivial.\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify `MinimumProtocolVersion: TLSv1.2_2019` as OK. The `_2019`\n  policy still permits CBC-mode ciphers (`ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256`). Only\n  `TLSv1.2_2021` restricts the cipher suite to AEAD-only (GCM). Treating\n  `_2019` as acceptable misses the cipher-suite downgrade — the most\n  common false-negative in CloudFront TLS audits.\n\n- NEVER treat `ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all` as acceptable. This actively\n  serves content over plaintext HTTP — every request between viewer and edge\n  is sniffable. `allow-all` is not \"flexible\"; it is a compliance violation\n  under PCI-DSS 4.1, HIPAA 164.312(e), and SOC2 CC6.1.\n\n- NEVER classify an S3 origin without OAC as CONFIG_GAP when OAI is also\n  absent. Without either mechanism, the bucket MUST be public — that is a\n  direct-origin bypass, not a configuration gap. OAI-only (no OAC) is\n  CONFIG_GAP; neither OAC nor OAI is NO_OAC.\n\n- NEVER treat `OriginProtocolPolicy: match-viewer` as equivalent to\n  `https-only`. `match-viewer` propagates the viewer's protocol — if the\n  viewer connected over HTTP (before a redirect-to-https), the origin\n  connection is also HTTP. Only `https-only` guarantees encrypted origin\n  traffic regardless of viewer protocol.\n\n- NEVER classify an S3 website endpoint origin as a simple origin type\n  difference. The website endpoint forces the bucket to be publicly readable\n  — it bypasses all S3 access policies. This is an active data exposure, not\n  a style preference. The only valid remediation is switching to the REST\n  endpoint with OAC.\n\n- NEVER assume `WebACLId: \"\"` means \"WAFv2 not supported on this\n  distribution.\" The field stores the WAFv2 ARN for WAFv2 ACLs and the ID\n  for WAF Classic ACLs. An empty string always means no association,\n  regardless of WAF generation.\n\n- NEVER flag `GeoRestriction: none` as INSECURE_TLS or NO_OAC. A missing geo\n  restriction is a CONFIG_GAP — defense-in-depth, not an active exposure.\n  Conflating it with TLS or origin issues dilutes the severity signal.\n\n- NEVER recommend disabling a distribution as remediation without confirming\n  the impact. A disabled distribution serves zero traffic — every dependent\n  workload experiences an immediate outage. Always confirm with the operator\n  before recommending `Enabled: false`.\n\n- NEVER assume logging is working just because `Logging.Enabled: true`. The\n  logging bucket must have an ACL grant to `awslogsdelivery`. A bucket with\n  ACLs disabled (BucketOwnerEnforced) silently rejects all CloudFront logs.\n  Verify the bucket ACL separately in live-account audits.\n\n- NEVER confuse the default cache behavior with path-specific cache behaviors\n  for viewer protocol policy. Only the default behavior drives the verdict —\n  it applies to unmatched paths. A path-specific behavior with\n  `https-only` does not override a default behavior with `allow-all`.\n\n- NEVER recommend migrating from OAI to OAC without updating the S3 bucket\n  policy. OAC requires a different bucket policy statement\n  (`Service: cloudfront.amazonaws.com` with the OAC ARN condition) than OAI\n  (`CanonicalUser` with the CloudFront canonical ID). Migrating without the\n  policy update breaks all object access (403 Forbidden).\n\n- NEVER flag an empty `TrustedKeyGroups` on a public-content distribution.\n  Signed URLs are only needed for access-controlled content. Public\n  distributions (marketing sites, documentation) intentionally have no\n  trusted key groups.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nPre-flight safety checks (CONFIRMATION GATE, rollback snapshot, ETag requirement, TLS client coordination, OAC+bucket-policy pairing, us-east-1 Web ACL, propagation delay) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\nLoad them before emitting any remediation CLI.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation CLI sequences (TLS minimum, viewer policy, origin protocol, website endpoint, OAC, WAF, logging, geo, legacy OAI, OK posture) moved verbatim to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md).\nLoad on demand when writing the REMEDIATION block.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent AWS features (2024-2026) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when auditing VPC origins, KeyValueStore, continuous deployment, TLS 1.3, or non-S3 OAC origins.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step 0 expert knowledge, edge-case catalog, and recent AWS features moved from SKILL.md\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — pre-flight safety checks moved from SKILL.md\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — per-verdict remediation CLI sequences moved from SKILL.md\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F CloudFront Edge Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **Amazon CloudFront Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002FIntroduction.html\n- **CloudFront Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **CloudFront API Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcloudfront\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **CloudFront CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcloudfront\u002F\n- **Origin Access Control** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002Fprivate-content-restricting-access-to-s3.html\n- **Blog: VPC origins** — https:\u002F\u002Faws.amazon.com\u002Fblogs\u002Fnetworking-and-content-delivery\u002Fintroducing-amazon-cloudfront-vpc-origins\u002F\n","# CloudFront Distribution Auditor\n\n## Mindset\n\n**One-line takeaway:** the verdict is always the **worst** finding across all\ndimensions, and three CloudFront misconfigurations dominate real-world\nincidents — weak TLS minimum protocol (cipher-suite downgrade), missing OAC on\nS3 origins (direct bucket bypass), and absent WAF at the edge (no L7 filtering).\n\nCloudFront is the public edge of your infrastructure. Every request from every\nuser touches it before reaching origins.\n- **TLS minimum protocol** is the weakest cipher a viewer may negotiate. A\n  weak policy silently downgrades connections even when the browser supports\n  stronger ciphers — the server picks the floor, not the ceiling.\n- **Missing OAC on an S3 origin** means the bucket must be publicly readable\n  for CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront entirely and\n  hit the bucket directly — WAF, geo restrictions, and signed URLs all\n  evaporate.\n- **No WAF at the edge** means OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, path traversal)\n  reach the origin unfiltered. The origin must defend itself, which defeats\n  the purpose of an edge security layer.\n\n## Quick reference — verdict thresholds\n\n| Condition | Verdict | Step |\n|---|---|---|\n| `MinimumProtocolVersion` \u003C `TLSv1.2_2021` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 2 |\n| `ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all` on default cache behavior | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 1 |\n| Custom origin `OriginProtocolPolicy: http-only` or `match-viewer` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 3 |\n| Origin domain is S3 website endpoint (`s3-website-*`) | **INSECURE_TLS** | Step 4 |\n| S3 REST origin with no OAC AND no legacy OAI | **NO_OAC** | Step 5 |\n| No WAF Web ACL associated (`WebACLId` empty) | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 6 |\n| `Logging.Enabled: false` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 7 |\n| `GeoRestriction.RestrictionType: none` | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 8 |\n| Empty `DefaultRootObject` on S3 origin | **CONFIG_GAP** | Step 9 |\n| All dimensions pass | **OK** | Step 10 |\n\nSee the ordered steps below for edge cases. The verdict priority is\nINSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK.\n\n## Pre-flight: distribution metadata gate\n\nBefore evaluating the distribution config, classify the distribution itself.\nSeveral attributes **short-circuit** the audit.\n\n**Multi-distribution sweep note (pagination):** when auditing every\ndistribution in an account, `aws cloudfront list-distributions` returns at\nmost 200 per page. Use `--marker` from the prior `NextMarker` to page through\nall distributions; iterating only the first page silently skips stale or\nforgotten distributions (the ones most likely to be misconfigured).\n\n| Attribute | Value | Effect on audit |\n|---|---|---|\n| `Enabled` | `false` | **Disabled distribution** — serves no traffic. Note as operational but still audit the config (it may be re-enabled). |\n| `Enabled` | `true` | Proceed with full audit. |\n| Origin type | S3 REST (`*.s3.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`) | Evaluate OAC\u002FOAI (Step 5). |\n| Origin type | S3 website (`*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`) | **Critical** — jump to Step 4. Forces public bucket. |\n| Origin type | Custom (`api.example.com`, ALB, etc.) | Evaluate OriginProtocolPolicy (Step 3). Skip OAC check. |\n| `ViewerCertificate.Certificate` | ACM cert not in us-east-1 | Note as deployment risk — CloudFront requires ACM certs in us-east-1. |\n\n**If the distribution config JSON is malformed** (invalid JSON, missing\n`Origins` or `DefaultCacheBehavior`), output:\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: \u003Cid>\nVERDICT: ERROR\nREASON: Distribution config is not valid JSON or is missing required fields — cannot classify.\nREMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical config with `aws cloudfront get-distribution-config --id \u003Cid> --output json` and re-audit.\n```\n\n## Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)\n\n### Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious CloudFront behaviors that change classification\n\nStep 0 expert knowledge (cipher-suite year suffixes, redirect-to-https caveat, match-viewer exposure, OAC vs OAI, website endpoints, us-east-1 WAF, WebACLId ARN, root-object listings, log-delivery ACLs, FLE deprecation, TrustedKeyGroups) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand before classifying any dimension.\n\n### Step 1: Viewer protocol policy (TLS exposure to the viewer)\n\nEvaluate `DefaultCacheBehavior.ViewerProtocolPolicy`:\n\n- **`allow-all`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. CloudFront serves content over both\n  HTTP and HTTPS. HTTP traffic between viewer and edge is sniffable,\n  modifiable (MITM), and never encrypted. This is the most severe TLS finding\n  because it actively serves unencrypted content.\n\n- **`redirect-to-https`** → OK for this dimension (note the initial-HTTP\n  caveat from Step 0). Acceptable for most workloads.\n\n- **`https-only`** → OK. CloudFront rejects all HTTP requests at the edge.\n\n### Step 2: TLS minimum protocol version\n\nEvaluate `ViewerCertificate.MinimumProtocolVersion`. The threshold is\n`TLSv1.2_2021` — anything below is INSECURE_TLS:\n\n| Value | Verdict | Reason |\n|---|---|---|\n| `SSLv3` | **INSECURE_TLS** | POODLE attack — completely broken protocol. |\n| `TLSv1` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Deprecated (RFC 8996). Enables BEAST, CRIME variants. |\n| `TLSv1_2016` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Allows TLS 1.0 negotiation; weak cipher suite. |\n| `TLSv1.1_2016` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Allows TLS 1.0\u002F1.1 negotiation; deprecated protocols. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2018` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Includes CBC-mode ciphers vulnerable to padding oracles. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2019` | **INSECURE_TLS** | Still permits `ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256` (CBC); weaker than 2021. |\n| `TLSv1.2_2021` | **OK** | AEAD-only cipher suite (GCM); minimum acceptable posture. |\n\nIf there is no `ViewerCertificate` block (the distribution uses the default\nCloudFront certificate), this only applies if the distribution has alternate\ndomain names. A distribution with no alternate domain names uses the default\n`*.cloudfront.net` certificate, which is always TLS 1.2+ — skip this check.\n\n### Step 3: Origin protocol policy (custom origins only)\n\nFor origins with `CustomOriginConfig`, evaluate `OriginProtocolPolicy`:\n\n- **`http-only`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. CloudFront connects to the origin over\n  plaintext HTTP. All traffic between edge and origin (including custom\n  headers with secrets) is unencrypted.\n\n- **`match-viewer`** → **INSECURE_TLS**. If the viewer used HTTP (before a\n  redirect), CloudFront connects to the origin over HTTP too. The origin\n  traffic inherits the viewer's (potentially insecure) protocol.\n\n- **`https-only`** → OK. CloudFront always uses HTTPS to the origin.\n\nSkip this step for S3 origins — CloudFront-to-S3 traffic uses S3's internal\nprotocol and is encrypted in transit by AWS infrastructure.\n\n### Step 4: S3 website endpoint origin (forces public bucket)\n\nIf any origin's `DomainName` matches the S3 website endpoint pattern\n(`*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com`), classify as **INSECURE_TLS**. The website\nendpoint requires the bucket to be publicly readable — it bypasses S3 access\npolicies entirely. Users can enumerate and read objects directly from the\nbucket, bypassing CloudFront, WAF, and geo restrictions.\n\nThe remediation is to switch the origin to the REST endpoint\n(`bucket.s3.amazonaws.com`) and configure OAC. This is Step 4 (before OAC\ncheck) because it is both an origin exposure AND a TLS issue (website\nendpoints do not support HTTPS on the origin connection).\n\n### Step 5: Origin Access Control (S3 REST origins)\n\nFor each S3 REST origin (`*.s3.amazonaws.com`, `*.s3.\u003Cregion>.amazonaws.com`,\n`*.s3.dualstack.*.amazonaws.com`):\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is present and non-empty** → OK for this\n  dimension. The OAC is configured (verify the OAC exists via\n  `aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control --id \u003Cid>`).\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is empty AND\n  `S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity` is empty** → **NO_OAC**. Neither OAC\n  nor legacy OAI is configured. The S3 bucket must be publicly readable for\n  CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront and access the\n  bucket directly.\n\n- **`OriginAccessControlId` is empty AND\n  `S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity` is non-empty** → **CONFIG_GAP**\n  (not NO_OAC). The legacy OAI keeps the bucket private (not an exposure),\n  but OAI is deprecated and does not support SSE-KMS. Flag for migration to\n  OAC.\n\nA distribution with multiple S3 origins where ANY origin lacks OAC is\nclassified by the **worst** origin — one origin without OAC means NO_OAC for\nthe whole distribution.\n\n### Step 6: WAF Web ACL association\n\nEvaluate `WebACLId`:\n\n- **`WebACLId` is empty or absent** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No WAF at the edge.\n  OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, bot, path traversal) reach the origin unfiltered.\n  The origin must defend itself, defeating the purpose of edge security.\n\n- **`WebACLId` contains a Web ACL ARN** → OK for this dimension. The WAF is\n  associated. Note: verify the Web ACL has rules (an empty Web ACL provides\n  no protection) — but this audit checks association, not rule quality (use\n  the `wafv2-web-acl-auditor` skill for rule-level analysis).\n\n### Step 7: Access logging\n\nEvaluate `Logging.Enabled`:\n\n- **`Logging.Enabled: false`** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No access logs. Breach\n  forensics, anomaly detection, and compliance auditing have no signal. For\n  PCI\u002FHIPAA\u002FSOC2, logging is a control requirement.\n\n- **`Logging.Enabled: true`** → OK for this dimension. Note: verify the\n  logging bucket has the correct ACL grant for `awslogsdelivery` (Step 0\n  expert note). Enabled logging with a misconfigured bucket silently drops\n  logs.\n\n### Step 8: Geographic restrictions\n\nEvaluate `Restrictions.GeoRestriction.RestrictionType`:\n\n- **`none`** → **CONFIG_GAP**. No geo restriction. The distribution serves\n  all countries. For workloads with regulatory or compliance boundaries\n  (GDPR data residency, OFAC sanctions), this is a control gap.\n\n- **`whitelist`** → OK. Only listed countries can access.\n- **`blacklist`** → OK. Listed countries are blocked.\n\n### Step 9: Default root object\n\nEvaluate `DefaultRootObject`:\n\n- **Empty string AND origin is S3** → **CONFIG_GAP**. Requests to the\n  distribution root return the S3 XML object listing — information disclosure\n  of object keys and metadata.\n\n- **Non-empty** → OK for this dimension.\n- **Empty AND origin is custom** → note but do not flag (custom origins\n  handle root requests per their own logic).\n\n### Step 10: Aggregation — worst finding wins\n\nThe final verdict is the **maximum severity** across all findings, where\nINSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK:\n\n```text\nverdict = max(all_step_severities)\n```\n\nIf no findings (all dimensions pass), the verdict is **OK**.\n\n## Output format (per distribution)\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: \u003Cdistribution-id>\nVERDICT: INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK\nREASON: \u003C1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>\nFINDINGS:\n  - [INSECURE_TLS] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] \u003Cfinding description (Step N)>\n  - [OK] \u003Cdimension that passed>\nREMEDIATION: \u003Cspecific action per finding, or \"None required\" if OK>\n```\n\n### Worked example — weak TLS and missing OAC\n\n```text\nDISTRIBUTION: E1A2B3C4D5\nVERDICT: INSECURE_TLS\nREASON: MinimumProtocolVersion is TLSv1.2_2019 (below TLSv1.2_2021 — CBC-mode\nciphers still permitted) (Step 2). S3 origin also has no OAC (Step 5).\nFINDINGS:\n  - [INSECURE_TLS] MinimumProtocolVersion TLSv1.2_2019 includes CBC-mode ciphers\n    vulnerable to padding-oracle variants (Step 2) — TLSv1.2_2021 removes them\n  - [NO_OAC] S3 origin \"app-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com\" has no OAC and no legacy\n    OAI — bucket must be publicly readable (Step 5)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] No WAF Web ACL associated (Step 6)\n  - [CONFIG_GAP] Logging.Enabled is false (Step 7)\nREMEDIATION:\n  1. Update MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021.\n  2. Create OAC and attach to the S3 origin; update bucket policy.\n  3. Associate a Web ACL (must be in us-east-1).\n  4. Enable access logging to an S3 bucket with awslogsdelivery ACL grant.\n```\n\n## Edge-case handling\n\nEdge-case catalog (partial configs, multi-behavior, multi-origin, mixed origins, ACM region, real-time vs standard logging) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when the distribution shape is non-trivial.\n\n## Anti-Patterns — NEVER\n\n- NEVER classify `MinimumProtocolVersion: TLSv1.2_2019` as OK. The `_2019`\n  policy still permits CBC-mode ciphers (`ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256`). Only\n  `TLSv1.2_2021` restricts the cipher suite to AEAD-only (GCM). Treating\n  `_2019` as acceptable misses the cipher-suite downgrade — the most\n  common false-negative in CloudFront TLS audits.\n\n- NEVER treat `ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all` as acceptable. This actively\n  serves content over plaintext HTTP — every request between viewer and edge\n  is sniffable. `allow-all` is not \"flexible\"; it is a compliance violation\n  under PCI-DSS 4.1, HIPAA 164.312(e), and SOC2 CC6.1.\n\n- NEVER classify an S3 origin without OAC as CONFIG_GAP when OAI is also\n  absent. Without either mechanism, the bucket MUST be public — that is a\n  direct-origin bypass, not a configuration gap. OAI-only (no OAC) is\n  CONFIG_GAP; neither OAC nor OAI is NO_OAC.\n\n- NEVER treat `OriginProtocolPolicy: match-viewer` as equivalent to\n  `https-only`. `match-viewer` propagates the viewer's protocol — if the\n  viewer connected over HTTP (before a redirect-to-https), the origin\n  connection is also HTTP. Only `https-only` guarantees encrypted origin\n  traffic regardless of viewer protocol.\n\n- NEVER classify an S3 website endpoint origin as a simple origin type\n  difference. The website endpoint forces the bucket to be publicly readable\n  — it bypasses all S3 access policies. This is an active data exposure, not\n  a style preference. The only valid remediation is switching to the REST\n  endpoint with OAC.\n\n- NEVER assume `WebACLId: \"\"` means \"WAFv2 not supported on this\n  distribution.\" The field stores the WAFv2 ARN for WAFv2 ACLs and the ID\n  for WAF Classic ACLs. An empty string always means no association,\n  regardless of WAF generation.\n\n- NEVER flag `GeoRestriction: none` as INSECURE_TLS or NO_OAC. A missing geo\n  restriction is a CONFIG_GAP — defense-in-depth, not an active exposure.\n  Conflating it with TLS or origin issues dilutes the severity signal.\n\n- NEVER recommend disabling a distribution as remediation without confirming\n  the impact. A disabled distribution serves zero traffic — every dependent\n  workload experiences an immediate outage. Always confirm with the operator\n  before recommending `Enabled: false`.\n\n- NEVER assume logging is working just because `Logging.Enabled: true`. The\n  logging bucket must have an ACL grant to `awslogsdelivery`. A bucket with\n  ACLs disabled (BucketOwnerEnforced) silently rejects all CloudFront logs.\n  Verify the bucket ACL separately in live-account audits.\n\n- NEVER confuse the default cache behavior with path-specific cache behaviors\n  for viewer protocol policy. Only the default behavior drives the verdict —\n  it applies to unmatched paths. A path-specific behavior with\n  `https-only` does not override a default behavior with `allow-all`.\n\n- NEVER recommend migrating from OAI to OAC without updating the S3 bucket\n  policy. OAC requires a different bucket policy statement\n  (`Service: cloudfront.amazonaws.com` with the OAC ARN condition) than OAI\n  (`CanonicalUser` with the CloudFront canonical ID). Migrating without the\n  policy update breaks all object access (403 Forbidden).\n\n- NEVER flag an empty `TrustedKeyGroups` on a public-content distribution.\n  Signed URLs are only needed for access-controlled content. Public\n  distributions (marketing sites, documentation) intentionally have no\n  trusted key groups.\n\n## Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)\n\nPre-flight safety checks (CONFIRMATION GATE, rollback snapshot, ETag requirement, TLS client coordination, OAC+bucket-policy pairing, us-east-1 Web ACL, propagation delay) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md).\nLoad them before emitting any remediation CLI.\n\n## Remediation guidance\n\nPer-verdict remediation CLI sequences (TLS minimum, viewer policy, origin protocol, website endpoint, OAC, WAF, logging, geo, legacy OAI, OK posture) moved verbatim to [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md).\nLoad on demand when writing the REMEDIATION block.\n\n## Recent AWS features (2024-2026)\n\nRecent AWS features (2024-2026) moved verbatim to [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md).\nLoad on demand when auditing VPC origins, KeyValueStore, continuous deployment, TLS 1.3, or non-S3 OAC origins.\n\n## References (load on demand)\n\n- [references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md](references\u002Fadvanced-patterns.md) — Step 0 expert knowledge, edge-case catalog, and recent AWS features moved from SKILL.md\n- [references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md](references\u002Fdiagnostic-commands.md) — pre-flight safety checks moved from SKILL.md\n- [references\u002Ferror-handling.md](references\u002Ferror-handling.md) — per-verdict remediation CLI sequences moved from SKILL.md\n\n## Domain\n\nAWS CloudOps \u002F CloudFront Edge Security & Compliance.\n\n## AWS documentation\n\n- **Amazon CloudFront Developer Guide** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002FIntroduction.html\n- **CloudFront Security** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002Fsecurity.html\n- **CloudFront API Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcloudfront\u002Flatest\u002FAPIReference\u002F\n- **CloudFront CLI Reference** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fcli\u002Flatest\u002Freference\u002Fcloudfront\u002F\n- **Origin Access Control** — https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.aws.amazon.com\u002FAmazonCloudFront\u002Flatest\u002FDeveloperGuide\u002Fprivate-content-restricting-access-to-s3.html\n- **Blog: VPC origins** — https:\u002F\u002Faws.amazon.com\u002Fblogs\u002Fnetworking-and-content-delivery\u002Fintroducing-amazon-cloudfront-vpc-origins\u002F\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":39},{"tags":25,"phase":26,"author":27,"domain":28,"family":29,"version":30,"keywords":31,"complexity":32,"entry_point":33,"when_to_use":34,"requires_llm":35,"verdict_shape":36,"invocation_schema":37,"supports_pipeline":35,"activation_triggers":38},"cloudfront, security, tls, oac, waf, logging, geo-restriction, networking, audit","2","Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder","aws-cloudops","Networking","0.1.0","CloudFront, distribution audit, TLS minimum protocol, TLSv1.2_2021, Origin Access Control, OAC, OAI, ViewerProtocolPolicy, OriginProtocolPolicy, WAF association, Web ACL, access logging, geographic restrictions, geo restriction, default cache behavior, default root object, S3 website endpoint, edge security, HTTPS enforcement, distribution hardening","high","false","Reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS minimum protocol version, validating Origin Access Control on S3 origins, verifying WAF Web ACL association, auditing access logging, inspecting geographic restrictions, or hardening edge security posture across distributions.","true","INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK","Input: either (a) a CloudFront distribution config JSON, optionally paired with origin-access-control metadata, OR (b) a distribution id for live-account audit. Output: deterministic DISTRIBUTION\u002FVERDICT\u002FREASON\u002F FINDINGS\u002FREMEDIATION block per distribution, where VERDICT belongs to {INSECURE_TLS, NO_OAC, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.","audit this CloudFront distribution, is my CloudFront TLS secure, check CloudFront OAC, is OAC configured on my S3 origin, does my distribution have a WAF, CloudFront logging disabled, geo restriction CloudFront, ViewerProtocolPolicy allow-all, hardening CloudFront before production, OriginProtocolPolicy http-only","Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline distribution-config classification. Live-account audits use aws cloudfront get-distribution-config, aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control, and aws cloudfront list-distributions (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).","main","eeace51bd5dd1db2030729d83eeab988861553aa","skills\u002Fcloudfront-distribution-auditor",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan","CTO & Co-Founder @Beever-AI  & @votee. CAISP. AWS Community Builder. Organizer@GDGCloudHK. MongoDB Champion. Technopreneur + Infornographer.","2026-09-24 08:54:10",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill cloudfront-distribution-auditor",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill cloudfront-distribution-auditor",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills --skill 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AWS X-Ray distributed tracing with production-grade configuration: X-Ray daemon deployment (EC2 systemd, ECS sidecar, EKS DaemonSet, Lambda built-in), SDK instrumentation (Java, Python, Node.js, Go, .NET) with annotations and metadata, sampling rules (default reservoir + rate vs custom rules with URL \u002F method \u002F service-name predicates), service map generation, trace query and retrieval, groups and insights, CloudWatch ServiceLens integration, IAM permissions (PutTraceSegments, GetSamplingRules), and latest features (Lambda Powertools tracing, OpenTelemetry \u002F ADOT Collector support, W3C trace context). Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with every configuration item verified. Use when enabling X-Ray on a new application, adding tracing to ECS \u002F EKS \u002F Lambda, validating a sampling configuration, or generating daemon deployment CLI and IaC templates. Triggers: X-Ray, distributed tracing, X-Ray daemon, sampling rules, service map, X-Ray SDK, OpenTelemetry, ADOT, Lambda Powertools, CloudWatch ServiceLens.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxray-tracing-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":153,"name":154,"nameZh":6,"description":155,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":156,"categories":157,"keywords":158,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADTVJ7DCBM9CB1FY51GH7J","wellarchitected-workload-auditor","Audits AWS Well-Architected Tool workloads for review staleness, per-pillar high-risk issue counts, milestone tracking gaps, and remediation plan completeness. Emits a deterministic verdict (STALE_REVIEW | HIGH_RISK | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per workload with per-pillar risk breakdown, milestone trend analysis, and specific remediation. Use when reviewing Well-Architected workloads, checking WA review freshness, auditing high-risk issues per pillar, validating milestone coverage, or tracking remediation plans.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-workload-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":160,"name":161,"nameZh":6,"description":162,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":163,"categories":164,"keywords":165,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADT59G6FTTNZYHT2QRPNNP","wellarchitected-review-operator","Operates AWS Well-Architected Tool reviews end-to-end — creates workloads, runs pillar reviews (operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, Prosperity), answers questions with risk-tier rationale, generates reports and improvement plans, creates milestones, and integrates with Trusted Advisor and Well-Architected Labs. Runs deterministic pre-checks (workload existence, lens availability, pillar coverage), emits the exact update-answer \u002F get-consolidated-report CLI behind a CONFIRM gate, and verifies risk-tier transitions. Emits READY | BLOCKED | COMPLETED. Use when creating a workload, answering pillar questions, generating an improvement plan, creating a milestone, or integrating with Trusted Advisor. Triggers: well-architected tool, well architected review, workload review, pillar, operational excellence, security, reliability, performance, cost optimization, sustainability, prosperity, improvement plan, milestone, trusted advisor.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwellarchitected-review-operator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":167,"name":168,"nameZh":6,"description":169,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":170,"categories":171,"keywords":172,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADSH5JA9QHNPPHQCD7EVA7","wafv2-web-acl-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 Web ACLs with correct production defaults: scope selection (CLOUDFRONT vs REGIONAL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, SQLiRuleSet, LinuxRuleSet, WindowsRuleSet, IPReputationList, BotControlRuleSet, AmazonIpReputationList, ATP), custom rules (byte match, IP set, regex pattern, geo match, size constraint, rate-based), rule priority ordering, logging destinations (Kinesis Firehose, CloudWatch Logs, S3), resource association (ALB, API Gateway, CloudFront), rate-based rules with aggregate keys (IP, forwarded IP), Challenge and CAPTCHA actions, and account takeover prevention. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist. Use when creating a Web ACL, attaching managed rules, configuring rate limiting, enabling WAF logging, associating a Web ACL with an ALB\u002FAPI Gateway\u002FCloudFront, or configuring CAPTCHA\u002FChallenge actions. Triggers: create WAF Web ACL, WAFv2, managed rule groups, WAF rate limiting, WAF logging, WAF CAPTCHA, WAF Challenge action, bot control, ATP managed rules.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":174,"name":175,"nameZh":6,"description":176,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":177,"categories":178,"keywords":179,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADRYFAT8R73FBNCHRC573X","wafv2-web-acl-auditor","Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow\u002Fbypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwafv2-web-acl-auditor\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":181,"name":182,"nameZh":6,"description":183,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":184,"categories":185,"keywords":186,"publishedAt":19},"01M7ADR8W7G72JX4KFGN03QK8Q","waf-rule-deployer","Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjhkchan\u002Faws-agent-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwaf-rule-deployer\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]