AGENT SKILL

cloudfront-distribution-auditor

Audits AWS CloudFront distributions for insecure TLS viewer minimum protocol versions and viewer protocol policies, missing Origin Access Control (OAC) on S3 origins, missing WAF Web ACL association, disabled access logging, absent geographic restrictions, and default-cache-behavior misconfigurations. Emits a deterministic verdict (INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per distribution with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS posture, validating OAC on S3 origins, verifying WAF coverage, auditing logging status, or hardening edge security.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-09-24
Stars
★ 4
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0

01 前言 Front Matter

name
cloudfront-distribution-auditor
license
Apache-2.0
metadata
{ "tags": "cloudfront, security, tls, oac, waf, logging, geo-restriction, networking, audit", "phase": "2", "author": "Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder", "domain": "aws-cloudops", "family": "Networking", "version": "0.1.0", "keywords": "CloudFront, distribution audit, TLS minimum protocol, TLSv1.2_2021, Origin Access Control, OAC, OAI, ViewerProtocolPolicy, OriginProtocolPolicy, WAF association, Web ACL, access logging, geographic restrictions, geo restriction, default cache behavior, default root object, S3 website endpoint, edge security, HTTPS enforcement, distribution hardening", "complexity": "high", "entry_point": "false", "when_to_use": "Reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS minimum protocol version, validating Origin Access Control on S3 origins, verifying WAF Web ACL association, auditing access logging, inspecting geographic restrictions, or hardening edge security posture across distributions.", "requires_llm": "true", "verdict_shape": "INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK", "invocation_schema": "Input: either (a) a CloudFront distribution config JSON, optionally paired with origin-access-control metadata, OR (b) a distribution id for live-account audit. Output: deterministic DISTRIBUTION/VERDICT/REASON/ FINDINGS/REMEDIATION block per distribution, where VERDICT belongs to {INSECURE_TLS, NO_OAC, CONFIG_GAP, OK, ERROR}.", "supports_pipeline": "true", "activation_triggers": "audit this CloudFront distribution, is my CloudFront TLS secure, check CloudFront OAC, is OAC configured on my S3 origin, does my distribution have a WAF, CloudFront logging disabled, geo restriction CloudFront, ViewerProtocolPolicy allow-all, hardening CloudFront before production, OriginProtocolPolicy http-only" }
description
Audits AWS CloudFront distributions for insecure TLS viewer minimum protocol versions and viewer protocol policies, missing Origin Access Control (OAC) on S3 origins, missing WAF Web ACL association, disabled access logging, absent geographic restrictions, and default-cache-behavior misconfigurations. Emits a deterministic verdict (INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK) per distribution with enumerated findings and CLI remediation. Use when reviewing a CloudFront distribution before production deployment, checking TLS posture, validating OAC on S3 origins, verifying WAF coverage, auditing logging status, or hardening edge security.
compatibility
Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). No AWS CLI required for offline distribution-config classification. Live-account audits use aws cloudfront get-distribution-config, aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control, and aws cloudfront list-distributions (AWS CLI v2, SSO or key-based credentials).

02 资源文件 20

03 SKILL.md 正文

CloudFront Distribution Auditor

Mindset

One-line takeaway: the verdict is always the worst finding across all dimensions, and three CloudFront misconfigurations dominate real-world incidents — weak TLS minimum protocol (cipher-suite downgrade), missing OAC on S3 origins (direct bucket bypass), and absent WAF at the edge (no L7 filtering).

CloudFront is the public edge of your infrastructure. Every request from every user touches it before reaching origins.

  • TLS minimum protocol is the weakest cipher a viewer may negotiate. A weak policy silently downgrades connections even when the browser supports stronger ciphers — the server picks the floor, not the ceiling.
  • Missing OAC on an S3 origin means the bucket must be publicly readable for CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront entirely and hit the bucket directly — WAF, geo restrictions, and signed URLs all evaporate.
  • No WAF at the edge means OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, path traversal) reach the origin unfiltered. The origin must defend itself, which defeats the purpose of an edge security layer.

Quick reference — verdict thresholds

Condition Verdict Step
MinimumProtocolVersion < TLSv1.2_2021 INSECURE_TLS Step 2
ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all on default cache behavior INSECURE_TLS Step 1
Custom origin OriginProtocolPolicy: http-only or match-viewer INSECURE_TLS Step 3
Origin domain is S3 website endpoint (s3-website-*) INSECURE_TLS Step 4
S3 REST origin with no OAC AND no legacy OAI NO_OAC Step 5
No WAF Web ACL associated (WebACLId empty) CONFIG_GAP Step 6
Logging.Enabled: false CONFIG_GAP Step 7
GeoRestriction.RestrictionType: none CONFIG_GAP Step 8
Empty DefaultRootObject on S3 origin CONFIG_GAP Step 9
All dimensions pass OK Step 10

See the ordered steps below for edge cases. The verdict priority is INSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK.

Pre-flight: distribution metadata gate

Before evaluating the distribution config, classify the distribution itself. Several attributes short-circuit the audit.

Multi-distribution sweep note (pagination): when auditing every distribution in an account, aws cloudfront list-distributions returns at most 200 per page. Use --marker from the prior NextMarker to page through all distributions; iterating only the first page silently skips stale or forgotten distributions (the ones most likely to be misconfigured).

Attribute Value Effect on audit
Enabled false Disabled distribution — serves no traffic. Note as operational but still audit the config (it may be re-enabled).
Enabled true Proceed with full audit.
Origin type S3 REST (*.s3.amazonaws.com, *.s3.<region>.amazonaws.com) Evaluate OAC/OAI (Step 5).
Origin type S3 website (*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com) Critical — jump to Step 4. Forces public bucket.
Origin type Custom (api.example.com, ALB, etc.) Evaluate OriginProtocolPolicy (Step 3). Skip OAC check.
ViewerCertificate.Certificate ACM cert not in us-east-1 Note as deployment risk — CloudFront requires ACM certs in us-east-1.

If the distribution config JSON is malformed (invalid JSON, missing Origins or DefaultCacheBehavior), output:

DISTRIBUTION: <id>
VERDICT: ERROR
REASON: Distribution config is not valid JSON or is missing required fields — cannot classify.
REMEDIATION: Retrieve the canonical config with `aws cloudfront get-distribution-config --id <id> --output json` and re-audit.

Process — Classification logic (apply in order, aggregate worst)

Step 0: Expert knowledge — non-obvious CloudFront behaviors that change classification

Step 0 expert knowledge (cipher-suite year suffixes, redirect-to-https caveat, match-viewer exposure, OAC vs OAI, website endpoints, us-east-1 WAF, WebACLId ARN, root-object listings, log-delivery ACLs, FLE deprecation, TrustedKeyGroups) moved verbatim to references/advanced-patterns.md. Load on demand before classifying any dimension.

Step 1: Viewer protocol policy (TLS exposure to the viewer)

Evaluate DefaultCacheBehavior.ViewerProtocolPolicy:

  • allow-all → INSECURE_TLS. CloudFront serves content over both HTTP and HTTPS. HTTP traffic between viewer and edge is sniffable, modifiable (MITM), and never encrypted. This is the most severe TLS finding because it actively serves unencrypted content.

  • redirect-to-https → OK for this dimension (note the initial-HTTP caveat from Step 0). Acceptable for most workloads.

  • https-only → OK. CloudFront rejects all HTTP requests at the edge.

Step 2: TLS minimum protocol version

Evaluate ViewerCertificate.MinimumProtocolVersion. The threshold is TLSv1.2_2021 — anything below is INSECURE_TLS:

Value Verdict Reason
SSLv3 INSECURE_TLS POODLE attack — completely broken protocol.
TLSv1 INSECURE_TLS Deprecated (RFC 8996). Enables BEAST, CRIME variants.
TLSv1_2016 INSECURE_TLS Allows TLS 1.0 negotiation; weak cipher suite.
TLSv1.1_2016 INSECURE_TLS Allows TLS 1.0/1.1 negotiation; deprecated protocols.
TLSv1.2_2018 INSECURE_TLS Includes CBC-mode ciphers vulnerable to padding oracles.
TLSv1.2_2019 INSECURE_TLS Still permits ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 (CBC); weaker than 2021.
TLSv1.2_2021 OK AEAD-only cipher suite (GCM); minimum acceptable posture.

If there is no ViewerCertificate block (the distribution uses the default CloudFront certificate), this only applies if the distribution has alternate domain names. A distribution with no alternate domain names uses the default *.cloudfront.net certificate, which is always TLS 1.2+ — skip this check.

Step 3: Origin protocol policy (custom origins only)

For origins with CustomOriginConfig, evaluate OriginProtocolPolicy:

  • http-only → INSECURE_TLS. CloudFront connects to the origin over plaintext HTTP. All traffic between edge and origin (including custom headers with secrets) is unencrypted.

  • match-viewer → INSECURE_TLS. If the viewer used HTTP (before a redirect), CloudFront connects to the origin over HTTP too. The origin traffic inherits the viewer's (potentially insecure) protocol.

  • https-only → OK. CloudFront always uses HTTPS to the origin.

Skip this step for S3 origins — CloudFront-to-S3 traffic uses S3's internal protocol and is encrypted in transit by AWS infrastructure.

Step 4: S3 website endpoint origin (forces public bucket)

If any origin's DomainName matches the S3 website endpoint pattern (*.s3-website-*.amazonaws.com), classify as INSECURE_TLS. The website endpoint requires the bucket to be publicly readable — it bypasses S3 access policies entirely. Users can enumerate and read objects directly from the bucket, bypassing CloudFront, WAF, and geo restrictions.

The remediation is to switch the origin to the REST endpoint (bucket.s3.amazonaws.com) and configure OAC. This is Step 4 (before OAC check) because it is both an origin exposure AND a TLS issue (website endpoints do not support HTTPS on the origin connection).

Step 5: Origin Access Control (S3 REST origins)

For each S3 REST origin (*.s3.amazonaws.com, *.s3.<region>.amazonaws.com, *.s3.dualstack.*.amazonaws.com):

  • OriginAccessControlId is present and non-empty → OK for this dimension. The OAC is configured (verify the OAC exists via aws cloudfront get-origin-access-control --id <id>).

  • OriginAccessControlId is empty AND S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity is empty → NO_OAC. Neither OAC nor legacy OAI is configured. The S3 bucket must be publicly readable for CloudFront to serve content. Users can bypass CloudFront and access the bucket directly.

  • OriginAccessControlId is empty AND S3OriginConfig.OriginAccessIdentity is non-empty → CONFIG_GAP (not NO_OAC). The legacy OAI keeps the bucket private (not an exposure), but OAI is deprecated and does not support SSE-KMS. Flag for migration to OAC.

A distribution with multiple S3 origins where ANY origin lacks OAC is classified by the worst origin — one origin without OAC means NO_OAC for the whole distribution.

Step 6: WAF Web ACL association

Evaluate WebACLId:

  • WebACLId is empty or absent → CONFIG_GAP. No WAF at the edge. OWASP attacks (SQLi, XSS, bot, path traversal) reach the origin unfiltered. The origin must defend itself, defeating the purpose of edge security.

  • WebACLId contains a Web ACL ARN → OK for this dimension. The WAF is associated. Note: verify the Web ACL has rules (an empty Web ACL provides no protection) — but this audit checks association, not rule quality (use the wafv2-web-acl-auditor skill for rule-level analysis).

Step 7: Access logging

Evaluate Logging.Enabled:

  • Logging.Enabled: false → CONFIG_GAP. No access logs. Breach forensics, anomaly detection, and compliance auditing have no signal. For PCI/HIPAA/SOC2, logging is a control requirement.

  • Logging.Enabled: true → OK for this dimension. Note: verify the logging bucket has the correct ACL grant for awslogsdelivery (Step 0 expert note). Enabled logging with a misconfigured bucket silently drops logs.

Step 8: Geographic restrictions

Evaluate Restrictions.GeoRestriction.RestrictionType:

  • none → CONFIG_GAP. No geo restriction. The distribution serves all countries. For workloads with regulatory or compliance boundaries (GDPR data residency, OFAC sanctions), this is a control gap.

  • whitelist → OK. Only listed countries can access.

  • blacklist → OK. Listed countries are blocked.

Step 9: Default root object

Evaluate DefaultRootObject:

  • Empty string AND origin is S3 → CONFIG_GAP. Requests to the distribution root return the S3 XML object listing — information disclosure of object keys and metadata.

  • Non-empty → OK for this dimension.

  • Empty AND origin is custom → note but do not flag (custom origins handle root requests per their own logic).

Step 10: Aggregation — worst finding wins

The final verdict is the maximum severity across all findings, where INSECURE_TLS > NO_OAC > CONFIG_GAP > OK:

verdict = max(all_step_severities)

If no findings (all dimensions pass), the verdict is OK.

Output format (per distribution)

DISTRIBUTION: <distribution-id>
VERDICT: INSECURE_TLS | NO_OAC | CONFIG_GAP | OK
REASON: <1-2 sentences citing the worst finding and its step number>
FINDINGS:
  - [INSECURE_TLS] <finding description (Step N)>
  - [CONFIG_GAP] <finding description (Step N)>
  - [OK] <dimension that passed>
REMEDIATION: <specific action per finding, or "None required" if OK>

Worked example — weak TLS and missing OAC

DISTRIBUTION: E1A2B3C4D5
VERDICT: INSECURE_TLS
REASON: MinimumProtocolVersion is TLSv1.2_2019 (below TLSv1.2_2021 — CBC-mode
ciphers still permitted) (Step 2). S3 origin also has no OAC (Step 5).
FINDINGS:
  - [INSECURE_TLS] MinimumProtocolVersion TLSv1.2_2019 includes CBC-mode ciphers
    vulnerable to padding-oracle variants (Step 2) — TLSv1.2_2021 removes them
  - [NO_OAC] S3 origin "app-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com" has no OAC and no legacy
    OAI — bucket must be publicly readable (Step 5)
  - [CONFIG_GAP] No WAF Web ACL associated (Step 6)
  - [CONFIG_GAP] Logging.Enabled is false (Step 7)
REMEDIATION:
  1. Update MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021.
  2. Create OAC and attach to the S3 origin; update bucket policy.
  3. Associate a Web ACL (must be in us-east-1).
  4. Enable access logging to an S3 bucket with awslogsdelivery ACL grant.

Edge-case handling

Edge-case catalog (partial configs, multi-behavior, multi-origin, mixed origins, ACM region, real-time vs standard logging) moved verbatim to references/advanced-patterns.md. Load on demand when the distribution shape is non-trivial.

Anti-Patterns — NEVER

  • NEVER classify MinimumProtocolVersion: TLSv1.2_2019 as OK. The _2019 policy still permits CBC-mode ciphers (ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256). Only TLSv1.2_2021 restricts the cipher suite to AEAD-only (GCM). Treating _2019 as acceptable misses the cipher-suite downgrade — the most common false-negative in CloudFront TLS audits.

  • NEVER treat ViewerProtocolPolicy: allow-all as acceptable. This actively serves content over plaintext HTTP — every request between viewer and edge is sniffable. allow-all is not "flexible"; it is a compliance violation under PCI-DSS 4.1, HIPAA 164.312(e), and SOC2 CC6.1.

  • NEVER classify an S3 origin without OAC as CONFIG_GAP when OAI is also absent. Without either mechanism, the bucket MUST be public — that is a direct-origin bypass, not a configuration gap. OAI-only (no OAC) is CONFIG_GAP; neither OAC nor OAI is NO_OAC.

  • NEVER treat OriginProtocolPolicy: match-viewer as equivalent to https-only. match-viewer propagates the viewer's protocol — if the viewer connected over HTTP (before a redirect-to-https), the origin connection is also HTTP. Only https-only guarantees encrypted origin traffic regardless of viewer protocol.

  • NEVER classify an S3 website endpoint origin as a simple origin type difference. The website endpoint forces the bucket to be publicly readable — it bypasses all S3 access policies. This is an active data exposure, not a style preference. The only valid remediation is switching to the REST endpoint with OAC.

  • NEVER assume WebACLId: "" means "WAFv2 not supported on this distribution." The field stores the WAFv2 ARN for WAFv2 ACLs and the ID for WAF Classic ACLs. An empty string always means no association, regardless of WAF generation.

  • NEVER flag GeoRestriction: none as INSECURE_TLS or NO_OAC. A missing geo restriction is a CONFIG_GAP — defense-in-depth, not an active exposure. Conflating it with TLS or origin issues dilutes the severity signal.

  • NEVER recommend disabling a distribution as remediation without confirming the impact. A disabled distribution serves zero traffic — every dependent workload experiences an immediate outage. Always confirm with the operator before recommending Enabled: false.

  • NEVER assume logging is working just because Logging.Enabled: true. The logging bucket must have an ACL grant to awslogsdelivery. A bucket with ACLs disabled (BucketOwnerEnforced) silently rejects all CloudFront logs. Verify the bucket ACL separately in live-account audits.

  • NEVER confuse the default cache behavior with path-specific cache behaviors for viewer protocol policy. Only the default behavior drives the verdict — it applies to unmatched paths. A path-specific behavior with https-only does not override a default behavior with allow-all.

  • NEVER recommend migrating from OAI to OAC without updating the S3 bucket policy. OAC requires a different bucket policy statement (Service: cloudfront.amazonaws.com with the OAC ARN condition) than OAI (CanonicalUser with the CloudFront canonical ID). Migrating without the policy update breaks all object access (403 Forbidden).

  • NEVER flag an empty TrustedKeyGroups on a public-content distribution. Signed URLs are only needed for access-controlled content. Public distributions (marketing sites, documentation) intentionally have no trusted key groups.

Pre-flight safety checks (run before any remediation CLI)

Pre-flight safety checks (CONFIRMATION GATE, rollback snapshot, ETag requirement, TLS client coordination, OAC+bucket-policy pairing, us-east-1 Web ACL, propagation delay) moved verbatim to references/diagnostic-commands.md. Load them before emitting any remediation CLI.

Remediation guidance

Per-verdict remediation CLI sequences (TLS minimum, viewer policy, origin protocol, website endpoint, OAC, WAF, logging, geo, legacy OAI, OK posture) moved verbatim to references/error-handling.md. Load on demand when writing the REMEDIATION block.

Recent AWS features (2024-2026)

Recent AWS features (2024-2026) moved verbatim to references/advanced-patterns.md. Load on demand when auditing VPC origins, KeyValueStore, continuous deployment, TLS 1.3, or non-S3 OAC origins.

References (load on demand)

Domain

AWS CloudOps / CloudFront Edge Security & Compliance.

AWS documentation

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