building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline
Builds an automated malware submission and analysis pipeline that collects suspicious files from endpoints and email gateways, submits them to sandbox environments and multi-engine scanners, and generates verdicts with IOCs for SIEM integration. Use when SOC teams need to scale malware analysis beyond manual sandbox submissions for high-volume alert triage.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-11
- Stars
- ★ 0
- Forks
- 0
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- building-automated-malware-submission-pipeline
- tags
- [ "soc", "malware-analysis", "sandbox", "automation", "virustotal", "cuckoo", "any-run", "pipeline" ]
- author
- mahipal
- domain
- cybersecurity
- license
- Apache-2.0
- version
- 1.0
- nist_csf
- [ "DE.CM-01", "DE.AE-02", "RS.MA-01", "DE.AE-06" ]
- subdomain
- soc-operations
- description
- Builds an automated malware submission and analysis pipeline that collects suspicious files from endpoints and email gateways, submits them to sandbox environments and multi-engine scanners, and generates verdicts with IOCs for SIEM integration. Use when SOC teams need to scale malware analysis beyond manual sandbox submissions for high-volume alert triage.
- mitre_attack
- [ "T1204.002", "T1566.001", "T1027", "T1055", "T1497" ]
02 资源文件 3
- 许可证LICENSE11.0 KB
- 参考文档references/api-reference.md1.9 KB
- 脚本scripts/agent.py7.8 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Building Automated Malware Submission Pipeline
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- SOC teams face high volume of suspicious file alerts requiring sandbox analysis
- Manual sandbox submission creates bottlenecks in alert triage workflow
- Endpoint and email security tools quarantine files needing automated verdict determination
- Incident response requires rapid malware family identification and IOC extraction
Do not use for analyzing live malware samples in production environments — always use isolated sandbox infrastructure.
Prerequisites
- Sandbox environment: Cuckoo Sandbox, Joe Sandbox, Any.Run, or VMRay
- VirusTotal API key (Enterprise for submission, free for lookup)
- MalwareBazaar API access for known malware lookup
- File collection mechanism: EDR quarantine API, email gateway export, network capture
- Python 3.8+ with
requests,vt-py,pefilelibraries - Isolated analysis network with no production connectivity
Workflow
Step 1: Build File Collection Pipeline
Collect suspicious files from multiple sources:
import requests
import hashlib
import os
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime
class MalwareCollector:
def __init__(self, quarantine_dir="/opt/malware_quarantine"):
self.quarantine_dir = Path(quarantine_dir)
self.quarantine_dir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
def collect_from_edr(self, edr_api_url, api_token):
"""Pull quarantined files from CrowdStrike Falcon"""
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_token}"}
# Get recent quarantine events
response = requests.get(
f"{edr_api_url}/quarantine/queries/quarantined-files/v1",
headers=headers,
params={"filter": "state:'quarantined'", "limit": 50}
)
file_ids = response.json()["resources"]
for file_id in file_ids:
# Download quarantined file
dl_response = requests.get(
f"{edr_api_url}/quarantine/entities/quarantined-files/v1",
headers=headers,
params={"ids": file_id}
)
file_data = dl_response.content
sha256 = hashlib.sha256(file_data).hexdigest()
filepath = self.quarantine_dir / f"{sha256}.sample"
filepath.write_bytes(file_data)
yield {"sha256": sha256, "path": str(filepath), "source": "edr"}
def collect_from_email_gateway(self, smtp_quarantine_path):
"""Pull attachments from email gateway quarantine"""
import email
from email import policy
for eml_file in Path(smtp_quarantine_path).glob("*.eml"):
msg = email.message_from_binary_file(
eml_file.open("rb"), policy=policy.default
)
for attachment in msg.iter_attachments():
content = attachment.get_content()
if isinstance(content, str):
content = content.encode()
sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
filename = attachment.get_filename() or "unknown"
filepath = self.quarantine_dir / f"{sha256}.sample"
filepath.write_bytes(content)
yield {
"sha256": sha256,
"path": str(filepath),
"source": "email",
"original_filename": filename,
"sender": msg["From"],
"subject": msg["Subject"]
}
def compute_hashes(self, filepath):
"""Calculate MD5, SHA1, SHA256 for a file"""
with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
content = f.read()
return {
"md5": hashlib.md5(content).hexdigest(),
"sha1": hashlib.sha1(content).hexdigest(),
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest(),
"size": len(content)
}
Step 2: Pre-Screen with Hash Lookups
Check if the file is already known before sandbox submission:
import vt
class MalwarePreScreener:
def __init__(self, vt_api_key, mb_api_url="https://mb-api.abuse.ch/api/v1/"):
self.vt_client = vt.Client(vt_api_key)
self.mb_api_url = mb_api_url
def check_virustotal(self, sha256):
"""Lookup hash in VirusTotal"""
try:
file_obj = self.vt_client.get_object(f"/files/{sha256}")
stats = file_obj.last_analysis_stats
return {
"found": True,
"malicious": stats.get("malicious", 0),
"suspicious": stats.get("suspicious", 0),
"undetected": stats.get("undetected", 0),
"total": sum(stats.values()),
"threat_label": getattr(file_obj, "popular_threat_classification", {}).get(
"suggested_threat_label", "Unknown"
),
"type": getattr(file_obj, "type_description", "Unknown")
}
except vt.APIError:
return {"found": False}
def check_malwarebazaar(self, sha256):
"""Lookup hash in MalwareBazaar"""
response = requests.post(
self.mb_api_url,
data={"query": "get_info", "hash": sha256}
)
data = response.json()
if data["query_status"] == "ok":
entry = data["data"][0]
return {
"found": True,
"signature": entry.get("signature", "Unknown"),
"tags": entry.get("tags", []),
"file_type": entry.get("file_type", "Unknown"),
"first_seen": entry.get("first_seen", "Unknown")
}
return {"found": False}
def pre_screen(self, sha256):
"""Run all pre-screening checks"""
vt_result = self.check_virustotal(sha256)
mb_result = self.check_malwarebazaar(sha256)
verdict = "UNKNOWN"
if vt_result["found"] and vt_result.get("malicious", 0) > 10:
verdict = "KNOWN_MALICIOUS"
elif vt_result["found"] and vt_result.get("malicious", 0) == 0:
verdict = "LIKELY_CLEAN"
return {
"sha256": sha256,
"virustotal": vt_result,
"malwarebazaar": mb_result,
"pre_screen_verdict": verdict,
"needs_sandbox": verdict == "UNKNOWN"
}
def close(self):
self.vt_client.close()
Step 3: Submit to Sandbox for Dynamic Analysis
Cuckoo Sandbox Submission:
class SandboxSubmitter:
def __init__(self, cuckoo_url="http://cuckoo.internal:8090"):
self.cuckoo_url = cuckoo_url
def submit_to_cuckoo(self, filepath, timeout=300):
"""Submit file to Cuckoo Sandbox"""
with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
response = requests.post(
f"{self.cuckoo_url}/tasks/create/file",
files={"file": f},
data={
"timeout": timeout,
"options": "procmemdump=yes,route=none",
"priority": 2,
"machine": "win10_x64"
}
)
task_id = response.json()["task_id"]
return task_id
def wait_for_analysis(self, task_id, poll_interval=30, max_wait=600):
"""Wait for sandbox analysis to complete"""
import time
elapsed = 0
while elapsed < max_wait:
response = requests.get(f"{self.cuckoo_url}/tasks/view/{task_id}")
status = response.json()["task"]["status"]
if status == "reported":
return self.get_report(task_id)
elif status == "failed_analysis":
return {"error": "Analysis failed"}
time.sleep(poll_interval)
elapsed += poll_interval
return {"error": "Analysis timed out"}
def get_report(self, task_id):
"""Retrieve analysis report"""
response = requests.get(f"{self.cuckoo_url}/tasks/report/{task_id}")
report = response.json()
# Extract key indicators
return {
"task_id": task_id,
"score": report.get("info", {}).get("score", 0),
"signatures": [
{"name": s["name"], "severity": s["severity"], "description": s["description"]}
for s in report.get("signatures", [])
],
"network": {
"dns": [d["request"] for d in report.get("network", {}).get("dns", [])],
"http": [
{"url": h["uri"], "method": h["method"]}
for h in report.get("network", {}).get("http", [])
],
"hosts": report.get("network", {}).get("hosts", [])
},
"dropped_files": [
{"name": f["name"], "sha256": f["sha256"], "size": f["size"]}
for f in report.get("dropped", [])
],
"processes": [
{"name": p["process_name"], "pid": p["pid"], "command_line": p.get("command_line", "")}
for p in report.get("behavior", {}).get("processes", [])
],
"registry_keys": [
k for k in report.get("behavior", {}).get("summary", {}).get("regkey_written", [])
]
}
def submit_to_joesandbox(self, filepath, joe_api_key, joe_url="https://jbxcloud.joesecurity.org/api"):
"""Submit to Joe Sandbox Cloud"""
with open(filepath, "rb") as f:
response = requests.post(
f"{joe_url}/v2/submission/new",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {joe_api_key}"},
files={"sample": f},
data={
"systems": "w10_64",
"internet-access": False,
"report-cache": True
}
)
return response.json()["data"]["webid"]
Step 4: Extract IOCs and Generate Verdict
class VerdictGenerator:
def __init__(self):
self.malicious_threshold = 7 # Cuckoo score threshold
def generate_verdict(self, pre_screen, sandbox_report):
"""Combine pre-screening and sandbox results for final verdict"""
iocs = {
"ips": [],
"domains": [],
"urls": [],
"hashes": [],
"registry_keys": [],
"files_dropped": []
}
# Extract IOCs from sandbox report
if sandbox_report:
iocs["domains"] = sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("dns", [])
iocs["ips"] = sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("hosts", [])
iocs["urls"] = [
h["url"] for h in sandbox_report.get("network", {}).get("http", [])
]
iocs["hashes"] = [
f["sha256"] for f in sandbox_report.get("dropped_files", [])
]
iocs["registry_keys"] = sandbox_report.get("registry_keys", [])[:10]
iocs["files_dropped"] = sandbox_report.get("dropped_files", [])
# Determine verdict
vt_malicious = pre_screen.get("virustotal", {}).get("malicious", 0)
sandbox_score = sandbox_report.get("score", 0) if sandbox_report else 0
sig_count = len(sandbox_report.get("signatures", [])) if sandbox_report else 0
combined_score = (vt_malicious * 2) + (sandbox_score * 10) + (sig_count * 5)
if combined_score >= 100:
verdict = "MALICIOUS"
confidence = "HIGH"
elif combined_score >= 50:
verdict = "SUSPICIOUS"
confidence = "MEDIUM"
elif combined_score >= 20:
verdict = "POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED"
confidence = "LOW"
else:
verdict = "CLEAN"
confidence = "HIGH"
return {
"verdict": verdict,
"confidence": confidence,
"combined_score": combined_score,
"iocs": iocs,
"vt_detections": vt_malicious,
"sandbox_score": sandbox_score,
"signatures": sandbox_report.get("signatures", []) if sandbox_report else []
}
Step 5: Push Results to SIEM
def push_to_splunk(verdict_result, splunk_url, splunk_token):
"""Send malware analysis verdict to Splunk HEC"""
import json
event = {
"sourcetype": "malware_analysis",
"source": "malware_pipeline",
"event": {
"sha256": verdict_result["sha256"],
"verdict": verdict_result["verdict"],
"confidence": verdict_result["confidence"],
"score": verdict_result["combined_score"],
"vt_detections": verdict_result["vt_detections"],
"sandbox_score": verdict_result["sandbox_score"],
"malware_family": verdict_result.get("threat_label", "Unknown"),
"iocs": verdict_result["iocs"],
"signatures": [s["name"] for s in verdict_result["signatures"]]
}
}
response = requests.post(
f"{splunk_url}/services/collector/event",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Splunk {splunk_token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json"
},
json=event,
verify=not os.environ.get("SKIP_TLS_VERIFY", "").lower() == "true", # Set SKIP_TLS_VERIFY=true for self-signed certs in lab environments
)
return response.status_code == 200
def push_iocs_to_blocklist(iocs, firewall_api):
"""Push extracted IOCs to blocking infrastructure"""
for ip in iocs.get("ips", []):
requests.post(
f"{firewall_api}/block",
json={"type": "ip", "value": ip, "action": "block", "source": "malware_pipeline"}
)
for domain in iocs.get("domains", []):
requests.post(
f"{firewall_api}/block",
json={"type": "domain", "value": domain, "action": "sinkhole", "source": "malware_pipeline"}
)
Step 6: Orchestrate the Full Pipeline
def run_malware_pipeline(sample_path, config):
"""Execute full malware analysis pipeline"""
collector = MalwareCollector()
screener = MalwarePreScreener(config["vt_key"])
submitter = SandboxSubmitter(config["cuckoo_url"])
generator = VerdictGenerator()
# Step 1: Hash and pre-screen
hashes = collector.compute_hashes(sample_path)
pre_screen = screener.pre_screen(hashes["sha256"])
# Step 2: Submit to sandbox if unknown
sandbox_report = None
if pre_screen["needs_sandbox"]:
task_id = submitter.submit_to_cuckoo(sample_path)
sandbox_report = submitter.wait_for_analysis(task_id)
# Step 3: Generate verdict
verdict = generator.generate_verdict(pre_screen, sandbox_report)
verdict["sha256"] = hashes["sha256"]
verdict["threat_label"] = pre_screen.get("virustotal", {}).get("threat_label", "Unknown")
# Step 4: Push to SIEM
push_to_splunk(verdict, config["splunk_url"], config["splunk_token"])
# Step 5: Block if malicious
if verdict["verdict"] == "MALICIOUS":
push_iocs_to_blocklist(verdict["iocs"], config["firewall_api"])
screener.close()
return verdict
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Dynamic Analysis | Executing malware in a sandbox to observe runtime behavior (process creation, network, file system changes) |
| Static Analysis | Examining malware without execution (hash lookup, string analysis, PE header inspection) |
| Sandbox Evasion | Techniques malware uses to detect sandbox environments and alter behavior to avoid analysis |
| IOC Extraction | Automated process of identifying network indicators, file artifacts, and registry changes from sandbox reports |
| Multi-AV Scanning | Submitting samples to multiple antivirus engines (VirusTotal) for consensus-based detection |
| Verdict | Final classification of a sample: Malicious, Suspicious, Potentially Unwanted, or Clean |
Tools & Systems
- Cuckoo Sandbox: Open-source automated malware analysis platform with behavioral analysis and network capture
- Joe Sandbox: Commercial sandbox with deep behavioral analysis, YARA matching, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping
- Any.Run: Interactive sandbox service allowing real-time manipulation during analysis for debugging evasive malware
- VirusTotal: Multi-engine scanning service providing 70+ AV results and behavioral analysis reports
- CAPE Sandbox: Community-maintained Cuckoo fork with enhanced payload extraction and configuration dumping
Common Scenarios
- Email Attachment Triage: Auto-submit quarantined email attachments, generate verdict in <5 minutes
- EDR Quarantine Processing: Batch-process files quarantined by endpoint security for detailed analysis
- Incident Investigation: Submit suspicious binaries found during IR for malware family identification and IOC extraction
- Threat Intel Enrichment: Analyze samples from threat feeds to extract C2 infrastructure and update blocking
- Zero-Day Detection: Sandbox catches novel malware missed by signature-based AV through behavioral analysis
Output Format
MALWARE ANALYSIS REPORT — Pipeline Submission
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Sample: invoice_march.docx
SHA256: a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8...
File Type: Microsoft Word Document (macro-enabled)
Pre-Screening:
VirusTotal: 34/72 malicious (Emotet.Downloader)
MalwareBazaar: Tags: emotet, macro, downloader
Sandbox Analysis (Cuckoo):
Score: 9.2/10 (MALICIOUS)
Signatures:
- Macro executes PowerShell download cradle (severity: 8)
- Process injection into explorer.exe (severity: 9)
- Connects to known Emotet C2 server (severity: 9)
Extracted IOCs:
C2 IPs: 185.234.218[.]50:8080, 45.77.123[.]45:443
Domains: update-service[.]evil[.]com
Dropped Files: payload.dll (SHA256: b2c3d4e5...)
Registry: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Update
VERDICT: MALICIOUS (Emotet Downloader) — Confidence: HIGH
ACTIONS:
[DONE] IOCs pushed to Splunk threat intel
[DONE] C2 IPs blocked on firewall
[DONE] Domain sinkholed on DNS
[DONE] Hash blocked on endpoint
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