AGENT SKILL

acm-private-ca-deployer

Provisions AWS Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA) with production defaults: CA creation (root vs subordinate), key algorithm (RSA_2048, EC_prime256v1), signing algorithm (SHA256withRSA, SHA256withECDSA), CRL configuration (S3 bucket, expiration, CNAME), certificate template selection, CA certificate issuance (self-signed root vs parent-signed subordinate), certificate revocation, audit via CloudTrail, CA deletion (7-30 day mandatory waiting period), CA permissions for ACM integration, and OCSP support. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with verification commands. Use when creating a private CA, issuing private certificates, configuring CRL revocation, setting up subordinate CA hierarchies, integrating ACM PCA with ACM, or deleting a private CA. Triggers: create private certificate authority, acm pca root ca, acm pca subordinate ca, issue private certificate, crl configuration s3, revoke certificate acm pca, ca deletion waiting period, acm pca permissions, acm managed private cert.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-09-24
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★ 4
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0

01 前言 Front Matter

name
acm-private-ca-deployer
license
Apache-2.0
metadata
{ "tags": "aws, acm-pca, private-ca, cloudops, deploy, security, provisioning, pki, certificates, crl, revocation", "phase": "1", "author": "Jacky Chan — AWS Community Builder", "domain": "aws-cloudops", "family": "Security", "version": "0.1.0", "keywords": "aws, acm, acm pca, private certificate authority, private ca, cloudops, deploy, provisioning, root ca, subordinate ca, certificate, crl, ocsp, revocation, pki", "task_type": "deploy", "complexity": "high", "entry_point": "false", "skill_class": "capability", "when_to_use": "Invoke when the user wants to create a private certificate authority (root or subordinate), issue private certificates, configure CRL revocation, set up a subordinate CA hierarchy, integrate ACM PCA with ACM for managed certificate lifecycle, delete a private CA, or revoke certificates. Do NOT invoke for public TLS certificates (use ACM public certificate skills), AWS Certificate Manager public issuance, or AWS Secrets Manager certificate storage.", "dependencies": "aws-orchestrator", "requires_llm": "true", "verdict_shape": "READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING", "lifecycle_status": "active", "supports_pipeline": "true" }
description
Provisions AWS Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA) with production defaults: CA creation (root vs subordinate), key algorithm (RSA_2048, EC_prime256v1), signing algorithm (SHA256withRSA, SHA256withECDSA), CRL configuration (S3 bucket, expiration, CNAME), certificate template selection, CA certificate issuance (self-signed root vs parent-signed subordinate), certificate revocation, audit via CloudTrail, CA deletion (7-30 day mandatory waiting period), CA permissions for ACM integration, and OCSP support. Emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with verification commands. Use when creating a private CA, issuing private certificates, configuring CRL revocation, setting up subordinate CA hierarchies, integrating ACM PCA with ACM, or deleting a private CA. Triggers: create private certificate authority, acm pca root ca, acm pca subordinate ca, issue private certificate, crl configuration s3, revoke certificate acm pca, ca deletion waiting period, acm pca permissions, acm managed private cert.
compatibility
Agent runtime that reads SKILL.md (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, Gemini). For live deployment: AWS CLI v2 with acm-pca and acm access. Works with Terraform aws_acmpca_certificate_authority / aws_acmpca_certificate / aws_acmpca_certificate_authority_certificate resources and CloudFormation AWS::ACMPCA::CertificateAuthority / AWS::ACMPCA::Certificate templates.

02 资源文件 19

03 SKILL.md 正文

ACM Private CA Deployer

An AWS CloudOps agent skill that provisions AWS Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA) with correct defaults. The skill walks the operator through root vs subordinate CA creation, key and signing algorithm selection, CRL configuration, certificate issuance, CA permissions for ACM integration, certificate revocation, and the mandatory CA deletion waiting period. It captures hierarchy decisions, explains why each default matters, and emits a READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist with copy- pasteable verification commands.

Activation keywords

create private certificate authority, ACM PCA root CA, ACM PCA subordinate CA, issue private certificate, CRL configuration S3, revoke certificate ACM PCA, CA deletion waiting period, ACM PCA permissions, ACM managed private cert.

STRICT output contract

When this skill is invoked with an ACM PCA provisioning request (create a private CA, issue a certificate, configure CRL, set up a subordinate hierarchy, delete a CA, or a partial configuration), the agent MUST respond with the READY_TO_DEPLOY checklist defined in the "Output format" section using the literal all-caps labels ACM_PCA:, VERDICT:, CHECKLIST:, and VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:. Do NOT preface the checklist with prose, headings, or disclaimers — emit the block as the first lines of the response. This contract is what assertion-based evals and downstream provisioning pipelines rely on; deviating from the literal labels breaks automation silently.

If any prerequisite is missing, the verdict is PREREQUISITES_MISSING with a specific gap citation in the checklist (marked [✗]), and READY_TO_DEPLOY MUST NOT also appear.

Quick navigation

Section When to read
Prerequisites Always — verify before provisioning
Step 1 — CA type: root vs subordinate Core CA model
Step 2 — Key and signing algorithm selection Cryptographic choice
Step 3 — CRL configuration (S3 bucket) Revocation infrastructure
Step 4 — Create the CA and issue CA certificate Provisioning step
Step 5 — Certificate templates and end-entity issuance Certificate issuance
Step 6 — CA permissions for ACM integration Cross-account / ACM managed certs
Step 7 — Certificate revocation and OCSP Revocation lifecycle
Step 8 — CA deletion (mandatory waiting period) Decommissioning
Step 9 — Audit via CloudTrail Compliance
Step 10 — Recent features Latest
NEVER do these things Review before signing off
Output format The literal checklist template
references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md Root/subordinate detail
references/crl-and-revocation.md CRL + revocation detail
references/advanced-patterns.md Expert-heuristic deep dives + recent features
references/error-handling.md Error remedies

Mindset

One-line takeaway: ACM PCA provides managed private CAs. A root CA is self-signed; a subordinate CA is signed by its parent CA and MUST have the parent's permission to issue. CRL revocation requires an S3 bucket with a policy granting the ACM PCA service principal write access. CA deletion is NOT immediate — it enters a mandatory 7-30 day waiting period before permanent deletion.

Three misconceptions dominate ACM PCA misdesign at provisioning time:

  • "Creating the CA is enough to issue certificates." It is not. A newly created CA is in PENDING_CERTIFICATE status. For a root CA, you must issue and import a self-signed certificate. For a subordinate CA, you must request a certificate from the parent CA, then import it. Until the CA is ACTIVE, no certificates can be issued from it.

  • "CRL works automatically without an S3 bucket policy." It does not. The CRL distribution point requires an S3 bucket where ACM PCA publishes the CRL. The bucket MUST have a policy granting the acm-pca.amazonaws.com service principal s3:PutObject permission. Without this policy, CRL publication silently fails and clients cannot check revocation status.

  • "CA deletion is instant." It is NOT. Deleting a CA initiates a mandatory waiting period of 7 to 30 days (you choose the duration). During this period the CA is in DELETED status but can be restored. After the period expires, the CA and all its data are permanently destroyed. This waiting period exists because certificates issued by the CA may still be in use.

Configuration dependency graph (novel heuristic)

ACM PCA configurations are NOT independent. The CA must be ACTIVE before issuing certificates. CRL requires an S3 bucket with the correct policy. Subordinate CAs require parent CA permission. Use this graph to sequence provisioning.

Configuration Hard dependencies (API error without) Silent failure / immutability Enables downstream
CA creation (root) Key alg, signing alg, subject DN CA is CREATING then PENDING_CERTIFICATE; NOT usable until ACTIVE the CA ARN
CA creation (subordinate) Key alg, signing alg, subject DN, parent CA ARN CA is PENDING_CERTIFICATE until parent signs it; parent MUST have create-permission subordinate CA
CA certificate (root) CA created; CSR obtained Root CA cert is self-signed; must issue then import ACTIVE status
CA certificate (subordinate) Subordinate CA created; CSR obtained; parent CA ACTIVE Parent CA must issue subordinate cert; then import into subordinate subordinate ACTIVE status
CRL configuration S3 bucket exists Bucket MUST have policy granting acm-pca.amazonaws.com s3:PutObject; without it CRL publication silently fails revocation checking
End-entity certificate CA ACTIVE; certificate template ARN Template determines key usage, path length, validity; wrong template = wrong certificate private TLS certificate
ACM integration CA ACTIVE; create-permission granting ACM service principal Without permission, ACM cannot request/renew certs from the CA managed private cert lifecycle
CA deletion CA exists 7-30 day mandatory waiting period; restorable until period expires decommissioning

The subordinate-parent-permission row is the one a baseline model misses. Creating a subordinate CA is not enough — the parent CA must have a permission entry (create-permission) granting the requesting principal the right to issue. Without it, the subordinate CA cannot be signed by the parent and stays in PENDING_CERTIFICATE forever.

Cross-dependency gotchas:

  • A subordinate CA requires the parent CA to be ACTIVE AND to have a create-permission entry. Both conditions must be met.
  • CRL publication requires the S3 bucket policy to grant acm-pca.amazonaws.com write access. Missing the policy is a silent failure — the CA appears to work, but CRL is never published.
  • ACM integration requires BOTH the CA to be ACTIVE AND a create-permission granting the ACM service principal access.
  • CA deletion is reversible during the waiting period via restore-certificate-authority. After the period, it is permanent.

Expert heuristic: root vs subordinate CA hierarchy

Full hierarchy decision tree (root self-sign vs subordinate parent-sign flows): moved to references/advanced-patterns.md; command-level detail in references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Expert heuristic: CRL S3 bucket policy

CRL prerequisite checklist and silent-failure mode: moved to references/advanced-patterns.md; bucket setup commands in references/crl-and-revocation.md.

Expert heuristic: CA deletion waiting period

Deletion flow and restore semantics: moved to references/advanced-patterns.md; delete/restore commands in references/crl-and-revocation.md.

Prerequisites (verify before provisioning)

Before emitting provisioning commands, verify these prerequisites. If any are missing, the verdict is PREREQUISITES_MISSING.

Prerequisite Why it matters How to verify
Key algorithm chosen Determines CA key type Confirm in plan
Signing algorithm chosen Must be compatible with key algorithm Confirm in plan
Subject distinguished name (DN) Required for CA creation Confirm subject
S3 bucket for CRL (if CRL enabled) CRL publication requires a writable bucket aws s3api head-bucket --bucket <name>
CRL bucket policy grants PCA access Without it CRL publication silently fails aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <name>
Parent CA ACTIVE (for subordinate) Subordinate CA requires parent signing aws acm-pca describe-certificate-authority --certificate-authority-arn <parent-arn>
Parent CA create-permission (for subordinate) Parent must grant permission to issue aws acm-pca list-permissions --certificate-authority-arn <parent-arn>
Certificate template identified Template determines cert type, key usage, path length Confirm template ARN

If any prerequisite is missing, output VERDICT: PREREQUISITES_MISSING and cite the specific gap.

Step 1 — CA type: root vs subordinate

Feature Root CA Subordinate CA
Certificate source Self-signed Signed by parent CA
Template for CA cert RootCACertificate/V1 SubordinateCACertificate/PathLen0/V1
Trust anchor Yes (clients trust directly) No (clients trust root above it)
Requires parent CA No Yes (parent ACTIVE + permission)
Typical use Offline root, trust anchor Intermediate CA for daily cert issuance

Best practice: use a root CA as the offline trust anchor and subordinate CAs for active certificate issuance. This limits root CA exposure.

Step 2 — Key and signing algorithm selection

Key algorithm Valid signing algorithms Notes
RSA_2048 SHA256withRSA, SHA384withRSA, SHA512withRSA Default for most CAs
RSA_4096 SHA256withRSA, SHA384withRSA, SHA512withRSA Root CAs requiring extra margin
EC_prime256v1 SHA256withECDSA, SHA384withECDSA, SHA512withECDSA High-throughput subordinate CAs
EC_secp384r1 SHA256withECDSA, SHA384withECDSA, SHA512withECDSA Stronger EC

Default: SHA256withRSA for RSA keys, SHA256withECDSA for EC keys. These have the broadest client compatibility.

Step 3 — CRL configuration (S3 bucket)

Bucket creation and PCA bucket-policy commands: references/crl-and-revocation.md.

Step 4 — Create the CA and issue CA certificate

create-certificate-authority commands (root + subordinate): references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Root CA activation commands (CSR -> self-signed issue -> import): references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Subordinate CA activation commands (parent signs CSR -> import chain): references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Verify CA is ACTIVE:

aws acm-pca describe-certificate-authority \
  --certificate-authority-arn "$ROOT_CA_ARN" \
  --query 'CertificateAuthority.Status' --region us-east-1
# Expected: ACTIVE

Common mistake: assuming the CA is immediately usable. After creation, the CA is in PENDING_CERTIFICATE. It must receive its CA certificate to become ACTIVE.

Step 5 — Certificate templates and end-entity issuance

Template ARN suffix Purpose Path length
RootCACertificate/V1 Self-signed root CA certificate N/A
SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen0/V1 Subordinate CA (cannot issue further CA certs) 0
SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen1/V1 Subordinate CA (can issue one more level) 1
EndEntityCertificate/CertPassedPathLen/0 End-entity TLS certificate N/A
EndEntityCertificate/V1 Basic end-entity certificate N/A
CodeSigningCertificate/V1 Code signing certificate N/A
OCSPSigningCertificate/V1 OCSP responder signing N/A

issue-certificate end-entity command: references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Step 6 — CA permissions for ACM integration

To let AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) request, issue, and renew private certificates from a PCA, grant the ACM service principal permission.

aws acm-pca create-permission \
  --certificate-authority-arn "$SUB_CA_ARN" \
  --principal acm.amazonaws.com \
  --actions IssueCertificate GetCertificate ListPermissions \
  --region us-east-1

Cross-account create-permission command: references/ca-hierarchy-and-signing.md.

Step 7 — Certificate revocation and OCSP

revoke-certificate and OCSP enable commands: references/crl-and-revocation.md.

Step 8 — CA deletion (mandatory waiting period)

delete/restore-certificate-authority commands: references/crl-and-revocation.md.

Step 9 — Audit via CloudTrail

All ACM PCA API calls are logged to CloudTrail, providing a full audit trail.

Event Security significance
CreateCertificateAuthority New CA created
IssueCertificate Certificate issued (who, what, template)
ImportCertificateAuthorityCertificate CA activated
RevokeCertificate Certificate revoked (who, why, serial)
DeleteCertificateAuthority CA deletion initiated (waiting period started)
CreatePermission Permission granted
DeletePermission Permission revoked

Step 10 — Recent features

Full feature list with dates: references/advanced-patterns.md.

NEVER do these things

  1. NEVER assume the CA is usable immediately after creation. The CA starts in PENDING_CERTIFICATE. It must receive its CA certificate to become ACTIVE.

  2. NEVER create a subordinate CA without verifying the parent CA is ACTIVE and has create-permission. Without permission, the subordinate stays PENDING_CERTIFICATE indefinitely.

  3. NEVER configure CRL without the S3 bucket policy. CRL publication silently fails without the policy granting acm-pca.amazonaws.com write access. Revoked certs appear valid.

  4. NEVER delete a CA without understanding the waiting period. Deletion enters a mandatory 7-30 day period. After expiration, the CA is permanently destroyed and existing certs cannot be revoked.

  5. NEVER use the wrong certificate template. Templates define key usage, extended key usage, and path length. Wrong template = wrong certificate extensions.

  6. NEVER forget to set up ACM permissions for managed cert lifecycle. Without create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com, ACM cannot request or renew private certificates.

  7. NEVER assume OCSP replaces CRL. Some clients only support CRL. Enable both for maximum client compatibility.

  8. NEVER issue certificates from a root CA for daily operations. Use subordinate CAs for active issuance. Root CAs should be the offline trust anchor.

  9. NEVER revoke a certificate without recording the serial. The certificate serial is required for revocation. Always record issued certificate serials in an asset inventory.

  10. NEVER assume CA deletion is instant. The mandatory waiting period is 7-30 days. Plan decommissioning timelines accordingly.

Output format (STRICT output contract)

When this skill is invoked with an ACM PCA provisioning request, the agent MUST respond with the block below using the literal all-caps labels ACM_PCA:, VERDICT:, CHECKLIST:, and VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:. Do NOT preface the checklist with prose, headings, or disclaimers — emit the block as the first lines of the response. This contract is what assertion-based evals and downstream provisioning pipelines rely on; deviating from the literal labels breaks automation silently.

If any prerequisite is missing, the verdict is PREREQUISITES_MISSING with a specific gap citation in the checklist (marked [✗]), and READY_TO_DEPLOY MUST NOT also appear.

Decision tree — CA provisioning flow

Need a private CA?
├── Need a self-signed trust anchor?
│     → ROOT CA
│       ├── Key: RSA_2048 (default) | RSA_4096 | EC_prime256v1 | EC_secp384r1
│       ├── Signing: SHA256withRSA (RSA) | SHA256withECDSA (EC)
│       ├── Template: RootCACertificate/V1
│       ├── CRL? → YES: create S3 bucket + policy → configure CrlConfiguration
│       │          NO: skip (OCSP only or none)
│       ├── ACM integration? → YES: create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com
│       └── Activate: self-sign → import-certificate-authority-certificate
│
├── Need a CA signed by an existing parent?
│     → SUBORDINATE CA
│       ├── PREREQUISITE: parent CA ACTIVE + has create-permission
│       ├── Template: SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen0/V1
│       └── Activate: parent signs CSR → import into subordinate
│
└── Need to issue end-entity certs (TLS)?
      → CA (root or subordinate) must be ACTIVE
      → Template: EndEntityCertificate/CertPassedPathLen/0
      → For ACM-managed lifecycle: create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com

Output template

ACM_PCA: <ca-name> (<ROOT|SUBORDINATE>, <key-algorithm>, <signing-algorithm>)
VERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY | PREREQUISITES_MISSING
CHECKLIST:
  [✓|✗] CA type: ROOT | SUBORDINATE
  [✓|✗] Key algorithm: RSA_2048 | RSA_4096 | EC_prime256v1 | EC_secp384r1
  [✓|✗] Signing algorithm: SHA256withRSA | SHA256withECDSA | ...
  [✓|✗] Subject DN: CN=<cn>, O=<org>, C=<country>
  [✓|✗] CRL S3 bucket: <bucket-name> — exists
  [✓|✗] CRL bucket policy: grants acm-pca.amazonaws.com s3:PutObject
  [✓|✗] CRL expiration: <days> days, CustomCname: <cname|none>
  [✓|✗] OCSP: enabled | disabled
  [✓|✗] CA status: CREATING | PENDING_CERTIFICATE | ACTIVE
  [✓|✗] CA certificate: self-signed (root) | parent-signed (subordinate, parent <parent-arn>)
  [✓|✗] Certificate template: <template-arn-suffix>
  [✓|✗] ACM integration: create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com (IssueCertificate, GetCertificate, ListPermissions)
  [✓|✗] Parent CA permission: create-permission granted (for subordinate only)
  [✓|✗] Tags: <key=value list>
VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:
  aws acm-pca describe-certificate-authority --certificate-authority-arn <ca-arn> --region <region>
  aws acm-pca list-permissions --certificate-authority-arn <ca-arn> --region <region>
  aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket <crl-bucket>

FORBIDDEN NEVER patterns (output contract)

  1. NEVER emit VERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY without confirming CA status is ACTIVE. A CA in PENDING_CERTIFICATE cannot issue certificates. The checklist MUST show CA status: ACTIVE with [✓].

  2. NEVER mark CRL as [✓] without confirming the S3 bucket policy. CRL publication silently fails without the policy granting acm-pca.amazonaws.com s3:PutObject. The checklist MUST show both the bucket name AND the policy status as verified.

  3. NEVER mark ACM integration as [✓] without confirming create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com. Without this permission, ACM cannot request or renew private certificates. The verification MUST include list-permissions output.

  4. NEVER show a subordinate CA as READY_TO_DEPLOY without confirming the parent CA is ACTIVE and has create-permission. A subordinate without parent signing stays PENDING_CERTIFICATE indefinitely. Both conditions (parent ACTIVE AND permission granted) must be met.

  5. NEVER omit the certificate template from the checklist. The template determines key usage, extended key usage, and path length. A missing or wrong template produces a certificate with incorrect extensions that may be rejected by clients.

  6. NEVER emit VERDICT: PREREQUISITES_MISSING without citing the specific gap. Each [✗] item MUST have a one-line reason citing what is missing and how to fix it. A bare [✗] with no explanation is non-compliant.

Perfect worked example — root CA with RSA_2048, CRL, and ACM end-entity issuance

ACM_PCA: Example Root CA (ROOT, RSA_2048, SHA256withRSA)
VERDICT: READY_TO_DEPLOY
CHECKLIST:
  [✓] CA type: ROOT
  [✓] Key algorithm: RSA_2048
  [✓] Signing algorithm: SHA256withRSA
  [✓] Subject DN: CN=Example Root CA, O=Example Org, C=US
  [✓] CRL S3 bucket: acm-pca-crl-123456789012-us-east-1 — exists
  [✓] CRL bucket policy: grants acm-pca.amazonaws.com s3:PutObject, s3:PutObjectAcl, s3:GetBucketAcl, s3:GetBucketLocation
  [✓] CRL expiration: 7 days, CustomCname: crl.example.com
  [✓] OCSP: enabled (OCSP + CRL both active for maximum client compatibility)
  [✓] CA status: ACTIVE
  [✓] CA certificate: self-signed (RootCACertificate/V1 template, validity 10 years)
  [✓] Certificate template: RootCACertificate/V1 (CA cert); EndEntityCertificate/CertPassedPathLen/0 (end-entity issuance)
  [✓] ACM integration: create-permission for acm.amazonaws.com — IssueCertificate, GetCertificate, ListPermissions granted
  [✓] Tags: Environment=production, Purpose=trust-anchor, Owner=platform-team
VERIFICATION_COMMANDS:
  aws acm-pca describe-certificate-authority --certificate-authority-arn arn:aws:acm-pca:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate-authority/aaaa-bbbb-cccc --region us-east-1
  aws acm-pca list-permissions --certificate-authority-arn arn:aws:acm-pca:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate-authority/aaaa-bbbb-cccc --region us-east-1
  aws s3api get-bucket-policy --bucket acm-pca-crl-123456789012-us-east-1
  aws acm-pca get-certificate-authority-certificate --certificate-authority-arn arn:aws:acm-pca:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate-authority/aaaa-bbbb-cccc --region us-east-1

How this example maps to provisioning steps:

  1. Created S3 bucket acm-pca-crl-123456789012-us-east-1 for CRL.
  2. Applied bucket policy granting acm-pca.amazonaws.com write access.
  3. Created ROOT CA with RSA_2048 / SHA256withRSA, CRL enabled (7-day expiration, CNAME crl.example.com), OCSP enabled.
  4. Obtained CSR, issued self-signed certificate using RootCACertificate/V1 template (10-year validity).
  5. Imported the certificate to activate the CA (ACTIVE status).
  6. Granted create-permission to acm.amazonaws.com so ACM can request end-entity certificates using EndEntityCertificate/CertPassedPathLen/0 template.

Self-check before emit:

  • [ ] CA status confirmed ACTIVE (not PENDING_CERTIFICATE)?
  • [ ] CRL bucket policy grants acm-pca.amazonaws.com s3:PutObject?
  • [ ] ACM create-permission confirmed via list-permissions?
  • [ ] Certificate template correct for the CA type?
  • [ ] For subordinate: parent CA ACTIVE + create-permission confirmed?

Error handling

Error remedies (stuck PENDING_CERTIFICATE, parent will not sign, CRL not publishing, ACM access denied, deletion delay): references/error-handling.md.

Domain

AWS CloudOps / AWS Private Certificate Authority (ACM PCA) Provisioning & PKI Management.

References (load on demand)

  • CA hierarchy and signing — full root/subordinate provisioning and activation flows, end-entity issuance, ACM + cross-account permissions, Terraform
  • CRL and revocation — CRL bucket setup and policy, revocation + OCSP commands, CA deletion/restore, CloudTrail auditing
  • Advanced patterns — expert heuristics (hierarchy decision tree, CRL bucket policy, deletion waiting period), recent AWS features
  • Error handling — stuck-state and access-denied remedies

AWS documentation

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jhkchan/aws-agent-skills

wafv2-web-acl-auditor

Audits AWS WAFv2 Web ACL configurations to determine whether the ACL provides effective protection: default-action posture (Allow vs Block), managed-rule-group coverage gaps, rule effectiveness (BLOCK vs COUNT, shadow/bypass rules, stale exclusions), rate-based rule correctness, logging and visibility configuration, and text-transformation bypass vectors. Emits a deterministic verdict per Web ACL. Use when reviewing a WAFv2 Web ACL for security posture, checking managed-rule coverage, validating rate-limit configuration, auditing WAF logging, or hardening a WAF before production deployment. Triggers: WAF, WAFv2, Web ACL, managed rule group, AWSManagedRules, rate-based rule, CAPTCHA, Challenge, OverrideAction, Count mode, forwarded IP, Bot Control, ATP, text transformation, WAF logging, WAF visibility, OWASP, SQLi, XSS, RFI.

★ 4
jhkchan
jhkchan/aws-agent-skills

waf-rule-deployer

Provisions AWS WAFv2 rule sets with production defaults: Web ACL creation (CloudFront scope in us-east-1 vs Regional scope), rule groups (managed vs custom) with capacity planning in WCU (Web ACL Capacity Units, 1500 default per ACL), managed rule groups (AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesAmazonIpReputationList, AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet, AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet), custom rules (byte-match, regex pattern set, geo-match, rate-based), IP set and regex pattern set resources, rule priority ordering (lowest number evaluated first), action types (allow, block, count, CAPTCHA, Challenge), bot control managed rule group, account takeover. Triggers: create WAF rule, WAF managed rule group, WAF custom rule, WAF byte match, WAF geo match, WAF rate based rule, WAF IP set, WAF regex pattern set, WAF WCU budget, WAF CloudFront ACL, WAF logging Kinesis Firehose, WAF bot control, WAF ATP, WAF label matching, WAF Challenge action, WAF CAPTCHA.

★ 4