[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M79SGHWYZSCB3S5227CS8QP6":3,"skill-same:01M79SGHWYZSCB3S5227CS8QP6":53},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":32,"commitSha":33,"skillDirectory":34,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":37,"updatedAt":38,"install":39,"resources":52},"01M79SGHWYZSCB3S5227CS8QP6","secrets-and-keys-architect",null,"Architect-level secrets management — secret stores and their hierarchy, rotation without downtime, envelope encryption with KMS\u002FHSM, key custody and destruction, environment and CI secret injection, and the leak-detection path that catches what escapes. Use when credentials, tokens, or encryption keys must be handled by systems.","SriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo","SriAkhilSJ","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F206201543?v=4","01M79RWFD1Q09B89SXTTKKJY6Z","Sri Akhil SJ","01M79RWFE26NPG0BZ1FRNX376H",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-and-devops-architect\u002Fidentity-architect\u002Fsecrets-and-keys-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: secrets-and-keys-architect\ndescription: Architect-level secrets management — secret stores and their hierarchy, rotation without downtime, envelope encryption with KMS\u002FHSM, key custody and destruction, environment and CI secret injection, and the leak-detection path that catches what escapes. Use when credentials, tokens, or encryption keys must be handled by systems.\nlicense: MIT\ncompatibility: AWS Secrets Manager\u002FKMS, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, Vault, SOPS\nmetadata:\n  crusor-domain: cloud-and-devops-architect\n  crusor-path: cloud-and-devops-architect\u002Fidentity-architect\u002Fsecrets-and-keys-architect\n  crusor-origin: original\n  crusor-sources: \"docs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fsecretsmanager; cloud.google.com\u002Fsecret-manager\u002Fdocs; developer.hashicorp.com\u002Fvault\u002Fdocs\"\n  crusor-triggers: \"secrets management, vault, kms, key rotation, envelope encryption, secret manager, api keys, key custody, hsm, leaked secret\"\n  crusor-verified-on: \"2026-10-30\"\n---\n\n# Secrets & Keys Architect\n\nSecrets fail in two ways: **they leak, or they cannot be rotated**. Every design\ndecision here is about making both cheap.\n\n## When to use\n\n- Application credentials, API keys, signing keys, database passwords.\n- Encryption at rest with customer-managed keys.\n- A leak has happened or is suspected.\n\n## When NOT to use\n\n- Human identity and permissions → `iam-architect`.\n- Mobile\u002Fweb client token storage → mobile or web security books.\n\n## Decision 1 — Store\n\n| Store | Fit |\n|---|---|\n| cloud secret manager | default; IAM-scoped, audited, versioned |\n| Vault | multi-cloud, dynamic credentials, PKI |\n| KMS\u002FHSM | encryption keys, never raw app secrets |\n| SOPS + repo | config encrypted at rest, bootstrapped by a key |\n| env vars \u002F files | delivery mechanism only, never the store |\n\n- Secrets never live in git, images, Terraform state in plaintext, or CI logs.\n- One secret per credential per environment; sharing a secret across services\n  makes rotation a coordination project.\n\n## Decision 2 — Access\n\n- Workload identity reads its own secrets; no human reads production secrets\n  routinely.\n- Path\u002Fnamespace per service, policy scoped to the identity.\n- Every read is audited; alert on access from an unexpected identity or region.\n- Prefer short-lived dynamic credentials (Vault database engine, IAM auth) over\n  static passwords where the system supports it.\n\n## Decision 3 — Rotation\n\n- Rotation is designed in, with two valid credentials during cutover.\n- Automated rotation where the provider supports it (database, cloud keys);\n  scheduled and monitored where it does not.\n- Consumers re-read the secret or watch for change; a restart requirement is an\n  outage waiting for a schedule.\n- Test rotation in staging on every change of the rotation job — a broken rotator\n  is discovered at 3 a.m. otherwise.\n\n## Decision 4 — Encryption keys\n\n- Envelope encryption: data key per object\u002Ftenant, wrapped by a KMS key.\n- Key hierarchy: root\u002FHSM → KMS key → data keys; permissions narrow at each level.\n- Separate keys per environment and, where required, per tenant (crypto-shredding\n  becomes deleting one key).\n- Key destruction is irreversible: require a waiting period, dual approval, and a\n  backup decision recorded.\n\n## Decision 5 — Delivery to workloads\n\n- Injected at runtime via the platform's identity (IRSA, workload identity,\n  managed identity), not baked into images.\n- CI\u002FCD gets short-lived credentials by OIDC; no long-lived deploy keys.\n- Local development uses a dev-only store; never a copy of production secrets.\n- Secret changes do not require an image rebuild.\n\n## Decision 6 — Detection\n\n- Scan repos and images for secret patterns; block the merge, not just alert.\n- Alert on a secret appearing in logs or error trackers.\n- Leak response runbook: revoke → rotate → audit access → notify. Revoke first.\n- Assume a leaked secret was used; check the audit trail.\n\n## Failure modes at scale\n\n- Database password in a Helm values file, committed and rotated never.\n- KMS key deleted to \"clean up\"; encrypted backups unrecoverable.\n- Rotation job fails silently for a year, then the password expires.\n- One shared secret across 30 services; rotation requires a coordinated freeze.\n- Secret in a CI log line, discovered months later by a third party.\n\n## Verification receipts\n\n1. Secret inventory: name, owner, consumers, rotation cadence.\n2. Rotation executed live with zero downtime observed.\n3. KMS key hierarchy diagram with policies per level.\n4. Leak scan wired into CI, proven by a deliberate test secret.\n5. Leak drill: revoke and rotate completed within the target time.\n","# Secrets & Keys Architect\n\nSecrets fail in two ways: **they leak, or they cannot be rotated**. Every design\ndecision here is about making both cheap.\n\n## When to use\n\n- Application credentials, API keys, signing keys, database passwords.\n- Encryption at rest with customer-managed keys.\n- A leak has happened or is suspected.\n\n## When NOT to use\n\n- Human identity and permissions → `iam-architect`.\n- Mobile\u002Fweb client token storage → mobile or web security books.\n\n## Decision 1 — Store\n\n| Store | Fit |\n|---|---|\n| cloud secret manager | default; IAM-scoped, audited, versioned |\n| Vault | multi-cloud, dynamic credentials, PKI |\n| KMS\u002FHSM | encryption keys, never raw app secrets |\n| SOPS + repo | config encrypted at rest, bootstrapped by a key |\n| env vars \u002F files | delivery mechanism only, never the store |\n\n- Secrets never live in git, images, Terraform state in plaintext, or CI logs.\n- One secret per credential per environment; sharing a secret across services\n  makes rotation a coordination project.\n\n## Decision 2 — Access\n\n- Workload identity reads its own secrets; no human reads production secrets\n  routinely.\n- Path\u002Fnamespace per service, policy scoped to the identity.\n- Every read is audited; alert on access from an unexpected identity or region.\n- Prefer short-lived dynamic credentials (Vault database engine, IAM auth) over\n  static passwords where the system supports it.\n\n## Decision 3 — Rotation\n\n- Rotation is designed in, with two valid credentials during cutover.\n- Automated rotation where the provider supports it (database, cloud keys);\n  scheduled and monitored where it does not.\n- Consumers re-read the secret or watch for change; a restart requirement is an\n  outage waiting for a schedule.\n- Test rotation in staging on every change of the rotation job — a broken rotator\n  is discovered at 3 a.m. otherwise.\n\n## Decision 4 — Encryption keys\n\n- Envelope encryption: data key per object\u002Ftenant, wrapped by a KMS key.\n- Key hierarchy: root\u002FHSM → KMS key → data keys; permissions narrow at each level.\n- Separate keys per environment and, where required, per tenant (crypto-shredding\n  becomes deleting one key).\n- Key destruction is irreversible: require a waiting period, dual approval, and a\n  backup decision recorded.\n\n## Decision 5 — Delivery to workloads\n\n- Injected at runtime via the platform's identity (IRSA, workload identity,\n  managed identity), not baked into images.\n- CI\u002FCD gets short-lived credentials by OIDC; no long-lived deploy keys.\n- Local development uses a dev-only store; never a copy of production secrets.\n- Secret changes do not require an image rebuild.\n\n## Decision 6 — Detection\n\n- Scan repos and images for secret patterns; block the merge, not just alert.\n- Alert on a secret appearing in logs or error trackers.\n- Leak response runbook: revoke → rotate → audit access → notify. Revoke first.\n- Assume a leaked secret was used; check the audit trail.\n\n## Failure modes at scale\n\n- Database password in a Helm values file, committed and rotated never.\n- KMS key deleted to \"clean up\"; encrypted backups unrecoverable.\n- Rotation job fails silently for a year, then the password expires.\n- One shared secret across 30 services; rotation requires a coordinated freeze.\n- Secret in a CI log line, discovered months later by a third party.\n\n## Verification receipts\n\n1. Secret inventory: name, owner, consumers, rotation cadence.\n2. Rotation executed live with zero downtime observed.\n3. KMS key hierarchy diagram with policies per level.\n4. Leak scan wired into CI, proven by a deliberate test secret.\n5. Leak drill: revoke and rotate completed within the target time.\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7,"compatibility":31},{"crusor-path":25,"crusor-domain":26,"crusor-origin":27,"crusor-sources":28,"crusor-triggers":29,"crusor-verified-on":30},"cloud-and-devops-architect\u002Fidentity-architect\u002Fsecrets-and-keys-architect","cloud-and-devops-architect","original","docs.aws.amazon.com\u002Fsecretsmanager; cloud.google.com\u002Fsecret-manager\u002Fdocs; developer.hashicorp.com\u002Fvault\u002Fdocs","secrets management, vault, kms, key rotation, envelope encryption, secret manager, api keys, key custody, hsm, leaked secret","2026-10-30","AWS Secrets Manager\u002FKMS, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, Vault, SOPS","main","8fa4e240be65b98472c9b2d3a505ade2aea1a5c6","skills\u002Fcloud-and-devops-architect\u002Fidentity-architect\u002Fsecrets-and-keys-architect","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ","Studying in CMR institute of Technology\r\n2024 - 2028","2026-11-13 21:02:23",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":40,"prompt":50,"zipAvailable":51},[41,44,47],{"tool":42,"command":43},"npx","npx skills add SriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo --skill secrets-and-keys-architect",{"tool":45,"command":46},"bunx","bunx skills add SriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo --skill secrets-and-keys-architect",{"tool":48,"command":49},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo --skill secrets-and-keys-architect","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud-and-devops-architect\u002Fidentity-architect\u002Fsecrets-and-keys-architect\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[54,61,68,75,82,89],{"skillNo":55,"name":56,"nameZh":6,"description":57,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":58,"categories":59,"keywords":60,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TTAJNACCNXCEN3649CMMD","interaction-patterns-architect","Architect-level interaction design in code — choosing established patterns over invented ones, feedback and latency behaviour, destructive-action safeguards, navigation and overlay conventions, and the state model behind every interactive surface. Use when a screen has to behave, not just look.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Fui-ux-implementation-architect\u002Finteraction-patterns-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":62,"name":63,"nameZh":6,"description":64,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TT2ESKB1TKZBYY9KYJHV9","design-system-ops-architect","Architect-level operation of a design system in code — token pipelines and versioning, component API and variant policy, the catalogue as the contract, adoption metrics, and the governance that stops a system from forking into three. Use when a component library must survive several teams.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Fui-ux-implementation-architect\u002Fdesign-system-ops-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TSV0PWGNK3PRX9P4JDR9N","design-handoff-architect","Architect-level design handoff — what must be specified before implementation starts, tokens over raw values, responsive and content-limit contracts, state matrices, and the review loop that catches drift between design and code. Use when a design is about to become code.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Fui-ux-implementation-architect\u002Fdesign-handoff-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TSJS9BFXNP696FMJ9GKDA","content-microcopy-architect","Architect-level UI content — where strings live, voice and terminology consistency, error and empty-state copy as part of the interface, translation-ready authoring, and the content model a product needs before it multiplies screens. Use when the words in the interface matter as much as the pixels.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Fui-ux-implementation-architect\u002Fcontent-microcopy-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TSCNBST3N1M68V1KPH9HQ","ui-ux-implementation-architect","Architect-level direction for turning a design into working UI — the handoff contract, component ownership versus screen-level layout, interaction and state conventions, design QA gates, and the review habits that keep an implementation faithful without frozen pixels. Use before any specific UI implementation skill.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Fui-ux-implementation-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":19},"01M79TS4N6A4D2QQ433VXS5D0R","test-strategy-architect","Architect-level test strategy — allocating assertions across unit, integration, contract and end-to-end layers, designing for testability through dependency boundaries, fixture and data strategy, and the flake and coverage policies that keep a suite trustworthy. Use when defining how a codebase is tested.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriAkhilSJ\u002FPulseAIRepo\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwebsite-architect\u002Ftesting-and-deployment-architect\u002Ftest-strategy-architect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]