[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M79SA2H6DCGAHNE2J8CKT36N":3,"skill-same:01M79SA2H6DCGAHNE2J8CKT36N":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M79SA2H6DCGAHNE2J8CKT36N","owasp-top-10-testing",null,"使用Strix对应用程序进行OWASP Top 10测试，Strix是一种自主的人工智能代理，尝试对当前OWASP Top 10:2025的每一类进行真正的攻击（访问控制中断，包括SSRF、安全配置错误、软件供应链故障、加密故障、注入、不安全设计、身份验证故障、完整性故障、日志记录和警报故障、异常情况处理不当），并仅报告他们能够实际证明的内容，并通过概念证明映射回该类别。还包括OWASP API安全性前十（2023）。当用户要求进行OWASP Top 10评估、OWASP合规性测试或映射到OWASP类别的安全审查时使用。","zzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN","zzz2929","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F145306978?v=4","01M79S11YZNA13C4SZEN9M9QH1","zxyzzz","01M79S1204VZEHJSESQE300A6N",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstrix\u002Fowasp-top-10-testing\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: owasp-top-10-testing\ndescription: 使用Strix对应用程序进行OWASP Top 10测试，Strix是一种自主的人工智能代理，尝试对当前OWASP Top 10:2025的每一类进行真正的攻击（访问控制中断，包括SSRF、安全配置错误、软件供应链故障、加密故障、注入、不安全设计、身份验证故障、完整性故障、日志记录和警报故障、异常情况处理不当），并仅报告他们能够实际证明的内容，并通过概念证明映射回该类别。还包括OWASP API安全性前十（2023）。当用户要求进行OWASP Top 10评估、OWASP合规性测试或映射到OWASP类别的安全审查时使用。\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nmetadata:\n  author: usestrix\n  homepage: https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.strix.ai\n---\n# Test against the OWASP Top 10\n\nThe OWASP Top 10 is a taxonomy of risk categories, not a test suite — \"OWASP Top 10 testing\" means exercising each category against the real application and reporting what's actually exploitable. Strix's agents do the exploitation; this skill covers running it category-by-category and reporting coverage honestly.\n\n**Use the current edition: [OWASP Top 10:2025](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002FTop10\u002F)** (8th installment, superseding 2021). Ask the user before targeting an older edition — some compliance checklists still reference 2021, and a report labelled with the wrong edition is misleading. Key differences from 2021: **SSRF is folded into A01**, **A03 Software Supply Chain Failures** expands the old \"Vulnerable and Outdated Components\", and **A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions** is new; A02 Security Misconfiguration moved 5→2.\n\nInstall, LLM setup, and the managed-cloud alternative: **penetration-testing-with-strix**. For a run with no Docker and no LLM key, the same binary drives the managed platform: `strix cloud login`, then `strix cloud scans start ...` (details in **managed-pentesting-with-strix**).\n\n## What is and is not testable by an agent\n\nBe straight with the user about this — claiming a clean sweep of all ten is misleading.\n\n| Category (2025)                           | Coverage                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| ----------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| A01 Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF)    | **Strong** — cross-user\u002Ftenant access, privilege escalation, IDOR, and SSRF (including blind, via out-of-band callbacks) are all exploit-validated. Needs two accounts plus a privileged one to prove the authorization half.                                                            |\n| A02 Security Misconfiguration             | **Strong** — debug endpoints, verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing hardening, default credentials, exposed admin surfaces.                                                                                                                                                           |\n| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures        | **Partial** — version fingerprinting, and vulnerable\u002Foutdated dependency review when source is supplied. Build-system and distribution-infrastructure compromise (the broader half of this category) is out of scope for a runtime scan — pair with SCA plus build-provenance controls. |\n| A04 Cryptographic Failures                | **Partial** — transport config, unencrypted data in transit, secrets and tokens leaked in responses. At-rest crypto and key management need source or infra review.                                                                                                                      |\n| A05 Injection                             | **Strong** — SQL\u002FNoSQL\u002Fcommand\u002Ftemplate injection and XSS, exploit-validated.                                                                                                                                                                                                            |\n| A06 Insecure Design                       | **Partial** — business-logic abuse (price\u002Fquantity tampering, workflow skipping, race conditions) is found where reachable; design intent still needs human review and threat modelling.                                                                                                 |\n| A07 Authentication Failures               | **Strong** — auth bypass, weak session\u002Ftoken handling, password-reset and MFA flaws.                                                                                                                                                                                                     |\n| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures   | **Partial** — insecure deserialization and unsigned-update paths where reachable; CI\u002FCD trust boundaries are not runtime-testable.                                                                                                                                                       |\n| A09 Security Logging & Alerting Failures  | **Not testable from outside** — requires reviewing the logging and alerting pipeline. State this rather than reporting it as passed.                                                                                                                                                     |\n| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | **Partial** — agents actively probe error handling and fail-open behavior (malformed input, forced errors, race and timeout conditions) and report what leaks or bypasses a control; exhaustive coverage of internal error paths needs source review.                                    |\n\nFor APIs, run the same exercise against the **OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)** — API1 BOLA, API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization (2019's excessive data exposure + mass assignment merged), API5 broken function-level authorization — using the **api-security-testing** skill.\n\n## Run it\n\nMaximum category coverage comes from giving the agents both the source and a running instance, plus credentials at two privilege levels:\n\n```bash\nstrix -n \\\n  -t https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Forg\u002Fapp \\\n  -t https:\u002F\u002Fstaging.example.com \\\n  --scan-mode deep --max-budget 30 \\\n  --instruction \"OWASP Top 10:2025 assessment. Cover every category systematically and map each finding to its 2025 category id.\nAccounts: userA@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw> (org 1), userB@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw> (org 2), admin@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw>.\nPrioritise A01 (cross-org access, privilege escalation, SSRF), A02, A05, A07, A10.\nOut of scope: \u002Fbilling\u002F*, outbound email.\"\n```\n\n- `--scan-mode deep` matters here: systematically walking ten categories is not a quick scan.\n- Without a second account, A01 results are structurally incomplete — say so in the report rather than leaving it implied.\n- Need an auditor-facing PDF? Run it through the managed platform and pull the technical report (**managed-pentesting-with-strix**).\n\n## Report honestly\n\nFrom `strix_runs\u002F\u003Crun>\u002F`, group `vulnerabilities\u002F*.md` by category and state, per category: what was attempted, what was proven, and what could not be assessed (A09 always; A03\u002FA04\u002FA06\u002FA08\u002FA10 partially). Label the report with the edition used. Verify each PoC yourself before it goes in front of the user.\n\nA `0` exit code means nothing exploitable was proven **in what was analyzed** — check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget`; a budget-capped run is not a completed assessment.\n\n## Then fix and re-test\n\nRemediate with **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** and re-run to prove each exploit is closed. For ongoing coverage as the app changes, gate pull requests using **ci-security-scanning-with-strix**.\n","# Test against the OWASP Top 10\n\nThe OWASP Top 10 is a taxonomy of risk categories, not a test suite — \"OWASP Top 10 testing\" means exercising each category against the real application and reporting what's actually exploitable. Strix's agents do the exploitation; this skill covers running it category-by-category and reporting coverage honestly.\n\n**Use the current edition: [OWASP Top 10:2025](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002FTop10\u002F)** (8th installment, superseding 2021). Ask the user before targeting an older edition — some compliance checklists still reference 2021, and a report labelled with the wrong edition is misleading. Key differences from 2021: **SSRF is folded into A01**, **A03 Software Supply Chain Failures** expands the old \"Vulnerable and Outdated Components\", and **A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions** is new; A02 Security Misconfiguration moved 5→2.\n\nInstall, LLM setup, and the managed-cloud alternative: **penetration-testing-with-strix**. For a run with no Docker and no LLM key, the same binary drives the managed platform: `strix cloud login`, then `strix cloud scans start ...` (details in **managed-pentesting-with-strix**).\n\n## What is and is not testable by an agent\n\nBe straight with the user about this — claiming a clean sweep of all ten is misleading.\n\n| Category (2025)                           | Coverage                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |\n| ----------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |\n| A01 Broken Access Control (incl. SSRF)    | **Strong** — cross-user\u002Ftenant access, privilege escalation, IDOR, and SSRF (including blind, via out-of-band callbacks) are all exploit-validated. Needs two accounts plus a privileged one to prove the authorization half.                                                            |\n| A02 Security Misconfiguration             | **Strong** — debug endpoints, verbose errors, permissive CORS, missing hardening, default credentials, exposed admin surfaces.                                                                                                                                                           |\n| A03 Software Supply Chain Failures        | **Partial** — version fingerprinting, and vulnerable\u002Foutdated dependency review when source is supplied. Build-system and distribution-infrastructure compromise (the broader half of this category) is out of scope for a runtime scan — pair with SCA plus build-provenance controls. |\n| A04 Cryptographic Failures                | **Partial** — transport config, unencrypted data in transit, secrets and tokens leaked in responses. At-rest crypto and key management need source or infra review.                                                                                                                      |\n| A05 Injection                             | **Strong** — SQL\u002FNoSQL\u002Fcommand\u002Ftemplate injection and XSS, exploit-validated.                                                                                                                                                                                                            |\n| A06 Insecure Design                       | **Partial** — business-logic abuse (price\u002Fquantity tampering, workflow skipping, race conditions) is found where reachable; design intent still needs human review and threat modelling.                                                                                                 |\n| A07 Authentication Failures               | **Strong** — auth bypass, weak session\u002Ftoken handling, password-reset and MFA flaws.                                                                                                                                                                                                     |\n| A08 Software or Data Integrity Failures   | **Partial** — insecure deserialization and unsigned-update paths where reachable; CI\u002FCD trust boundaries are not runtime-testable.                                                                                                                                                       |\n| A09 Security Logging & Alerting Failures  | **Not testable from outside** — requires reviewing the logging and alerting pipeline. State this rather than reporting it as passed.                                                                                                                                                     |\n| A10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions | **Partial** — agents actively probe error handling and fail-open behavior (malformed input, forced errors, race and timeout conditions) and report what leaks or bypasses a control; exhaustive coverage of internal error paths needs source review.                                    |\n\nFor APIs, run the same exercise against the **OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)** — API1 BOLA, API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization (2019's excessive data exposure + mass assignment merged), API5 broken function-level authorization — using the **api-security-testing** skill.\n\n## Run it\n\nMaximum category coverage comes from giving the agents both the source and a running instance, plus credentials at two privilege levels:\n\n```bash\nstrix -n \\\n  -t https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Forg\u002Fapp \\\n  -t https:\u002F\u002Fstaging.example.com \\\n  --scan-mode deep --max-budget 30 \\\n  --instruction \"OWASP Top 10:2025 assessment. Cover every category systematically and map each finding to its 2025 category id.\nAccounts: userA@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw> (org 1), userB@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw> (org 2), admin@example.com\u002F\u003Cpw>.\nPrioritise A01 (cross-org access, privilege escalation, SSRF), A02, A05, A07, A10.\nOut of scope: \u002Fbilling\u002F*, outbound email.\"\n```\n\n- `--scan-mode deep` matters here: systematically walking ten categories is not a quick scan.\n- Without a second account, A01 results are structurally incomplete — say so in the report rather than leaving it implied.\n- Need an auditor-facing PDF? Run it through the managed platform and pull the technical report (**managed-pentesting-with-strix**).\n\n## Report honestly\n\nFrom `strix_runs\u002F\u003Crun>\u002F`, group `vulnerabilities\u002F*.md` by category and state, per category: what was attempted, what was proven, and what could not be assessed (A09 always; A03\u002FA04\u002FA06\u002FA08\u002FA10 partially). Label the report with the edition used. Verify each PoC yourself before it goes in front of the user.\n\nA `0` exit code means nothing exploitable was proven **in what was analyzed** — check `run.json` status and cost against `--max-budget`; a budget-capped run is not a completed assessment.\n\n## Then fix and re-test\n\nRemediate with **fix-security-vulnerabilities-with-strix** and re-run to prove each exploit is closed. For ongoing coverage as the app changes, gate pull requests using **ci-security-scanning-with-strix**.\n",{"name":5,"license":15,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"author":25,"homepage":26},"usestrix","https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.strix.ai","main","9f046539cc7b77fcc2cdcc31dee08c104218a554","strix\u002Fowasp-top-10-testing","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929","2026-09-29 15:32:20",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add zzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN --skill owasp-top-10-testing",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add zzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN --skill owasp-top-10-testing",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add zzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN --skill owasp-top-10-testing","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fstrix\u002Fowasp-top-10-testing\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[48,56,63,70,77,85],{"skillNo":49,"name":50,"nameZh":6,"description":51,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SG5BDV2ZDS4QA238B9ZCR","vercel-react-view-transitions","使用 React 的视图转换 API（`\u003CViewTransition>` 组件、`addTransitionType` 和 CSS 视图转换伪元素）实现流畅、原生感觉的动画的指南。每当用户想要添加页面转换、为路线更改设置动画、创建共享元素动画、为组件的进入\u002F退出设置动画、为列表重新排序设置动画、实现定向（向前\u002F向后）导航动画或在 Next.js 中集成视图转换时，请使用此技能。当用户提及视图转换、startViewTransition、ViewTransition、转换类型或询问有关在 React 中的 UI 状态之间设置动画而无需第三方动画库时也可使用。","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fvercel-labs\u002Freact-view-transitions\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SG04BFAVYZ2C3RQ7YX9C6","vercel-react-native-skills","React Native和Expo构建高性能移动应用程序的最佳实践。在构建React Native组件、优化列表性能、实现动画或使用本机模块时使用。涉及React Native、Expo、移动性能或本机平台API的任务的触发器。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fvercel-labs\u002Freact-native-skills\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":67,"categories":68,"keywords":69,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SFVFWYQKG0V95RXM3MEAW","vercel-react-best-practices","Vercel Engineering的React和Next.js性能优化指南。在编写、审查或重构React\u002FNext.js代码时，应使用此技能，以确保最佳性能模式。涉及React组件、Next.js页面、数据获取、捆绑优化或性能改进的任务的触发器。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fvercel-labs\u002Freact-best-practices\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":71,"name":72,"nameZh":6,"description":73,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":74,"categories":75,"keywords":76,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SFJXD83X39ZFV0SR8Z6TY","vercel-composition-patterns","可扩展的React组合模式。在重构具有布尔属性增殖的组件、构建灵活的组件库或设计可重用的API时使用。涉及复合组件、渲染道具、上下文提供者或组件架构的任务的触发器。包括React 19 API变更。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fvercel-labs\u002Fcomposition-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SEC8F4BW45HKSK7VSYQ1Y","ui-styling","使用 shadcn\u002Fui 组件（基于 Radix UI + Tailwind 构建）、Tailwind CSS 实用优先样式和基于画布的视觉设计创建美观、可访问的用户界面。在构建用户界面、实现设计系统、创建响应式布局、添加可访问组件（对话框、下拉菜单、表单、表格）、自定义主题和颜色、实现深色模式、生成视觉设计和海报或跨应用程序建立一致的样式模式时使用。","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max\u002Fui-styling\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max\u002Fui-styling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":52,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":19},"01M79SE0JWV6111HE4M0A5K6XW","design","“综合设计技能：品牌标识、设计标记、UI 样式、徽标生成（55 种样式、Gemini 或 Atlas Cloud AI）、企业形象程序（50 个可交付成果、CIP 模型）、HTML 演示文稿（Chart.js）、横幅设计（22 种样式、社交\u002F广告\u002F网页\u002F打印）、图标设计（15 种样式、SVG、Gemini 3.1 Pro）、社交照片（HTML→屏幕截图、多平台）。操作：设计徽标、创建 CIP、生成模型、构建幻灯片、设计横幅、生成图标、创建社交照片、社交媒体图像、品牌标识、设计系统：Facebook、Twitter、LinkedIn、YouTube、Instagram、Pinterest、TikTok、Threads、Google Ads。”","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fzzz2929\u002Fskills-zh-CN\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fui-ux-pro-max\u002Fdesign\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]