AGENT SKILL

hostile-test-gap-auditor

Use tests as a map of assumptions and find missing negative, authorization, tenant, failure, race, retry, state, configuration, boundary, and recovery tests.

License 许可
MIT
最近更新
2026-11-13
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01 前言 Front Matter

name
hostile-test-gap-auditor
description
Use tests as a map of assumptions and find missing negative, authorization, tenant, failure, race, retry, state, configuration, boundary, and recovery tests.

03 SKILL.md 正文

hostile-test-gap-auditor

Purpose

Use tests as a map of assumptions and find missing negative, authorization, tenant, failure, race, retry, state, configuration, boundary, and recovery tests.

Threat model

Assume attacker-controlled or externally influenced data can reach every exposed, internal, asynchronous, persisted, operational, and compatibility boundary. Treat cross-tenant and privilege-changing effects as security-sensitive.

Adversarial mindset

Do not trust names, comments, tests, intended reachability, or prior clean labels. Prefer valid-input abuse, alternate interfaces, replay, second-order effects, races, stale state, and partial failure.

Inputs consumed

All test files, fixtures, test commands, CI, coverage config, public seams, known invariants.

Scope

All relevant hand-written code plus security-relevant generated, vendored, schema, migration, deployment, and test boundaries. Read applicable repository instructions and preserve unrelated changes.

Search strategy

Start with tracked-file inventory and repository references, then use symbol/reference search, route/handler discovery, dangerous-sink search, schema/config inspection, and test mapping. Keep exact paths and line ranges.

Investigation procedure

Map each critical component and invariant to behavioral tests; inspect tautologies, mocks, missing combinations, and tests that do not fail on defect. Record evidence in audit-results/hostile-test-gap-auditor.md using skills/hostile-repository-auditor/references/artifact-template.md. Inspect callers and callees, success and failure, configuration, persistence, retries, and alternate paths before calling a component clean.

Questions to ask

Which plausible abuse path has no test capable of detecting it?

Cross-component checks

Compare application checks with DB/RLS, adapters, workers, queues, migrations, external responses, caches, and deployment defaults. Follow identity, tenant, state, and attacker data across every boundary.

Evidence requirements

Cite exact locations, reachable entry point, attacker preconditions, trace, violated invariant, impact, mitigation search, commands/tests, and confidence. Separate confirmed, high-confidence, plausible, hardening, and non-issue.

False-positive elimination procedure

Attempt to disprove reachability; search for centralized and alternate protections; verify the claimed sink and impact; test a bypass variant; downgrade or close when a real mitigation blocks the path.

Coverage tracking

List files/components, entry points, callers/callees, workflows, inputs, trust boundaries, invariants, tests, gaps, and exclusions in the artifact. File opening alone is not coverage.

Escalation conditions

Escalate to the master auditor for suspected Critical/High impact, cross-tenant or privilege escalation, exploitable chains, contradictory controls, or evidence requiring a second specialist.

Stopping criteria

Stop only after the assigned scope, alternate interfaces, error/retry/concurrency paths, configuration and persistence effects, and tests have been considered, with gaps explicitly recorded.

Required output artifact

A persistent audit-results/hostile-test-gap-auditor.md artifact containing every field in the shared template, plus findings and commands with results.

Self-improvement notes

Record any search, heuristic, false-positive lesson, invariant, or cross-component pattern that materially improved detection. Generalize it and propose the owning skill update in audit-results/skill-improvement-log.md.

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