security-threat-model
Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-07-19
- Stars
- ★ 1
- Forks
- 1
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- security-threat-model
- description
- Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats/abuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.
02 资源文件 4
- 参考文档agents/openai.yaml254 B
- 许可证LICENSE.txt10.5 KB
- 参考文档references/prompt-template.md12.3 KB
- 参考文档references/security-controls-and-assets.md1.6 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Threat Model Source Code Repo
Deliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.
Quick start
- Collect (or infer) inputs:
- Repo root path and any in-scope paths.
- Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).
- Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.
- Use prompts in
references/prompt-template.mdto generate a repository summary. - Follow the required output contract in
references/prompt-template.md. Use it verbatim when possible.
Workflow
1) Scope and extract the system model
- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.
- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.
- Separate runtime behavior from CI/build/dev tooling and from tests/examples.
- Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.
- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.
2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points
- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.
- List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).
- Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers/decoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging/error sinks).
3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities
- List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).
- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.
- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.
4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths
- Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).
- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.
- Keep the number of threats small but high quality.
5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning
- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low/medium/high) with short justifications.
- Set overall priority (critical/high/medium/low) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.
- State which assumptions most influence the ranking.
6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user
- Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.
- Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale/users, deployment model, authn/authz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).
- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.
- If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.
7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths
- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.
- Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).
- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., "enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads" vs "validate inputs").
- Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.
8) Run a quality check before finalizing
- Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.
- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.
- Confirm runtime vs CI/dev separation.
- Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.
- Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.
- Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template:
references/prompt-template.md - Write the final Markdown to a file named
<repo-or-dir-name>-threat-model.md(use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).
Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)
- High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.
- Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log/metrics poisoning that affects detection.
- Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.
References
- Output contract and full prompt template:
references/prompt-template.md - Optional controls/asset list:
references/security-controls-and-assets.md
Only load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
Zotero
Use Zotero Desktop from Codex to enable/probe the local API, search a local Zotero library, list items/collections/tags, export BibTeX, insert citation keys into LaTeX or Markdown drafts, read indexed full text when requested, and import BibTeX/RIS records into Zotero through the connector server. Use when the user mentions Zotero, citations, references.bib, BibTeX export, local Zotero API, localhost:23119, or adding citations from a Zotero library.
zoom-apps-sdk
Use when using Apps SDK.
youtube
Obtain accurate, timestamped YouTube video transcripts (preferring manual captions over auto-generated) as the primary deliverable, then derive summaries, key claims, or notes from that transcript. Use when the user provides a YouTube URL (or video ID) and wants the transcript, a faithful summary, key claims with attribution, timestamped notes, or "what does this video actually say". The skill is transcript-first: never substitute metadata, title, description, or search snippets for the spoken content. Triggers: "youtube transcript", "get the transcript of this video", "summarize this youtube video", "what did they say in https://youtube.com/...", "key claims from this talk".
yeet
Publish local changes to GitHub by confirming scope, committing intentionally, pushing the branch, and opening a draft PR through the GitHub app from this plugin, with `gh` used only as a fallback where connector coverage is insufficient.
x-post-creator
Create X-ready post threads and co-located story packages from the active conversation or referenced project material. Use when the user says turn this into an X-post, /x-post, make this into an X thread, or wants plain-language social posts with supporting images saved to docs/x-posts/[story-name]/.
x-api
Search, read, and write X posts through the local X API MCP server (the same backend used by the Codex x-api skill). Use for searching X/x.com, reading threads and replies, creating lists, staging/publishing posts for @alltheputs, finding high-visibility reply targets for research outreach, ingesting public context, or any request that mentions /x-api or "search X".