[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798RQQPXYMQFFZT4SWM9K2Q":3,"skill-same:01M798RQQPXYMQFFZT4SWM9K2Q":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798RQQPXYMQFFZT4SWM9K2Q","lockbit",null,"LockBit \u002F generic RaaS-affiliate adversary-emulation playbook — broker\u002Fedge\u002FRDP initial access, beacon, AD compromise to Domain Admin, defense evasion (Defender-disable via GPO, shadow-copy deletion), bulk exfil, then canary double-extortion encryption (Windows + ESXi). Reusable template for any ransomware affiliate (ALPHV, Akira, Black Basta). Triggers on: 'emulate LockBit', 'ransomware affiliate', 'RaaS', 'double extortion', 'StealBit', 'domain-wide ransomware', 'ESXi locker'.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flockbit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: lockbit\ndescription: \"LockBit \u002F generic RaaS-affiliate adversary-emulation playbook — broker\u002Fedge\u002FRDP initial access, beacon, AD compromise to Domain Admin, defense evasion (Defender-disable via GPO, shadow-copy deletion), bulk exfil, then canary double-extortion encryption (Windows + ESXi). Reusable template for any ransomware affiliate (ALPHV, Akira, Black Basta). Triggers on: 'emulate LockBit', 'ransomware affiliate', 'RaaS', 'double extortion', 'StealBit', 'domain-wide ransomware', 'ESXi locker'.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Edit\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: planning\n  when_to_use: \"emulate LockBit, ransomware affiliate, RaaS, double extortion, StealBit, domain wide ransomware, ESXi locker, ALPHV, BlackCat, Akira, Black Basta, shadow copy deletion, GPO Defender disable, backup resilience test\"\n  tags: adversary-emulation, lockbit, ransomware, raas, double-extortion, ecrime\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1486, T1490, T1562.001, T1567.002, T1021.001\n---\n\n# LockBit \u002F RaaS Affiliate — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-2 ransomware-affiliate kill chain. Modeled on LockBit (most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023,\n> disrupted by Operation Cronos in Feb 2024) but written as the **generic double-extortion\n> template** — swap `actor_name`\u002F`group_id` to retarget ALPHV\u002FBlackCat, Akira, or Black Basta.\n> The flow: cheap initial access (broker\u002Fedge\u002FRDP) → AD compromise to Domain Admin → disable\n> defenses + delete backups → bulk exfil → encrypt Windows + ESXi. Encryption and recovery\n> sabotage are **canary\u002Flab-only**. Authorized red-team emulation only.\n\n## When to emulate a RaaS affiliate\n\n- The client's top concern is **ransomware resilience**: time-to-Domain-Admin, EDR survival,\n  backup\u002Fshadow-copy protection, ESXi exposure, and exfil detection.\n- Any sector — RaaS is opportunistic and cross-industry (see the industry → actor map in\n  `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"LockBit-like (RaaS affiliate)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"LockBit 3.0 \u002F Black\", \"RaaS affiliate\", \"(retarget: ALPHV \u002F Akira \u002F Black Basta)\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-2\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"high\",\n  \"motivation\": \"financial\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1190\", \"T1133\", \"T1566\", \"T1078\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.001\", \"T1003.001\", \"T1558.003\", \"T1484.001\", \"T1562.001\", \"T1490\", \"T1021.001\", \"T1567.002\", \"T1486\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Initial-access-broker creds\", \"Sliver \u002F Cobalt-style beacon\", \"NetExec\", \"Impacket \u002F PsExec\", \"rclone (exfil)\", \"canary encryptor (lab)\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"RDP\u002FVPN edge foothold\", \"GPO-based deployment\", \"Engagement-owned exfil bucket\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"LockBit: StealBit\u002FMEGA exfil, Windows + VMware ESXi lockers, GPO-pushed deployment; affiliate model persists post-Operation-Cronos. Template applies to ALPHV\u002FBlackCat (Rust, ESXi), Akira, Black Basta.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Initial Access | T1190 \u002F T1133 \u002F T1078 | Broker creds \u002F edge exploit \u002F RDP-VPN logon | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcve\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566 | Phishing loader | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | C2 | T1071.001 | Beacon for hands-on-keyboard ops | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Discovery \u002F AD | T1018 \u002F T1083 | Enumerate hosts, shares, AD attack paths | ad → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fbloodhound-query\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 \u002F T1558.003 | LSASS dump; Kerberoast | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fkerberoasting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Priv Esc to DA | T1003.006 | DCSync to domain dominance | ad → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fdcsync\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | Defense Evasion **(GATED)** | T1484.001 \u002F T1562.001 \u002F T1490 | GPO disable Defender; delete shadow copies (lab) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fprivilege-escalation\u002FSKILL.md` (shared `defense-evasion` auto-loaded) |\n| 8 | Lateral | T1021.001 \u002F T1570 | PsExec\u002FGPO push across the estate | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fnetexec\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Bulk exfil (StealBit\u002Frclone) of the canary data set | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | Impact **(CANARY)** | T1486 | Deploy canary encryptor (Windows + ESXi) via GPO\u002FPsExec | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — quick AD\u002Fhost\u002Fshare discovery (affiliates often buy access, so recon is light) (4).\n2. `initial-access` — broker creds \u002F edge exploit \u002F RDP \u002F phishing (1-2).\n3. `post-exploit` — beacon, cred access, DA via DCSync, **gated** defense evasion + backup sabotage, lateral push (3-8).\n4. `c2` — Sliver (3).\n5. `exfiltration` — bulk exfil then **canary** double-extortion encryption (9-10).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Fast and loud at the end.** Affiliates exfil first (double extortion), then deploy\n  domain-wide in one push — mirror that sequencing so backup\u002FEDR\u002Fsegmentation are exercised.\n- **GPO\u002FPsExec mass deployment** is the fidelity-defining move; the test is whether one\n  Domain-Admin compromise really equals estate-wide encryption.\n- Hit **ESXi** as well as Windows — RaaS crews target hypervisors for maximum impact.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- Defense-evasion (Defender-disable via GPO), **shadow-copy\u002Fbackup deletion**, mass deployment,\n  and encryption are **destructive** — lab\u002Fcanary only, with explicit authorization. Add an\n  `EMERGENCY` abort: *\"production endpoint protection disabled, production backups\u002Fshadow copies\n  deleted, real data exfiltrated, or a production host encrypted.\"*\n- Exfil destination is an **engagement-controlled** bucket seeded with **canary** data only.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Record broker\u002Fedge foothold, beacon, GPO changes (and their rollback), exfil destination, and\n  the canary encryptor hash in `deconfliction.json` + `cleanup.json`.\n- Agree the defense-evasion + deployment window with the SOC; the deliverable is the\n  time-to-DA, backup-resilience, and exfil-detection findings — not a real outage.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real LockBit\u002FALPHV locker.** The impact step runs a canary encryptor against a\n  lab\u002Fcanary host set; StealBit is replaced by rclone to an engagement bucket.\n- This playbook is the reusable RaaS template: to emulate ALPHV\u002FBlackCat (Rust, ESXi-first),\n  Akira, or Black Basta, change `actor_name`\u002F`actor_aliases`, leave `group_id` empty (MITRE\n  tracks these as software, not groups — see `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md` crosswalk), and\n  adjust the initial-access row to the crew's preferred vector.\n","# LockBit \u002F RaaS Affiliate — Adversary Emulation Playbook\n\n> Tier-2 ransomware-affiliate kill chain. Modeled on LockBit (most prolific RaaS of 2022-2023,\n> disrupted by Operation Cronos in Feb 2024) but written as the **generic double-extortion\n> template** — swap `actor_name`\u002F`group_id` to retarget ALPHV\u002FBlackCat, Akira, or Black Basta.\n> The flow: cheap initial access (broker\u002Fedge\u002FRDP) → AD compromise to Domain Admin → disable\n> defenses + delete backups → bulk exfil → encrypt Windows + ESXi. Encryption and recovery\n> sabotage are **canary\u002Flab-only**. Authorized red-team emulation only.\n\n## When to emulate a RaaS affiliate\n\n- The client's top concern is **ransomware resilience**: time-to-Domain-Admin, EDR survival,\n  backup\u002Fshadow-copy protection, ESXi exposure, and exfil detection.\n- Any sector — RaaS is opportunistic and cross-industry (see the industry → actor map in\n  `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md`).\n\n## ThreatProfile seed (`plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`)\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"\u003Cfill>\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"LockBit-like (RaaS affiliate)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"LockBit 3.0 \u002F Black\", \"RaaS affiliate\", \"(retarget: ALPHV \u002F Akira \u002F Black Basta)\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-2\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"high\",\n  \"motivation\": \"financial\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1190\", \"T1133\", \"T1566\", \"T1078\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.001\", \"T1003.001\", \"T1558.003\", \"T1484.001\", \"T1562.001\", \"T1490\", \"T1021.001\", \"T1567.002\", \"T1486\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Initial-access-broker creds\", \"Sliver \u002F Cobalt-style beacon\", \"NetExec\", \"Impacket \u002F PsExec\", \"rclone (exfil)\", \"canary encryptor (lab)\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"RDP\u002FVPN edge foothold\", \"GPO-based deployment\", \"Engagement-owned exfil bucket\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"LockBit: StealBit\u002FMEGA exfil, Windows + VMware ESXi lockers, GPO-pushed deployment; affiliate model persists post-Operation-Cronos. Template applies to ALPHV\u002FBlackCat (Rust, ESXi), Akira, Black Basta.\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n## Kill-chain emulation\n\n| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |\n|---|-------|-------|-----------------|-------------------------|\n| 1 | Initial Access | T1190 \u002F T1133 \u002F T1078 | Broker creds \u002F edge exploit \u002F RDP-VPN logon | exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fcve\u002FSKILL.md`, `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fato-methodology\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 2 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566 | Phishing loader | phisher → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 3 | C2 | T1071.001 | Beacon for hands-on-keyboard ops | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fc2-sliver\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 4 | Discovery \u002F AD | T1018 \u002F T1083 | Enumerate hosts, shares, AD attack paths | ad → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fbloodhound-query\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 5 | Credential Access | T1003.001 \u002F T1558.003 | LSASS dump; Kerberoast | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fcredential-access\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fkerberoasting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 6 | Priv Esc to DA | T1003.006 | DCSync to domain dominance | ad → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fdcsync\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 7 | Defense Evasion **(GATED)** | T1484.001 \u002F T1562.001 \u002F T1490 | GPO disable Defender; delete shadow copies (lab) | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Fprivilege-escalation\u002FSKILL.md` (shared `defense-evasion` auto-loaded) |\n| 8 | Lateral | T1021.001 \u002F T1570 | PsExec\u002FGPO push across the estate | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Flateral-movement\u002FSKILL.md`; `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fnetexec\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 9 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Bulk exfil (StealBit\u002Frclone) of the canary data set | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n| 10 | Impact **(CANARY)** | T1486 | Deploy canary encryptor (Windows + ESXi) via GPO\u002FPsExec | post-exploit → `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fpost-exploit\u002Freporting\u002FSKILL.md` |\n\n## CONOPS kill_chain (copy into `conops.json`)\n\n1. `recon` — quick AD\u002Fhost\u002Fshare discovery (affiliates often buy access, so recon is light) (4).\n2. `initial-access` — broker creds \u002F edge exploit \u002F RDP \u002F phishing (1-2).\n3. `post-exploit` — beacon, cred access, DA via DCSync, **gated** defense evasion + backup sabotage, lateral push (3-8).\n4. `c2` — Sliver (3).\n5. `exfiltration` — bulk exfil then **canary** double-extortion encryption (9-10).\n\n## OPSEC & signature fidelity\n\n- **Fast and loud at the end.** Affiliates exfil first (double extortion), then deploy\n  domain-wide in one push — mirror that sequencing so backup\u002FEDR\u002Fsegmentation are exercised.\n- **GPO\u002FPsExec mass deployment** is the fidelity-defining move; the test is whether one\n  Domain-Admin compromise really equals estate-wide encryption.\n- Hit **ESXi** as well as Windows — RaaS crews target hypervisors for maximum impact.\n\n## RoE \u002F safety gates\n\n- Defense-evasion (Defender-disable via GPO), **shadow-copy\u002Fbackup deletion**, mass deployment,\n  and encryption are **destructive** — lab\u002Fcanary only, with explicit authorization. Add an\n  `EMERGENCY` abort: *\"production endpoint protection disabled, production backups\u002Fshadow copies\n  deleted, real data exfiltrated, or a production host encrypted.\"*\n- Exfil destination is an **engagement-controlled** bucket seeded with **canary** data only.\n\n## Deconfliction\n\n- Record broker\u002Fedge foothold, beacon, GPO changes (and their rollback), exfil destination, and\n  the canary encryptor hash in `deconfliction.json` + `cleanup.json`.\n- Agree the defense-evasion + deployment window with the SOC; the deliverable is the\n  time-to-DA, backup-resilience, and exfil-detection findings — not a real outage.\n\n## Fidelity notes (deviations)\n\n- **No real LockBit\u002FALPHV locker.** The impact step runs a canary encryptor against a\n  lab\u002Fcanary host set; StealBit is replaced by rclone to an engagement bucket.\n- This playbook is the reusable RaaS template: to emulate ALPHV\u002FBlackCat (Rust, ESXi-first),\n  Akira, or Black Basta, change `actor_name`\u002F`actor_aliases`, leave `group_id` empty (MITRE\n  tracks these as software, not groups — see `..\u002F..\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md` crosswalk), and\n  adjust the initial-access row to the crew's preferred vector.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"adversary-emulation, lockbit, ransomware, raas, double-extortion, ecrime","planning","emulate LockBit, ransomware affiliate, RaaS, double extortion, StealBit, domain wide ransomware, ESXi locker, ALPHV, BlackCat, Akira, Black Basta, shadow copy deletion, GPO Defender disable, backup resilience test","T1190, T1486, T1490, T1562.001, T1567.002, T1021.001","Read Write Edit","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flockbit",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill lockbit",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill lockbit",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill lockbit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Flockbit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]