[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798MDZATV7491MY28WSVMJ6":3,"skill-same:01M798MDZATV7491MY28WSVMJ6":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798MDZATV7491MY28WSVMJ6","reverser-android-malware",null,"Android APK malware analysis — manifest permission review, smali disassembly, Java decompilation with jadx, dynamic instrumentation with Frida, network traffic interception, native library analysis, and automated scanning with MobSF.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fandroid-malware\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: reverser-android-malware\ndescription: \"Android APK malware analysis — manifest permission review, smali disassembly, Java decompilation with jadx, dynamic instrumentation with Frida, network traffic interception, native library analysis, and automated scanning with MobSF.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"android apk malware mobile app analysis frida jadx apktool smali dex dalvik mobsf dropper banker spyware stalkerware sms stealer\"\n  subdomain: reverser\n  tags: \"Android, APK, Frida, jadx, mobile malware, smali\"\n  mitre_attack: \"T1404, T1418\"\n---\n\n# Android APK Malware Analysis\n\nFull analysis workflow for suspicious Android APKs — from static manifest review through dynamic instrumentation and C2 extraction.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Decode APK resources and smali\napktool d \u003CTARGET>.apk -o .\u002Fdecoded\u002F\n\n# Decompile to Java source\njadx -d .\u002Fjava_src\u002F \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Quick permission audit\naapt dump permissions \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Hash and signature check\nsha256sum \u003CTARGET>.apk\napksigner verify --print-certs \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Automated scan\ndocker run -p 8000:8000 opensecurity\u002Fmobile-security-framework-mobsf\n# Upload APK to http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\n\n# List Frida processes on device\nfrida-ps -U\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | How It Appears |\n|---|---|---|\n| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | T1404 | Root exploits, DirtyCOW, Magisk abuse in APK payloads |\n| Software Discovery | T1418 | Enumerating installed apps to detect security tools or targets |\n| Input Capture | T1417 | Keyloggers, accessibility service abuse for credential capture |\n| SMS\u002FMMS Collection | T1636.004 | Banking trojans intercepting OTP SMS messages |\n| Location Tracking | T1430 | Stalkerware GPS tracking via background services |\n| Obfuscated Files | T1406 | ProGuard, DexGuard, string encryption, native packer |\n| Application Layer Protocol | T1437 | C2 over HTTPS, Telegram bot API, Firebase messaging |\n\n## 1. Static Analysis — APK Structure\n\nUnpack and examine the APK structure and manifest.\n\n```bash\n# Decode APK (keeps smali + resources)\napktool d \u003CTARGET>.apk -o .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002F\n\n# Examine AndroidManifest.xml for suspicious permissions\ncat .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml | grep -iE 'permission|receiver|service|provider'\n\n# High-risk permissions to flag:\n# SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS — SMS interception (banking trojans)\n# READ_CONTACTS, READ_CALL_LOG — data exfiltration\n# RECORD_AUDIO, CAMERA — spyware\n# ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE — overlay attacks, keylogging\n# BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN — device admin abuse (ransomware)\n# INSTALL_PACKAGES — dropper \u002F sideloader\n# REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS — persistent background service\n\n# Check for accessibility service (major red flag for credential stealers)\ngrep -r \"android.accessibilityservice\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n\n# List receivers (broadcast receivers for SMS, boot, etc.)\ngrep -A5 \"receiver\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n\n# Check for native libraries\nls -la .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Flib\u002F*\u002F\n\n# Certificate analysis\napksigner verify --print-certs -v \u003CTARGET>.apk\n# Self-signed with debug key? → highly suspicious\n# Check: keytool -printcert -jarfile \u003CTARGET>.apk\n```\n\n## 2. Decompile to Java\n\nRecover readable source from DEX bytecode.\n\n```bash\n# jadx — best-in-class Android decompiler\njadx -d .\u002Fjava_src\u002F --show-bad-code \u003CTARGET>.apk\n# --show-bad-code includes methods that failed to decompile cleanly\n\n# Search for key behaviors\ngrep -rn \"SmsManager\\|sendTextMessage\\|getDefault()\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"HttpURLConnection\\|OkHttpClient\\|Retrofit\\|Volley\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"getDeviceId\\|getSubscriberId\\|getLine1Number\\|IMEI\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"getInstalledPackages\\|getInstalledApplications\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"TelephonyManager\\|PackageManager\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"Runtime\\.exec\\|ProcessBuilder\\|\\\"su\\\"\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"DexClassLoader\\|PathClassLoader\\|InMemoryDexClassLoader\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"crypto\\|Cipher\\|SecretKey\\|AES\\|DES\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"AccessibilityService\\|onAccessibilityEvent\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\n\n# Extract hardcoded URLs \u002F IPs \u002F domains\ngrep -rnE 'https?:\u002F\u002F[^\\s\"]+|[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}' .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\n\n# Alternative: dex2jar + JD-GUI\nd2j-dex2jar \u003CTARGET>.apk -o \u003CTARGET>.jar\n# Open \u003CTARGET>.jar in JD-GUI\n```\n\n## 3. Smali Analysis\n\nFor obfuscated samples where jadx fails, work at smali level.\n\n```bash\n# Smali is already extracted by apktool in step 1\n# Navigate to entry points\nfind .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali* -name \"*.smali\" | head -20\n\n# Find the main activity\ngrep -r \"android.intent.action.MAIN\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n# Then read the corresponding smali file\n\n# Search for reflection (used to hide API calls)\ngrep -rn \"Ljava\u002Flang\u002Freflect\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\ngrep -rn \"invoke-virtual.*Method;->invoke\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for dynamic class loading (dropper behavior)\ngrep -rn \"DexClassLoader\\|InMemoryDexClassLoader\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for crypto operations\ngrep -rn \"Ljavax\u002Fcrypto\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for command execution (root exploits)\ngrep -rn \"Runtime;->exec\\|\\\"su\\\"\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Decode obfuscated strings — common pattern: XOR or Base64 in static init\ngrep -rn \"const-string\\|sget-object\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F | grep -i \"Base64\\|decode\"\n```\n\n## 4. Dynamic Analysis with Frida\n\nInstrument the running APK to intercept behavior.\n\n```bash\n# Start Frida server on rooted device\u002Femulator\nadb push frida-server-\u003Cversion>-android-\u003Carch> \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server\nadb shell \"chmod 755 \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server && \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server &\"\n\n# List running apps\nfrida-ps -Ua\n\n# Hook encryption calls to capture plaintext\nfrida -U -l hook_crypto.js -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME> --no-pause\n```\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F hook_crypto.js — intercept javax.crypto.Cipher\nJava.perform(function() {\n    var Cipher = Java.use(\"javax.crypto.Cipher\");\n\n    Cipher.doFinal.overload(\"[B\").implementation = function(input) {\n        console.log(\"[*] Cipher.doFinal called\");\n        console.log(\"    Algorithm: \" + this.getAlgorithm());\n        console.log(\"    Input: \" + bytesToHex(input));\n        var result = this.doFinal(input);\n        console.log(\"    Output: \" + bytesToHex(result));\n        return result;\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Hook URL connections for C2 traffic\n    var URL = Java.use(\"java.net.URL\");\n    URL.$init.overload(\"java.lang.String\").implementation = function(url) {\n        console.log(\"[*] URL: \" + url);\n        return this.$init(url);\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Hook SMS sending\n    var SmsManager = Java.use(\"android.telephony.SmsManager\");\n    SmsManager.sendTextMessage.implementation = function(dest, sc, text, sentPI, delPI) {\n        console.log(\"[!] SMS to: \" + dest + \" body: \" + text);\n        \u002F\u002F Don't actually send\n        \u002F\u002F return this.sendTextMessage(dest, sc, text, sentPI, delPI);\n    };\n});\n\nfunction bytesToHex(bytes) {\n    var hex = [];\n    for (var i = 0; i \u003C bytes.length; i++) {\n        hex.push(('0' + (bytes[i] & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2));\n    }\n    return hex.join('');\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# SSL pinning bypass for traffic interception\nfrida -U -l ssl_bypass.js -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME> --no-pause\n# Then proxy through Burp\u002Fmitmproxy on port 8080\n\n# Trace all JNI calls (native ↔ Java bridge)\nfrida-trace -U -i \"JNI_*\" -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME>\n```\n\n## 5. Network Traffic Analysis\n\n```bash\n# Set up transparent proxy on emulator\nadb shell settings put global http_proxy \u003CHOST_IP>:8080\n\n# mitmproxy with Android CA installed\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --listen-port 8080\n\n# For certificate-pinned apps, use Frida SSL bypass first\n# Then capture traffic in mitmproxy\u002FBurp\n\n# tcpdump on device (root required)\nadb shell tcpdump -i any -w \u002Fsdcard\u002Fcapture.pcap\nadb pull \u002Fsdcard\u002Fcapture.pcap\nwireshark capture.pcap\n\n# Analyze DNS queries\ntshark -r capture.pcap -Y \"dns.qr == 0\" -T fields -e dns.qry.name | sort -u\n```\n\n## 6. Native Library Analysis\n\n```bash\n# List native libraries in APK\nunzip -l \u003CTARGET>.apk | grep \"\\.so$\"\n\n# Extract and analyze\nunzip \u003CTARGET>.apk lib\u002F -d .\u002Fnative_libs\u002F\n\n# Identify architecture\nfile .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002F*\u002F*.so\n\n# Strings from native libs\nstrings -n 8 .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so | grep -iE 'http|socket|exec|system|decrypt|key|aes'\n\n# Ghidra\u002FIDA for full native RE\n# Focus on: JNI_OnLoad, Java_\u003Cpackage>_\u003Cclass>_\u003Cmethod> exports\nreadelf -s .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so | grep -i \"java_\\|jni_onload\"\n\n# Check for packer\u002Fprotector in native code\n# Bangcle, Qihoo 360, Baidu, Tencent packers wrap the real DEX\nrabin2 -I .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so\n```\n\n## 7. Automated Analysis with MobSF\n\n```bash\n# Run MobSF\ndocker run -it --rm -p 8000:8000 opensecurity\u002Fmobile-security-framework-mobsf\n\n# Upload via API\ncurl -F \"file=@\u003CTARGET>.apk\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fupload \\\n  -H \"Authorization: \u003CAPI_KEY>\"\n\n# Get scan results\ncurl \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fscan\" \\\n  -X POST -d \"scan_type=apk&file_name=\u003CTARGET>.apk&hash=\u003CFILE_HASH>\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: \u003CAPI_KEY>\"\n\n# MobSF checks:\n# - Manifest analysis (permissions, exported components)\n# - Code analysis (hardcoded secrets, insecure APIs)\n# - Binary analysis (native libs, packer detection)\n# - CVSS scoring and compliance mapping\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Install |\n|---|---|---|\n| apktool | APK decode\u002Frebuild (smali + resources) | github.com\u002FiBotPeaches\u002FApktool |\n| jadx | DEX → Java decompiler | github.com\u002Fskylot\u002Fjadx |\n| Frida | Dynamic instrumentation framework | frida.re \u002F pip install frida-tools |\n| MobSF | Automated mobile app security scanner | github.com\u002FMobSF\u002FMobile-Security-Framework-MobSF |\n| dex2jar | DEX → JAR converter | github.com\u002Fpxb1988\u002Fdex2jar |\n| Objection | Frida-powered runtime exploration | github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fobjection |\n| APKiD | APK packer\u002Fcompiler detector | github.com\u002Frednaga\u002FAPKiD |\n| mitmproxy | HTTPS traffic interception | mitmproxy.org |\n| Drozer | Android security assessment framework | github.com\u002FWithSecureLabs\u002Fdrozer |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Description | Detection |\n|---|---|---|\n| SEND_SMS + RECEIVE_SMS + INTERNET | SMS interceptor (banking trojan) | Manifest permission analysis |\n| BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE | Overlay\u002Fkeylogger credential stealer | Manifest + smali accessibility handler |\n| DexClassLoader usage | Dynamic code loading \u002F dropper | jadx\u002Fgrep for DexClassLoader |\n| Encrypted assets in `\u002Fassets\u002F` | Packed payload or hidden DEX | High entropy file in assets dir |\n| Native JNI with obfuscated exports | Anti-analysis native packer | readelf -s + string analysis |\n| Self-signed debug certificate | Non-Play-Store distribution | apksigner verify --print-certs |\n| Root detection code (su, Magisk) | Anti-analysis \u002F environment check | grep for \"su\", \"magisk\", \"test-keys\" |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n| Issue | Resolution |\n|---|---|\n| jadx fails on obfuscated DEX | Use `--show-bad-code`; fall back to smali analysis |\n| Multi-DEX APK | apktool handles automatically; jadx merges all DEX files |\n| Split APK (APKS\u002FXAPK) | Extract base APK + split APKs; analyze each |\n| Native packer (Bangcle\u002F360\u002FTencent) | Dump unpacked DEX from memory with Frida: `frida-dexdump` |\n| SSL pinning blocks proxy | Frida SSL bypass script; patch smali `checkServerTrusted` |\n| Emulator detection in malware | Use physical rooted device; patch emulator checks via Frida |\n| Dropper loads payload from C2 | Intercept download URL via Frida URL hook; fetch payload separately |\n| React Native \u002F Flutter \u002F Xamarin | Different analysis: RN → `index.android.bundle`; Flutter → `libapp.so`; Xamarin → DLLs in `assemblies\u002F` |\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF APK has suspicious permissions (SMS + Accessibility + Internet):\n  → Full static analysis (manifest + jadx + strings)\n  → Extract C2 URLs and hardcoded secrets\n  → Dynamic analysis with Frida hooks on crypto\u002Fnetwork\u002FSMS\nELSE IF APK has native libraries with obfuscated exports:\n  → Likely packed — dump real DEX with frida-dexdump\n  → Analyze unpacked DEX with jadx\n  → RE native lib with Ghidra for JNI logic\nELSE IF APK loads code dynamically (DexClassLoader):\n  → Dropper — intercept payload download with Frida\n  → Analyze second-stage DEX separately\nELSE:\n  → Standard jadx decompilation\n  → Behavioral analysis in MobSF\n  → Network traffic capture for C2 identification\n```\n","# Android APK Malware Analysis\n\nFull analysis workflow for suspicious Android APKs — from static manifest review through dynamic instrumentation and C2 extraction.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Decode APK resources and smali\napktool d \u003CTARGET>.apk -o .\u002Fdecoded\u002F\n\n# Decompile to Java source\njadx -d .\u002Fjava_src\u002F \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Quick permission audit\naapt dump permissions \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Hash and signature check\nsha256sum \u003CTARGET>.apk\napksigner verify --print-certs \u003CTARGET>.apk\n\n# Automated scan\ndocker run -p 8000:8000 opensecurity\u002Fmobile-security-framework-mobsf\n# Upload APK to http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\n\n# List Frida processes on device\nfrida-ps -U\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | How It Appears |\n|---|---|---|\n| Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | T1404 | Root exploits, DirtyCOW, Magisk abuse in APK payloads |\n| Software Discovery | T1418 | Enumerating installed apps to detect security tools or targets |\n| Input Capture | T1417 | Keyloggers, accessibility service abuse for credential capture |\n| SMS\u002FMMS Collection | T1636.004 | Banking trojans intercepting OTP SMS messages |\n| Location Tracking | T1430 | Stalkerware GPS tracking via background services |\n| Obfuscated Files | T1406 | ProGuard, DexGuard, string encryption, native packer |\n| Application Layer Protocol | T1437 | C2 over HTTPS, Telegram bot API, Firebase messaging |\n\n## 1. Static Analysis — APK Structure\n\nUnpack and examine the APK structure and manifest.\n\n```bash\n# Decode APK (keeps smali + resources)\napktool d \u003CTARGET>.apk -o .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002F\n\n# Examine AndroidManifest.xml for suspicious permissions\ncat .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml | grep -iE 'permission|receiver|service|provider'\n\n# High-risk permissions to flag:\n# SEND_SMS, RECEIVE_SMS, READ_SMS — SMS interception (banking trojans)\n# READ_CONTACTS, READ_CALL_LOG — data exfiltration\n# RECORD_AUDIO, CAMERA — spyware\n# ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE — overlay attacks, keylogging\n# BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN — device admin abuse (ransomware)\n# INSTALL_PACKAGES — dropper \u002F sideloader\n# REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS — persistent background service\n\n# Check for accessibility service (major red flag for credential stealers)\ngrep -r \"android.accessibilityservice\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n\n# List receivers (broadcast receivers for SMS, boot, etc.)\ngrep -A5 \"receiver\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n\n# Check for native libraries\nls -la .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Flib\u002F*\u002F\n\n# Certificate analysis\napksigner verify --print-certs -v \u003CTARGET>.apk\n# Self-signed with debug key? → highly suspicious\n# Check: keytool -printcert -jarfile \u003CTARGET>.apk\n```\n\n## 2. Decompile to Java\n\nRecover readable source from DEX bytecode.\n\n```bash\n# jadx — best-in-class Android decompiler\njadx -d .\u002Fjava_src\u002F --show-bad-code \u003CTARGET>.apk\n# --show-bad-code includes methods that failed to decompile cleanly\n\n# Search for key behaviors\ngrep -rn \"SmsManager\\|sendTextMessage\\|getDefault()\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"HttpURLConnection\\|OkHttpClient\\|Retrofit\\|Volley\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"getDeviceId\\|getSubscriberId\\|getLine1Number\\|IMEI\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"getInstalledPackages\\|getInstalledApplications\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"TelephonyManager\\|PackageManager\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"Runtime\\.exec\\|ProcessBuilder\\|\\\"su\\\"\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"DexClassLoader\\|PathClassLoader\\|InMemoryDexClassLoader\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"crypto\\|Cipher\\|SecretKey\\|AES\\|DES\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\ngrep -rn \"AccessibilityService\\|onAccessibilityEvent\" .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\n\n# Extract hardcoded URLs \u002F IPs \u002F domains\ngrep -rnE 'https?:\u002F\u002F[^\\s\"]+|[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}' .\u002Fjava_src\u002F\n\n# Alternative: dex2jar + JD-GUI\nd2j-dex2jar \u003CTARGET>.apk -o \u003CTARGET>.jar\n# Open \u003CTARGET>.jar in JD-GUI\n```\n\n## 3. Smali Analysis\n\nFor obfuscated samples where jadx fails, work at smali level.\n\n```bash\n# Smali is already extracted by apktool in step 1\n# Navigate to entry points\nfind .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali* -name \"*.smali\" | head -20\n\n# Find the main activity\ngrep -r \"android.intent.action.MAIN\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002FAndroidManifest.xml\n# Then read the corresponding smali file\n\n# Search for reflection (used to hide API calls)\ngrep -rn \"Ljava\u002Flang\u002Freflect\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\ngrep -rn \"invoke-virtual.*Method;->invoke\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for dynamic class loading (dropper behavior)\ngrep -rn \"DexClassLoader\\|InMemoryDexClassLoader\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for crypto operations\ngrep -rn \"Ljavax\u002Fcrypto\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Search for command execution (root exploits)\ngrep -rn \"Runtime;->exec\\|\\\"su\\\"\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F\n\n# Decode obfuscated strings — common pattern: XOR or Base64 in static init\ngrep -rn \"const-string\\|sget-object\" .\u002Fapk_decoded\u002Fsmali*\u002F | grep -i \"Base64\\|decode\"\n```\n\n## 4. Dynamic Analysis with Frida\n\nInstrument the running APK to intercept behavior.\n\n```bash\n# Start Frida server on rooted device\u002Femulator\nadb push frida-server-\u003Cversion>-android-\u003Carch> \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server\nadb shell \"chmod 755 \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server && \u002Fdata\u002Flocal\u002Ftmp\u002Ffrida-server &\"\n\n# List running apps\nfrida-ps -Ua\n\n# Hook encryption calls to capture plaintext\nfrida -U -l hook_crypto.js -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME> --no-pause\n```\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F hook_crypto.js — intercept javax.crypto.Cipher\nJava.perform(function() {\n    var Cipher = Java.use(\"javax.crypto.Cipher\");\n\n    Cipher.doFinal.overload(\"[B\").implementation = function(input) {\n        console.log(\"[*] Cipher.doFinal called\");\n        console.log(\"    Algorithm: \" + this.getAlgorithm());\n        console.log(\"    Input: \" + bytesToHex(input));\n        var result = this.doFinal(input);\n        console.log(\"    Output: \" + bytesToHex(result));\n        return result;\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Hook URL connections for C2 traffic\n    var URL = Java.use(\"java.net.URL\");\n    URL.$init.overload(\"java.lang.String\").implementation = function(url) {\n        console.log(\"[*] URL: \" + url);\n        return this.$init(url);\n    };\n\n    \u002F\u002F Hook SMS sending\n    var SmsManager = Java.use(\"android.telephony.SmsManager\");\n    SmsManager.sendTextMessage.implementation = function(dest, sc, text, sentPI, delPI) {\n        console.log(\"[!] SMS to: \" + dest + \" body: \" + text);\n        \u002F\u002F Don't actually send\n        \u002F\u002F return this.sendTextMessage(dest, sc, text, sentPI, delPI);\n    };\n});\n\nfunction bytesToHex(bytes) {\n    var hex = [];\n    for (var i = 0; i \u003C bytes.length; i++) {\n        hex.push(('0' + (bytes[i] & 0xFF).toString(16)).slice(-2));\n    }\n    return hex.join('');\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# SSL pinning bypass for traffic interception\nfrida -U -l ssl_bypass.js -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME> --no-pause\n# Then proxy through Burp\u002Fmitmproxy on port 8080\n\n# Trace all JNI calls (native ↔ Java bridge)\nfrida-trace -U -i \"JNI_*\" -f \u003CPACKAGE_NAME>\n```\n\n## 5. Network Traffic Analysis\n\n```bash\n# Set up transparent proxy on emulator\nadb shell settings put global http_proxy \u003CHOST_IP>:8080\n\n# mitmproxy with Android CA installed\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --listen-port 8080\n\n# For certificate-pinned apps, use Frida SSL bypass first\n# Then capture traffic in mitmproxy\u002FBurp\n\n# tcpdump on device (root required)\nadb shell tcpdump -i any -w \u002Fsdcard\u002Fcapture.pcap\nadb pull \u002Fsdcard\u002Fcapture.pcap\nwireshark capture.pcap\n\n# Analyze DNS queries\ntshark -r capture.pcap -Y \"dns.qr == 0\" -T fields -e dns.qry.name | sort -u\n```\n\n## 6. Native Library Analysis\n\n```bash\n# List native libraries in APK\nunzip -l \u003CTARGET>.apk | grep \"\\.so$\"\n\n# Extract and analyze\nunzip \u003CTARGET>.apk lib\u002F -d .\u002Fnative_libs\u002F\n\n# Identify architecture\nfile .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002F*\u002F*.so\n\n# Strings from native libs\nstrings -n 8 .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so | grep -iE 'http|socket|exec|system|decrypt|key|aes'\n\n# Ghidra\u002FIDA for full native RE\n# Focus on: JNI_OnLoad, Java_\u003Cpackage>_\u003Cclass>_\u003Cmethod> exports\nreadelf -s .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so | grep -i \"java_\\|jni_onload\"\n\n# Check for packer\u002Fprotector in native code\n# Bangcle, Qihoo 360, Baidu, Tencent packers wrap the real DEX\nrabin2 -I .\u002Fnative_libs\u002Flib\u002Farm64-v8a\u002F*.so\n```\n\n## 7. Automated Analysis with MobSF\n\n```bash\n# Run MobSF\ndocker run -it --rm -p 8000:8000 opensecurity\u002Fmobile-security-framework-mobsf\n\n# Upload via API\ncurl -F \"file=@\u003CTARGET>.apk\" http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fupload \\\n  -H \"Authorization: \u003CAPI_KEY>\"\n\n# Get scan results\ncurl \"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fscan\" \\\n  -X POST -d \"scan_type=apk&file_name=\u003CTARGET>.apk&hash=\u003CFILE_HASH>\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: \u003CAPI_KEY>\"\n\n# MobSF checks:\n# - Manifest analysis (permissions, exported components)\n# - Code analysis (hardcoded secrets, insecure APIs)\n# - Binary analysis (native libs, packer detection)\n# - CVSS scoring and compliance mapping\n```\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose | Install |\n|---|---|---|\n| apktool | APK decode\u002Frebuild (smali + resources) | github.com\u002FiBotPeaches\u002FApktool |\n| jadx | DEX → Java decompiler | github.com\u002Fskylot\u002Fjadx |\n| Frida | Dynamic instrumentation framework | frida.re \u002F pip install frida-tools |\n| MobSF | Automated mobile app security scanner | github.com\u002FMobSF\u002FMobile-Security-Framework-MobSF |\n| dex2jar | DEX → JAR converter | github.com\u002Fpxb1988\u002Fdex2jar |\n| Objection | Frida-powered runtime exploration | github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fobjection |\n| APKiD | APK packer\u002Fcompiler detector | github.com\u002Frednaga\u002FAPKiD |\n| mitmproxy | HTTPS traffic interception | mitmproxy.org |\n| Drozer | Android security assessment framework | github.com\u002FWithSecureLabs\u002Fdrozer |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Indicator | Description | Detection |\n|---|---|---|\n| SEND_SMS + RECEIVE_SMS + INTERNET | SMS interceptor (banking trojan) | Manifest permission analysis |\n| BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE | Overlay\u002Fkeylogger credential stealer | Manifest + smali accessibility handler |\n| DexClassLoader usage | Dynamic code loading \u002F dropper | jadx\u002Fgrep for DexClassLoader |\n| Encrypted assets in `\u002Fassets\u002F` | Packed payload or hidden DEX | High entropy file in assets dir |\n| Native JNI with obfuscated exports | Anti-analysis native packer | readelf -s + string analysis |\n| Self-signed debug certificate | Non-Play-Store distribution | apksigner verify --print-certs |\n| Root detection code (su, Magisk) | Anti-analysis \u002F environment check | grep for \"su\", \"magisk\", \"test-keys\" |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n| Issue | Resolution |\n|---|---|\n| jadx fails on obfuscated DEX | Use `--show-bad-code`; fall back to smali analysis |\n| Multi-DEX APK | apktool handles automatically; jadx merges all DEX files |\n| Split APK (APKS\u002FXAPK) | Extract base APK + split APKs; analyze each |\n| Native packer (Bangcle\u002F360\u002FTencent) | Dump unpacked DEX from memory with Frida: `frida-dexdump` |\n| SSL pinning blocks proxy | Frida SSL bypass script; patch smali `checkServerTrusted` |\n| Emulator detection in malware | Use physical rooted device; patch emulator checks via Frida |\n| Dropper loads payload from C2 | Intercept download URL via Frida URL hook; fetch payload separately |\n| React Native \u002F Flutter \u002F Xamarin | Different analysis: RN → `index.android.bundle`; Flutter → `libapp.so`; Xamarin → DLLs in `assemblies\u002F` |\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF APK has suspicious permissions (SMS + Accessibility + Internet):\n  → Full static analysis (manifest + jadx + strings)\n  → Extract C2 URLs and hardcoded secrets\n  → Dynamic analysis with Frida hooks on crypto\u002Fnetwork\u002FSMS\nELSE IF APK has native libraries with obfuscated exports:\n  → Likely packed — dump real DEX with frida-dexdump\n  → Analyze unpacked DEX with jadx\n  → RE native lib with Ghidra for JNI logic\nELSE IF APK loads code dynamically (DexClassLoader):\n  → Dropper — intercept payload download with Frida\n  → Analyze second-stage DEX separately\nELSE:\n  → Standard jadx decompilation\n  → Behavioral analysis in MobSF\n  → Network traffic capture for C2 identification\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"Android, APK, Frida, jadx, mobile malware, smali","reverser","android apk malware mobile app analysis frida jadx apktool smali dex dalvik mobsf dropper banker spyware stalkerware sms stealer","T1404, T1418","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fandroid-malware",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill reverser-android-malware",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill reverser-android-malware",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill reverser-android-malware","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Fandroid-malware\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]