[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798KH3077DAMBPQ9KZAP6PR":3,"skill-same:01M798KH3077DAMBPQ9KZAP6PR":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798KH3077DAMBPQ9KZAP6PR","web-auth-mapping",null,"Authentication surface — login endpoints, JWT\u002FOAuth\u002FSAML\u002FSSO\u002FAPI-key mechanism identification.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fauth-mapping\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: web-auth-mapping\ndescription: \"Authentication surface — login endpoints, JWT\u002FOAuth\u002FSAML\u002FSSO\u002FAPI-key mechanism identification.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reconnaissance\n  when_to_use: \"auth surface, login endpoints, JWT, OAuth, SAML, SSO, API key, authentication mechanism\"\n  tags: auth-mapping\n  mitre_attack: T1589.001\n---\n\n# Authentication Surface Mapping\n\nMap every authentication mechanism the target exposes. Exploit downstream needs to know exactly how to hold a session (cookie, JWT, API key) and where to attack auth (token theft, race-condition on bcrypt, SSO redirect chain).\n\n## 1. Login Endpoint Discovery\n\n```bash\n# Common auth paths\nfor path in login signin auth authenticate oauth\u002Fauthorize \\\n    api\u002Fauth api\u002Flogin admin\u002Flogin wp-login.php; do\n    code=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002F$path\")\n    [ \"$code\" != \"404\" ] && echo \"$code https:\u002F\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002F$path\"\ndone\n```\n\n## 2. Auth Mechanism Identification\n\n| Mechanism | Signal |\n|-----------|--------|\n| Cookie-based | `Set-Cookie` headers after login (often `session=`, `JSESSIONID=`, `PHPSESSID=`) |\n| JWT | `Authorization: Bearer eyJ...` patterns; three base64 segments separated by `.` |\n| OAuth 2.0 | `\u002Foauth\u002Fauthorize`, `\u002Foauth\u002Ftoken` endpoints; `state`\u002F`code`\u002F`redirect_uri` params |\n| API Key | `X-API-Key` header accepted; `Authorization: ApiKey \u003Ctoken>` |\n| SAML\u002FSSO | Redirects to IdP (Okta, Azure AD, Auth0); `SAMLRequest` form param |\n| Session row + slow KDF | Login latency >50ms on wrong password (bcrypt\u002FArgon2) — flag for race-condition recon |\n\n## 3. Output for Handoff\n\nRecord per mechanism: endpoint, success\u002Ffail signals (status code, cookie set, JSON shape), credentials used, observed latency. This feeds the **Required session state** line in the recon → exploit handoff.\n","# Authentication Surface Mapping\n\nMap every authentication mechanism the target exposes. Exploit downstream needs to know exactly how to hold a session (cookie, JWT, API key) and where to attack auth (token theft, race-condition on bcrypt, SSO redirect chain).\n\n## 1. Login Endpoint Discovery\n\n```bash\n# Common auth paths\nfor path in login signin auth authenticate oauth\u002Fauthorize \\\n    api\u002Fauth api\u002Flogin admin\u002Flogin wp-login.php; do\n    code=$(curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002F$path\")\n    [ \"$code\" != \"404\" ] && echo \"$code https:\u002F\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002F$path\"\ndone\n```\n\n## 2. Auth Mechanism Identification\n\n| Mechanism | Signal |\n|-----------|--------|\n| Cookie-based | `Set-Cookie` headers after login (often `session=`, `JSESSIONID=`, `PHPSESSID=`) |\n| JWT | `Authorization: Bearer eyJ...` patterns; three base64 segments separated by `.` |\n| OAuth 2.0 | `\u002Foauth\u002Fauthorize`, `\u002Foauth\u002Ftoken` endpoints; `state`\u002F`code`\u002F`redirect_uri` params |\n| API Key | `X-API-Key` header accepted; `Authorization: ApiKey \u003Ctoken>` |\n| SAML\u002FSSO | Redirects to IdP (Okta, Azure AD, Auth0); `SAMLRequest` form param |\n| Session row + slow KDF | Login latency >50ms on wrong password (bcrypt\u002FArgon2) — flag for race-condition recon |\n\n## 3. Output for Handoff\n\nRecord per mechanism: endpoint, success\u002Ffail signals (status code, cookie set, JSON shape), credentials used, observed latency. This feeds the **Required session state** line in the recon → exploit handoff.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"auth-mapping","reconnaissance","auth surface, login endpoints, JWT, OAuth, SAML, SSO, API key, authentication mechanism","T1589.001","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fauth-mapping",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill web-auth-mapping",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill web-auth-mapping",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill web-auth-mapping","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Frecon\u002Fweb-recon\u002Fauth-mapping\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]