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Covers \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow and passwd parsing, busybox httpd configs, telnet\u002Fdropbear stanzas, MQTT\u002Fcloud API key extraction, and cross-referencing against known default-credential databases.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fhardcoded-creds\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: hardcoded-creds\ndescription: Systematic hunt for hardcoded credentials, API keys, certificates, and default passwords in extracted IoT firmware. Covers \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow and passwd parsing, busybox httpd configs, telnet\u002Fdropbear stanzas, MQTT\u002Fcloud API key extraction, and cross-referencing against known default-credential databases.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: iot\n  when_to_use: hardcoded credentials, default password, busybox, telnet creds, SSH key, API key embedded, \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow, httpd config, dropbear key, hardcoded secret, firmware credentials, MQTT creds, default login\n  tags: iot, credentials, hardcoded, shadow, passwd, busybox, httpd, telnet, dropbear, api-key, default-creds, embedded, firmware\n  mitre_attack: T1552.001, T1078.001, T1110.001, T1552.004\n---\n\n# Hardcoded Credentials\n\n> Extracted rootfs often contains plaintext or weakly hashed credentials,\n> embedded TLS private keys, cloud API tokens, and hardcoded admin accounts.\n> This playbook covers the full triage path from raw rootfs to validated cred.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Extracted rootfs from `binwalk-extract` skill (path: `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsquashfs_root` or similar).\n- Tools: `john`, `hashcat`, `openssl`, `trufflehog`, `strings`, standard GNU utilities.\n\n```bash\nROOT=\u002Ftmp\u002Fsquashfs_root   # set once; referenced throughout\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Account Databases\n\n### \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd + \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\n\n```bash\n# Check for non-standard shells (telnetd, \u002Fbin\u002Fsh) and disabled-but-present accounts\ngrep -v \"nologin\\|false\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\"\n\n# Extract hashed passwords\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"shadow not present\"\n\n# Identify hash types\n# $1$ = MD5, $5$ = SHA-256, $6$ = SHA-512, $y$ = yescrypt, no-$ = DES\nawk -F: '{print $1, $2}' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" | grep -v '^\\*\\|^!\\|^:$'\n\n# Crack with hashcat (shadow format)\nhashcat -m 1800 \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # $6$ SHA-512\nhashcat -m 500  \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # $1$ MD5\nhashcat -m 1500 \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # DES\n\n# john fallback (handles multi-type auto)\nunshadow \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --wordlist=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --show\n```\n\n### BusyBox-specific user configs\n\n```bash\n# BusyBox httpd uses \u002Fetc\u002Fhttpd.conf for auth\nfind \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\" -name \"httpd.conf\" -o -name \".htpasswd\" | xargs cat 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# BusyBox udhcpd \u002F telnetd startup stanzas\ngrep -r \"telnetd\\|login\\|password\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finittab\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finit.d\u002F\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Frc.d\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^Binary\"\n\n# BusyBox shadow format check (some use MD5 without $1$ prefix)\ngrep -E '^[^:]+:[^:!*]{3,}' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — SSH \u002F Dropbear Keys\n\n```bash\n# Host keys (baked into firmware = same key across all units of same model)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"dropbear_*_host_key\" -o -name \"ssh_host_*_key\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Convert Dropbear key to OpenSSH PEM for use\ndropbearconvert dropbear openssh \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fdropbear\u002Fdropbear_rsa_host_key\" \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_rsa.pem\nopenssl rsa -in \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_rsa.pem -text -noout | head -20\n\n# Authorized keys embedded for backdoor accounts\nfind \"$ROOT\" -path \"*\u002F.ssh\u002Fauthorized_keys\" | xargs cat 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check if root has a passwordless authorized_key → instant SSH root on any unit\ngrep -r \"authorized_keys\\|ssh-rsa\\|ecdsa-sha2\" \"$ROOT\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -10\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Web Interface Credentials\n\n```bash\n# CGI \u002F Lua \u002F PHP \u002F lighttpd configs\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.lua\" -o -name \"*.cgi\" -o -name \"*.php\" | \\\n    xargs grep -l \"password\\|passwd\\|credential\\|secret\\|admin\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Plaintext credentials in web config files\ngrep -rn \"admin\\|password\\|passwd\\|secret\\|token\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Flighttpd\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fnginx\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fhttpd\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Hardcoded credentials in Lua\u002FCGI scripts\ngrep -rn '\"admin\"\\|\"root\"\\|\"1234\"\\|\"password\"' \"$ROOT\u002Fusr\u002Flib\u002Flua\u002F\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fwww\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwww\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Strings-Based Secret Sweep\n\n```bash\n# Broad strings dump: capture all printable sequences ≥ 8 chars\nfind \"$ROOT\" -type f -executable | while read f; do\n    strings \"$f\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone > \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt\n\n# Filter credential-like patterns\ngrep -iE 'password|passwd|secret|api.?key|token|credential|auth' \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt \\\n    | grep -vE '^(#|\u002F\u002F|\u003C!|\u003Chtml|\u003Chead)' | sort -u | head -100\n\n# AWS \u002F GCP \u002F Azure key patterns\ngrep -E 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}' \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt\n\n# JWT tokens\ngrep -oP 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=_-]+' \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt | head -10\n```\n\n### trufflehog filesystem scan\n\n```bash\n# trufflehog works on directories — point at rootfs\ntrufflehog filesystem \"$ROOT\" --only-verified 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n# Without --only-verified for broader sweep:\ntrufflehog filesystem \"$ROOT\" --json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n    python3 -c \"import sys,json; [print(json.dumps(r, indent=2)) for r in map(json.loads, sys.stdin)]\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — MQTT \u002F Cloud \u002F IoT-Platform Tokens\n\n```bash\n# MQTT broker credentials\ngrep -rn \"mqtt\\|MQTT\\|mosquitto\" \"$ROOT\" --include=\"*.conf\" --include=\"*.cfg\" \\\n    --include=\"*.json\" --include=\"*.lua\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# Cloud platform tokens (Tuya, HomeKit, AWS IoT, Azure IoT Hub)\ngrep -rn \"tuya\\|homekit\\|awsiot\\|azure.*iot\\|device_key\\|productKey\\|deviceSecret\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\" --include=\"*.json\" --include=\"*.conf\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# PCB-serial-derived default PSK (check if device ID used as secret)\ngrep -rn \"serial\\|SerialNum\\|MAC\\|mac_addr\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fconfig\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Default Credential Matrix Cross-Reference\n\n```bash\n# Extract all discovered usernames\nUSERS=$(grep -v 'nologin\\|false\\|halt\\|sync\\|shutdown' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\" | \\\n    awk -F: '{print $1}' | tr '\\n' ' ')\necho \"Accounts found: $USERS\"\n\n# Cross-reference against routersploit \u002F seclists default creds\n# RouterSploit default cred wordlist path (if installed):\nDFLT=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Froutersploit\u002Fresources\u002Fwordlists\u002Fdefault_passwords.txt\n[ -f \"$DFLT\" ] && echo \"Default wordlist available: $DFLT\"\n\n# SecLists IoT default creds\nSECLIST=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FPasswords\u002FDefault-Credentials\u002Fdefault-passwords.csv\n[ -f \"$SECLIST\" ] && grep -iE 'admin|root|user' \"$SECLIST\" | head -20\n```\n\n### Known vendor default credential matrix\n\n| Vendor | Username | Password | Protocol |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| TP-Link (pre-2022) | admin | admin | HTTP \u002F Telnet |\n| Netgear | admin | password | HTTP |\n| D-Link | admin | (blank) | HTTP |\n| Asus (stock) | admin | admin | HTTP |\n| MikroTik | admin | (blank) | SSH \u002F Winbox |\n| Hikvision | admin | 12345 | RTSP \u002F HTTP |\n| Dahua | admin | admin | HTTP |\n| Ubiquiti AirOS | ubnt | ubnt | SSH |\n| Western Digital MyCloud | admin | (blank) | HTTP |\n| Seagate NAS | admin | admin | HTTP |\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — TLS Certificate Private Keys\n\n```bash\n# Find PEM-encoded private keys\ngrep -rl \"BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY\\|BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY\" \"$ROOT\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Find DER-format keys (binary — look for SEQUENCE headers)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.der\" -o -name \"*.key\" -o -name \"*.pem\" | while read f; do\n    openssl rsa -in \"$f\" -text -noout 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -3 && echo \"FILE: $f\"\ndone\n\n# Verify if vendor CA cert is self-signed (same key on all units = MitM vector)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.crt\" -o -name \"*.pem\" | while read f; do\n    openssl x509 -in \"$f\" -noout -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull && echo \"  FILE: $f\"\ndone\n\n# Check if the private key matches the certificate\nopenssl x509 -noout -modulus -in \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fserver.crt\" | openssl md5\nopenssl rsa  -noout -modulus -in \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fserver.key\" | openssl md5\n# Matching MD5 = key pair is valid and present on device\n```\n\n---\n\n## Evidence\n\n```bash\nEVDIR=\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Fcredentials\nmkdir -p \"$EVDIR\"\n\n# Save cred findings\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --show > \"$EVDIR\u002Fcracked_passwords.txt\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt \"$EVDIR\u002Fstrings_all.txt\"\n\n# Record each finding as a credential node\n# kg_add_node(\n#     kind=\"credential\",\n#     label=\"Hardcoded admin credential in \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\",\n#     props={\n#         \"key\": \"iot-cred::\u003Ctarget>::admin\",\n#         \"secret_type\": \"unix_password\",\n#         \"username\": \"admin\",\n#         \"hash\": \"\u003Chash>\",\n#         \"plaintext\": \"\u003Cif cracked>\",\n#         \"source\": \"firmware \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\",\n#     },\n# )\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Cracked shadow credentials are valid on every unit of the same firmware version\n  (until the vendor patches). Document model + firmware version precisely.\n- Private key extraction enables MitM against the vendor's cloud API for all devices\n  using that firmware. Escalate finding severity accordingly.\n- MQTT tokens with `#` wildcard subscriptions allow full telemetry interception across\n  the vendor's entire fleet — flag as Critical if RoE scope allows cloud testing.\n\n## References\n\n- SecLists default credentials: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdanielmiessler\u002FSecLists\u002Ftree\u002Fmaster\u002FPasswords\u002FDefault-Credentials`\n- RouterSploit modules: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthreat9\u002Froutersploit`\n- trufflehog: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftrufflesecurity\u002Ftrufflehog`\n- Hashcat hash-modes: `https:\u002F\u002Fhashcat.net\u002Fwiki\u002Fdoku.php?id=hashcat`\n","# Hardcoded Credentials\n\n> Extracted rootfs often contains plaintext or weakly hashed credentials,\n> embedded TLS private keys, cloud API tokens, and hardcoded admin accounts.\n> This playbook covers the full triage path from raw rootfs to validated cred.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Extracted rootfs from `binwalk-extract` skill (path: `\u002Ftmp\u002Fsquashfs_root` or similar).\n- Tools: `john`, `hashcat`, `openssl`, `trufflehog`, `strings`, standard GNU utilities.\n\n```bash\nROOT=\u002Ftmp\u002Fsquashfs_root   # set once; referenced throughout\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1 — Account Databases\n\n### \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd + \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\n\n```bash\n# Check for non-standard shells (telnetd, \u002Fbin\u002Fsh) and disabled-but-present accounts\ngrep -v \"nologin\\|false\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\"\n\n# Extract hashed passwords\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo \"shadow not present\"\n\n# Identify hash types\n# $1$ = MD5, $5$ = SHA-256, $6$ = SHA-512, $y$ = yescrypt, no-$ = DES\nawk -F: '{print $1, $2}' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" | grep -v '^\\*\\|^!\\|^:$'\n\n# Crack with hashcat (shadow format)\nhashcat -m 1800 \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # $6$ SHA-512\nhashcat -m 500  \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # $1$ MD5\nhashcat -m 1500 \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt   # DES\n\n# john fallback (handles multi-type auto)\nunshadow \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --wordlist=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --show\n```\n\n### BusyBox-specific user configs\n\n```bash\n# BusyBox httpd uses \u002Fetc\u002Fhttpd.conf for auth\nfind \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\" -name \"httpd.conf\" -o -name \".htpasswd\" | xargs cat 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# BusyBox udhcpd \u002F telnetd startup stanzas\ngrep -r \"telnetd\\|login\\|password\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finittab\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finit.d\u002F\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Frc.d\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v \"^Binary\"\n\n# BusyBox shadow format check (some use MD5 without $1$ prefix)\ngrep -E '^[^:]+:[^:!*]{3,}' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2 — SSH \u002F Dropbear Keys\n\n```bash\n# Host keys (baked into firmware = same key across all units of same model)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"dropbear_*_host_key\" -o -name \"ssh_host_*_key\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Convert Dropbear key to OpenSSH PEM for use\ndropbearconvert dropbear openssh \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fdropbear\u002Fdropbear_rsa_host_key\" \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_rsa.pem\nopenssl rsa -in \u002Ftmp\u002Fhost_rsa.pem -text -noout | head -20\n\n# Authorized keys embedded for backdoor accounts\nfind \"$ROOT\" -path \"*\u002F.ssh\u002Fauthorized_keys\" | xargs cat 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Check if root has a passwordless authorized_key → instant SSH root on any unit\ngrep -r \"authorized_keys\\|ssh-rsa\\|ecdsa-sha2\" \"$ROOT\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -10\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3 — Web Interface Credentials\n\n```bash\n# CGI \u002F Lua \u002F PHP \u002F lighttpd configs\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.lua\" -o -name \"*.cgi\" -o -name \"*.php\" | \\\n    xargs grep -l \"password\\|passwd\\|credential\\|secret\\|admin\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# Plaintext credentials in web config files\ngrep -rn \"admin\\|password\\|passwd\\|secret\\|token\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Flighttpd\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fnginx\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fhttpd\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Hardcoded credentials in Lua\u002FCGI scripts\ngrep -rn '\"admin\"\\|\"root\"\\|\"1234\"\\|\"password\"' \"$ROOT\u002Fusr\u002Flib\u002Flua\u002F\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\u002Fwww\u002F\" \"$ROOT\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwww\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4 — Strings-Based Secret Sweep\n\n```bash\n# Broad strings dump: capture all printable sequences ≥ 8 chars\nfind \"$ROOT\" -type f -executable | while read f; do\n    strings \"$f\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ndone > \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt\n\n# Filter credential-like patterns\ngrep -iE 'password|passwd|secret|api.?key|token|credential|auth' \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt \\\n    | grep -vE '^(#|\u002F\u002F|\u003C!|\u003Chtml|\u003Chead)' | sort -u | head -100\n\n# AWS \u002F GCP \u002F Azure key patterns\ngrep -E 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}' \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt\n\n# JWT tokens\ngrep -oP 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]+\\.[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=_-]+' \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt | head -10\n```\n\n### trufflehog filesystem scan\n\n```bash\n# trufflehog works on directories — point at rootfs\ntrufflehog filesystem \"$ROOT\" --only-verified 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n# Without --only-verified for broader sweep:\ntrufflehog filesystem \"$ROOT\" --json 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | \\\n    python3 -c \"import sys,json; [print(json.dumps(r, indent=2)) for r in map(json.loads, sys.stdin)]\"\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5 — MQTT \u002F Cloud \u002F IoT-Platform Tokens\n\n```bash\n# MQTT broker credentials\ngrep -rn \"mqtt\\|MQTT\\|mosquitto\" \"$ROOT\" --include=\"*.conf\" --include=\"*.cfg\" \\\n    --include=\"*.json\" --include=\"*.lua\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# Cloud platform tokens (Tuya, HomeKit, AWS IoT, Azure IoT Hub)\ngrep -rn \"tuya\\|homekit\\|awsiot\\|azure.*iot\\|device_key\\|productKey\\|deviceSecret\" \\\n    \"$ROOT\" --include=\"*.json\" --include=\"*.conf\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -30\n\n# PCB-serial-derived default PSK (check if device ID used as secret)\ngrep -rn \"serial\\|SerialNum\\|MAC\\|mac_addr\" \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fconfig\u002F\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n```\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6 — Default Credential Matrix Cross-Reference\n\n```bash\n# Extract all discovered usernames\nUSERS=$(grep -v 'nologin\\|false\\|halt\\|sync\\|shutdown' \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\" | \\\n    awk -F: '{print $1}' | tr '\\n' ' ')\necho \"Accounts found: $USERS\"\n\n# Cross-reference against routersploit \u002F seclists default creds\n# RouterSploit default cred wordlist path (if installed):\nDFLT=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Froutersploit\u002Fresources\u002Fwordlists\u002Fdefault_passwords.txt\n[ -f \"$DFLT\" ] && echo \"Default wordlist available: $DFLT\"\n\n# SecLists IoT default creds\nSECLIST=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fseclists\u002FPasswords\u002FDefault-Credentials\u002Fdefault-passwords.csv\n[ -f \"$SECLIST\" ] && grep -iE 'admin|root|user' \"$SECLIST\" | head -20\n```\n\n### Known vendor default credential matrix\n\n| Vendor | Username | Password | Protocol |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| TP-Link (pre-2022) | admin | admin | HTTP \u002F Telnet |\n| Netgear | admin | password | HTTP |\n| D-Link | admin | (blank) | HTTP |\n| Asus (stock) | admin | admin | HTTP |\n| MikroTik | admin | (blank) | SSH \u002F Winbox |\n| Hikvision | admin | 12345 | RTSP \u002F HTTP |\n| Dahua | admin | admin | HTTP |\n| Ubiquiti AirOS | ubnt | ubnt | SSH |\n| Western Digital MyCloud | admin | (blank) | HTTP |\n| Seagate NAS | admin | admin | HTTP |\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7 — TLS Certificate Private Keys\n\n```bash\n# Find PEM-encoded private keys\ngrep -rl \"BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY\\|BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY\" \"$ROOT\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Find DER-format keys (binary — look for SEQUENCE headers)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.der\" -o -name \"*.key\" -o -name \"*.pem\" | while read f; do\n    openssl rsa -in \"$f\" -text -noout 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -3 && echo \"FILE: $f\"\ndone\n\n# Verify if vendor CA cert is self-signed (same key on all units = MitM vector)\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"*.crt\" -o -name \"*.pem\" | while read f; do\n    openssl x509 -in \"$f\" -noout -subject -issuer 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull && echo \"  FILE: $f\"\ndone\n\n# Check if the private key matches the certificate\nopenssl x509 -noout -modulus -in \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fserver.crt\" | openssl md5\nopenssl rsa  -noout -modulus -in \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fserver.key\" | openssl md5\n# Matching MD5 = key pair is valid and present on device\n```\n\n---\n\n## Evidence\n\n```bash\nEVDIR=\u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fiot\u002F\u003Ctarget>\u002Fcredentials\nmkdir -p \"$EVDIR\"\n\n# Save cred findings\njohn \u002Ftmp\u002Funshadowed.txt --show > \"$EVDIR\u002Fcracked_passwords.txt\"\ncp \u002Ftmp\u002Fall_strings.txt \"$EVDIR\u002Fstrings_all.txt\"\n\n# Record each finding as a credential node\n# kg_add_node(\n#     kind=\"credential\",\n#     label=\"Hardcoded admin credential in \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\",\n#     props={\n#         \"key\": \"iot-cred::\u003Ctarget>::admin\",\n#         \"secret_type\": \"unix_password\",\n#         \"username\": \"admin\",\n#         \"hash\": \"\u003Chash>\",\n#         \"plaintext\": \"\u003Cif cracked>\",\n#         \"source\": \"firmware \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\",\n#     },\n# )\n```\n\n## OPSEC Notes\n\n- Cracked shadow credentials are valid on every unit of the same firmware version\n  (until the vendor patches). Document model + firmware version precisely.\n- Private key extraction enables MitM against the vendor's cloud API for all devices\n  using that firmware. Escalate finding severity accordingly.\n- MQTT tokens with `#` wildcard subscriptions allow full telemetry interception across\n  the vendor's entire fleet — flag as Critical if RoE scope allows cloud testing.\n\n## References\n\n- SecLists default credentials: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdanielmiessler\u002FSecLists\u002Ftree\u002Fmaster\u002FPasswords\u002FDefault-Credentials`\n- RouterSploit modules: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fthreat9\u002Froutersploit`\n- trufflehog: `https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftrufflesecurity\u002Ftrufflehog`\n- Hashcat hash-modes: `https:\u002F\u002Fhashcat.net\u002Fwiki\u002Fdoku.php?id=hashcat`\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"iot, credentials, hardcoded, shadow, passwd, busybox, httpd, telnet, dropbear, api-key, default-creds, embedded, firmware","iot","hardcoded credentials, default password, busybox, telnet creds, SSH key, API key embedded, \u002Fetc\u002Fshadow, httpd config, dropbear key, hardcoded secret, firmware credentials, MQTT creds, default login","T1552.001, T1078.001, T1110.001, T1552.004","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fhardcoded-creds",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill hardcoded-creds",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill hardcoded-creds",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill hardcoded-creds","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fiot\u002Fhardcoded-creds\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]