[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798AS5ZST3FZDW5BKP9JBD5":3,"skill-same:01M798AS5ZST3FZDW5BKP9JBD5":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":31,"commitSha":32,"skillDirectory":33,"forksCount":34,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":37,"install":38,"resources":50},"01M798AS5ZST3FZDW5BKP9JBD5","ics-overview",null,"Use when the target is an industrial control system or operational technology network running Modbus, BACnet, S7Comm\u002FS7Comm Plus, DNP3, OPC-UA, or any PLC\u002FHMI\u002FSCADA stack. Engagements MUST set RoE flag industrial_safety_critical=true; this catalog gates every write-scope operation behind explicit operator confirmation regardless of HITL middleware.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: ics-overview\ndescription: >\n  Use when the target is an industrial control system or operational technology\n  network running Modbus, BACnet, S7Comm\u002FS7Comm Plus, DNP3, OPC-UA, or any\n  PLC\u002FHMI\u002FSCADA stack. Engagements MUST set RoE flag\n  industrial_safety_critical=true; this catalog gates every write-scope\n  operation behind explicit operator confirmation regardless of HITL middleware.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: ics\n  when_to_use: \"ics ot industrial control modbus bacnet s7comm dnp3 opcua plc hmi scada safety-critical operational technology\"\n  tags: ics, ot, scada, plc, hmi, modbus, bacnet, s7, dnp3, opcua\n  mitre_attack: T0800, T0801, T0859, T0830, T0814, T0846\n  safety_critical: true\n---\n\n# ICS \u002F OT Operator Skill Catalog\n\nIndustrial engagements are not application security with longer rules of\nengagement — they are a different discipline. A miswritten Modbus coil\non a real plant kills people. This catalog is **read-mostly by default**;\nevery write-scope skill carries an explicit safety gate.\n\n## Hard rules\n\n1. **No writes without OPPLAN.safety_critical confirmation**. The\n   middleware refuses writes when the active OPPLAN objective does not\n   carry `safety_critical_confirmed=true`. Bypass requires operator\n   signature in `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsafety-attestation.txt`.\n2. **Read-only protocol discovery first**. Identify what's on the wire\n   before any active probing. Many ICS protocols are unauthenticated;\n   a single malformed read can crash an old PLC.\n3. **Out-of-band physical safety**. The blue team includes plant ops.\n   A ConOps with `blue_team.plant_ops_phone` is mandatory for engagements\n   on active production lines.\n\n## Playbooks\n\n> **Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills.** The entries below\n> are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate `SKILL.md` to open for\n> each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools\n> using this summary and the Workflow in this file.\n\n\n| Technique | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| **modbus-discovery** | Read-only Modbus TCP\u002FRTU enumeration, function code 3\u002F4 polling |\n| **modbus-write** | **GATED** Write coils \u002F registers; safety gate enforced |\n| **bacnet-discovery** | BACnet\u002FIP Who-Is, object enumeration, device profile |\n| **s7comm** | Siemens S7 \u002F S7Comm Plus enumeration via Snap7 \u002F python-snap7 |\n| **dnp3** | DNP3 outstation \u002F master discovery; integrity poll |\n| **opcua** | OPC-UA browse, anonymous auth check, certificate analysis |\n| **hmi-web** | HMI web stacks (Wonderware, Iconics, Schneider) — known CVEs |\n| **engineering-software** | TIA Portal \u002F Studio 5000 \u002F Unity Pro project extraction |\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Passive observation**: tap a SPAN port if available. Identify protocols\n   on the wire (`tshark -Y modbus || tshark -Y bacnet || ...`).\n2. **Network-layer discovery**: nmap with `-sV --script modbus-discover`,\n   `bacnet-info`, `s7-info`, `dnp3-info` (NSE scripts ship in Kali by\n   default; some are slow — set `-T2` for production networks).\n3. **Function-code-3 polling**: read holding registers from every Modbus\n   device discovered. Log register maps to the knowledge graph as\n   `:Service` nodes with `protocol=modbus`.\n4. **Identify the safety integrity level (SIL)** of any device touched.\n   SIL 3+ devices NEVER get write probes without plant-ops sign-off.\n5. **Engineering software attack path**: if you can reach the engineering\n   workstation, extract the project archive (.s7p, .acd, .stp). The\n   project file is the crown jewel — it reveals the entire process model.\n\n## Detection gap\n\nICS networks rarely have host-based detection on PLCs\u002FRTUs themselves —\nthe detection stack lives on the engineering workstation, the historian,\nand any IT\u002FOT gateway. Detector agent should generate Sigma rules\ntargeting:\n\n- Function-code anomalies (write to coils outside normal ranges).\n- Connection sources outside the documented MES\u002FSCADA IP set.\n- TIA Portal \u002F Studio 5000 project download events.\n\n## Out of scope by default\n\nActive glitching of PLC firmware; firmware upload to PLCs; safety\ncontroller writes — all of these require an explicit RoE annex signed\nby the asset owner. The default ICS RoE template in `soundwave\u002F` includes\nthis annex skeleton.\n","# ICS \u002F OT Operator Skill Catalog\n\nIndustrial engagements are not application security with longer rules of\nengagement — they are a different discipline. A miswritten Modbus coil\non a real plant kills people. This catalog is **read-mostly by default**;\nevery write-scope skill carries an explicit safety gate.\n\n## Hard rules\n\n1. **No writes without OPPLAN.safety_critical confirmation**. The\n   middleware refuses writes when the active OPPLAN objective does not\n   carry `safety_critical_confirmed=true`. Bypass requires operator\n   signature in `\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsafety-attestation.txt`.\n2. **Read-only protocol discovery first**. Identify what's on the wire\n   before any active probing. Many ICS protocols are unauthenticated;\n   a single malformed read can crash an old PLC.\n3. **Out-of-band physical safety**. The blue team includes plant ops.\n   A ConOps with `blue_team.plant_ops_phone` is mandatory for engagements\n   on active production lines.\n\n## Playbooks\n\n> **Inline technique reference — not separately loadable skills.** The entries below\n> are summarized here for direct use; there is no separate `SKILL.md` to open for\n> each. Do NOT call the skill loader on them — apply the technique with your tools\n> using this summary and the Workflow in this file.\n\n\n| Technique | Use for |\n|---|---|\n| **modbus-discovery** | Read-only Modbus TCP\u002FRTU enumeration, function code 3\u002F4 polling |\n| **modbus-write** | **GATED** Write coils \u002F registers; safety gate enforced |\n| **bacnet-discovery** | BACnet\u002FIP Who-Is, object enumeration, device profile |\n| **s7comm** | Siemens S7 \u002F S7Comm Plus enumeration via Snap7 \u002F python-snap7 |\n| **dnp3** | DNP3 outstation \u002F master discovery; integrity poll |\n| **opcua** | OPC-UA browse, anonymous auth check, certificate analysis |\n| **hmi-web** | HMI web stacks (Wonderware, Iconics, Schneider) — known CVEs |\n| **engineering-software** | TIA Portal \u002F Studio 5000 \u002F Unity Pro project extraction |\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Passive observation**: tap a SPAN port if available. Identify protocols\n   on the wire (`tshark -Y modbus || tshark -Y bacnet || ...`).\n2. **Network-layer discovery**: nmap with `-sV --script modbus-discover`,\n   `bacnet-info`, `s7-info`, `dnp3-info` (NSE scripts ship in Kali by\n   default; some are slow — set `-T2` for production networks).\n3. **Function-code-3 polling**: read holding registers from every Modbus\n   device discovered. Log register maps to the knowledge graph as\n   `:Service` nodes with `protocol=modbus`.\n4. **Identify the safety integrity level (SIL)** of any device touched.\n   SIL 3+ devices NEVER get write probes without plant-ops sign-off.\n5. **Engineering software attack path**: if you can reach the engineering\n   workstation, extract the project archive (.s7p, .acd, .stp). The\n   project file is the crown jewel — it reveals the entire process model.\n\n## Detection gap\n\nICS networks rarely have host-based detection on PLCs\u002FRTUs themselves —\nthe detection stack lives on the engineering workstation, the historian,\nand any IT\u002FOT gateway. Detector agent should generate Sigma rules\ntargeting:\n\n- Function-code anomalies (write to coils outside normal ranges).\n- Connection sources outside the documented MES\u002FSCADA IP set.\n- TIA Portal \u002F Studio 5000 project download events.\n\n## Out of scope by default\n\nActive glitching of PLC firmware; firmware upload to PLCs; safety\ncontroller writes — all of these require an explicit RoE annex signed\nby the asset owner. The default ICS RoE template in `soundwave\u002F` includes\nthis annex skeleton.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":30},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28,"safety_critical":29},"ics, ot, scada, plc, hmi, modbus, bacnet, s7, dnp3, opcua","ics","ics ot industrial control modbus bacnet s7comm dnp3 opcua plc hmi scada safety-critical operational technology","T0800, T0801, T0859, T0830, T0814, T0846",true,"Use when the target is an industrial control system or operational technology network running Modbus, BACnet, S7Comm\u002FS7Comm Plus, DNP3, OPC-UA, or any PLC\u002FHMI\u002FSCADA stack. Engagements MUST set RoE flag industrial_safety_critical=true; this catalog gates every write-scope operation behind explicit operator confirmation regardless of HITL middleware.\n","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fics",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":39,"prompt":49,"zipAvailable":29},[40,43,46],{"tool":41,"command":42},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill ics-overview",{"tool":44,"command":45},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill ics-overview",{"tool":47,"command":48},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill ics-overview","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]