[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M797GFSESECMPTQ76349S5N0":3,"skill-same:01M797GFSESECMPTQ76349S5N0":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":30,"commitSha":31,"skillDirectory":32,"forksCount":33,"repositoryHtmlUrl":34,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":35,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M797GFSESECMPTQ76349S5N0","apt29-cozy-bear",null,"Adversary-emulation profile for APT29 (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard \u002F NOBELIUM \u002F The Dukes), Russia's SVR-attributed cyber-espionage group, mapping its ATT&CK TTPs to Decepticon emulation tooling.","7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","7ShIkI3","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F78133376?v=4","01M797CTK5AHH2161YVG93NJ3B","Raphael Pascaud","01M797CTKRQS64R01J7E6TJSEM",3,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt29-cozy-bear\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: apt29-cozy-bear\ndescription: \"Adversary-emulation profile for APT29 (Cozy Bear \u002F Midnight Blizzard \u002F NOBELIUM \u002F The Dukes), Russia's SVR-attributed cyber-espionage group, mapping its ATT&CK TTPs to Decepticon emulation tooling.\"\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: adversary-emulation\n  when_to_use: \"APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, CozyDuke, UNC2452, Dark Halo, SVR, Russian state-sponsored espionage, SolarWinds emulation, golden SAML, OAuth abuse, password spray cloud access, supply chain compromise emulation, stealthy long-dwell APT emulation\"\n  tags: apt29, cozy-bear, midnight-blizzard, nobelium, the-dukes, svr, russia, espionage, cloud-attack, golden-saml, oauth-abuse, supply-chain, password-spray, adversary-emulation, mitre-attack, G0016\n  mitre_attack: T1595.002, T1589.001, T1598.003, T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003, T1190, T1195.002, T1199, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1078.003, T1078.004, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1059.009, T1106, T1053.005, T1047, T1569.002, T1547.001, T1546.003, T1098.001, T1098.002, T1098.003, T1098.005, T1136.003, T1556.007, T1505.003, T1543.003, T1068, T1548.002, T1484.002, T1027.006, T1027.002, T1036.005, T1070.004, T1070.006, T1070.008, T1218.011, T1553.002, T1497, T1620, T1110.003, T1003.003, T1003.006, T1003.001, T1558.003, T1606.001, T1606.002, T1528, T1539, T1621, T1555.003, T1649, T1087.002, T1087.004, T1018, T1482, T1526, T1538, T1069.002, T1021.001, T1021.006, T1021.007, T1550.001, T1550.002, T1550.003, T1570, T1114.002, T1213, T1530, T1560.001, T1071.001, T1071.004, T1573.002, T1090.004, T1568, T1102.002, T1041, T1567.002, T1048\n---\n\n# APT29 (Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nAPT29 (MITRE ATT&CK **G0016**; also tracked as Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, CozyDuke, UNC2452, Dark Halo, NobleBaron, YTTRIUM, Blue Kitsune, IRON RITUAL\u002FIRON HEMLOCK) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber-espionage group attributed by multiple governments to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Active since at least 2008, it is among the most operationally disciplined intrusion sets on record: it favors patient, stealthy, long-dwell access against high-value strategic targets, custom and living-off-the-land tooling, rigorous operational security (residential-proxy infrastructure, anti-forensic indicator removal, low-and-slow authentication attacks), and a sustained pivot toward cloud and identity-plane attacks (Microsoft 365 \u002F Entra ID, OAuth, federation). It is best known for the 2015–2016 DNC intrusion, the 2020 SolarWinds Orion supply-chain compromise, and the 2024 Microsoft corporate-email breach. This profile teaches Decepticon to emulate APT29's signature TTPs so an authorized red team can exercise the blue cell against a realistic, identity-and-cloud-centric espionage adversary.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Suspected sponsor \u002F nation:** Russian Federation — Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, **SVR**). Attribution is publicly asserted by the U.S. government (CISA\u002FFBI\u002FNSA), the UK NCSC, Canada's CSE, and corroborated by vendor reporting (Mandiant\u002FGoogle, Microsoft, CrowdStrike).\n- **Motivation:** Strategic **espionage** — collection of foreign-policy, diplomatic, defense, government, and technology intelligence in support of Russian state interests. APT29 is not financially motivated and is not primarily a destructive actor; its goal is durable, covert access and exfiltration of intelligence, not disruption.\n- **Confidence:** **High** for SVR attribution — it is the consensus of multiple Five Eyes governments and independent commercial vendors, reinforced by consistent tradecraft across a decade-plus of operations.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** National governments and foreign ministries, diplomatic missions\u002Fembassies, think tanks and policy research institutes, defense and military organizations, IT and managed\u002Fcloud service providers (used as a stepping stone to downstream victims), technology companies, healthcare\u002Fpharmaceutical and vaccine research (2020), and aviation\u002Feducation\u002Flaw enforcement (post-SolarWinds expansion).\n- **Regions:** Primarily NATO and Western-aligned states — United States, United Kingdom, Europe broadly, and other governments of intelligence interest to Russia.\n- **Victim profile:** Organizations holding information of strategic value to Russian foreign policy and security. APT29 frequently exploits **trusted relationships** (T1199) — compromising cloud solution providers, MSPs, and software vendors to reach the ultimate intelligence target downstream.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **2008–2018 — \"The Dukes\" espionage operations.** Long-running campaigns against Western governments and think tanks using the MiniDuke\u002FCosmicDuke\u002FCozyDuke\u002FSeaDuke\u002FHAMMERTOSS toolset. (MITRE ATT&CK G0016: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F)\n- **2015–2016 — U.S. Democratic National Committee (DNC) compromise.** Spearphishing-led intrusion attributed to APT29 alongside APT28. (MITRE ATT&CK G0016: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F)\n- **2020 — COVID-19 vaccine research targeting (WellMess \u002F WellMail).** NCSC\u002FCSE\u002FCISA\u002FNSA joint advisory (16 July 2020) detailed APT29 targeting vaccine-development organizations in the UK, US, and Canada, exploiting internet-facing CVEs (Citrix, Pulse Secure, FortiGate, Zimbra), spearphishing for credentials, and deploying the WellMess and WellMail implants. (NCSC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ncsc.gov.uk\u002Fnews\u002Fadvisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development)\n- **Aug 2019 – Jan 2021 — SolarWinds Orion supply-chain compromise (ATT&CK Campaign C0024; UNC2452\u002F\"SolarStorm\"; SUNBURST).** APT29 trojanized SolarWinds Orion updates (versions 2019.4–2020.2.1), reaching ~18,000 organizations, then selectively deployed TEARDROP\u002FRAINDROP loaders for Cobalt Strike and forged SAML tokens (\"Golden SAML\") to access Microsoft 365 and Azure AD. Publicly disclosed 13 December 2020. (MITRE C0024: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fcampaigns\u002FC0024\u002F ; Mandiant\u002FGoogle: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fevasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor)\n- **Since Sept 2023 — JetBrains TeamCity exploitation (CVE-2023-42793).** FBI\u002FCISA\u002FNSA\u002FNCSC\u002FPolish SKW joint advisory (AA23-347A) attributed large-scale exploitation of the TeamCity authentication-bypass flaw to the SVR, deploying the GraphicalProton backdoor for follow-on espionage and software supply-chain positioning. (CISA AA23-347A: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-347a)\n- **Nov 2023 – Jan 2024 — Microsoft corporate email breach (\"Midnight Blizzard\").** Password-spray (from residential proxies) against a legacy non-production test tenant account lacking MFA; abuse of a legacy test **OAuth** application granted the Exchange Online `full_access_as_app` role to read corporate mailboxes (incl. senior leadership). Detected 12 Jan 2024. (Microsoft MSRC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fmsrc\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002Fmicrosoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard ; Microsoft Security: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002F25\u002Fmidnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack\u002F)\n- **Feb 2024 — CISA AA24-057A \"SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access.\"** Documented the group's shift to cloud\u002Fidentity initial access: password spraying, brute force, exploitation of dormant\u002Fservice accounts, token theft, MFA fatigue\u002Fbombing, and device-registration persistence. (CISA AA24-057A: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-057a)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1566.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003** — Spearphishing via attachment, link, and trusted service; HTML-smuggling lures (e.g., EnvyScout) deliver droppers.\n- **T1190** — Exploit public-facing applications, including CVE-2023-42793 (JetBrains TeamCity) and 2020 edge appliance CVEs (Citrix, Pulse Secure, FortiGate, Zimbra).\n- **T1195.002** — Software supply-chain compromise (trojanized SolarWinds Orion builds → SUNBURST).\n- **T1199** — Trusted-relationship abuse: compromise of cloud solution providers, MSPs, and vendors to reach downstream victims.\n- **T1133** — External remote services \u002F valid-account access to VPNs and remote portals.\n- **T1078 \u002F .004** — Valid accounts, especially **cloud accounts** (compromised O365\u002FEntra admins, dormant test tenants).\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .005 \u002F .009** — PowerShell, Windows command shell, VBScript, and **Cloud API** execution.\n- **T1204.001 \u002F .002** — User execution of malicious links and files.\n- **T1106** — Native API; **T1047** — WMI; **T1569.002** — service execution.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1547.001** — Registry Run keys \u002F Startup folder; **T1546.003** — WMI event subscription.\n- **T1053.005** — Scheduled tasks.\n- **T1098.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003 \u002F .005** — Cloud account manipulation: add credentials to service principals\u002FOAuth apps, grant additional email-delegate and cloud-role permissions, and register attacker devices.\n- **T1136.003** — Create new cloud accounts; **T1556.007** — modify hybrid-identity authentication.\n- **T1505.003** — Web shells; **T1543.003** — Windows service.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploitation for privilege escalation; **T1548.002** — UAC bypass.\n- **T1484.002** — Domain\u002Ftenant trust modification (add federated IdP \u002F trusted domain to mint tokens).\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1027.006** — HTML smuggling; **T1027.002** — software packing.\n- **T1036.005** — Match legitimate name\u002Flocation; **T1218.011** — rundll32 proxy execution.\n- **T1070.004 \u002F .006 \u002F .008** — File deletion (sdelete), timestomp, and **clear mailbox data**.\n- **T1553.002** — Code signing with valid\u002Fabused certificates; **T1497** — sandbox\u002FVM evasion; **T1620** — reflective\u002Fin-memory loading (TEARDROP).\n- Operational hallmark: **residential-proxy \u002F \"TOR-like\" rotating egress** to defeat IOC- and geo-based detection.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1110.003** — Password spraying (low-and-slow, distributed proxies).\n- **T1003.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .006** — LSASS dumping, NTDS.dit theft, and **DCSync**.\n- **T1558.003** — Kerberoasting.\n- **T1606.001 \u002F .002** — Forge web cookies and **forge SAML tokens (\"Golden SAML\")** using a stolen ADFS token-signing certificate.\n- **T1528** — Steal application access tokens; **T1539** — steal web session cookies; **T1621** — MFA request generation (push bombing\u002Ffatigue).\n- **T1555.003** — Credentials from browsers; **T1649** — steal\u002Fforge authentication certificates.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.002 \u002F .004** — Domain and **cloud** account discovery; **T1018** — remote system discovery.\n- **T1482** — Domain-trust discovery; **T1069.002** — domain group discovery.\n- **T1526** — Cloud service discovery; **T1538** — cloud service dashboard enumeration.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001 \u002F .006 \u002F .007** — RDP, WinRM, and **cloud services** (e.g., Exchange Online via OAuth app).\n- **T1550.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003** — Use of alternate auth material: **application access tokens**, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket.\n- **T1570** — Lateral tool transfer.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1114.002** — Remote email collection (cloud mailboxes, the SolarWinds and Midnight Blizzard objective).\n- **T1213** — Data from information repositories; **T1530** — data from cloud storage.\n- **T1560.001** — Archive collected data via utility before exfil.\n\n### Command & Control\n- **T1071.001 \u002F .004** — Web (HTTPS) and DNS C2; **T1102.002** — bidirectional web-service C2 (HAMMERTOSS used Twitter\u002FGitHub\u002Fcloud storage as dead-drops).\n- **T1573.002** — Asymmetric encrypted channels; **T1568** — dynamic resolution; **T1090.004** — domain fronting.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- **T1041** — Exfiltration over C2 channel.\n- **T1567.002** — Exfiltration to cloud storage.\n- **T1048** — Exfiltration over alternative protocol.\n\n### Impact\n- APT29 is an **espionage** actor; it deliberately avoids destructive impact. The \"impact\" of an APT29 operation is confidentiality loss (mass mailbox and document theft) and durable strategic access, not data destruction or ransom.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **Custom backdoors \u002F implants (custom):** SUNBURST (S0559), TEARDROP (S0560), RAINDROP, GoldMax\u002FSUNSHUTTLE (S0588), GoldFinder (S0597), Sibot, BoomBox (S0635), EnvyScout (S0634), FoggyWeb (S0661), MagicWeb, GraphicalProton, WellMess, WellMail, the \"Duke\" family (MiniDuke, CosmicDuke S0050, CozyCar S0046, SeaDuke, HAMMERTOSS S0037, PolyglotDuke, RegDuke, FatDuke S0512, LiteDuke S0513, GeminiDuke S0049, CloudDuke S0054), POSHSPY, SUNSPOT (build-process implant).\n- **Identity \u002F cloud tooling (custom + public):** AADInternals (S0677) for Entra ID \u002F federation abuse and SAML-token operations; custom .NET utilities to extract ADFS token-signing certificates for Golden SAML.\n- **Commodity \u002F dual-use (public):** Cobalt Strike (S0154) BEACON, Impacket (S0357), Mimikatz, BloodHound (S0521), AdFind (S0552), sdelete, ipconfig (S0100), and other living-off-the-land binaries.\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n> **Authorized use only.** Execute these TTPs strictly within the documented rules of engagement, target scope, and time window of a signed authorization. Do not touch out-of-scope tenants, accounts, or third parties.\n\nEmulate APT29's *style*, not just its techniques: be patient, quiet, and identity-centric. Prefer valid credentials and cloud\u002FOAuth paths over noisy malware; rotate egress; clean up artifacts.\n\n- **Initial access (T1566.x, T1190, T1110.003):** Use the **bash** tool and phishing\u002Fpayload tooling to stage HTML-smuggling lures mirroring EnvyScout, and exercise the **defense-evasion** skill to package droppers. For cloud-first emulation, run **low-and-slow password spraying** via the **cloud** skill against in-scope test\u002Fdormant identities — small attempt counts, spread over time, sourced from approved rotating\u002Fproxy egress to mimic residential infrastructure.\n- **Supply-chain & trusted-relationship (T1195.002, T1199):** Where the engagement authorizes a build-pipeline or vendor-trust scenario, use the **bash**\u002FCI tooling to plant a benign marker in a build artifact to validate that build-integrity and downstream-trust controls fire — never ship a real backdoor to production.\n- **Execution & C2 (T1059.001, T1071.001, T1573.002, T1090.004):** Use the **c2\u002Fsliver** skill as the BEACON\u002FTEARDROP analogue — HTTPS beacons with long jitter, asymmetric encryption, optional domain-fronting\u002Fredirector chains, and DNS fallback to reproduce APT29's encrypted, resilient C2.\n- **Credential access & identity abuse (T1003.006, T1558.003, T1606.002, T1528, T1550.001):** Use the **AD skills** to demonstrate DCSync, Kerberoasting, and NTDS extraction in scope; use the **cloud** skill (Entra ID \u002F AADInternals-style workflows) to emulate **Golden SAML** token forging from a captured\u002Flab signing certificate, OAuth application-token theft, and consent-grant abuse — the defining Midnight Blizzard play.\n- **Persistence (T1098.x, T1136.003, T1484.002):** Via the **cloud** skill, register a controlled service principal \u002F OAuth app, add credentials to it, grant a scoped mailbox\u002FGraph permission, and (where authorized) add a federated trust — then verify the blue cell detects the new app, consent grant, and federation change.\n- **Lateral movement & collection (T1021.007, T1550.x, T1114.002):** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for pass-the-ticket\u002Ftoken reuse on-prem, and the **cloud** skill to pivot into Exchange Online via the consented app and perform scoped mailbox collection that mirrors the real objective.\n- **Defense evasion & exfil (T1070.x, T1620, T1567.002):** Use the **defense-evasion** skill for in-memory loading, timestomping, and log\u002Fmailbox-artifact cleanup, and stage scoped exfiltration to an approved cloud-storage endpoint to test DLP and egress monitoring.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Identity is the control plane.** Enforce phishing-resistant **MFA** on *every* account including legacy\u002Fservice\u002Ftest tenants; eliminate dormant accounts; apply conditional access and block legacy auth. The Midnight Blizzard root cause was an MFA-less legacy tenant (mitigates T1110.003, T1078.004).\n- **Password spray \u002F brute force (T1110.003):** Alert on many accounts × few attempts from rotating IPs; correlate residential-proxy \u002F ASN-anomalous sign-ins rather than relying on per-IP IOCs.\n- **OAuth & consent abuse (T1528, T1098.001\u002F.003, T1550.001):** Audit and alert on new\u002Fover-privileged OAuth app registrations and consent grants — especially `full_access_as_app`, `ApplicationImpersonation`, and Graph mail scopes; review credentials added to service principals; use Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps \u002F Entra ID Protection anomaly detection.\n- **Federation & Golden SAML (T1606.002, T1484.002, T1556.007):** Protect and monitor the ADFS\u002FEntra token-signing certificate; alert on new federated domains\u002Ftrusts and on tokens minted outside the IdP; review `Set-MSOLDomainAuthentication`-equivalent changes.\n- **On-prem credential theft (T1003.006, T1558.003):** Monitor for DCSync (non-DC replication requests), LSASS access, NTDS.dit copy, and Kerberoasting; restrict Domain Admin and replication rights.\n- **Supply chain (T1195.002, T1199):** Enforce build-pipeline integrity, code-signing verification, and least-privilege for vendor\u002FCSP delegated access; monitor partner\u002Fdelegated-admin activity.\n- **C2 & exfil (T1071.001, T1090.004, T1567.002, T1041):** Inspect TLS for domain-fronting and anomalous SNI\u002Fhost mismatches; baseline DNS; apply DLP and egress controls on cloud-storage uploads and bulk mailbox export (`MailItemsAccessed`\u002FEWS audit).\n- **Anti-forensics (T1070.004\u002F.006\u002F.008):** Centralize and protect logs (mailbox-audit, unified audit, Sysmon, EDR) with off-host retention so APT29's file deletion, timestomping, and mailbox-data clearing cannot blind the responder.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — APT29 (G0016): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F\n- MITRE ATT&CK — SolarWinds Compromise (Campaign C0024): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fcampaigns\u002FC0024\u002F\n- CISA AA24-057A — SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-057a\n- CISA AA23-347A — Russian SVR Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE-2023-42793 Globally: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-347a\n- Microsoft MSRC — Microsoft Actions Following Attack by Nation State Actor Midnight Blizzard: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fmsrc\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002Fmicrosoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard\n- Microsoft Security Blog — Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attack: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002F25\u002Fmidnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack\u002F\n- NCSC — Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ncsc.gov.uk\u002Fnews\u002Fadvisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — SUNBURST backdoor SolarWinds supply-chain compromise: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fevasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — UNC2452 Merged into APT29: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Func2452-merged-into-apt29\n","# APT29 (Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes) — Adversary Emulation Profile\n\nAPT29 (MITRE ATT&CK **G0016**; also tracked as Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, CozyDuke, UNC2452, Dark Halo, NobleBaron, YTTRIUM, Blue Kitsune, IRON RITUAL\u002FIRON HEMLOCK) is a Russian state-sponsored cyber-espionage group attributed by multiple governments to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Active since at least 2008, it is among the most operationally disciplined intrusion sets on record: it favors patient, stealthy, long-dwell access against high-value strategic targets, custom and living-off-the-land tooling, rigorous operational security (residential-proxy infrastructure, anti-forensic indicator removal, low-and-slow authentication attacks), and a sustained pivot toward cloud and identity-plane attacks (Microsoft 365 \u002F Entra ID, OAuth, federation). It is best known for the 2015–2016 DNC intrusion, the 2020 SolarWinds Orion supply-chain compromise, and the 2024 Microsoft corporate-email breach. This profile teaches Decepticon to emulate APT29's signature TTPs so an authorized red team can exercise the blue cell against a realistic, identity-and-cloud-centric espionage adversary.\n\n## Attribution & motivation\n\n- **Suspected sponsor \u002F nation:** Russian Federation — Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, **SVR**). Attribution is publicly asserted by the U.S. government (CISA\u002FFBI\u002FNSA), the UK NCSC, Canada's CSE, and corroborated by vendor reporting (Mandiant\u002FGoogle, Microsoft, CrowdStrike).\n- **Motivation:** Strategic **espionage** — collection of foreign-policy, diplomatic, defense, government, and technology intelligence in support of Russian state interests. APT29 is not financially motivated and is not primarily a destructive actor; its goal is durable, covert access and exfiltration of intelligence, not disruption.\n- **Confidence:** **High** for SVR attribution — it is the consensus of multiple Five Eyes governments and independent commercial vendors, reinforced by consistent tradecraft across a decade-plus of operations.\n\n## Targeting\n\n- **Sectors:** National governments and foreign ministries, diplomatic missions\u002Fembassies, think tanks and policy research institutes, defense and military organizations, IT and managed\u002Fcloud service providers (used as a stepping stone to downstream victims), technology companies, healthcare\u002Fpharmaceutical and vaccine research (2020), and aviation\u002Feducation\u002Flaw enforcement (post-SolarWinds expansion).\n- **Regions:** Primarily NATO and Western-aligned states — United States, United Kingdom, Europe broadly, and other governments of intelligence interest to Russia.\n- **Victim profile:** Organizations holding information of strategic value to Russian foreign policy and security. APT29 frequently exploits **trusted relationships** (T1199) — compromising cloud solution providers, MSPs, and software vendors to reach the ultimate intelligence target downstream.\n\n## Notable campaigns\n\n- **2008–2018 — \"The Dukes\" espionage operations.** Long-running campaigns against Western governments and think tanks using the MiniDuke\u002FCosmicDuke\u002FCozyDuke\u002FSeaDuke\u002FHAMMERTOSS toolset. (MITRE ATT&CK G0016: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F)\n- **2015–2016 — U.S. Democratic National Committee (DNC) compromise.** Spearphishing-led intrusion attributed to APT29 alongside APT28. (MITRE ATT&CK G0016: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F)\n- **2020 — COVID-19 vaccine research targeting (WellMess \u002F WellMail).** NCSC\u002FCSE\u002FCISA\u002FNSA joint advisory (16 July 2020) detailed APT29 targeting vaccine-development organizations in the UK, US, and Canada, exploiting internet-facing CVEs (Citrix, Pulse Secure, FortiGate, Zimbra), spearphishing for credentials, and deploying the WellMess and WellMail implants. (NCSC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ncsc.gov.uk\u002Fnews\u002Fadvisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development)\n- **Aug 2019 – Jan 2021 — SolarWinds Orion supply-chain compromise (ATT&CK Campaign C0024; UNC2452\u002F\"SolarStorm\"; SUNBURST).** APT29 trojanized SolarWinds Orion updates (versions 2019.4–2020.2.1), reaching ~18,000 organizations, then selectively deployed TEARDROP\u002FRAINDROP loaders for Cobalt Strike and forged SAML tokens (\"Golden SAML\") to access Microsoft 365 and Azure AD. Publicly disclosed 13 December 2020. (MITRE C0024: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fcampaigns\u002FC0024\u002F ; Mandiant\u002FGoogle: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fevasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor)\n- **Since Sept 2023 — JetBrains TeamCity exploitation (CVE-2023-42793).** FBI\u002FCISA\u002FNSA\u002FNCSC\u002FPolish SKW joint advisory (AA23-347A) attributed large-scale exploitation of the TeamCity authentication-bypass flaw to the SVR, deploying the GraphicalProton backdoor for follow-on espionage and software supply-chain positioning. (CISA AA23-347A: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-347a)\n- **Nov 2023 – Jan 2024 — Microsoft corporate email breach (\"Midnight Blizzard\").** Password-spray (from residential proxies) against a legacy non-production test tenant account lacking MFA; abuse of a legacy test **OAuth** application granted the Exchange Online `full_access_as_app` role to read corporate mailboxes (incl. senior leadership). Detected 12 Jan 2024. (Microsoft MSRC: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fmsrc\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002Fmicrosoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard ; Microsoft Security: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002F25\u002Fmidnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack\u002F)\n- **Feb 2024 — CISA AA24-057A \"SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access.\"** Documented the group's shift to cloud\u002Fidentity initial access: password spraying, brute force, exploitation of dormant\u002Fservice accounts, token theft, MFA fatigue\u002Fbombing, and device-registration persistence. (CISA AA24-057A: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-057a)\n\n## TTPs by ATT&CK tactic\n\n### Initial Access\n- **T1566.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003** — Spearphishing via attachment, link, and trusted service; HTML-smuggling lures (e.g., EnvyScout) deliver droppers.\n- **T1190** — Exploit public-facing applications, including CVE-2023-42793 (JetBrains TeamCity) and 2020 edge appliance CVEs (Citrix, Pulse Secure, FortiGate, Zimbra).\n- **T1195.002** — Software supply-chain compromise (trojanized SolarWinds Orion builds → SUNBURST).\n- **T1199** — Trusted-relationship abuse: compromise of cloud solution providers, MSPs, and vendors to reach downstream victims.\n- **T1133** — External remote services \u002F valid-account access to VPNs and remote portals.\n- **T1078 \u002F .004** — Valid accounts, especially **cloud accounts** (compromised O365\u002FEntra admins, dormant test tenants).\n\n### Execution\n- **T1059.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .005 \u002F .009** — PowerShell, Windows command shell, VBScript, and **Cloud API** execution.\n- **T1204.001 \u002F .002** — User execution of malicious links and files.\n- **T1106** — Native API; **T1047** — WMI; **T1569.002** — service execution.\n\n### Persistence\n- **T1547.001** — Registry Run keys \u002F Startup folder; **T1546.003** — WMI event subscription.\n- **T1053.005** — Scheduled tasks.\n- **T1098.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003 \u002F .005** — Cloud account manipulation: add credentials to service principals\u002FOAuth apps, grant additional email-delegate and cloud-role permissions, and register attacker devices.\n- **T1136.003** — Create new cloud accounts; **T1556.007** — modify hybrid-identity authentication.\n- **T1505.003** — Web shells; **T1543.003** — Windows service.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n- **T1068** — Exploitation for privilege escalation; **T1548.002** — UAC bypass.\n- **T1484.002** — Domain\u002Ftenant trust modification (add federated IdP \u002F trusted domain to mint tokens).\n\n### Defense Evasion\n- **T1027.006** — HTML smuggling; **T1027.002** — software packing.\n- **T1036.005** — Match legitimate name\u002Flocation; **T1218.011** — rundll32 proxy execution.\n- **T1070.004 \u002F .006 \u002F .008** — File deletion (sdelete), timestomp, and **clear mailbox data**.\n- **T1553.002** — Code signing with valid\u002Fabused certificates; **T1497** — sandbox\u002FVM evasion; **T1620** — reflective\u002Fin-memory loading (TEARDROP).\n- Operational hallmark: **residential-proxy \u002F \"TOR-like\" rotating egress** to defeat IOC- and geo-based detection.\n\n### Credential Access\n- **T1110.003** — Password spraying (low-and-slow, distributed proxies).\n- **T1003.001 \u002F .003 \u002F .006** — LSASS dumping, NTDS.dit theft, and **DCSync**.\n- **T1558.003** — Kerberoasting.\n- **T1606.001 \u002F .002** — Forge web cookies and **forge SAML tokens (\"Golden SAML\")** using a stolen ADFS token-signing certificate.\n- **T1528** — Steal application access tokens; **T1539** — steal web session cookies; **T1621** — MFA request generation (push bombing\u002Ffatigue).\n- **T1555.003** — Credentials from browsers; **T1649** — steal\u002Fforge authentication certificates.\n\n### Discovery\n- **T1087.002 \u002F .004** — Domain and **cloud** account discovery; **T1018** — remote system discovery.\n- **T1482** — Domain-trust discovery; **T1069.002** — domain group discovery.\n- **T1526** — Cloud service discovery; **T1538** — cloud service dashboard enumeration.\n\n### Lateral Movement\n- **T1021.001 \u002F .006 \u002F .007** — RDP, WinRM, and **cloud services** (e.g., Exchange Online via OAuth app).\n- **T1550.001 \u002F .002 \u002F .003** — Use of alternate auth material: **application access tokens**, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket.\n- **T1570** — Lateral tool transfer.\n\n### Collection\n- **T1114.002** — Remote email collection (cloud mailboxes, the SolarWinds and Midnight Blizzard objective).\n- **T1213** — Data from information repositories; **T1530** — data from cloud storage.\n- **T1560.001** — Archive collected data via utility before exfil.\n\n### Command & Control\n- **T1071.001 \u002F .004** — Web (HTTPS) and DNS C2; **T1102.002** — bidirectional web-service C2 (HAMMERTOSS used Twitter\u002FGitHub\u002Fcloud storage as dead-drops).\n- **T1573.002** — Asymmetric encrypted channels; **T1568** — dynamic resolution; **T1090.004** — domain fronting.\n\n### Exfiltration\n- **T1041** — Exfiltration over C2 channel.\n- **T1567.002** — Exfiltration to cloud storage.\n- **T1048** — Exfiltration over alternative protocol.\n\n### Impact\n- APT29 is an **espionage** actor; it deliberately avoids destructive impact. The \"impact\" of an APT29 operation is confidentiality loss (mass mailbox and document theft) and durable strategic access, not data destruction or ransom.\n\n## Signature tooling & malware\n\n- **Custom backdoors \u002F implants (custom):** SUNBURST (S0559), TEARDROP (S0560), RAINDROP, GoldMax\u002FSUNSHUTTLE (S0588), GoldFinder (S0597), Sibot, BoomBox (S0635), EnvyScout (S0634), FoggyWeb (S0661), MagicWeb, GraphicalProton, WellMess, WellMail, the \"Duke\" family (MiniDuke, CosmicDuke S0050, CozyCar S0046, SeaDuke, HAMMERTOSS S0037, PolyglotDuke, RegDuke, FatDuke S0512, LiteDuke S0513, GeminiDuke S0049, CloudDuke S0054), POSHSPY, SUNSPOT (build-process implant).\n- **Identity \u002F cloud tooling (custom + public):** AADInternals (S0677) for Entra ID \u002F federation abuse and SAML-token operations; custom .NET utilities to extract ADFS token-signing certificates for Golden SAML.\n- **Commodity \u002F dual-use (public):** Cobalt Strike (S0154) BEACON, Impacket (S0357), Mimikatz, BloodHound (S0521), AdFind (S0552), sdelete, ipconfig (S0100), and other living-off-the-land binaries.\n\n## Emulation guidance (Decepticon)\n\n> **Authorized use only.** Execute these TTPs strictly within the documented rules of engagement, target scope, and time window of a signed authorization. Do not touch out-of-scope tenants, accounts, or third parties.\n\nEmulate APT29's *style*, not just its techniques: be patient, quiet, and identity-centric. Prefer valid credentials and cloud\u002FOAuth paths over noisy malware; rotate egress; clean up artifacts.\n\n- **Initial access (T1566.x, T1190, T1110.003):** Use the **bash** tool and phishing\u002Fpayload tooling to stage HTML-smuggling lures mirroring EnvyScout, and exercise the **defense-evasion** skill to package droppers. For cloud-first emulation, run **low-and-slow password spraying** via the **cloud** skill against in-scope test\u002Fdormant identities — small attempt counts, spread over time, sourced from approved rotating\u002Fproxy egress to mimic residential infrastructure.\n- **Supply-chain & trusted-relationship (T1195.002, T1199):** Where the engagement authorizes a build-pipeline or vendor-trust scenario, use the **bash**\u002FCI tooling to plant a benign marker in a build artifact to validate that build-integrity and downstream-trust controls fire — never ship a real backdoor to production.\n- **Execution & C2 (T1059.001, T1071.001, T1573.002, T1090.004):** Use the **c2\u002Fsliver** skill as the BEACON\u002FTEARDROP analogue — HTTPS beacons with long jitter, asymmetric encryption, optional domain-fronting\u002Fredirector chains, and DNS fallback to reproduce APT29's encrypted, resilient C2.\n- **Credential access & identity abuse (T1003.006, T1558.003, T1606.002, T1528, T1550.001):** Use the **AD skills** to demonstrate DCSync, Kerberoasting, and NTDS extraction in scope; use the **cloud** skill (Entra ID \u002F AADInternals-style workflows) to emulate **Golden SAML** token forging from a captured\u002Flab signing certificate, OAuth application-token theft, and consent-grant abuse — the defining Midnight Blizzard play.\n- **Persistence (T1098.x, T1136.003, T1484.002):** Via the **cloud** skill, register a controlled service principal \u002F OAuth app, add credentials to it, grant a scoped mailbox\u002FGraph permission, and (where authorized) add a federated trust — then verify the blue cell detects the new app, consent grant, and federation change.\n- **Lateral movement & collection (T1021.007, T1550.x, T1114.002):** Use the **lateral-movement** skill for pass-the-ticket\u002Ftoken reuse on-prem, and the **cloud** skill to pivot into Exchange Online via the consented app and perform scoped mailbox collection that mirrors the real objective.\n- **Defense evasion & exfil (T1070.x, T1620, T1567.002):** Use the **defense-evasion** skill for in-memory loading, timestomping, and log\u002Fmailbox-artifact cleanup, and stage scoped exfiltration to an approved cloud-storage endpoint to test DLP and egress monitoring.\n\n## Detection & defense\n\n- **Identity is the control plane.** Enforce phishing-resistant **MFA** on *every* account including legacy\u002Fservice\u002Ftest tenants; eliminate dormant accounts; apply conditional access and block legacy auth. The Midnight Blizzard root cause was an MFA-less legacy tenant (mitigates T1110.003, T1078.004).\n- **Password spray \u002F brute force (T1110.003):** Alert on many accounts × few attempts from rotating IPs; correlate residential-proxy \u002F ASN-anomalous sign-ins rather than relying on per-IP IOCs.\n- **OAuth & consent abuse (T1528, T1098.001\u002F.003, T1550.001):** Audit and alert on new\u002Fover-privileged OAuth app registrations and consent grants — especially `full_access_as_app`, `ApplicationImpersonation`, and Graph mail scopes; review credentials added to service principals; use Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps \u002F Entra ID Protection anomaly detection.\n- **Federation & Golden SAML (T1606.002, T1484.002, T1556.007):** Protect and monitor the ADFS\u002FEntra token-signing certificate; alert on new federated domains\u002Ftrusts and on tokens minted outside the IdP; review `Set-MSOLDomainAuthentication`-equivalent changes.\n- **On-prem credential theft (T1003.006, T1558.003):** Monitor for DCSync (non-DC replication requests), LSASS access, NTDS.dit copy, and Kerberoasting; restrict Domain Admin and replication rights.\n- **Supply chain (T1195.002, T1199):** Enforce build-pipeline integrity, code-signing verification, and least-privilege for vendor\u002FCSP delegated access; monitor partner\u002Fdelegated-admin activity.\n- **C2 & exfil (T1071.001, T1090.004, T1567.002, T1041):** Inspect TLS for domain-fronting and anomalous SNI\u002Fhost mismatches; baseline DNS; apply DLP and egress controls on cloud-storage uploads and bulk mailbox export (`MailItemsAccessed`\u002FEWS audit).\n- **Anti-forensics (T1070.004\u002F.006\u002F.008):** Centralize and protect logs (mailbox-audit, unified audit, Sysmon, EDR) with off-host retention so APT29's file deletion, timestomping, and mailbox-data clearing cannot blind the responder.\n\n## Sources\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK — APT29 (G0016): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fgroups\u002FG0016\u002F\n- MITRE ATT&CK — SolarWinds Compromise (Campaign C0024): https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fcampaigns\u002FC0024\u002F\n- CISA AA24-057A — SVR Cyber Actors Adapt Tactics for Initial Cloud Access: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa24-057a\n- CISA AA23-347A — Russian SVR Exploiting JetBrains TeamCity CVE-2023-42793 Globally: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cisa.gov\u002Fnews-events\u002Fcybersecurity-advisories\u002Faa23-347a\n- Microsoft MSRC — Microsoft Actions Following Attack by Nation State Actor Midnight Blizzard: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fmsrc\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002Fmicrosoft-actions-following-attack-by-nation-state-actor-midnight-blizzard\n- Microsoft Security Blog — Midnight Blizzard: Guidance for responders on nation-state attack: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fsecurity\u002Fblog\u002F2024\u002F01\u002F25\u002Fmidnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack\u002F\n- NCSC — Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.ncsc.gov.uk\u002Fnews\u002Fadvisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — SUNBURST backdoor SolarWinds supply-chain compromise: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Fevasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor\n- Mandiant \u002F Google Cloud — UNC2452 Merged into APT29: https:\u002F\u002Fcloud.google.com\u002Fblog\u002Ftopics\u002Fthreat-intelligence\u002Func2452-merged-into-apt29\n",{"name":5,"metadata":24,"description":7,"allowed-tools":29},{"tags":25,"subdomain":26,"when_to_use":27,"mitre_attack":28},"apt29, cozy-bear, midnight-blizzard, nobelium, the-dukes, svr, russia, espionage, cloud-attack, golden-saml, oauth-abuse, supply-chain, password-spray, adversary-emulation, mitre-attack, G0016","adversary-emulation","APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, CozyDuke, UNC2452, Dark Halo, SVR, Russian state-sponsored espionage, SolarWinds emulation, golden SAML, OAuth abuse, password spray cloud access, supply chain compromise emulation, stealthy long-dwell APT emulation","T1595.002, T1589.001, T1598.003, T1566.001, T1566.002, T1566.003, T1190, T1195.002, T1199, T1133, T1078, T1078.002, T1078.003, T1078.004, T1204.001, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1059.003, T1059.005, T1059.009, T1106, T1053.005, T1047, T1569.002, T1547.001, T1546.003, T1098.001, T1098.002, T1098.003, T1098.005, T1136.003, T1556.007, T1505.003, T1543.003, T1068, T1548.002, T1484.002, T1027.006, T1027.002, T1036.005, T1070.004, T1070.006, T1070.008, T1218.011, T1553.002, T1497, T1620, T1110.003, T1003.003, T1003.006, T1003.001, T1558.003, T1606.001, T1606.002, T1528, T1539, T1621, T1555.003, T1649, T1087.002, T1087.004, T1018, T1482, T1526, T1538, T1069.002, T1021.001, T1021.006, T1021.007, T1550.001, T1550.002, T1550.003, T1570, T1114.002, T1213, T1530, T1560.001, T1071.001, T1071.004, T1573.002, T1090.004, T1568, T1102.002, T1041, T1567.002, T1048","Bash Read Write","main","42b918525fb79065e730da3da997bffb33fcd414","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt29-cozy-bear",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3","2026-07-22 19:02:27",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill apt29-cozy-bear",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill apt29-cozy-bear",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add 7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad --skill apt29-cozy-bear","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fshared\u002Fadversary-emulation\u002Fapt29-cozy-bear\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,59,66,73,80,87],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TNHEBA4Y67TJJ7W0KBDD","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TH79VR8XM7AAMG0ZKSXX","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":67,"name":68,"nameZh":6,"description":69,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":70,"categories":71,"keywords":72,"publishedAt":19},"01M798TD0E10ZHQN5X362M4HG9","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":74,"name":75,"nameZh":6,"description":76,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T7HFR3NB9WJTK1FESVF9","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":19},"01M798T38B4SV0T87VQK56KPHC","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M798SXTNF0RP1DXKQEWFVQ9H","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002F7ShIkI3\u002FDecepticon-x-DarkTriad\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]