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Use when SOC teams need early warning of lateral movement, credential abuse, or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing traps across the network.","jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","jukeyman","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F142960420?v=4","01M78FR4Y3DHMMCBCC0GXXNB3F","RICK JEFFERSON","01M78FR4Z8RVQRAD31Y5J7V6EB",1,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: performing-deception-technology-deployment\ndescription: >\n  Deploys deception technology including honeypots, honeytokens, and decoy systems to detect\n  attackers who have bypassed perimeter defenses, providing high-fidelity alerts with near-zero\n  false positive rates. Use when SOC teams need early warning of lateral movement, credential abuse,\n  or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing traps across the network.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags: [soc, deception, honeypot, honeytoken, canary, lateral-movement, detection]\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n# Performing Deception Technology Deployment\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need high-fidelity detection of post-compromise lateral movement with near-zero false positives\n- Existing detection tools miss advanced attackers who avoid triggering threshold-based alerts\n- The organization wants to detect credential abuse by planting fake credentials as honeytokens\n- Network segmentation gaps need compensating detection controls\n\n**Do not use** as a replacement for fundamental security controls (patching, EDR, network segmentation) — deception is a detection layer, not a prevention mechanism.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Network segments identified for honeypot\u002Fdecoy deployment (server VLANs, DMZ, OT networks)\n- Deception platform (Thinkst Canary, Attivo\u002FSentinelOne Hologram, or open-source alternatives)\n- SIEM integration for deception alerts (any interaction with deception assets is suspicious)\n- Active Directory access for honeytoken account and credential creation\n- Network team coordination for IP allocation and traffic routing\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Attack Surface for Deception Placement\n\nIdentify high-value network segments where attackers would traverse:\n\n```\nDECEPTION DEPLOYMENT MAP\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSegment              Decoy Type          Rationale\nServer VLAN          Fake file server    Attackers enumerate SMB shares during recon\nDatabase VLAN        Fake DB server      SQL scanning detected in past incidents\nAD\u002FDC Segment        Honeytoken account  Credential theft detection\nExecutive Subnet     Fake workstation    Targeted attacks pivot through exec systems\nDMZ                  Honeypot web app    External attacker detection\nOT Network           Fake PLC\u002FHMI        Industrial threat detection\nCloud (AWS VPC)      Canary EC2 + S3     Cloud lateral movement detection\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Thinkst Canary Devices\n\nConfigure Canary devices mimicking real infrastructure:\n\n**Windows File Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n  \"personality\": \"windows-server-2019\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"smb\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"shares\": [\"Finance_Backup\", \"HR_Archive\", \"IT_Docs\"],\n      \"files\": [\n        {\"name\": \"Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"employee_ssn_export.csv\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"admin_passwords.kdbx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"}\n      ]\n    },\n    \"rdp\": {\"enabled\": true},\n    \"http\": {\"enabled\": false}\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.5.200\",\n    \"hostname\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n    \"domain\": \"company.local\"\n  },\n  \"alert_webhook\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fsoar.company.com\u002Fapi\u002Fwebhook\u002Fcanary\"\n}\n```\n\n**Database Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"DB-ARCHIVE-02\",\n  \"personality\": \"linux-mysql\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"mysql\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 3306,\n      \"databases\": [\"customer_pii\", \"payment_archive\"],\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    },\n    \"ssh\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 22,\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    }\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.10.50\",\n    \"hostname\": \"db-archive-02\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Honeytokens in Active Directory\n\nCreate fake privileged accounts that should never be used:\n\n```powershell\n# Create honeytoken service account\nNew-ADUser -Name \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -UserPrincipalName \"svc_sql_backup@company.local\" `\n    -Description \"SQL Backup Service Account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString \"FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\" -AsPlainText -Force) `\n    -Enabled $true `\n    -PasswordNeverExpires $true `\n    -CannotChangePassword $true\n\n# Add to a group that looks attractive (but monitor for any use)\nAdd-ADGroupMember -Identity \"Domain Admins\" -Members \"svc_sql_backup\"\n\n# Place cached credentials on decoy workstation\n# (Mimikatz\u002Fcredential dumping will find these)\ncmdkey \u002Fadd:fileserver-bk04.company.local \u002Fuser:company\\svc_sql_backup \u002Fpass:FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\n```\n\n**Monitor honeytoken usage in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\nTargetUserName=\"svc_sql_backup\"\n| eval alert_severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval alert_message = \"HONEYTOKEN ACCOUNT USED — Likely credential theft detected\"\n| table _time, EventCode, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, Logon_Type, alert_message\n```\n\n### Step 4: Deploy Canary Files and Documents\n\nPlant tracked documents that beacon when opened:\n\n**Canary Document (Word doc with tracking):**\n```python\n# Using Thinkst Canary API to create a canary token document\nimport requests\n\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"doc-msword\",\n        \"memo\": \"Finance backup folder canary document\",\n        \"flock_id\": \"flock:default\"\n    }\n)\ntoken = response.json()\ndownload_url = token[\"canarytoken\"][\"canarytoken_url\"]\nprint(f\"Download canary doc: {download_url}\")\n# Place this document in honeypot SMB shares and sensitive directories\n```\n\n**AWS Canary Token (S3 access key):**\n```python\n# Create AWS canary token — alerts when access key is used\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"aws-id\",\n        \"memo\": \"Canary AWS key in developer laptop .aws\u002Fcredentials\"\n    }\n)\naws_keys = response.json()\nprint(f\"Access Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['access_key_id']}\")\nprint(f\"Secret Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['secret_access_key']}\")\n# Plant in .aws\u002Fcredentials on developer workstations\n```\n\n### Step 5: Integrate Deception Alerts with SIEM\u002FSOAR\n\nAll deception alerts are high-fidelity — any interaction is suspicious:\n\n**Splunk Alert for Canary Triggers:**\n```spl\nindex=canary sourcetype=\"canary:alerts\"\n| eval severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval confidence = \"HIGH — Deception asset triggered, zero false positive expected\"\n| table _time, canary_name, alert_type, source_ip, service, details\n| sendalert create_notable param.rule_title=\"Deception Alert — Canary Triggered\"\n  param.severity=\"critical\" param.drilldown_search=\"index=canary source_ip=$source_ip$\"\n```\n\n**SOAR Automated Response:**\n```python\ndef canary_triggered(container):\n    \"\"\"Auto-response for deception alerts — high confidence, no approval needed\"\"\"\n    source_ip = container[\"artifacts\"][0][\"cef\"][\"sourceAddress\"]\n\n    # Immediately isolate the source\n    phantom.act(\"quarantine device\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip_hostname\": source_ip}],\n                assets=[\"crowdstrike_prod\"],\n                name=\"isolate_attacker_host\")\n\n    # Block at firewall\n    phantom.act(\"block ip\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip\": source_ip, \"direction\": \"both\"}],\n                assets=[\"palo_alto_prod\"],\n                name=\"block_attacker_ip\")\n\n    # Create high-priority incident\n    phantom.act(\"create ticket\",\n                parameters=[{\n                    \"short_description\": f\"DECEPTION ALERT: Canary triggered from {source_ip}\",\n                    \"urgency\": \"1\",\n                    \"impact\": \"1\"\n                }],\n                assets=[\"servicenow_prod\"])\n\n    phantom.set_severity(container, \"critical\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Maintain Deception Realism\n\nRegularly update decoys to maintain believability:\n\n- Rotate honeytoken passwords quarterly (update cached credentials on decoy workstations)\n- Update canary file modification dates to appear recently accessed\n- Add realistic network traffic to honeypots (scheduled SMB enumeration, DNS lookups)\n- Register honeypot hostnames in DNS and Active Directory to appear in network scans\n- Update canary document contents to match current business context\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Honeypot** | Decoy system mimicking real infrastructure to attract and detect attackers in the network |\n| **Honeytoken** | Fake credential, file, or data record that triggers an alert when accessed or used |\n| **Canary** | Lightweight deception device or token that alerts on any interaction (Thinkst Canary platform) |\n| **Breadcrumb** | Planted artifact (cached credential, bookmark, config file) leading attackers to deception assets |\n| **High-Fidelity Alert** | Detection signal with near-zero false positive rate because no legitimate user should interact with deception assets |\n| **Decoy Network** | Set of interconnected honeypots simulating a realistic network segment to observe attacker TTPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Thinkst Canary**: Commercial deception platform offering hardware\u002Fvirtual canaries and canary tokens\n- **Canarytokens.org**: Free honeytoken generation service (DNS, HTTP, AWS keys, Word docs, SQL queries)\n- **Attivo Networks (SentinelOne)**: Enterprise deception platform with AD decoys and endpoint breadcrumbs\n- **HoneyDB**: Community honeypot data aggregation platform for threat intelligence sharing\n- **T-Pot**: Open-source multi-honeypot platform combining 20+ honeypot types in a Docker deployment\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Lateral Movement Detection**: Attacker enumerates SMB shares and accesses honeypot file server — immediate high-fidelity alert\n- **Credential Theft Discovery**: Mimikatz dumps honeytoken cached credentials — usage of fake account triggers alert\n- **Cloud Key Compromise**: Stolen AWS canary token used from external IP — detects supply chain or insider compromise\n- **Ransomware Early Warning**: Ransomware encrypts canary files on honeypot shares — early detection before production systems affected\n- **Insider Threat Signal**: Employee accesses honeypot \"salary database\" — indicates unauthorized data exploration\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDECEPTION ALERT — CRITICAL\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nTime:         2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC\nCanary:       FILESERVER-BK04 (10.0.5.200)\nService:      SMB — File share \"Finance_Backup\" accessed\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\nUser:         company\\jsmith\nFile Accessed: Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx (canary document)\n\nAlert Confidence: HIGH — No legitimate reason to access deception asset\nFalse Positive Likelihood: \u003C1%\n\nAutomated Response:\n  [DONE] WORKSTATION-042 isolated via CrowdStrike\n  [DONE] 192.168.1.105 blocked at firewall (bidirectional)\n  [DONE] Incident INC0012567 created (P1 — Critical)\n  [PENDING] Tier 2 investigation — determine if workstation compromised or insider threat\n```\n","# Performing Deception Technology Deployment\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need high-fidelity detection of post-compromise lateral movement with near-zero false positives\n- Existing detection tools miss advanced attackers who avoid triggering threshold-based alerts\n- The organization wants to detect credential abuse by planting fake credentials as honeytokens\n- Network segmentation gaps need compensating detection controls\n\n**Do not use** as a replacement for fundamental security controls (patching, EDR, network segmentation) — deception is a detection layer, not a prevention mechanism.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Network segments identified for honeypot\u002Fdecoy deployment (server VLANs, DMZ, OT networks)\n- Deception platform (Thinkst Canary, Attivo\u002FSentinelOne Hologram, or open-source alternatives)\n- SIEM integration for deception alerts (any interaction with deception assets is suspicious)\n- Active Directory access for honeytoken account and credential creation\n- Network team coordination for IP allocation and traffic routing\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Map Attack Surface for Deception Placement\n\nIdentify high-value network segments where attackers would traverse:\n\n```\nDECEPTION DEPLOYMENT MAP\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSegment              Decoy Type          Rationale\nServer VLAN          Fake file server    Attackers enumerate SMB shares during recon\nDatabase VLAN        Fake DB server      SQL scanning detected in past incidents\nAD\u002FDC Segment        Honeytoken account  Credential theft detection\nExecutive Subnet     Fake workstation    Targeted attacks pivot through exec systems\nDMZ                  Honeypot web app    External attacker detection\nOT Network           Fake PLC\u002FHMI        Industrial threat detection\nCloud (AWS VPC)      Canary EC2 + S3     Cloud lateral movement detection\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Thinkst Canary Devices\n\nConfigure Canary devices mimicking real infrastructure:\n\n**Windows File Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n  \"personality\": \"windows-server-2019\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"smb\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"shares\": [\"Finance_Backup\", \"HR_Archive\", \"IT_Docs\"],\n      \"files\": [\n        {\"name\": \"Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"employee_ssn_export.csv\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"},\n        {\"name\": \"admin_passwords.kdbx\", \"alert_on\": \"read\"}\n      ]\n    },\n    \"rdp\": {\"enabled\": true},\n    \"http\": {\"enabled\": false}\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.5.200\",\n    \"hostname\": \"FILESERVER-BK04\",\n    \"domain\": \"company.local\"\n  },\n  \"alert_webhook\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fsoar.company.com\u002Fapi\u002Fwebhook\u002Fcanary\"\n}\n```\n\n**Database Server Canary:**\n```json\n{\n  \"device_name\": \"DB-ARCHIVE-02\",\n  \"personality\": \"linux-mysql\",\n  \"services\": {\n    \"mysql\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 3306,\n      \"databases\": [\"customer_pii\", \"payment_archive\"],\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    },\n    \"ssh\": {\n      \"enabled\": true,\n      \"port\": 22,\n      \"alert_on_login_attempt\": true\n    }\n  },\n  \"network\": {\n    \"ip\": \"10.0.10.50\",\n    \"hostname\": \"db-archive-02\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Honeytokens in Active Directory\n\nCreate fake privileged accounts that should never be used:\n\n```powershell\n# Create honeytoken service account\nNew-ADUser -Name \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sql_backup\" `\n    -UserPrincipalName \"svc_sql_backup@company.local\" `\n    -Description \"SQL Backup Service Account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString \"FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\" -AsPlainText -Force) `\n    -Enabled $true `\n    -PasswordNeverExpires $true `\n    -CannotChangePassword $true\n\n# Add to a group that looks attractive (but monitor for any use)\nAdd-ADGroupMember -Identity \"Domain Admins\" -Members \"svc_sql_backup\"\n\n# Place cached credentials on decoy workstation\n# (Mimikatz\u002Fcredential dumping will find these)\ncmdkey \u002Fadd:fileserver-bk04.company.local \u002Fuser:company\\svc_sql_backup \u002Fpass:FakeP@ssw0rd2024!\n```\n\n**Monitor honeytoken usage in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4648 OR EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\nTargetUserName=\"svc_sql_backup\"\n| eval alert_severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval alert_message = \"HONEYTOKEN ACCOUNT USED — Likely credential theft detected\"\n| table _time, EventCode, src_ip, ComputerName, TargetUserName, Logon_Type, alert_message\n```\n\n### Step 4: Deploy Canary Files and Documents\n\nPlant tracked documents that beacon when opened:\n\n**Canary Document (Word doc with tracking):**\n```python\n# Using Thinkst Canary API to create a canary token document\nimport requests\n\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"doc-msword\",\n        \"memo\": \"Finance backup folder canary document\",\n        \"flock_id\": \"flock:default\"\n    }\n)\ntoken = response.json()\ndownload_url = token[\"canarytoken\"][\"canarytoken_url\"]\nprint(f\"Download canary doc: {download_url}\")\n# Place this document in honeypot SMB shares and sensitive directories\n```\n\n**AWS Canary Token (S3 access key):**\n```python\n# Create AWS canary token — alerts when access key is used\nresponse = requests.post(\n    \"https:\u002F\u002FYOURCOMPANY.canary.tools\u002Fapi\u002Fv1\u002Fcanarytoken\u002Fcreate\",\n    data={\n        \"auth_token\": \"YOUR_API_TOKEN\",\n        \"kind\": \"aws-id\",\n        \"memo\": \"Canary AWS key in developer laptop .aws\u002Fcredentials\"\n    }\n)\naws_keys = response.json()\nprint(f\"Access Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['access_key_id']}\")\nprint(f\"Secret Key: {aws_keys['canarytoken']['secret_access_key']}\")\n# Plant in .aws\u002Fcredentials on developer workstations\n```\n\n### Step 5: Integrate Deception Alerts with SIEM\u002FSOAR\n\nAll deception alerts are high-fidelity — any interaction is suspicious:\n\n**Splunk Alert for Canary Triggers:**\n```spl\nindex=canary sourcetype=\"canary:alerts\"\n| eval severity = \"CRITICAL\"\n| eval confidence = \"HIGH — Deception asset triggered, zero false positive expected\"\n| table _time, canary_name, alert_type, source_ip, service, details\n| sendalert create_notable param.rule_title=\"Deception Alert — Canary Triggered\"\n  param.severity=\"critical\" param.drilldown_search=\"index=canary source_ip=$source_ip$\"\n```\n\n**SOAR Automated Response:**\n```python\ndef canary_triggered(container):\n    \"\"\"Auto-response for deception alerts — high confidence, no approval needed\"\"\"\n    source_ip = container[\"artifacts\"][0][\"cef\"][\"sourceAddress\"]\n\n    # Immediately isolate the source\n    phantom.act(\"quarantine device\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip_hostname\": source_ip}],\n                assets=[\"crowdstrike_prod\"],\n                name=\"isolate_attacker_host\")\n\n    # Block at firewall\n    phantom.act(\"block ip\",\n                parameters=[{\"ip\": source_ip, \"direction\": \"both\"}],\n                assets=[\"palo_alto_prod\"],\n                name=\"block_attacker_ip\")\n\n    # Create high-priority incident\n    phantom.act(\"create ticket\",\n                parameters=[{\n                    \"short_description\": f\"DECEPTION ALERT: Canary triggered from {source_ip}\",\n                    \"urgency\": \"1\",\n                    \"impact\": \"1\"\n                }],\n                assets=[\"servicenow_prod\"])\n\n    phantom.set_severity(container, \"critical\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Maintain Deception Realism\n\nRegularly update decoys to maintain believability:\n\n- Rotate honeytoken passwords quarterly (update cached credentials on decoy workstations)\n- Update canary file modification dates to appear recently accessed\n- Add realistic network traffic to honeypots (scheduled SMB enumeration, DNS lookups)\n- Register honeypot hostnames in DNS and Active Directory to appear in network scans\n- Update canary document contents to match current business context\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Honeypot** | Decoy system mimicking real infrastructure to attract and detect attackers in the network |\n| **Honeytoken** | Fake credential, file, or data record that triggers an alert when accessed or used |\n| **Canary** | Lightweight deception device or token that alerts on any interaction (Thinkst Canary platform) |\n| **Breadcrumb** | Planted artifact (cached credential, bookmark, config file) leading attackers to deception assets |\n| **High-Fidelity Alert** | Detection signal with near-zero false positive rate because no legitimate user should interact with deception assets |\n| **Decoy Network** | Set of interconnected honeypots simulating a realistic network segment to observe attacker TTPs |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Thinkst Canary**: Commercial deception platform offering hardware\u002Fvirtual canaries and canary tokens\n- **Canarytokens.org**: Free honeytoken generation service (DNS, HTTP, AWS keys, Word docs, SQL queries)\n- **Attivo Networks (SentinelOne)**: Enterprise deception platform with AD decoys and endpoint breadcrumbs\n- **HoneyDB**: Community honeypot data aggregation platform for threat intelligence sharing\n- **T-Pot**: Open-source multi-honeypot platform combining 20+ honeypot types in a Docker deployment\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Lateral Movement Detection**: Attacker enumerates SMB shares and accesses honeypot file server — immediate high-fidelity alert\n- **Credential Theft Discovery**: Mimikatz dumps honeytoken cached credentials — usage of fake account triggers alert\n- **Cloud Key Compromise**: Stolen AWS canary token used from external IP — detects supply chain or insider compromise\n- **Ransomware Early Warning**: Ransomware encrypts canary files on honeypot shares — early detection before production systems affected\n- **Insider Threat Signal**: Employee accesses honeypot \"salary database\" — indicates unauthorized data exploration\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDECEPTION ALERT — CRITICAL\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nTime:         2024-03-15 14:23:07 UTC\nCanary:       FILESERVER-BK04 (10.0.5.200)\nService:      SMB — File share \"Finance_Backup\" accessed\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\nUser:         company\\jsmith\nFile Accessed: Q4_Revenue_2024.xlsx (canary document)\n\nAlert Confidence: HIGH — No legitimate reason to access deception asset\nFalse Positive Likelihood: \u003C1%\n\nAutomated Response:\n  [DONE] WORKSTATION-042 isolated via CrowdStrike\n  [DONE] 192.168.1.105 blocked at firewall (bidirectional)\n  [DONE] Incident INC0012567 created (P1 — Critical)\n  [PENDING] Tier 2 investigation — determine if workstation compromised or insider threat\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"subdomain":36,"description":37},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"soc","deception","honeypot","honeytoken","canary","lateral-movement","detection","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0","soc-operations","Deploys deception technology including honeypots, honeytokens, and decoy systems to detect attackers who have bypassed perimeter defenses, providing high-fidelity alerts with near-zero false positive rates. Use when SOC teams need early warning of lateral movement, credential abuse, or internal reconnaissance by deploying convincing traps across the network.\n","main","99825ad3f3bcc6597ddcc7294a14e6e922f2b67b","skills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman","https:\u002F\u002FRJBUSINESSSOLUTIONS.ORG","Credit and Finance Expert | Developer\r\n\r\nI'm Rick Jefferson, a seasoned credit and finance expert with over a decade of experience in financial literacy,","2026-07-13 07:03:29",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill performing-deception-technology-deployment","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002FSKILL.md",true,[61,65,71],{"path":62,"resourceType":62,"resourceTypeDesc":63,"sizeBytes":64,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":66,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2160,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":72,"resourceType":73,"resourceTypeDesc":74,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7774,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fperforming-deception-technology-deployment\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[78,86,93,100,107,115],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":20},"01M79ANS2SM329NEP5ZCX106RR","zustand-store-creator","Create zustand store creator operations. Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category. Use when working with zustand store creator functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"zustand store creator\", \"zustand creator\", \"zustand\".","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMZKP4YDEZ7EHG1Y7PP74","zero-trust-config-helper","Configure with zero trust config helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"zero trust config helper\", \"zero helper\", \"zero\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":94,"name":95,"nameZh":6,"description":96,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMJSBCEJQNBTYNAHYN5HM","zapier-integration-helper","Assist with zapier integration helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category. Use when working with APIs or building integrations. Trigger with phrases like \"zapier integration helper\", \"zapier helper\", \"zapier\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":101,"name":102,"nameZh":6,"description":103,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":104,"categories":105,"keywords":106,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHJZGVMARS13VFQYRR1MP","yaml-config-validator","Validate yaml config validator operations. Auto-activating skill for DevOps Basics.\nTriggers on: yaml config validator, yaml config validator\nPart of the DevOps Basics skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"yaml config validator\", \"yaml validator\", \"yaml\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fyaml-config-validator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":111,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHGDZRN0020RDQSQDPAM8","xvary-stock-research","Thesis-driven equity analysis from public SEC EDGAR and market data; \u002Fanalyze, \u002Fscore, \u002Fcompare workflows with bundled Python tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHCYJ9FV9RMHQ24HDRN33","xss-vulnerability-scanner","Scan xss vulnerability scanner operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Fundamentals.\nTriggers on: xss vulnerability scanner, xss vulnerability scanner\nPart of the Security Fundamentals skill category. Use when working with xss vulnerability scanner functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"xss vulnerability scanner\", \"xss scanner\", \"xss\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxss-vulnerability-scanner\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]