[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78M2R09FFTBDFMM115PZRPG":3,"skill-same:01M78M2R09FFTBDFMM115PZRPG":81},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":38,"commitSha":39,"skillDirectory":40,"forksCount":41,"repositoryHtmlUrl":42,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":43,"ownerBlogUrl":44,"ownerDescription":45,"updatedAt":46,"install":47,"resources":60},"01M78M2R09FFTBDFMM115PZRPG","deploying-active-directory-honeytokens",null,"Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.","jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","jukeyman","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F142960420?v=4","01M78FR4Y3DHMMCBCC0GXXNB3F","RICK JEFFERSON","01M78FR4Z8RVQRAD31Y5J7V6EB",1,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: deploying-active-directory-honeytokens\ndescription: >\n  Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts\n  with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with\n  cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625,\n  4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for\n  detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: deception-technology\ntags: [active-directory, honeytokens, kerberoasting, deception, detection, bloodhound, gpo]\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: mukul975\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n\n# Deploying Active Directory Honeytokens\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying deception-based detection in Active Directory environments\n- When detecting Kerberoasting attacks via fake SPN honeytokens (honeyroasting)\n- When creating tripwire accounts to detect credential theft and lateral movement\n- When building decoy GPOs to detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting\n- When creating deceptive BloodHound paths to misdirect and detect attackers\n- When supplementing existing AD monitoring with high-fidelity detection signals\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Domain Admin or delegated AD administration privileges\n- Active Directory domain (Windows Server 2016+ recommended)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic)\n- PowerShell 5.1+ with ActiveDirectory module\n- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)\n- Understanding of AD security, Kerberos, and BloodHound attack paths\n\n## Background\n\n### Why AD Honeytokens\n\nTraditional signature-based detection misses novel attack techniques. Honeytokens\nprovide high-fidelity detection with near-zero false positives because any interaction\nwith a decoy object is inherently suspicious. In Active Directory:\n\n- **Fake privileged accounts** detect credential dumping (DCSync, NTDS.dit extraction)\n- **Fake SPNs** detect Kerberoasting reconnaissance (TGS requests for nonexistent services)\n- **Decoy GPOs** detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting\n- **Fake BloodHound paths** mislead attackers using graph-based AD analysis\n\n### Key Detection Event IDs\n\n| Event ID | Description | Honeytoken Use |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| 4769 | Kerberos TGS ticket requested | Detect Kerberoast against honey SPN |\n| 4625 | Failed logon attempt | Detect use of fake credentials from decoy GPO |\n| 4662 | Directory service object accessed | Detect DACL read on honeytoken user |\n| 5136 | Directory service object modified | Detect modification of decoy GPO |\n| 5137 | Directory service object created | Detect GPO creation mimicking decoy |\n| 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Detect AS-REP roasting of honey account |\n\n### Making Honeytokens Realistic\n\nPer Trimarc Security research, effective honeytokens must appear legitimate:\n\n- **Age the account**: Repurpose old inactive accounts (10-15 year old accounts in\n  similarly aged domains appear authentic)\n- **Set AdminCount=1**: Flags the account as having elevated AD rights, making it\n  an attractive Kerberoasting target\n- **Use realistic naming**: Match organizational naming conventions (svc_sqlbackup,\n  admin.maintenance, svc_exchange_legacy)\n- **Set old password date**: Password age of 10+ years with an SPN looks like a\n  high-value, neglected service account to attackers\n- **Add group memberships**: Place in visible groups like \"Remote Desktop Users\" or\n  a custom \"Backup Operators\" to increase attacker interest\n- **Avoid detection tells**: Attackers check creation date vs. last logon vs.\n  password change date for consistency\n\n## Instructions\n\n### Step 1: Deploy Fake Privileged Admin Account\n\nCreate a honeytoken account that mimics a legacy privileged service account.\n\n```powershell\n# Import the deployment module\nImport-Module .\\scripts\\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1\n\n# Create a honeytoken admin account\n$honeyAdmin = New-HoneytokenAdmin `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -DisplayName \"SQL Backup Service (Legacy)\" `\n    -Description \"Legacy SQL Server backup service account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -OU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\" `\n    -PasswordLength 128 `\n    -SetAdminCount $true\n\nWrite-Host \"Honeytoken admin created: $($honeyAdmin.DistinguishedName)\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Fake SPN for Kerberoasting Detection\n\nAssign a realistic but fake SPN to the honeytoken account. Any TGS request\nfor this SPN is definitively malicious (honeyroasting).\n\n```powershell\n# Add fake SPN to honeytoken account\n$honeySPN = Add-HoneytokenSPN `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -ServiceClass \"MSSQLSvc\" `\n    -Hostname \"sql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com\" `\n    -Port 1433\n\nWrite-Host \"Honey SPN registered: $($honeySPN.SPN)\"\nWrite-Host \"Monitor Event ID 4769 for TGS requests targeting this SPN\"\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Decoy GPO with Credential Trap\n\nCreate a fake GPO in SYSVOL with an embedded cpassword (Group Policy Preference\npassword). Attackers using tools like Get-GPPPassword or gpp-decrypt will find\nand attempt to use these credentials, triggering detection.\n\n```powershell\n# Create decoy GPO with cpassword trap\n$decoyGPO = New-DecoyGPO `\n    -GPOName \"Server Maintenance Policy (Legacy)\" `\n    -DecoyUsername \"admin_maintenance\" `\n    -DecoyDomain \"CORP\" `\n    -SYSVOLPath \"\\\\corp.example.com\\SYSVOL\\corp.example.com\\Policies\" `\n    -EnableAuditSACL $true\n\nWrite-Host \"Decoy GPO created: $($decoyGPO.GPOGuid)\"\nWrite-Host \"SACL audit enabled - any read attempt will generate Event ID 4663\"\n```\n\n### Step 4: Create Deceptive BloodHound Paths\n\nSet ACL permissions that create fake attack paths visible to BloodHound\u002FSharpHound\nreconnaissance, leading attackers toward monitored honeytokens.\n\n```powershell\n# Create fake BloodHound attack path\n$deceptivePath = New-DeceptiveBloodHoundPath `\n    -HoneytokenSamAccount \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -TargetHighValueGroup \"Domain Admins\" `\n    -IntermediateOU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\"\n\nWrite-Host \"Deceptive path created: $($deceptivePath.PathDescription)\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Configure Detection Rules\n\nSet up SIEM detection rules to alert on any honeytoken interaction.\n\n```python\n# Using the Python detection agent\nfrom agent import ADHoneytokenMonitor\n\nmonitor = ADHoneytokenMonitor(config_path=\"honeytoken_config.json\")\n\n# Register all honeytokens for monitoring\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\", token_type=\"admin_account\")\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"MSSQLSvc\u002Fsql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com:1433\", token_type=\"spn\")\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"admin_maintenance\", token_type=\"gpo_credential\")\n\n# Generate SIEM detection rules\nsplunk_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"splunk\")\nsentinel_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"sentinel\")\nsigma_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"sigma\")\n\nfor rule in sigma_rules:\n    print(f\"Rule: {rule['title']}\")\n    print(f\"  Detection: {rule['detection_logic']}\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Deployment\n\nTest the honeytokens to ensure detection fires correctly.\n\n```powershell\n# Validate honeytoken deployment\n$validation = Test-HoneytokenDeployment `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -ValidateAdminCount `\n    -ValidateSPN `\n    -ValidateGPODecoy `\n    -ValidateAuditPolicy\n\n$validation | Format-Table Check, Status, Details -AutoSize\n```\n\n## Examples\n\n### Full Deployment Pipeline\n\n```powershell\nImport-Module .\\scripts\\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1\n\n# Deploy complete honeytoken suite\n$deployment = Deploy-FullHoneytokenSuite `\n    -Environment \"Production\" `\n    -ServiceAccountOU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\" `\n    -SYSVOLPath \"\\\\corp.example.com\\SYSVOL\\corp.example.com\\Policies\" `\n    -TokenCount 3 `\n    -IncludeSPN $true `\n    -IncludeGPODecoy $true `\n    -IncludeBloodHoundPath $true `\n    -SIEMType \"Splunk\"\n\n# Output deployment report\n$deployment.Tokens | Format-Table Name, Type, SPN, DetectionRule -AutoSize\n$deployment | Export-Csv \"honeytoken_deployment_report.csv\" -NoTypeInformation\n```\n\n### Kerberoasting Detection Query (Splunk)\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\"\n| eval alert_severity=\"critical\"\n| eval alert_type=\"honeytoken_kerberoast\"\n| table _time, src_ip, Account_Name, ServiceName, Ticket_Encryption_Type\n| sort - _time\n```\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel KQL Detection\n\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where ServiceName in (\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\", \"svc_exchange_legacy\")\n| extend AlertType = \"Honeytoken Kerberoast Detected\"\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ServiceName, IpAddress, TicketEncryptionType\n```\n\n## References\n\n- Trimarc Security - The Art of the Honeypot Account: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hub.trimarcsecurity.com\u002Fpost\u002Fthe-art-of-the-honeypot-account-making-the-unusual-look-normal\n- ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity Part 2 (Honeypot): https:\u002F\u002Fadsecurity.org\u002F?p=3513\n- Microsoft Defender for Identity Honeytokens: https:\u002F\u002Ftechcommunity.microsoft.com\u002Fblog\u002Fmicrosoftthreatprotectionblog\u002Fdeceptive-defense-best-practices-for-identity-based-honeytokens-in-microsoft-def\u002F3851641\n- SpecterOps - Kerberoasting and AES-256: https:\u002F\u002Fspecterops.io\u002Fblog\u002F2025\u002F10\u002F21\u002Fis-kerberoasting-still-a-risk-when-aes-256-kerberos-encryption-is-enabled\u002F\n- APT29a Blog - Deploying Honeytokens in AD: https:\u002F\u002Fapt29a.blogspot.com\u002F2019\u002F11\u002Fdeploying-honeytokens-in-active.html\n- ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity: https:\u002F\u002Fadsecurity.org\u002F?p=3458\n","# Deploying Active Directory Honeytokens\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When deploying deception-based detection in Active Directory environments\n- When detecting Kerberoasting attacks via fake SPN honeytokens (honeyroasting)\n- When creating tripwire accounts to detect credential theft and lateral movement\n- When building decoy GPOs to detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting\n- When creating deceptive BloodHound paths to misdirect and detect attackers\n- When supplementing existing AD monitoring with high-fidelity detection signals\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Domain Admin or delegated AD administration privileges\n- Active Directory domain (Windows Server 2016+ recommended)\n- Windows Event Log forwarding to SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic)\n- PowerShell 5.1+ with ActiveDirectory module\n- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC)\n- Understanding of AD security, Kerberos, and BloodHound attack paths\n\n## Background\n\n### Why AD Honeytokens\n\nTraditional signature-based detection misses novel attack techniques. Honeytokens\nprovide high-fidelity detection with near-zero false positives because any interaction\nwith a decoy object is inherently suspicious. In Active Directory:\n\n- **Fake privileged accounts** detect credential dumping (DCSync, NTDS.dit extraction)\n- **Fake SPNs** detect Kerberoasting reconnaissance (TGS requests for nonexistent services)\n- **Decoy GPOs** detect Group Policy Preference password harvesting\n- **Fake BloodHound paths** mislead attackers using graph-based AD analysis\n\n### Key Detection Event IDs\n\n| Event ID | Description | Honeytoken Use |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| 4769 | Kerberos TGS ticket requested | Detect Kerberoast against honey SPN |\n| 4625 | Failed logon attempt | Detect use of fake credentials from decoy GPO |\n| 4662 | Directory service object accessed | Detect DACL read on honeytoken user |\n| 5136 | Directory service object modified | Detect modification of decoy GPO |\n| 5137 | Directory service object created | Detect GPO creation mimicking decoy |\n| 4768 | Kerberos TGT requested | Detect AS-REP roasting of honey account |\n\n### Making Honeytokens Realistic\n\nPer Trimarc Security research, effective honeytokens must appear legitimate:\n\n- **Age the account**: Repurpose old inactive accounts (10-15 year old accounts in\n  similarly aged domains appear authentic)\n- **Set AdminCount=1**: Flags the account as having elevated AD rights, making it\n  an attractive Kerberoasting target\n- **Use realistic naming**: Match organizational naming conventions (svc_sqlbackup,\n  admin.maintenance, svc_exchange_legacy)\n- **Set old password date**: Password age of 10+ years with an SPN looks like a\n  high-value, neglected service account to attackers\n- **Add group memberships**: Place in visible groups like \"Remote Desktop Users\" or\n  a custom \"Backup Operators\" to increase attacker interest\n- **Avoid detection tells**: Attackers check creation date vs. last logon vs.\n  password change date for consistency\n\n## Instructions\n\n### Step 1: Deploy Fake Privileged Admin Account\n\nCreate a honeytoken account that mimics a legacy privileged service account.\n\n```powershell\n# Import the deployment module\nImport-Module .\\scripts\\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1\n\n# Create a honeytoken admin account\n$honeyAdmin = New-HoneytokenAdmin `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -DisplayName \"SQL Backup Service (Legacy)\" `\n    -Description \"Legacy SQL Server backup service account - DO NOT DELETE\" `\n    -OU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\" `\n    -PasswordLength 128 `\n    -SetAdminCount $true\n\nWrite-Host \"Honeytoken admin created: $($honeyAdmin.DistinguishedName)\"\n```\n\n### Step 2: Deploy Fake SPN for Kerberoasting Detection\n\nAssign a realistic but fake SPN to the honeytoken account. Any TGS request\nfor this SPN is definitively malicious (honeyroasting).\n\n```powershell\n# Add fake SPN to honeytoken account\n$honeySPN = Add-HoneytokenSPN `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -ServiceClass \"MSSQLSvc\" `\n    -Hostname \"sql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com\" `\n    -Port 1433\n\nWrite-Host \"Honey SPN registered: $($honeySPN.SPN)\"\nWrite-Host \"Monitor Event ID 4769 for TGS requests targeting this SPN\"\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy Decoy GPO with Credential Trap\n\nCreate a fake GPO in SYSVOL with an embedded cpassword (Group Policy Preference\npassword). Attackers using tools like Get-GPPPassword or gpp-decrypt will find\nand attempt to use these credentials, triggering detection.\n\n```powershell\n# Create decoy GPO with cpassword trap\n$decoyGPO = New-DecoyGPO `\n    -GPOName \"Server Maintenance Policy (Legacy)\" `\n    -DecoyUsername \"admin_maintenance\" `\n    -DecoyDomain \"CORP\" `\n    -SYSVOLPath \"\\\\corp.example.com\\SYSVOL\\corp.example.com\\Policies\" `\n    -EnableAuditSACL $true\n\nWrite-Host \"Decoy GPO created: $($decoyGPO.GPOGuid)\"\nWrite-Host \"SACL audit enabled - any read attempt will generate Event ID 4663\"\n```\n\n### Step 4: Create Deceptive BloodHound Paths\n\nSet ACL permissions that create fake attack paths visible to BloodHound\u002FSharpHound\nreconnaissance, leading attackers toward monitored honeytokens.\n\n```powershell\n# Create fake BloodHound attack path\n$deceptivePath = New-DeceptiveBloodHoundPath `\n    -HoneytokenSamAccount \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -TargetHighValueGroup \"Domain Admins\" `\n    -IntermediateOU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\"\n\nWrite-Host \"Deceptive path created: $($deceptivePath.PathDescription)\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Configure Detection Rules\n\nSet up SIEM detection rules to alert on any honeytoken interaction.\n\n```python\n# Using the Python detection agent\nfrom agent import ADHoneytokenMonitor\n\nmonitor = ADHoneytokenMonitor(config_path=\"honeytoken_config.json\")\n\n# Register all honeytokens for monitoring\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\", token_type=\"admin_account\")\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"MSSQLSvc\u002Fsql-legacy-bak01.corp.example.com:1433\", token_type=\"spn\")\nmonitor.register_honeytoken(\"admin_maintenance\", token_type=\"gpo_credential\")\n\n# Generate SIEM detection rules\nsplunk_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"splunk\")\nsentinel_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"sentinel\")\nsigma_rules = monitor.generate_detection_rules(siem=\"sigma\")\n\nfor rule in sigma_rules:\n    print(f\"Rule: {rule['title']}\")\n    print(f\"  Detection: {rule['detection_logic']}\")\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Deployment\n\nTest the honeytokens to ensure detection fires correctly.\n\n```powershell\n# Validate honeytoken deployment\n$validation = Test-HoneytokenDeployment `\n    -SamAccountName \"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\" `\n    -ValidateAdminCount `\n    -ValidateSPN `\n    -ValidateGPODecoy `\n    -ValidateAuditPolicy\n\n$validation | Format-Table Check, Status, Details -AutoSize\n```\n\n## Examples\n\n### Full Deployment Pipeline\n\n```powershell\nImport-Module .\\scripts\\Deploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1\n\n# Deploy complete honeytoken suite\n$deployment = Deploy-FullHoneytokenSuite `\n    -Environment \"Production\" `\n    -ServiceAccountOU \"OU=Service Accounts,DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com\" `\n    -SYSVOLPath \"\\\\corp.example.com\\SYSVOL\\corp.example.com\\Policies\" `\n    -TokenCount 3 `\n    -IncludeSPN $true `\n    -IncludeGPODecoy $true `\n    -IncludeBloodHoundPath $true `\n    -SIEMType \"Splunk\"\n\n# Output deployment report\n$deployment.Tokens | Format-Table Name, Type, SPN, DetectionRule -AutoSize\n$deployment | Export-Csv \"honeytoken_deployment_report.csv\" -NoTypeInformation\n```\n\n### Kerberoasting Detection Query (Splunk)\n\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769 ServiceName=\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\"\n| eval alert_severity=\"critical\"\n| eval alert_type=\"honeytoken_kerberoast\"\n| table _time, src_ip, Account_Name, ServiceName, Ticket_Encryption_Type\n| sort - _time\n```\n\n### Microsoft Sentinel KQL Detection\n\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where ServiceName in (\"svc_sqlbackup_legacy\", \"svc_exchange_legacy\")\n| extend AlertType = \"Honeytoken Kerberoast Detected\"\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ServiceName, IpAddress, TicketEncryptionType\n```\n\n## References\n\n- Trimarc Security - The Art of the Honeypot Account: https:\u002F\u002Fwww.hub.trimarcsecurity.com\u002Fpost\u002Fthe-art-of-the-honeypot-account-making-the-unusual-look-normal\n- ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity Part 2 (Honeypot): https:\u002F\u002Fadsecurity.org\u002F?p=3513\n- Microsoft Defender for Identity Honeytokens: https:\u002F\u002Ftechcommunity.microsoft.com\u002Fblog\u002Fmicrosoftthreatprotectionblog\u002Fdeceptive-defense-best-practices-for-identity-based-honeytokens-in-microsoft-def\u002F3851641\n- SpecterOps - Kerberoasting and AES-256: https:\u002F\u002Fspecterops.io\u002Fblog\u002F2025\u002F10\u002F21\u002Fis-kerberoasting-still-a-risk-when-aes-256-kerberos-encryption-is-enabled\u002F\n- APT29a Blog - Deploying Honeytokens in AD: https:\u002F\u002Fapt29a.blogspot.com\u002F2019\u002F11\u002Fdeploying-honeytokens-in-active.html\n- ADSecurity.org - Detecting Kerberoasting Activity: https:\u002F\u002Fadsecurity.org\u002F?p=3458\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"subdomain":36,"description":37},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"active-directory","honeytokens","kerberoasting","deception","detection","bloodhound","gpo","mukul975","cybersecurity","1.0","deception-technology","Deploys deception-based honeytokens in Active Directory including fake privileged accounts with AdminCount=1, fake SPNs for Kerberoasting detection (honeyroasting), decoy GPOs with cpassword traps, and fake BloodHound paths. Monitors Windows Security Event IDs 4769, 4625, 4662, 5136 for honeytoken interaction. Use when implementing AD deception defenses for detecting lateral movement, credential theft, and reconnaissance.\n","main","99825ad3f3bcc6597ddcc7294a14e6e922f2b67b","skills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman","https:\u002F\u002FRJBUSINESSSOLUTIONS.ORG","Credit and Finance Expert | Developer\r\n\r\nI'm Rick Jefferson, a seasoned credit and finance expert with over a decade of experience in financial literacy,","2026-07-13 07:03:29",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokens",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokens",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill deploying-active-directory-honeytokens","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002FSKILL.md",true,[61,65,71,77],{"path":62,"resourceType":62,"resourceTypeDesc":63,"sizeBytes":64,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":66,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",12004,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":72,"resourceType":73,"resourceTypeDesc":74,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",53930,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":78,"resourceType":73,"resourceTypeDesc":74,"sizeBytes":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80},"scripts\u002FDeploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1",22762,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-active-directory-honeytokens\u002Fscripts\u002FDeploy-ADHoneytokens.ps1",[82,90,97,104,111,119],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":20},"01M79ANS2SM329NEP5ZCX106RR","zustand-store-creator","Create zustand store creator operations. Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category. Use when working with zustand store creator functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"zustand store creator\", \"zustand creator\", \"zustand\".","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMZKP4YDEZ7EHG1Y7PP74","zero-trust-config-helper","Configure with zero trust config helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"zero trust config helper\", \"zero helper\", \"zero\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMJSBCEJQNBTYNAHYN5HM","zapier-integration-helper","Assist with zapier integration helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category. Use when working with APIs or building integrations. Trigger with phrases like \"zapier integration helper\", \"zapier helper\", \"zapier\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHJZGVMARS13VFQYRR1MP","yaml-config-validator","Validate yaml config validator operations. Auto-activating skill for DevOps Basics.\nTriggers on: yaml config validator, yaml config validator\nPart of the DevOps Basics skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"yaml config validator\", \"yaml validator\", \"yaml\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fyaml-config-validator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":112,"name":113,"nameZh":6,"description":114,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":115,"sourceHtmlUrl":116,"categories":117,"keywords":118,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHGDZRN0020RDQSQDPAM8","xvary-stock-research","Thesis-driven equity analysis from public SEC EDGAR and market data; \u002Fanalyze, \u002Fscore, \u002Fcompare workflows with bundled Python tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":86,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHCYJ9FV9RMHQ24HDRN33","xss-vulnerability-scanner","Scan xss vulnerability scanner operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Fundamentals.\nTriggers on: xss vulnerability scanner, xss vulnerability scanner\nPart of the Security Fundamentals skill category. Use when working with xss vulnerability scanner functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"xss vulnerability scanner\", \"xss scanner\", \"xss\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxss-vulnerability-scanner\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]