apt29
APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard, SVR) adversary-emulation playbook — malware-light cloud-identity espionage: no-MFA password spray, OAuth consent/token abuse, Golden SAML, mailbox collection over residential proxies. Use when emulating APT29 against an M365/Entra/AWS-identity estate. Triggers on: 'emulate APT29', 'Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'NOBELIUM', 'OAuth abuse', 'cloud identity espionage', 'Golden SAML'.
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- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-09
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- apt29
- metadata
- { "tags": "adversary-emulation, apt29, cozy-bear, cloud-identity, oauth, espionage", "subdomain": "planning", "when_to_use": "emulate APT29, Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The Dukes, SVR, cloud identity espionage, OAuth consent abuse, token theft, Golden SAML, M365 Entra espionage, supply chain", "mitre_attack": "T1078.004, T1528, T1550.001, T1098.001, T1606.002, T1114.002, T1071.001" }
- description
- APT29 (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard, SVR) adversary-emulation playbook — malware-light cloud-identity espionage: no-MFA password spray, OAuth consent/token abuse, Golden SAML, mailbox collection over residential proxies. Use when emulating APT29 against an M365/Entra/AWS-identity estate. Triggers on: 'emulate APT29', 'Cozy Bear', 'Midnight Blizzard', 'NOBELIUM', 'OAuth abuse', 'cloud identity espionage', 'Golden SAML'.
- allowed-tools
- Read Write Edit
03 SKILL.md 正文
APT29 — Adversary Emulation Playbook
Tier-3 Russian SVR espionage actor. Emulate stealth cloud-identity tradecraft, not malware: APT29's modern signature is compromising identity (no-MFA password spray, device-code/consent phishing), abusing OAuth applications and tokens for persistence, and collecting mail/documents over residential proxies with a near-zero endpoint footprint. Authorized red-team emulation only — every action runs under the engagement RoE.
When to emulate APT29
- Target is a cloud-first / hybrid-identity estate (Microsoft 365 + Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM Identity Center, Google Workspace) and the client wants their identity blast radius tested the way a top-tier espionage actor would.
- Government, diplomatic, defense, think-tank, technology, or MSP targets (see the
industry → actor map in
../../references/apt-groups.md). - The objective is quiet, long-dwell collection — not smash-and-grab.
ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)
{
"engagement_name": "<fill>",
"actor_name": "APT29-like (Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard)",
"actor_aliases": ["Cozy Bear", "Midnight Blizzard", "NOBELIUM", "The Dukes", "UNC2452"],
"group_id": "G0016",
"tier": "tier-3",
"sophistication": "nation-state",
"motivation": "espionage",
"initial_access": ["T1078.004", "T1110.003", "T1566.002", "T1195.002"],
"key_ttps": ["T1528", "T1550.001", "T1098.001", "T1098.003", "T1606.002", "T1114.002", "T1071.001", "T1090.003", "T1070.004"],
"tools": ["AADInternals", "ROADtools", "TokenTactics", "Sliver", "residential proxies"],
"infrastructure": ["Engagement-owned OAuth apps (consent abuse)", "Residential proxy egress", "Low-and-slow Graph/API calls"],
"recent_cti_delta": "2024-2026: malware-light cloud tradecraft — malicious OAuth app consent, device-code phishing, password spray against legacy/no-MFA tenants (Microsoft + HPE corporate breaches); SolarWinds-style CI/CD supply-chain remains in repertoire.",
"confidence": "probable"
}
Prune to RoE: if social engineering is out of scope, drop T1566.002; if only one cloud is
in scope, drop the others. A phase whose techniques are all pruned drops its kill-chain row.
Kill-chain emulation
Each row is a candidate OPPLAN objective. The orchestrator's OPPLAN-builder turns surviving
rows into add_objective calls; the executing agent loads the named skill.
| # | Phase | MITRE | Emulated action | Executing agent → skill |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Recon | T1593 / T1589.002 | Map tenant, federation, employees, exposed apps/OWA, email format | recon → /skills/standard/recon/osint/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/recon/cloud-recon/SKILL.md |
| 2 | Initial Access | T1110.003 | Slow password spray against legacy/no-MFA cloud auth | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/ato-methodology/SKILL.md |
| 3 | Initial Access (alt) | T1566.002 | Device-code / consent phishing (Teams/email lure) | phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md |
| 4 | Initial Access (alt) | T1195.002 | CI/CD or dependency supply-chain foothold | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md |
| 5 | Credential/Token | T1528 / T1550.001 | Steal & replay OAuth app access tokens (skip password+MFA) | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/oauth/SKILL.md |
| 6 | Persistence (cloud) | T1098.001 / T1098.003 | Add app credentials + high Graph roles; consent malicious OAuth app | cloud → /skills/standard/cloud/azure-managed-identity/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/cloud/aws-iam-passrole-chain/SKILL.md |
| 7 | Lateral (identity) | T1606.002 | Golden SAML / federation-trust token forgery | exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/saml/SKILL.md |
| 8 | Collection | T1114.002 | Mailbox / document collection via Graph (canary mailbox) | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md |
| 9 | C2 | T1071.001 / T1090.003 | Sliver beacon over HTTPS via residential proxy | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md |
| 10 | Exfiltration | T1567.002 | Low-and-slow exfil of scoped collection set | post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/reporting/SKILL.md |
Defense evasion (T1070.004 log/file cleanup, blending with admin activity) is cross-cutting —
the shared defense-evasion / opsec skills are auto-injected into every operational agent.
CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)
Collapse the table into the 5-phase ObjectivePhase model:
recon— tenant/identity/federation enumeration (rows 1).initial-access— no-MFA password spray + consent phishing + optional supply-chain (2-4).post-exploit— token theft, cloud role/cred persistence, Golden SAML, mailbox collection (5-8).c2— Sliver over HTTPS via residential proxy (9).exfiltration— scoped, throttled collection exfil (10).
OPSEC & signature fidelity
- Low and slow. Spread the password spray over hours, one attempt per account; APT29 is patient. No bursty auth.
- Egress from residential / reputable IP space, not a datacenter VPS, to defeat IOC-based detection (mirror the real actor's residential-proxy obfuscation).
- Prefer tokens over passwords. Once an app token is held, stop touching passwords/MFA — that is the whole point of the OAuth tradecraft.
- Blend with admin activity. Use Graph/PowerShell the way a tenant admin would; avoid noisy endpoint tooling.
- Clean up consent grants and added credentials at engagement end (feeds
cleanup.json).
RoE / safety gates
- Identity takeover is high blast-radius. OAuth consent + added cloud roles can affect a production tenant globally — require explicit, written cloud-tenant authorization. Prefer a dedicated test tenant or a sandboxed app registration.
- Phishing requires social-engineering authorization and a lure-deconfliction pass
(
/skills/standard/phisher/lure-deconfliction/SKILL.md). - Add an
EMERGENCYabort trigger toabort.json: "real (non-canary) user mailbox or document collected, or consent granted on a non-engagement OAuth app."
Deconfliction
- Name every engagement OAuth app
redteam-<engagement-id>-*and record the app/client IDs indeconfliction.json. - Pin a known deconfliction egress IP range + a marker User-Agent string so the identity team can separate the exercise from a real Midnight Blizzard sign-in.
- Pre-brief the identity/SOC team that no-MFA spray + consent grants are expected.
Fidelity notes (deviations)
- Emulate consent/token abuse with an engagement-owned app registration — never publish a real malicious multi-tenant app.
- Use a canary mailbox/SharePoint site seeded with marked documents for the collection and exfil phases; do not collect real PII or classified mail.
- Sliver replaces APT29's bespoke implants (WINELOADER, etc.); fidelity is the C2 channel shape (HTTPS, jittered beacon, residential egress), not the binary.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
wps-pixie-dust
WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K / pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.
wpa3-sae
WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.
wpa2-psk
WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer/SMB encryption mode in 2026.
wpa-enterprise-eap
WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
krack-fragattacks
KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation/aggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.
evil-twin-karma
Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA/Mana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK/open networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.