[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78J7M5934SVC0J9Q9TYTRFK":3,"skill-same:01M78J7M5934SVC0J9Q9TYTRFK":59},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M78J7M5934SVC0J9Q9TYTRFK","threat-profile",null,"Threat actor profiling for adversary emulation — APT group research, sophistication tiers, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, initial access vectors, custom archetypes.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: threat-profile\ndescription: \"Threat actor profiling for adversary emulation — APT group research, sophistication tiers, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, initial access vectors, custom archetypes.\"\nallowed-tools: Read Write Edit\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: planning\n  when_to_use: \"threat modeling, adversary emulation, APT simulation, threat actor selection, who should we emulate, what kind of attacker\"\n  tags: threat-modeling, apt, adversary-emulation, mitre-attack\n  upstream_ref: \"Soundwave engagement-planning template — threat actor profiling for adversary emulation\"\n---\n\n# Threat Profile Builder\n\nThreat profiling defines **who** the red team is emulating. Without a clear profile, the engagement devolves into arbitrary tool usage instead of realistic adversary simulation.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During CONOPS creation when selecting a threat actor\n- User asks about threat actors, APT groups, or adversary emulation\n- Need to map engagement scope to realistic attacker behaviors\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Determine Tier\n\nAsk the user which tier fits. If they're unsure, recommend based on engagement type:\n\n| Tier | Actor Type | Sophistication | Best For |\n|------|-----------|---------------|----------|\n| 1 | Opportunistic attacker | Low | Vulnerability assessment, external scan |\n| 2 | Targeted cybercriminal | Medium | Penetration test, focused engagement |\n| 3 | APT \u002F nation-state | High | Full red team, advanced simulation |\n| 4 | Insider threat | Varies | Internal assessment, assumed breach |\n\n### Step 2: Build the Profile\n\nGather or derive these fields — see `references\u002Fadversary-archetypes.md` for pre-built tier profiles and `references\u002Fapt-groups.md` for known APT\u002FeCrime group cards (now 19 actors + a MITRE Group-ID crosswalk). For a **named actor**, load the matching emulation playbook (`emulation\u002F\u003Cactor>\u002FSKILL.md`, indexed by `emulation\u002FSKILL.md`) — it ships a ready-to-edit `ThreatProfile` seed **and** the full kill chain mapped to Decepticon skills:\n\n1. **Name\u002FAlias** — Known group or custom archetype\n2. **Sophistication** — low \u002F medium \u002F high \u002F nation-state\n3. **Motivation** — financial, espionage, disruption, hacktivism\n4. **Initial Access** — MITRE technique IDs for how they get in\n5. **Key TTPs** — Top 5-10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques\n6. **Tools & Infrastructure** — Realistic toolset for this actor\n\n### Step 3: Validate Against RoE\n\nThe profile must be consistent with what the RoE allows. There's no point emulating spearphishing if social engineering isn't authorized.\n\n| RoE Constraint | Profile Implication |\n|---|---|\n| External only, no social engineering | Focus on T1190, T1595, T1133 |\n| Phishing authorized | Include T1566, T1598 |\n| Internal assumed breach | Start from T1078 (Valid Accounts) |\n| Full red team | Full kill chain TTPs |\n\n### Step 4: Output\n\nGenerate **two** payloads:\n\n**(a) Standalone `plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`** — full `ThreatProfile` schema:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"...\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"APT29-like (Cozy Bear)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Cozy Bear\", \"The Dukes\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0050\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"espionage\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1195.002\", \"T1566.001\", \"T1078\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.001\", \"T1053.005\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1048.003\", \"T1550.001\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Cobalt Strike\", \"Mimikatz\", \"WMI Event Subscription\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Compromised SaaS\", \"Domain fronting via CDN\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"Q1 2026 reports show shift toward OAuth abuse and CI\u002FCD supply-chain\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n`tier` is the StrEnum value: `\"tier-1\"` (opportunistic), `\"tier-2\"` (targeted cybercrime), `\"tier-3\"` (APT \u002F nation-state), `\"tier-4\"` (insider). Map to `sophistication` informally — `tier-3` ↔ \"nation-state\", `tier-2` ↔ \"high\", `tier-1` ↔ \"low\u002Fmedium\".\n\n**(b) Embedded summary** — one-entry `threat_actors` list inside `conops.json` for backward-compat (the legacy `ThreatActor` shape: `name` + `sophistication` + `motivation` + `initial_access` + `ttps`). Skip `tier`\u002F`group_id`\u002F`tools`\u002F`infrastructure` here — those live only in the standalone profile.\n\n### Step 5: Named-actor kill chain (optional but recommended)\n\nWhen the operator picked a known actor, don't hand-build the TTP sequence — load the\nemulation catalog and copy the per-actor plan:\n\n```text\nload_skill(\"\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002FSKILL.md\")   # routing table\nload_skill(\"\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fapt29\u002FSKILL.md\")  # e.g. APT29\n```\n\nEach playbook gives you (a) the `ThreatProfile` seed for `plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`, (b) the\nordered `kill_chain` to copy into `conops.json` (mapped to the 5 `ObjectivePhase` buckets),\nand (c) the actor-specific RoE\u002Fsafety gates to carry into `abort.json` + `deconfliction.json`.\nPrune any technique the RoE forbids (Step 3) before writing. Available: `apt29`, `sandworm`,\n`scattered-spider`, `volt-typhoon`, `lazarus`, `fin7`, `lockbit`.\n","# Threat Profile Builder\n\nThreat profiling defines **who** the red team is emulating. Without a clear profile, the engagement devolves into arbitrary tool usage instead of realistic adversary simulation.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- During CONOPS creation when selecting a threat actor\n- User asks about threat actors, APT groups, or adversary emulation\n- Need to map engagement scope to realistic attacker behaviors\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Determine Tier\n\nAsk the user which tier fits. If they're unsure, recommend based on engagement type:\n\n| Tier | Actor Type | Sophistication | Best For |\n|------|-----------|---------------|----------|\n| 1 | Opportunistic attacker | Low | Vulnerability assessment, external scan |\n| 2 | Targeted cybercriminal | Medium | Penetration test, focused engagement |\n| 3 | APT \u002F nation-state | High | Full red team, advanced simulation |\n| 4 | Insider threat | Varies | Internal assessment, assumed breach |\n\n### Step 2: Build the Profile\n\nGather or derive these fields — see `references\u002Fadversary-archetypes.md` for pre-built tier profiles and `references\u002Fapt-groups.md` for known APT\u002FeCrime group cards (now 19 actors + a MITRE Group-ID crosswalk). For a **named actor**, load the matching emulation playbook (`emulation\u002F\u003Cactor>\u002FSKILL.md`, indexed by `emulation\u002FSKILL.md`) — it ships a ready-to-edit `ThreatProfile` seed **and** the full kill chain mapped to Decepticon skills:\n\n1. **Name\u002FAlias** — Known group or custom archetype\n2. **Sophistication** — low \u002F medium \u002F high \u002F nation-state\n3. **Motivation** — financial, espionage, disruption, hacktivism\n4. **Initial Access** — MITRE technique IDs for how they get in\n5. **Key TTPs** — Top 5-10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques\n6. **Tools & Infrastructure** — Realistic toolset for this actor\n\n### Step 3: Validate Against RoE\n\nThe profile must be consistent with what the RoE allows. There's no point emulating spearphishing if social engineering isn't authorized.\n\n| RoE Constraint | Profile Implication |\n|---|---|\n| External only, no social engineering | Focus on T1190, T1595, T1133 |\n| Phishing authorized | Include T1566, T1598 |\n| Internal assumed breach | Start from T1078 (Valid Accounts) |\n| Full red team | Full kill chain TTPs |\n\n### Step 4: Output\n\nGenerate **two** payloads:\n\n**(a) Standalone `plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`** — full `ThreatProfile` schema:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"engagement_name\": \"...\",\n  \"actor_name\": \"APT29-like (Cozy Bear)\",\n  \"actor_aliases\": [\"Cozy Bear\", \"The Dukes\"],\n  \"group_id\": \"G0050\",\n  \"tier\": \"tier-3\",\n  \"sophistication\": \"nation-state\",\n  \"motivation\": \"espionage\",\n  \"initial_access\": [\"T1195.002\", \"T1566.001\", \"T1078\"],\n  \"key_ttps\": [\"T1059.001\", \"T1053.005\", \"T1071.001\", \"T1048.003\", \"T1550.001\"],\n  \"tools\": [\"Cobalt Strike\", \"Mimikatz\", \"WMI Event Subscription\"],\n  \"infrastructure\": [\"Compromised SaaS\", \"Domain fronting via CDN\"],\n  \"recent_cti_delta\": \"Q1 2026 reports show shift toward OAuth abuse and CI\u002FCD supply-chain\",\n  \"confidence\": \"probable\"\n}\n```\n\n`tier` is the StrEnum value: `\"tier-1\"` (opportunistic), `\"tier-2\"` (targeted cybercrime), `\"tier-3\"` (APT \u002F nation-state), `\"tier-4\"` (insider). Map to `sophistication` informally — `tier-3` ↔ \"nation-state\", `tier-2` ↔ \"high\", `tier-1` ↔ \"low\u002Fmedium\".\n\n**(b) Embedded summary** — one-entry `threat_actors` list inside `conops.json` for backward-compat (the legacy `ThreatActor` shape: `name` + `sophistication` + `motivation` + `initial_access` + `ttps`). Skip `tier`\u002F`group_id`\u002F`tools`\u002F`infrastructure` here — those live only in the standalone profile.\n\n### Step 5: Named-actor kill chain (optional but recommended)\n\nWhen the operator picked a known actor, don't hand-build the TTP sequence — load the\nemulation catalog and copy the per-actor plan:\n\n```text\nload_skill(\"\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002FSKILL.md\")   # routing table\nload_skill(\"\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Femulation\u002Fapt29\u002FSKILL.md\")  # e.g. APT29\n```\n\nEach playbook gives you (a) the `ThreatProfile` seed for `plan\u002Fthreat-profile.json`, (b) the\nordered `kill_chain` to copy into `conops.json` (mapped to the 5 `ObjectivePhase` buckets),\nand (c) the actor-specific RoE\u002Fsafety gates to carry into `abort.json` + `deconfliction.json`.\nPrune any technique the RoE forbids (Step 3) before writing. Available: `apt29`, `sandworm`,\n`scattered-spider`, `volt-typhoon`, `lazarus`, `fin7`, `lockbit`.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7,"allowed-tools":28},{"tags":24,"subdomain":25,"when_to_use":26,"upstream_ref":27},"threat-modeling, apt, adversary-emulation, mitre-attack","planning","threat modeling, adversary emulation, APT simulation, threat actor selection, who should we emulate, what kind of attacker","Soundwave engagement-planning template — threat actor profiling for adversary emulation","Read Write Edit","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill threat-profile",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill threat-profile",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill threat-profile","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49,55],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"references\u002Fadversary-archetypes.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2755,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Freferences\u002Fadversary-archetypes.md",{"path":56,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":57,"sourceHtmlUrl":58},"references\u002Fapt-groups.md",17837,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fsoundwave\u002Fthreat-profile\u002Freferences\u002Fapt-groups.md",[60,67,74,81,88,95],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]