threat-profile
Threat actor profiling for adversary emulation — APT group research, sophistication tiers, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, initial access vectors, custom archetypes.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-09
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- threat-profile
- metadata
- { "tags": "threat-modeling, apt, adversary-emulation, mitre-attack", "subdomain": "planning", "when_to_use": "threat modeling, adversary emulation, APT simulation, threat actor selection, who should we emulate, what kind of attacker", "upstream_ref": "Soundwave engagement-planning template — threat actor profiling for adversary emulation" }
- description
- Threat actor profiling for adversary emulation — APT group research, sophistication tiers, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, initial access vectors, custom archetypes.
- allowed-tools
- Read Write Edit
02 资源文件 2
- 参考文档references/adversary-archetypes.md2.7 KB
- 参考文档references/apt-groups.md17.4 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
Threat Profile Builder
Threat profiling defines who the red team is emulating. Without a clear profile, the engagement devolves into arbitrary tool usage instead of realistic adversary simulation.
When to Use
- During CONOPS creation when selecting a threat actor
- User asks about threat actors, APT groups, or adversary emulation
- Need to map engagement scope to realistic attacker behaviors
Workflow
Step 1: Determine Tier
Ask the user which tier fits. If they're unsure, recommend based on engagement type:
| Tier | Actor Type | Sophistication | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Opportunistic attacker | Low | Vulnerability assessment, external scan |
| 2 | Targeted cybercriminal | Medium | Penetration test, focused engagement |
| 3 | APT / nation-state | High | Full red team, advanced simulation |
| 4 | Insider threat | Varies | Internal assessment, assumed breach |
Step 2: Build the Profile
Gather or derive these fields — see references/adversary-archetypes.md for pre-built tier profiles and references/apt-groups.md for known APT/eCrime group cards (now 19 actors + a MITRE Group-ID crosswalk). For a named actor, load the matching emulation playbook (emulation/<actor>/SKILL.md, indexed by emulation/SKILL.md) — it ships a ready-to-edit ThreatProfile seed and the full kill chain mapped to Decepticon skills:
- Name/Alias — Known group or custom archetype
- Sophistication — low / medium / high / nation-state
- Motivation — financial, espionage, disruption, hacktivism
- Initial Access — MITRE technique IDs for how they get in
- Key TTPs — Top 5-10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- Tools & Infrastructure — Realistic toolset for this actor
Step 3: Validate Against RoE
The profile must be consistent with what the RoE allows. There's no point emulating spearphishing if social engineering isn't authorized.
| RoE Constraint | Profile Implication |
|---|---|
| External only, no social engineering | Focus on T1190, T1595, T1133 |
| Phishing authorized | Include T1566, T1598 |
| Internal assumed breach | Start from T1078 (Valid Accounts) |
| Full red team | Full kill chain TTPs |
Step 4: Output
Generate two payloads:
(a) Standalone plan/threat-profile.json — full ThreatProfile schema:
{
"engagement_name": "...",
"actor_name": "APT29-like (Cozy Bear)",
"actor_aliases": ["Cozy Bear", "The Dukes"],
"group_id": "G0050",
"tier": "tier-3",
"sophistication": "nation-state",
"motivation": "espionage",
"initial_access": ["T1195.002", "T1566.001", "T1078"],
"key_ttps": ["T1059.001", "T1053.005", "T1071.001", "T1048.003", "T1550.001"],
"tools": ["Cobalt Strike", "Mimikatz", "WMI Event Subscription"],
"infrastructure": ["Compromised SaaS", "Domain fronting via CDN"],
"recent_cti_delta": "Q1 2026 reports show shift toward OAuth abuse and CI/CD supply-chain",
"confidence": "probable"
}
tier is the StrEnum value: "tier-1" (opportunistic), "tier-2" (targeted cybercrime), "tier-3" (APT / nation-state), "tier-4" (insider). Map to sophistication informally — tier-3 ↔ "nation-state", tier-2 ↔ "high", tier-1 ↔ "low/medium".
(b) Embedded summary — one-entry threat_actors list inside conops.json for backward-compat (the legacy ThreatActor shape: name + sophistication + motivation + initial_access + ttps). Skip tier/group_id/tools/infrastructure here — those live only in the standalone profile.
Step 5: Named-actor kill chain (optional but recommended)
When the operator picked a known actor, don't hand-build the TTP sequence — load the emulation catalog and copy the per-actor plan:
load_skill("/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/SKILL.md") # routing table
load_skill("/skills/standard/soundwave/threat-profile/emulation/apt29/SKILL.md") # e.g. APT29
Each playbook gives you (a) the ThreatProfile seed for plan/threat-profile.json, (b) the
ordered kill_chain to copy into conops.json (mapped to the 5 ObjectivePhase buckets),
and (c) the actor-specific RoE/safety gates to carry into abort.json + deconfliction.json.
Prune any technique the RoE forbids (Step 3) before writing. Available: apt29, sandworm,
scattered-spider, volt-typhoon, lazarus, fin7, lockbit.
04 同仓库更多 Skills
wps-pixie-dust
WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K / pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.
wpa3-sae
WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.
wpa2-psk
WPA/WPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer/SMB encryption mode in 2026.
wpa-enterprise-eap
WPA/WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.
krack-fragattacks
KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation/aggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.
evil-twin-karma
Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA/Mana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK/open networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.