[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78J4MMDBH4JMCEXWZAA7Y81":3,"skill-same:01M78J4MMDBH4JMCEXWZAA7Y81":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M78J4MMDBH4JMCEXWZAA7Y81","reverser-firmware",null,"Router \u002F IoT firmware extraction pipeline — unpack nested filesystems, locate web server, identify backdoor credentials.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Ffirmware\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: reverser-firmware\ndescription: Router \u002F IoT firmware extraction pipeline — unpack nested filesystems, locate web server, identify backdoor credentials.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: reverse-engineering\n  when_to_use: \"firmware extraction router iot binwalk nested filesystem web server backdoor credential squashfs cramfs\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1542\n    - T1078.001\n---\n\n# Firmware Extraction Playbook\n\n## 1. Extract\n```bash\napt-get install -y binwalk squashfs-tools cramfsprogs\nmkdir -p \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffw && cd \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffw\nbinwalk -eM \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffirmware.bin\nfind _firmware.bin.extracted -name \"squashfs-root\" -o -name \"rootfs\"\n```\n\n## 2. Map the root\n```bash\nROOT=$(find _firmware.bin.extracted -type d -name \"squashfs-root\" | head -1)\nls -la \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002F\"\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\"          # look for hardcoded users\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\"          # password hashes — feed to hashcat\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finit.d\u002FS*\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Frc.d\u002Frc.local\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Web server binary\n```bash\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"httpd\" -o -name \"lighttpd\" -o -name \"nginx\" -o -name \"boa\"\n# For each: bin_identify + bin_strings + bin_symbols_report\n```\nCGI binaries under `www\u002Fcgi-bin\u002F` are the highest-yield targets — often\none file per endpoint with direct `system()` calls from query params.\n\n## 4. Hardcoded credentials\n```\nbin_strings(path=web_server_binary, category_filter=\"secret\")\nbin_strings(path=web_server_binary, category_filter=\"crypto\")\n```\nAlso check for base64 \u002F hex key patterns near `strcmp` calls (manual\naudit via Ghidra — use `bin_ghidra_script` to seed).\n\n## 5. Authentication bypass audit\nLook for:\n- Magic string comparisons (`strcmp(user, \"admin\")`)\n- Debug backdoor paths (`\u002Fdebug`, `\u002Fcgi-bin\u002Fshell`, `.sys`)\n- UART\u002FJTAG enabled in bootargs (check `bootargs.txt` in extraction)\n\n## 6. Cross-reference CVEs\nFor the extracted busybox \u002F kernel \u002F dropbear \u002F openssl versions:\n```\ncve_by_package(\"busybox\", \"1.27.2\", \"OSS-Fuzz\")\ncve_lookup(\"CVE-2021-28831,CVE-2023-0464\")\n```\n\n## 7. Record\nAdd:\n- `repo` node for the firmware image\n- `file` nodes for each interesting binary\n- `credential` nodes for any hardcoded creds\n- `vulnerability` nodes for each audit finding\n- `entrypoint` for each cgi-bin path\n","# Firmware Extraction Playbook\n\n## 1. Extract\n```bash\napt-get install -y binwalk squashfs-tools cramfsprogs\nmkdir -p \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffw && cd \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffw\nbinwalk -eM \u002Fworkspace\u002Ffirmware.bin\nfind _firmware.bin.extracted -name \"squashfs-root\" -o -name \"rootfs\"\n```\n\n## 2. Map the root\n```bash\nROOT=$(find _firmware.bin.extracted -type d -name \"squashfs-root\" | head -1)\nls -la \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002F\"\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd\"          # look for hardcoded users\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow\"          # password hashes — feed to hashcat\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Finit.d\u002FS*\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\ncat \"$ROOT\u002Fetc\u002Frc.d\u002Frc.local\" 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## 3. Web server binary\n```bash\nfind \"$ROOT\" -name \"httpd\" -o -name \"lighttpd\" -o -name \"nginx\" -o -name \"boa\"\n# For each: bin_identify + bin_strings + bin_symbols_report\n```\nCGI binaries under `www\u002Fcgi-bin\u002F` are the highest-yield targets — often\none file per endpoint with direct `system()` calls from query params.\n\n## 4. Hardcoded credentials\n```\nbin_strings(path=web_server_binary, category_filter=\"secret\")\nbin_strings(path=web_server_binary, category_filter=\"crypto\")\n```\nAlso check for base64 \u002F hex key patterns near `strcmp` calls (manual\naudit via Ghidra — use `bin_ghidra_script` to seed).\n\n## 5. Authentication bypass audit\nLook for:\n- Magic string comparisons (`strcmp(user, \"admin\")`)\n- Debug backdoor paths (`\u002Fdebug`, `\u002Fcgi-bin\u002Fshell`, `.sys`)\n- UART\u002FJTAG enabled in bootargs (check `bootargs.txt` in extraction)\n\n## 6. Cross-reference CVEs\nFor the extracted busybox \u002F kernel \u002F dropbear \u002F openssl versions:\n```\ncve_by_package(\"busybox\", \"1.27.2\", \"OSS-Fuzz\")\ncve_lookup(\"CVE-2021-28831,CVE-2023-0464\")\n```\n\n## 7. Record\nAdd:\n- `repo` node for the firmware image\n- `file` nodes for each interesting binary\n- `credential` nodes for any hardcoded creds\n- `vulnerability` nodes for each audit finding\n- `entrypoint` for each cgi-bin path\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"mitre_attack":26},"reverse-engineering","firmware extraction router iot binwalk nested filesystem web server backdoor credential squashfs cramfs",[27,28],"T1542","T1078.001","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Ffirmware","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill reverser-firmware",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill reverser-firmware",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill reverser-firmware","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Freverser\u002Ffirmware\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[50,57,64,71,78,85],{"skillNo":51,"name":52,"nameZh":6,"description":53,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]