[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78J2KMT01WXQC2MH8YZWNDP":3,"skill-same:01M78J2KMT01WXQC2MH8YZWNDP":77},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":38,"commitSha":39,"skillDirectory":40,"forksCount":41,"repositoryHtmlUrl":42,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":43,"ownerBlogUrl":44,"ownerDescription":45,"updatedAt":46,"install":47,"resources":60},"01M78J2KMT01WXQC2MH8YZWNDP","building-soc-playbook-for-ransomware",null,"Builds a structured SOC incident response playbook for ransomware attacks covering detection, containment, eradication, and recovery phases with specific SIEM queries, isolation procedures, and decision trees. Use when SOC teams need formalized response procedures for ransomware incidents aligned to NIST SP 800-61 and MITRE ATT&CK ransomware techniques.","jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","jukeyman","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F142960420?v=4","01M78FR4Y3DHMMCBCC0GXXNB3F","RICK JEFFERSON","01M78FR4Z8RVQRAD31Y5J7V6EB",1,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: building-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\ndescription: >\n  Builds a structured SOC incident response playbook for ransomware attacks covering detection,\n  containment, eradication, and recovery phases with specific SIEM queries, isolation procedures,\n  and decision trees. Use when SOC teams need formalized response procedures for ransomware\n  incidents aligned to NIST SP 800-61 and MITRE ATT&CK ransomware techniques.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags: [soc, ransomware, incident-response, playbook, nist, mitre-attack, containment]\nversion: \"1.0\"\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\n---\n# Building SOC Playbook for Ransomware\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need a standardized ransomware response playbook for Tier 1-3 analysts\n- An organization lacks documented procedures for ransomware containment and recovery\n- Tabletop exercises reveal gaps in ransomware response coordination\n- Compliance requirements (NIST CSF, ISO 27001) mandate documented incident playbooks\n\n**Do not use** during an active ransomware incident as the sole guide — have pre-built playbooks tested and rehearsed before incidents occur.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- SIEM platform (Splunk ES, Elastic Security, or Sentinel) with endpoint and network data\n- EDR solution (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) with network isolation capability\n- Backup infrastructure with tested recovery procedures and offline\u002Fimmutable backups\n- Communication plan with legal, executive leadership, and external IR retainer contacts\n- MITRE ATT&CK knowledge for ransomware technique chains\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Define Detection Triggers\n\nCreate SIEM detection rules for early ransomware indicators:\n\n**Mass File Encryption Detection (Splunk):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=11\n| bin _time span=1m\n| stats dc(TargetFilename) AS unique_files, values(TargetFilename) AS sample_files by Computer, Image, _time\n| where unique_files > 100\n| eval suspicious_extensions = if(match(mvjoin(sample_files, \",\"), \"\\.(encrypted|locked|crypt|enc|ransom)\"), \"YES\", \"NO\")\n| where suspicious_extensions=\"YES\" OR unique_files > 500\n| sort - unique_files\n```\n\n**Shadow Copy Deletion (T1490):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" OR index=sysmon EventCode=1\n(CommandLine=\"*vssadmin*delete*shadows*\" OR CommandLine=\"*wmic*shadowcopy*delete*\"\n OR CommandLine=\"*bcdedit*\u002Fset*recoveryenabled*no*\" OR CommandLine=\"*wbadmin*delete*catalog*\")\n| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine\n```\n\n**Ransomware Note File Creation:**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=11\nTargetFilename IN (\"*README*.txt\", \"*DECRYPT*.txt\", \"*RANSOM*.txt\", \"*RECOVER*.html\", \"*HOW_TO*.txt\")\n| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename\n| where count > 5\n```\n\n**Elastic Security EQL variant:**\n```eql\nsequence by host.name with maxspan=2m\n  [process where event.type == \"start\" and\n    process.args : (\"*vssadmin*\", \"*delete*\", \"*shadows*\")]\n  [file where event.type == \"creation\" and\n    file.name : (\"*README*DECRYPT*\", \"*RANSOM*\", \"*HOW_TO_RECOVER*\")]\n```\n\n### Step 2: Build Triage Decision Tree\n\n```\nRANSOMWARE ALERT TRIAGE\n│\n├── Is encryption actively occurring?\n│   ├── YES → IMMEDIATE: Isolate host from network (Step 3)\n│   │         Do NOT power off (preserve memory for forensics)\n│   └── NO → Is this a pre-encryption indicator?\n│       ├── Shadow copy deletion → HIGH PRIORITY: Isolate and investigate\n│       ├── Known ransomware hash → HIGH PRIORITY: Block hash, scan enterprise\n│       └── Suspicious process behavior → MEDIUM: Investigate, prepare isolation\n│\n├── How many hosts affected?\n│   ├── Single host → Contained incident, follow host isolation procedure\n│   ├── Multiple hosts (2-10) → Escalate to Tier 2, begin enterprise-wide scan\n│   └── Enterprise-wide (>10) → Activate full IR team, engage external retainer\n│\n└── Is data exfiltration confirmed?\n    ├── YES → Double extortion scenario, engage legal for breach notification\n    └── NO\u002FUNKNOWN → Check for Cobalt Strike\u002FC2 beacons, review outbound transfers\n```\n\n### Step 3: Containment Procedures\n\n**Network Isolation via EDR (CrowdStrike Falcon):**\n```bash\n# Isolate host using CrowdStrike Falcon API\ncurl -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.crowdstrike.com\u002Fdevices\u002Fentities\u002Fdevices-actions\u002Fv2?action_name=contain\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"ids\": [\"device_id_here\"]}'\n```\n\n**Network Isolation via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint:**\n```powershell\n# Isolate machine via MDE API\n$headers = @{Authorization = \"Bearer $token\"}\n$body = @{Comment = \"Ransomware containment - IR-2024-0500\"; IsolationType = \"Full\"} | ConvertTo-Json\nInvoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.securitycenter.microsoft.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmachines\u002F$machineId\u002Fisolate\" `\n    -Method Post -Headers $headers -Body $body -ContentType \"application\u002Fjson\"\n```\n\n**Firewall Emergency Rules:**\n```\n# Palo Alto — Block SMB lateral spread\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment from Trust to Trust\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment application ms-ds-smb\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment action deny\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment disabled no\ncommit\n```\n\n**Active Directory Emergency Actions:**\n```powershell\n# Disable compromised account\nDisable-ADAccount -Identity \"compromised_user\"\n\n# Reset Kerberos TGT (if domain admin compromised)\n# WARNING: This resets krbtgt and requires two resets 12+ hours apart\nReset-KrbtgtKeys -Server \"DC-PRIMARY\" -Force\n\n# Block lateral movement by disabling remote services\nSet-Service -Name \"RemoteRegistry\" -StartupType Disabled -Status Stopped\n```\n\n### Step 4: Evidence Collection and Preservation\n\nCollect forensic artifacts before remediation:\n\n```powershell\n# Capture running processes and network connections\nGet-Process | Export-Csv \"C:\\IR\\processes_$(hostname).csv\"\nGet-NetTCPConnection | Export-Csv \"C:\\IR\\netstat_$(hostname).csv\"\n\n# Capture memory dump (if host still running)\nwinpmem_mini_x64.exe C:\\IR\\memory_$(hostname).raw\n\n# Collect ransomware artifacts\nCopy-Item \"C:\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*README*\" \"C:\\IR\\ransom_notes\\\" -Recurse\nCopy-Item \"C:\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*.encrypted\" \"C:\\IR\\encrypted_samples\\\" -Force\n\n# Capture event logs\nwevtutil epl Security \"C:\\IR\\Security_$(hostname).evtx\"\nwevtutil epl System \"C:\\IR\\System_$(hostname).evtx\"\nwevtutil epl \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational\" \"C:\\IR\\Sysmon_$(hostname).evtx\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Eradication and Recovery\n\n**Identify ransomware variant:**\n- Upload encrypted sample and ransom note to ID Ransomware (https:\u002F\u002Fid-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com\u002F)\n- Check No More Ransom Project (https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nomoreransom.org\u002F) for available decryptors\n- Search for ransomware family IOCs in MalwareBazaar\n\n**Enterprise-wide IOC scan in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=3)\n(TargetFilename=\"*ransomware_binary_name*\" OR sha256=\"KNOWN_HASH\"\n OR DestinationIp=\"C2_IP_ADDRESS\" OR CommandLine=\"*malicious_command*\")\n| stats count by Computer, EventCode, Image, CommandLine\n| sort - count\n```\n\n**Recovery from backups:**\n1. Verify backup integrity (offline\u002Fimmutable backups not affected)\n2. Rebuild affected systems from known-good images\n3. Restore data from last clean backup\n4. Validate restored systems before reconnecting to network\n5. Monitor restored systems for 72 hours for reinfection\n\n### Step 6: Post-Incident Documentation\n\nStructure the playbook conclusion with lessons learned:\n\n```\nPOST-INCIDENT REVIEW TEMPLATE\n1. Timeline of events (detection to full recovery)\n2. Initial access vector identification\n3. Dwell time analysis (time from initial compromise to encryption)\n4. Detection gaps identified\n5. Response effectiveness metrics (MTTD, MTTC, MTTR)\n6. Playbook improvements recommended\n7. New detection rules deployed\n8. Backup and recovery procedure updates\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Double Extortion** | Ransomware tactic combining data encryption with data theft, threatening public release if ransom unpaid |\n| **Dwell Time** | Duration between initial compromise and detection — ransomware operators average 5-9 days before encryption |\n| **MTTC** | Mean Time to Contain — time from detection to successful isolation of affected systems |\n| **Kill Chain** | Ransomware progression: Initial Access -> Execution -> Persistence -> Privilege Escalation -> Lateral Movement -> Collection -> Exfiltration -> Impact |\n| **Immutable Backup** | Backup storage that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period (WORM storage) |\n| **RTO\u002FRPO** | Recovery Time Objective \u002F Recovery Point Objective — maximum acceptable downtime and data loss thresholds |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon \u002F SentinelOne**: EDR platforms with network isolation, process kill, and threat hunting capabilities\n- **Splunk ES \u002F Elastic Security**: SIEM platforms for detection rule deployment and enterprise-wide IOC scanning\n- **ID Ransomware**: Online service identifying ransomware variants from encrypted file samples and ransom notes\n- **No More Ransom Project**: Europol-backed initiative providing free decryption tools for known ransomware families\n- **Veeam \u002F Rubrik**: Enterprise backup solutions with immutable backup support and instant recovery capabilities\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **LockBit Attack**: Detected via SMB lateral movement and mass file encryption — isolate, scan for Cobalt Strike beacons\n- **BlackCat\u002FALPHV**: Detected via ransomware note creation — check for data exfiltration via Rclone or Mega upload\n- **Conti\u002FRoyal**: Detected via shadow copy deletion — check for prior BazarLoader\u002FEmotet initial access\n- **RansomHub**: Detected via anomalous process execution — investigate for compromised VPN or RDP credentials\n- **Play Ransomware**: Detected via service account abuse — audit AD for newly created accounts and group membership changes\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nRANSOMWARE PLAYBOOK EXECUTION — IR-2024-0500\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPhase 1 - Detection:\n  Alert:      Mass file encryption detected on FILESERVER-03\n  Variant:    LockBit 3.0 (confirmed via ID Ransomware)\n  MTTD:       12 minutes from first encryption to SOC alert\n\nPhase 2 - Containment:\n  [DONE] FILESERVER-03 isolated via CrowdStrike at 14:35 UTC\n  [DONE] SMB blocked enterprise-wide via firewall emergency rule\n  [DONE] Compromised service account disabled in AD\n  MTTC:       23 minutes\n\nPhase 3 - Eradication:\n  [DONE] 3 additional hosts with C2 beacon identified and isolated\n  [DONE] Cobalt Strike C2 domain (c2[.]evil[.]com) sinkholed\n  [DONE] Enterprise-wide IOC scan completed — no additional infections\n\nPhase 4 - Recovery:\n  [DONE] FILESERVER-03 rebuilt from gold image\n  [DONE] Data restored from immutable Veeam backup (RPO: 4 hours)\n  [DONE] Systems monitored 72 hours — no reinfection\n  MTTR:       18 hours\n\nTotal Affected: 1 server, 3 workstations\nData Loss:      4 hours of file modifications (backup RPO)\nExfiltration:   No evidence of data exfiltration confirmed\n```\n","# Building SOC Playbook for Ransomware\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC teams need a standardized ransomware response playbook for Tier 1-3 analysts\n- An organization lacks documented procedures for ransomware containment and recovery\n- Tabletop exercises reveal gaps in ransomware response coordination\n- Compliance requirements (NIST CSF, ISO 27001) mandate documented incident playbooks\n\n**Do not use** during an active ransomware incident as the sole guide — have pre-built playbooks tested and rehearsed before incidents occur.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- SIEM platform (Splunk ES, Elastic Security, or Sentinel) with endpoint and network data\n- EDR solution (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) with network isolation capability\n- Backup infrastructure with tested recovery procedures and offline\u002Fimmutable backups\n- Communication plan with legal, executive leadership, and external IR retainer contacts\n- MITRE ATT&CK knowledge for ransomware technique chains\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Define Detection Triggers\n\nCreate SIEM detection rules for early ransomware indicators:\n\n**Mass File Encryption Detection (Splunk):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=11\n| bin _time span=1m\n| stats dc(TargetFilename) AS unique_files, values(TargetFilename) AS sample_files by Computer, Image, _time\n| where unique_files > 100\n| eval suspicious_extensions = if(match(mvjoin(sample_files, \",\"), \"\\.(encrypted|locked|crypt|enc|ransom)\"), \"YES\", \"NO\")\n| where suspicious_extensions=\"YES\" OR unique_files > 500\n| sort - unique_files\n```\n\n**Shadow Copy Deletion (T1490):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" OR index=sysmon EventCode=1\n(CommandLine=\"*vssadmin*delete*shadows*\" OR CommandLine=\"*wmic*shadowcopy*delete*\"\n OR CommandLine=\"*bcdedit*\u002Fset*recoveryenabled*no*\" OR CommandLine=\"*wbadmin*delete*catalog*\")\n| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine\n```\n\n**Ransomware Note File Creation:**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=11\nTargetFilename IN (\"*README*.txt\", \"*DECRYPT*.txt\", \"*RANSOM*.txt\", \"*RECOVER*.html\", \"*HOW_TO*.txt\")\n| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetFilename\n| where count > 5\n```\n\n**Elastic Security EQL variant:**\n```eql\nsequence by host.name with maxspan=2m\n  [process where event.type == \"start\" and\n    process.args : (\"*vssadmin*\", \"*delete*\", \"*shadows*\")]\n  [file where event.type == \"creation\" and\n    file.name : (\"*README*DECRYPT*\", \"*RANSOM*\", \"*HOW_TO_RECOVER*\")]\n```\n\n### Step 2: Build Triage Decision Tree\n\n```\nRANSOMWARE ALERT TRIAGE\n│\n├── Is encryption actively occurring?\n│   ├── YES → IMMEDIATE: Isolate host from network (Step 3)\n│   │         Do NOT power off (preserve memory for forensics)\n│   └── NO → Is this a pre-encryption indicator?\n│       ├── Shadow copy deletion → HIGH PRIORITY: Isolate and investigate\n│       ├── Known ransomware hash → HIGH PRIORITY: Block hash, scan enterprise\n│       └── Suspicious process behavior → MEDIUM: Investigate, prepare isolation\n│\n├── How many hosts affected?\n│   ├── Single host → Contained incident, follow host isolation procedure\n│   ├── Multiple hosts (2-10) → Escalate to Tier 2, begin enterprise-wide scan\n│   └── Enterprise-wide (>10) → Activate full IR team, engage external retainer\n│\n└── Is data exfiltration confirmed?\n    ├── YES → Double extortion scenario, engage legal for breach notification\n    └── NO\u002FUNKNOWN → Check for Cobalt Strike\u002FC2 beacons, review outbound transfers\n```\n\n### Step 3: Containment Procedures\n\n**Network Isolation via EDR (CrowdStrike Falcon):**\n```bash\n# Isolate host using CrowdStrike Falcon API\ncurl -X POST \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.crowdstrike.com\u002Fdevices\u002Fentities\u002Fdevices-actions\u002Fv2?action_name=contain\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application\u002Fjson\" \\\n  -d '{\"ids\": [\"device_id_here\"]}'\n```\n\n**Network Isolation via Microsoft Defender for Endpoint:**\n```powershell\n# Isolate machine via MDE API\n$headers = @{Authorization = \"Bearer $token\"}\n$body = @{Comment = \"Ransomware containment - IR-2024-0500\"; IsolationType = \"Full\"} | ConvertTo-Json\nInvoke-RestMethod -Uri \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.securitycenter.microsoft.com\u002Fapi\u002Fmachines\u002F$machineId\u002Fisolate\" `\n    -Method Post -Headers $headers -Body $body -ContentType \"application\u002Fjson\"\n```\n\n**Firewall Emergency Rules:**\n```\n# Palo Alto — Block SMB lateral spread\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment from Trust to Trust\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment application ms-ds-smb\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment action deny\nset rulebase security rules RansomwareContainment disabled no\ncommit\n```\n\n**Active Directory Emergency Actions:**\n```powershell\n# Disable compromised account\nDisable-ADAccount -Identity \"compromised_user\"\n\n# Reset Kerberos TGT (if domain admin compromised)\n# WARNING: This resets krbtgt and requires two resets 12+ hours apart\nReset-KrbtgtKeys -Server \"DC-PRIMARY\" -Force\n\n# Block lateral movement by disabling remote services\nSet-Service -Name \"RemoteRegistry\" -StartupType Disabled -Status Stopped\n```\n\n### Step 4: Evidence Collection and Preservation\n\nCollect forensic artifacts before remediation:\n\n```powershell\n# Capture running processes and network connections\nGet-Process | Export-Csv \"C:\\IR\\processes_$(hostname).csv\"\nGet-NetTCPConnection | Export-Csv \"C:\\IR\\netstat_$(hostname).csv\"\n\n# Capture memory dump (if host still running)\nwinpmem_mini_x64.exe C:\\IR\\memory_$(hostname).raw\n\n# Collect ransomware artifacts\nCopy-Item \"C:\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*README*\" \"C:\\IR\\ransom_notes\\\" -Recurse\nCopy-Item \"C:\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*.encrypted\" \"C:\\IR\\encrypted_samples\\\" -Force\n\n# Capture event logs\nwevtutil epl Security \"C:\\IR\\Security_$(hostname).evtx\"\nwevtutil epl System \"C:\\IR\\System_$(hostname).evtx\"\nwevtutil epl \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational\" \"C:\\IR\\Sysmon_$(hostname).evtx\"\n```\n\n### Step 5: Eradication and Recovery\n\n**Identify ransomware variant:**\n- Upload encrypted sample and ransom note to ID Ransomware (https:\u002F\u002Fid-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com\u002F)\n- Check No More Ransom Project (https:\u002F\u002Fwww.nomoreransom.org\u002F) for available decryptors\n- Search for ransomware family IOCs in MalwareBazaar\n\n**Enterprise-wide IOC scan in Splunk:**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=3)\n(TargetFilename=\"*ransomware_binary_name*\" OR sha256=\"KNOWN_HASH\"\n OR DestinationIp=\"C2_IP_ADDRESS\" OR CommandLine=\"*malicious_command*\")\n| stats count by Computer, EventCode, Image, CommandLine\n| sort - count\n```\n\n**Recovery from backups:**\n1. Verify backup integrity (offline\u002Fimmutable backups not affected)\n2. Rebuild affected systems from known-good images\n3. Restore data from last clean backup\n4. Validate restored systems before reconnecting to network\n5. Monitor restored systems for 72 hours for reinfection\n\n### Step 6: Post-Incident Documentation\n\nStructure the playbook conclusion with lessons learned:\n\n```\nPOST-INCIDENT REVIEW TEMPLATE\n1. Timeline of events (detection to full recovery)\n2. Initial access vector identification\n3. Dwell time analysis (time from initial compromise to encryption)\n4. Detection gaps identified\n5. Response effectiveness metrics (MTTD, MTTC, MTTR)\n6. Playbook improvements recommended\n7. New detection rules deployed\n8. Backup and recovery procedure updates\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Double Extortion** | Ransomware tactic combining data encryption with data theft, threatening public release if ransom unpaid |\n| **Dwell Time** | Duration between initial compromise and detection — ransomware operators average 5-9 days before encryption |\n| **MTTC** | Mean Time to Contain — time from detection to successful isolation of affected systems |\n| **Kill Chain** | Ransomware progression: Initial Access -> Execution -> Persistence -> Privilege Escalation -> Lateral Movement -> Collection -> Exfiltration -> Impact |\n| **Immutable Backup** | Backup storage that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period (WORM storage) |\n| **RTO\u002FRPO** | Recovery Time Objective \u002F Recovery Point Objective — maximum acceptable downtime and data loss thresholds |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon \u002F SentinelOne**: EDR platforms with network isolation, process kill, and threat hunting capabilities\n- **Splunk ES \u002F Elastic Security**: SIEM platforms for detection rule deployment and enterprise-wide IOC scanning\n- **ID Ransomware**: Online service identifying ransomware variants from encrypted file samples and ransom notes\n- **No More Ransom Project**: Europol-backed initiative providing free decryption tools for known ransomware families\n- **Veeam \u002F Rubrik**: Enterprise backup solutions with immutable backup support and instant recovery capabilities\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **LockBit Attack**: Detected via SMB lateral movement and mass file encryption — isolate, scan for Cobalt Strike beacons\n- **BlackCat\u002FALPHV**: Detected via ransomware note creation — check for data exfiltration via Rclone or Mega upload\n- **Conti\u002FRoyal**: Detected via shadow copy deletion — check for prior BazarLoader\u002FEmotet initial access\n- **RansomHub**: Detected via anomalous process execution — investigate for compromised VPN or RDP credentials\n- **Play Ransomware**: Detected via service account abuse — audit AD for newly created accounts and group membership changes\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nRANSOMWARE PLAYBOOK EXECUTION — IR-2024-0500\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPhase 1 - Detection:\n  Alert:      Mass file encryption detected on FILESERVER-03\n  Variant:    LockBit 3.0 (confirmed via ID Ransomware)\n  MTTD:       12 minutes from first encryption to SOC alert\n\nPhase 2 - Containment:\n  [DONE] FILESERVER-03 isolated via CrowdStrike at 14:35 UTC\n  [DONE] SMB blocked enterprise-wide via firewall emergency rule\n  [DONE] Compromised service account disabled in AD\n  MTTC:       23 minutes\n\nPhase 3 - Eradication:\n  [DONE] 3 additional hosts with C2 beacon identified and isolated\n  [DONE] Cobalt Strike C2 domain (c2[.]evil[.]com) sinkholed\n  [DONE] Enterprise-wide IOC scan completed — no additional infections\n\nPhase 4 - Recovery:\n  [DONE] FILESERVER-03 rebuilt from gold image\n  [DONE] Data restored from immutable Veeam backup (RPO: 4 hours)\n  [DONE] Systems monitored 72 hours — no reinfection\n  MTTR:       18 hours\n\nTotal Affected: 1 server, 3 workstations\nData Loss:      4 hours of file modifications (backup RPO)\nExfiltration:   No evidence of data exfiltration confirmed\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"license":15,"version":35,"subdomain":36,"description":37},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"soc","ransomware","incident-response","playbook","nist","mitre-attack","containment","mahipal","cybersecurity","1.0","soc-operations","Builds a structured SOC incident response playbook for ransomware attacks covering detection, containment, eradication, and recovery phases with specific SIEM queries, isolation procedures, and decision trees. Use when SOC teams need formalized response procedures for ransomware incidents aligned to NIST SP 800-61 and MITRE ATT&CK ransomware techniques.\n","main","99825ad3f3bcc6597ddcc7294a14e6e922f2b67b","skills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman","https:\u002F\u002FRJBUSINESSSOLUTIONS.ORG","Credit and Finance Expert | Developer\r\n\r\nI'm Rick Jefferson, a seasoned credit and finance expert with over a decade of experience in financial literacy,","2026-07-13 07:03:29",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":48,"prompt":58,"zipAvailable":59},[49,52,55],{"tool":50,"command":51},"npx","npx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill building-soc-playbook-for-ransomware",{"tool":53,"command":54},"bunx","bunx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill building-soc-playbook-for-ransomware",{"tool":56,"command":57},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add jukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills --skill building-soc-playbook-for-ransomware","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\u002FSKILL.md",true,[61,65,71],{"path":62,"resourceType":62,"resourceTypeDesc":63,"sizeBytes":64,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":66,"resourceType":67,"resourceTypeDesc":68,"sizeBytes":69,"sourceHtmlUrl":70},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2219,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":72,"resourceType":73,"resourceTypeDesc":74,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6001,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fbuilding-soc-playbook-for-ransomware\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[78,86,93,100,107,115],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":83,"categories":84,"keywords":85,"publishedAt":20},"01M79ANS2SM329NEP5ZCX106RR","zustand-store-creator","Create zustand store creator operations. Auto-activating skill for Frontend Development.\nTriggers on: zustand store creator, zustand store creator\nPart of the Frontend Development skill category. Use when working with zustand store creator functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"zustand store creator\", \"zustand creator\", \"zustand\".","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzustand-store-creator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMZKP4YDEZ7EHG1Y7PP74","zero-trust-config-helper","Configure with zero trust config helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Advanced.\nTriggers on: zero trust config helper, zero trust config helper\nPart of the Security Advanced skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"zero trust config helper\", \"zero helper\", \"zero\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzero-trust-config-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":94,"name":95,"nameZh":6,"description":96,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":97,"categories":98,"keywords":99,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AMJSBCEJQNBTYNAHYN5HM","zapier-integration-helper","Assist with zapier integration helper operations. Auto-activating skill for Business Automation.\nTriggers on: zapier integration helper, zapier integration helper\nPart of the Business Automation skill category. Use when working with APIs or building integrations. Trigger with phrases like \"zapier integration helper\", \"zapier helper\", \"zapier\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fzapier-integration-helper\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":101,"name":102,"nameZh":6,"description":103,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":104,"categories":105,"keywords":106,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHJZGVMARS13VFQYRR1MP","yaml-config-validator","Validate yaml config validator operations. Auto-activating skill for DevOps Basics.\nTriggers on: yaml config validator, yaml config validator\nPart of the DevOps Basics skill category. Use when configuring systems or services. Trigger with phrases like \"yaml config validator\", \"yaml validator\", \"yaml\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fyaml-config-validator\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":111,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHGDZRN0020RDQSQDPAM8","xvary-stock-research","Thesis-driven equity analysis from public SEC EDGAR and market data; \u002Fanalyze, \u002Fscore, \u002Fcompare workflows with bundled Python tools (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxvary-stock-research\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":82,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":119,"categories":120,"keywords":121,"publishedAt":20},"01M79AHCYJ9FV9RMHQ24HDRN33","xss-vulnerability-scanner","Scan xss vulnerability scanner operations. Auto-activating skill for Security Fundamentals.\nTriggers on: xss vulnerability scanner, xss vulnerability scanner\nPart of the Security Fundamentals skill category. Use when working with xss vulnerability scanner functionality. Trigger with phrases like \"xss vulnerability scanner\", \"xss scanner\", \"xss\".","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjukeyman\u002Fjukeyman-skills\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fxss-vulnerability-scanner\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]