[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78HCEYAEM4183M16TXK71TA":3,"skill-same:01M78HCEYAEM4183M16TXK71TA":59},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78HCEYAEM4183M16TXK71TA","rng-entropy-audit",null,"Cryptographic-hardware RNG + seed entropy audit. Scores captured RNG output for bias \u002F repetition \u002F low min-entropy (TRNG→PRNG fallback like the Coldcard 2021 regression), and scores seed material (BIP39 word count + passphrase bits) for attack cost. Triggers on 'RNG bug', 'TRNG disabled', 'PRNG fallback', 'entropy audit', 'hardware wallet', 'seed strength', 'Coldcard', 'BIP39 passphrase'.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: rng-entropy-audit\ndescription: Cryptographic-hardware RNG + seed entropy audit. Scores captured RNG output for bias \u002F repetition \u002F low min-entropy (TRNG→PRNG fallback like the Coldcard 2021 regression), and scores seed material (BIP39 word count + passphrase bits) for attack cost. Triggers on 'RNG bug', 'TRNG disabled', 'PRNG fallback', 'entropy audit', 'hardware wallet', 'seed strength', 'Coldcard', 'BIP39 passphrase'.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: crypto-hw\n  when_to_use: \"hardware wallet RNG audit, TRNG PRNG fallback detection, BIP39 seed entropy, seed passphrase strength, firmware regression against a prior sample, incident postmortem for a shipped device\"\n  upstream_ref: \"NIST SP 800-90B (entropy sources), NIST SP 800-22 (statistical tests), BIP39\"\n---\n\n# RNG + Seed Entropy Audit Skill\n\nYou are auditing whether a shipped cryptographic hardware device (wallet,\nHSM, TPM, YubiKey-class token) actually delivers the entropy its data\nsheet promises. The two inputs you accept are:\n\n1. **A captured RNG sample** (hex or base64, at least 4 KiB recommended)\n   pulled from the device's random-source endpoint under owner consent.\n2. **A seed spec** (BIP39 word count + optional passphrase-bit estimate)\n   the owner supplies for a strength check on their existing wallet.\n\nThe two outputs are structured findings that either (a) certify the\ndevice \u002F seed as meeting the 128-bit post-Grover strength target or\n(b) name the concrete remediation (add passphrase bits, rotate to\naudited firmware, migrate off the affected chip).\n\n## Threat model (fixed — do not renegotiate)\n\n- **TRNG-to-PRNG silent fallback** is the class of bug that took down\n  Coldcard Mk2\u002FMk3 in the 2021 firmware regression. The RNG source\n  quietly switches from a hardware entropy source to a deterministic\n  software PRNG seeded from stable device state (serial, boot counter,\n  flash pointer). Once one sample is available the state space shrinks\n  to something a laptop can enumerate.\n- **Under-truncated seeds**. BIP39 12-word seeds provide 128 bits of raw\n  entropy (128-bit security). 24-word seeds provide 256 bits raw but\n  are typically rated at 256 bits of *security* only because they\n  reference a checksum that doesn't multiply security. Additional\n  BIP39 passphrase bits are additive: each character of a\n  cryptographically-random passphrase adds ~5.9 bits (95-char printable\n  ASCII), each dictionary word from a 4096-word list adds 12 bits.\n- **Grover halves the effective bits** of any brute-force target. A\n  128-bit seed is 64 pq-bits under Grover; below the NIST Cat-1 128-bit\n  target. The remediation (BEFORE Q-day) is to add passphrase bits —\n  every doubling of effective bits doubles the Grover search cost.\n\n## Operating principles\n\n1. **Score before you speculate.** Run `rng_entropy_score.py --sample`\n   on any captured RNG output and `rng_entropy_score.py --seed` on any\n   seed spec. Findings ship with structured severity — no free-form\n   speculation.\n2. **Never accept a sample from an unverified source.** The value of the\n   audit depends on the sample coming from the actual device under\n   owner control. Ingest only samples with a chain-of-custody record\n   in `findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-capture\u002Fprovenance.json`.\n3. **Never persist the sample or seed itself.** Only the SHA-256 of the\n   sample and the *shape* of the seed (word count, passphrase bits)\n   reach the KG. The raw bytes and any recovered mnemonic stay in\n   the operator's ephemeral workspace and are shredded post-audit.\n4. **Recommend passphrase bits BEFORE recommending device replacement.**\n   Adding 8 – 16 bits of high-entropy passphrase is cheaper for the\n   owner than migrating funds off a hardware wallet and buys time\n   until a firmware fix or a PQC-native successor ships.\n\n## Severity rubric — RNG sample\n\n| Signal | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| min-entropy H_min ≥ 7.0 bits\u002Fbyte AND monobit \\|dev\\| ≤ 4σ AND repeated-block ratio ≤ 0.01 | INFO | RNG output indistinguishable from ideal at this sample size. |\n| H_min between 6.0 and 7.0 bits\u002Fbyte OR monobit 4σ – 6σ | LOW | Detectable bias; increase sample size and re-audit. |\n| H_min between 4.0 and 6.0 OR repeated 4-byte block ratio between 0.01 and 0.25 | MEDIUM | Structural bias present; likely non-cryptographic RNG. Do not use for key derivation. |\n| H_min \u003C 4.0 OR any all-zero \u002F all-ones block ≥ 16 bytes OR repeated 4-byte block ratio > 0.25 | HIGH | RNG output is deterministic or has failed catastrophically. Do not use. Assume any key derived from this source is recoverable. |\n\n> The repeated-4byte-block ratio is the primary Coldcard-class signal.\n> A truly random sample of ~1024 four-byte blocks has essentially zero\n> collisions in a 2^32 space (birthday bound), so any measurable\n> collision rate signals a small effective state — the fingerprint of\n> a software PRNG cycling in a tight loop.\n\n## Severity rubric — seed spec\n\n| Effective bits (post-passphrase) | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| ≥ 128 pq-bits (≥ 256 classical) | INFO | Meets NIST Cat-1 post-Grover target. |\n| 96 – 127 pq-bits | LOW | Below Cat-1. Add 8–16 passphrase bits on next rotation. |\n| 64 – 95 pq-bits | MEDIUM | Vulnerable to a CRQC by 2035. Rotate within 2 years OR add passphrase bits now. |\n| \u003C 64 pq-bits | HIGH | Recoverable pre-CRQC by nation-state targeting. Rotate immediately AND add ≥ 32 passphrase bits. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n```\n1. Load spec + sample from findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-capture\u002F.\n   Require provenance.json (device serial, firmware version, capture\n   method, operator identity).\n2. If a sample is present:\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Csample.hex> [--label \u003Cname>]\n   Emit finding = { source, bytes, min_entropy, monobit_dev, longest_run,\n                    repeated_block_ratio, severity, rec }.\n3. If a seed spec is present:\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --seed --words \u003Cn> --passphrase-bits \u003Cb>\n   Emit finding = { words, raw_bits, passphrase_bits, effective_bits,\n                    pq_bits, severity, migration }.\n4. If both firmware versions are supplied (regression mode):\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Cbefore.hex> --label before\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Cafter.hex>  --label after\n   Compare the two verdicts; emit an additional finding of severity\n   HIGH if the \"after\" verdict is worse than \"before\" (regression).\n5. Persist findings to findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002FFIND-NNN.md via the shared\n   finding-protocol skill; each MUST cite provenance.json + the exact\n   firmware version.\n```\n\n## Inputs\n\n**RNG sample** (hex-encoded bytes):\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample sample.hex --label \"coldcard-mk3-5.0.6\"\n```\n\n**Seed spec**:\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --seed --words 24 --passphrase-bits 0\n```\n\n**Regression pair** (before \u002F after firmware upgrade):\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample before.hex --label before\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample after.hex  --label after\n```\n\n## What NOT to do\n\n- Do NOT run this skill on a captured sample without provenance.json.\n  A sample from an unknown source proves nothing about the device;\n  the audit collapses to \"here is a byte string\".\n- Do NOT publish or transmit the sample bytes. Only the SHA-256 hash,\n  size, and derived metrics are safe to persist. The sample itself\n  can be device-identifying via subtle biases.\n- Do NOT recommend a device replacement on a MEDIUM finding alone.\n  Adding passphrase bits is faster, cheaper, and reversible.\n- Do NOT run this skill on a target the operator does not own or does\n  not have written consent to audit. Cryptographic hardware audits on\n  third-party devices are out of scope regardless of RoE authorization.\n","# RNG + Seed Entropy Audit Skill\n\nYou are auditing whether a shipped cryptographic hardware device (wallet,\nHSM, TPM, YubiKey-class token) actually delivers the entropy its data\nsheet promises. The two inputs you accept are:\n\n1. **A captured RNG sample** (hex or base64, at least 4 KiB recommended)\n   pulled from the device's random-source endpoint under owner consent.\n2. **A seed spec** (BIP39 word count + optional passphrase-bit estimate)\n   the owner supplies for a strength check on their existing wallet.\n\nThe two outputs are structured findings that either (a) certify the\ndevice \u002F seed as meeting the 128-bit post-Grover strength target or\n(b) name the concrete remediation (add passphrase bits, rotate to\naudited firmware, migrate off the affected chip).\n\n## Threat model (fixed — do not renegotiate)\n\n- **TRNG-to-PRNG silent fallback** is the class of bug that took down\n  Coldcard Mk2\u002FMk3 in the 2021 firmware regression. The RNG source\n  quietly switches from a hardware entropy source to a deterministic\n  software PRNG seeded from stable device state (serial, boot counter,\n  flash pointer). Once one sample is available the state space shrinks\n  to something a laptop can enumerate.\n- **Under-truncated seeds**. BIP39 12-word seeds provide 128 bits of raw\n  entropy (128-bit security). 24-word seeds provide 256 bits raw but\n  are typically rated at 256 bits of *security* only because they\n  reference a checksum that doesn't multiply security. Additional\n  BIP39 passphrase bits are additive: each character of a\n  cryptographically-random passphrase adds ~5.9 bits (95-char printable\n  ASCII), each dictionary word from a 4096-word list adds 12 bits.\n- **Grover halves the effective bits** of any brute-force target. A\n  128-bit seed is 64 pq-bits under Grover; below the NIST Cat-1 128-bit\n  target. The remediation (BEFORE Q-day) is to add passphrase bits —\n  every doubling of effective bits doubles the Grover search cost.\n\n## Operating principles\n\n1. **Score before you speculate.** Run `rng_entropy_score.py --sample`\n   on any captured RNG output and `rng_entropy_score.py --seed` on any\n   seed spec. Findings ship with structured severity — no free-form\n   speculation.\n2. **Never accept a sample from an unverified source.** The value of the\n   audit depends on the sample coming from the actual device under\n   owner control. Ingest only samples with a chain-of-custody record\n   in `findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-capture\u002Fprovenance.json`.\n3. **Never persist the sample or seed itself.** Only the SHA-256 of the\n   sample and the *shape* of the seed (word count, passphrase bits)\n   reach the KG. The raw bytes and any recovered mnemonic stay in\n   the operator's ephemeral workspace and are shredded post-audit.\n4. **Recommend passphrase bits BEFORE recommending device replacement.**\n   Adding 8 – 16 bits of high-entropy passphrase is cheaper for the\n   owner than migrating funds off a hardware wallet and buys time\n   until a firmware fix or a PQC-native successor ships.\n\n## Severity rubric — RNG sample\n\n| Signal | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| min-entropy H_min ≥ 7.0 bits\u002Fbyte AND monobit \\|dev\\| ≤ 4σ AND repeated-block ratio ≤ 0.01 | INFO | RNG output indistinguishable from ideal at this sample size. |\n| H_min between 6.0 and 7.0 bits\u002Fbyte OR monobit 4σ – 6σ | LOW | Detectable bias; increase sample size and re-audit. |\n| H_min between 4.0 and 6.0 OR repeated 4-byte block ratio between 0.01 and 0.25 | MEDIUM | Structural bias present; likely non-cryptographic RNG. Do not use for key derivation. |\n| H_min \u003C 4.0 OR any all-zero \u002F all-ones block ≥ 16 bytes OR repeated 4-byte block ratio > 0.25 | HIGH | RNG output is deterministic or has failed catastrophically. Do not use. Assume any key derived from this source is recoverable. |\n\n> The repeated-4byte-block ratio is the primary Coldcard-class signal.\n> A truly random sample of ~1024 four-byte blocks has essentially zero\n> collisions in a 2^32 space (birthday bound), so any measurable\n> collision rate signals a small effective state — the fingerprint of\n> a software PRNG cycling in a tight loop.\n\n## Severity rubric — seed spec\n\n| Effective bits (post-passphrase) | Severity | Finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| ≥ 128 pq-bits (≥ 256 classical) | INFO | Meets NIST Cat-1 post-Grover target. |\n| 96 – 127 pq-bits | LOW | Below Cat-1. Add 8–16 passphrase bits on next rotation. |\n| 64 – 95 pq-bits | MEDIUM | Vulnerable to a CRQC by 2035. Rotate within 2 years OR add passphrase bits now. |\n| \u003C 64 pq-bits | HIGH | Recoverable pre-CRQC by nation-state targeting. Rotate immediately AND add ≥ 32 passphrase bits. |\n\n## Workflow\n\n```\n1. Load spec + sample from findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-capture\u002F.\n   Require provenance.json (device serial, firmware version, capture\n   method, operator identity).\n2. If a sample is present:\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Csample.hex> [--label \u003Cname>]\n   Emit finding = { source, bytes, min_entropy, monobit_dev, longest_run,\n                    repeated_block_ratio, severity, rec }.\n3. If a seed spec is present:\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --seed --words \u003Cn> --passphrase-bits \u003Cb>\n   Emit finding = { words, raw_bits, passphrase_bits, effective_bits,\n                    pq_bits, severity, migration }.\n4. If both firmware versions are supplied (regression mode):\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Cbefore.hex> --label before\n     python rng_entropy_score.py --sample \u003Cafter.hex>  --label after\n   Compare the two verdicts; emit an additional finding of severity\n   HIGH if the \"after\" verdict is worse than \"before\" (regression).\n5. Persist findings to findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002FFIND-NNN.md via the shared\n   finding-protocol skill; each MUST cite provenance.json + the exact\n   firmware version.\n```\n\n## Inputs\n\n**RNG sample** (hex-encoded bytes):\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample sample.hex --label \"coldcard-mk3-5.0.6\"\n```\n\n**Seed spec**:\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --seed --words 24 --passphrase-bits 0\n```\n\n**Regression pair** (before \u002F after firmware upgrade):\n\n```\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample before.hex --label before\n$ python rng_entropy_score.py --sample after.hex  --label after\n```\n\n## What NOT to do\n\n- Do NOT run this skill on a captured sample without provenance.json.\n  A sample from an unknown source proves nothing about the device;\n  the audit collapses to \"here is a byte string\".\n- Do NOT publish or transmit the sample bytes. Only the SHA-256 hash,\n  size, and derived metrics are safe to persist. The sample itself\n  can be device-identifying via subtle biases.\n- Do NOT recommend a device replacement on a MEDIUM finding alone.\n  Adding passphrase bits is faster, cheaper, and reversible.\n- Do NOT run this skill on a target the operator does not own or does\n  not have written consent to audit. Cryptographic hardware audits on\n  third-party devices are out of scope regardless of RoE authorization.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"upstream_ref":26},"crypto-hw","hardware wallet RNG audit, TRNG PRNG fallback detection, BIP39 seed entropy, seed passphrase strength, firmware regression against a prior sample, incident postmortem for a shipped device","NIST SP 800-90B (entropy sources), NIST SP 800-22 (statistical tests), BIP39","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Frng-entropy-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill rng-entropy-audit",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill rng-entropy-audit",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill rng-entropy-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[47,53],{"path":48,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":51,"sourceHtmlUrl":52},"references\u002Fhardware-wallet-postmortem-template.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",8489,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002Freferences\u002Fhardware-wallet-postmortem-template.md",{"path":54,"resourceType":55,"resourceTypeDesc":56,"sizeBytes":57,"sourceHtmlUrl":58},"rng_entropy_score.py","SCRIPT","脚本",11825,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002Frng_entropy_score.py",[60,67,74,81,88,95],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":91,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":92,"categories":93,"keywords":94,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":96,"name":97,"nameZh":6,"description":98,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":99,"categories":100,"keywords":101,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]