[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78HC820QKYHN90P7AE5MM2F":3,"skill-same:01M78HC820QKYHN90P7AE5MM2F":53},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M78HC820QKYHN90P7AE5MM2F","firmware-guard-audit",null,"Static-code audit for the Coldcard-class \"defined-but-zero guard macro\" firmware bug. Scans C\u002FC++ firmware source for `#ifndef X_ENABLE` guards protecting hardware-RNG init when the same X_ENABLE is defined elsewhere as `0` (guard is silent while the feature is disabled). Also flags symbol-name aliasing hints where a hardware and a software function share a name and the linker silently picks the fallback. Triggers on 'firmware audit', 'MicroPython RNG', 'MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG', 'ifndef guard', 'linker fallback', 'Coldcard firmware'.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Ffirmware-guard-audit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: firmware-guard-audit\ndescription: Static-code audit for the Coldcard-class \"defined-but-zero guard macro\" firmware bug. Scans C\u002FC++ firmware source for `#ifndef X_ENABLE` guards protecting hardware-RNG init when the same X_ENABLE is defined elsewhere as `0` (guard is silent while the feature is disabled). Also flags symbol-name aliasing hints where a hardware and a software function share a name and the linker silently picks the fallback. Triggers on 'firmware audit', 'MicroPython RNG', 'MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG', 'ifndef guard', 'linker fallback', 'Coldcard firmware'.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: crypto-hw\n  when_to_use: \"firmware source audit for hardware-RNG init, MicroPython port review, defined-but-zero macro guard, weak-symbol linker fallback for RNG, Coldcard-shaped bugs\"\n  upstream_ref: \"Coldcard incident 2026-07-05 (Mk2\u002FMk3 firmware 4.4.1 through 4.1.9, Mk4\u002FQ pre-5.4.0 or Edge pre-6.6.66)\"\n---\n\n# Firmware Guard-Macro Audit Skill\n\nYou are looking for the Coldcard-class firmware bug: a preprocessor guard\nprotecting hardware-RNG initialization fires \"the setting isn't set\" when\nin fact the setting IS set — to zero. The guard reads `#ifndef X_ENABLE`,\nsees `X_ENABLE` is defined, stays quiet, and the firmware builds without\nthe hardware RNG. Meanwhile a same-named software-fallback function\nhappens to satisfy the linker for the symbol the crypto library asks\nfor, so the build succeeds and the wallet ships. Nothing crashes.\nNothing warns. Every seed the wallet generates for the next four years\nis enumerable from device-serial + timer state.\n\nThis skill runs OFFLINE against source files the owner or vendor\nsupplies. It never patches source; it emits findings for a human to\nreview + patch. No sandbox, no bash, no network egress required.\n\n## Threat model (Coldcard 2026-07-05 postmortem)\n\n- **Root cause A** — `#ifndef` where `#if` is required. A guard that\n  fires on presence-of-macro instead of truth-of-macro silently\n  disables the feature whenever the config file says `#define X 0`.\n- **Root cause B** — same-symbol-name aliasing. The crypto library\n  asks for `rng_get()` (or similar). The hardware driver exports\n  `hw_rng_get()`. The MicroPython software fallback exports\n  `rng_get()`. Linker picks the fallback; no warning, no error.\n- **Root cause C** — the fallback is seeded ONCE per boot from\n  device-stable values (OSC serial, SYSTICK ticks, RTC) instead of\n  from a hardware entropy source. Once one seed is known the entire\n  wallet's history is derivable.\n\n## Signals this skill matches\n\n**HIGH — defined-but-zero guard around hardware RNG init:**\n\n```c\n\u002F\u002F somewhere in board config:\n#define MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG (0)\n\n\u002F\u002F somewhere in RNG driver:\n#ifndef MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG\n  hw_rng_init();      \u002F\u002F \u003C-- never runs, because the macro IS defined\n#endif\n```\n\n**HIGH — same-name RNG symbol exported by both hw and fallback:**\n\n```\nhw\u002Frng.c:      uint8_t rng_get(void) { return read_trng_register(); }\nsoft\u002Frng.c:    uint8_t rng_get(void) { return lcg_next(); }\n```\n\n(Weak-symbol variant, `__attribute__((weak))`, is even worse — no error\nat link time even without `-Wl,--allow-multiple-definition`.)\n\n**MEDIUM — build system quietly links a `soft\u002F`\u002F`fallback\u002F` path when\n`hw\u002F` build is disabled** (Makefile \u002F CMake OBJECTS conditional lists,\nKconfig `depends on` chains, MicroPython port `SRC_QSTR` selection).\n\n## Workflow\n\n```\n1. Load the firmware source tree from findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-audit\u002Fsrc\u002F.\n   Require a provenance.json naming the vendor, product line, firmware\n   version, and source commit hash.\n2. Run the audit:\n     python firmware_guard_audit.py --src \u003Cpath> --pretty\n   Emits one JSON finding with severity, matches (file:line), and\n   the specific rule that fired.\n3. For any HIGH finding, cite the exact snippet in the postmortem\n   under the \"Technical root cause\" section (see\n   ..\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002Freferences\u002Fhardware-wallet-postmortem-template.md).\n4. Cross-check against a known-vulnerable-firmware version range table\n   in the postmortem template. If the firmware being audited falls in\n   the Coldcard-published range (Mk2\u002FMk3: 4.4.1 through 4.1.9 [note\n   the descending numbering is intentional per Coldcard's release\n   scheme]; Mk4\u002FQ: pre-5.4.0; Edge: pre-6.6.66), auto-escalate to\n   HIGH regardless of code match.\n```\n\n## What NOT to do\n\n- Do NOT patch the source. Findings are advisory; the fix belongs\n  to the vendor or the owner's firmware pinning workflow.\n- Do NOT publish the source tree or any diff externally. The skill\n  runs offline against source you have permission to read.\n- Do NOT confuse this with a runtime audit. This skill sees the\n  STATIC pattern; whether the pattern actually causes the hardware\n  RNG to be skipped at runtime requires the `rng-entropy-audit`\n  skill on a captured RNG sample from the built firmware. Both\n  together give a HIGH-confidence verdict.\n- Do NOT run this skill on binary firmware — you need source. For\n  binary-only cases, escalate to the `reverser` specialist agent.\n","# Firmware Guard-Macro Audit Skill\n\nYou are looking for the Coldcard-class firmware bug: a preprocessor guard\nprotecting hardware-RNG initialization fires \"the setting isn't set\" when\nin fact the setting IS set — to zero. The guard reads `#ifndef X_ENABLE`,\nsees `X_ENABLE` is defined, stays quiet, and the firmware builds without\nthe hardware RNG. Meanwhile a same-named software-fallback function\nhappens to satisfy the linker for the symbol the crypto library asks\nfor, so the build succeeds and the wallet ships. Nothing crashes.\nNothing warns. Every seed the wallet generates for the next four years\nis enumerable from device-serial + timer state.\n\nThis skill runs OFFLINE against source files the owner or vendor\nsupplies. It never patches source; it emits findings for a human to\nreview + patch. No sandbox, no bash, no network egress required.\n\n## Threat model (Coldcard 2026-07-05 postmortem)\n\n- **Root cause A** — `#ifndef` where `#if` is required. A guard that\n  fires on presence-of-macro instead of truth-of-macro silently\n  disables the feature whenever the config file says `#define X 0`.\n- **Root cause B** — same-symbol-name aliasing. The crypto library\n  asks for `rng_get()` (or similar). The hardware driver exports\n  `hw_rng_get()`. The MicroPython software fallback exports\n  `rng_get()`. Linker picks the fallback; no warning, no error.\n- **Root cause C** — the fallback is seeded ONCE per boot from\n  device-stable values (OSC serial, SYSTICK ticks, RTC) instead of\n  from a hardware entropy source. Once one seed is known the entire\n  wallet's history is derivable.\n\n## Signals this skill matches\n\n**HIGH — defined-but-zero guard around hardware RNG init:**\n\n```c\n\u002F\u002F somewhere in board config:\n#define MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG (0)\n\n\u002F\u002F somewhere in RNG driver:\n#ifndef MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG\n  hw_rng_init();      \u002F\u002F \u003C-- never runs, because the macro IS defined\n#endif\n```\n\n**HIGH — same-name RNG symbol exported by both hw and fallback:**\n\n```\nhw\u002Frng.c:      uint8_t rng_get(void) { return read_trng_register(); }\nsoft\u002Frng.c:    uint8_t rng_get(void) { return lcg_next(); }\n```\n\n(Weak-symbol variant, `__attribute__((weak))`, is even worse — no error\nat link time even without `-Wl,--allow-multiple-definition`.)\n\n**MEDIUM — build system quietly links a `soft\u002F`\u002F`fallback\u002F` path when\n`hw\u002F` build is disabled** (Makefile \u002F CMake OBJECTS conditional lists,\nKconfig `depends on` chains, MicroPython port `SRC_QSTR` selection).\n\n## Workflow\n\n```\n1. Load the firmware source tree from findings\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002F\u003Cutc>-audit\u002Fsrc\u002F.\n   Require a provenance.json naming the vendor, product line, firmware\n   version, and source commit hash.\n2. Run the audit:\n     python firmware_guard_audit.py --src \u003Cpath> --pretty\n   Emits one JSON finding with severity, matches (file:line), and\n   the specific rule that fired.\n3. For any HIGH finding, cite the exact snippet in the postmortem\n   under the \"Technical root cause\" section (see\n   ..\u002Frng-entropy-audit\u002Freferences\u002Fhardware-wallet-postmortem-template.md).\n4. Cross-check against a known-vulnerable-firmware version range table\n   in the postmortem template. If the firmware being audited falls in\n   the Coldcard-published range (Mk2\u002FMk3: 4.4.1 through 4.1.9 [note\n   the descending numbering is intentional per Coldcard's release\n   scheme]; Mk4\u002FQ: pre-5.4.0; Edge: pre-6.6.66), auto-escalate to\n   HIGH regardless of code match.\n```\n\n## What NOT to do\n\n- Do NOT patch the source. Findings are advisory; the fix belongs\n  to the vendor or the owner's firmware pinning workflow.\n- Do NOT publish the source tree or any diff externally. The skill\n  runs offline against source you have permission to read.\n- Do NOT confuse this with a runtime audit. This skill sees the\n  STATIC pattern; whether the pattern actually causes the hardware\n  RNG to be skipped at runtime requires the `rng-entropy-audit`\n  skill on a captured RNG sample from the built firmware. Both\n  together give a HIGH-confidence verdict.\n- Do NOT run this skill on binary firmware — you need source. For\n  binary-only cases, escalate to the `reverser` specialist agent.\n",{"name":5,"metadata":23,"description":7},{"subdomain":24,"when_to_use":25,"upstream_ref":26},"crypto-hw","firmware source audit for hardware-RNG init, MicroPython port review, defined-but-zero macro guard, weak-symbol linker fallback for RNG, Coldcard-shaped bugs","Coldcard incident 2026-07-05 (Mk2\u002FMk3 firmware 4.4.1 through 4.1.9, Mk4\u002FQ pre-5.4.0 or Edge pre-6.6.66)","main","376de63e2b186eeb9856476ae89186e62b1d3fbe","packages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Ffirmware-guard-audit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou","2026-11-09 16:34:40",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill firmware-guard-audit",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill firmware-guard-audit",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon --skill firmware-guard-audit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Ffirmware-guard-audit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[47],{"path":48,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":51,"sourceHtmlUrl":52},"firmware_guard_audit.py","SCRIPT","脚本",11129,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcrypto-hw\u002Ffirmware-guard-audit\u002Ffirmware_guard_audit.py",[54,61,68,75,82,89],{"skillNo":55,"name":56,"nameZh":6,"description":57,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":58,"categories":59,"keywords":60,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAX15GZR5Q5S7RMPWFX43","wps-pixie-dust","WPS Pixie-Dust offline nonce attack (reaver -K \u002F pixiewps) and fallback online PIN brute (bully) to recover the AP's WPA PSK without capturing a handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":62,"name":63,"nameZh":6,"description":64,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]