[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M78HBWSNCHWCZ5MNDGXJM2FT":3,"skill-same:01M78HBWSNCHWCZ5MNDGXJM2FT":49},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":13,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M78HBWSNCHWCZ5MNDGXJM2FT","signature-replay",null,"Signature replay attacks — missing nonces, missing chain ID, ecrecover zero address, signature malleability, cross-chain replay.","dnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon","dnzengou","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F7807581?v=4","01M75KKJA3F5ZP7CA10MB2AEXC","01M78GP0FED2V1CDPB1N6G0CTH",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fcontracts\u002Fsignature-replay\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-15 14:19:17",false,"---\nname: signature-replay\ndescription: Signature replay attacks — missing nonces, missing chain ID, ecrecover zero address, signature malleability, cross-chain replay.\nmetadata:\n  subdomain: smart-contracts\n  when_to_use: \"signature replay eip-712 nonce smart contract\"\n  mitre_attack:\n    - T1556\n    - T1190\n---\n\n# Signature Replay Playbook\n\nEIP-712 signatures, permits, meta-transactions, and cross-chain bridges\nall use `ecrecover` (or its variants). Each has well-known bugs.\n\n## Bug classes\n\n### 1. Missing nonce → replay\n```solidity\nfunction execute(uint256 amount, bytes calldata sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount));\n    address signer = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(signer == owner);\n    \u002F\u002F ... withdraw amount\n}\n```\nA valid signature can be replayed forever — anyone who saw it once can\nre-submit it. **Fix**: include a per-user \u002F per-message nonce:\n```solidity\nmapping(address => uint256) public nonces;\nfunction execute(uint256 amount, uint256 nonce, bytes calldata sig) external {\n    require(nonce == nonces[msg.sender]);\n    nonces[msg.sender]++;\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount, nonce));\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Missing chain ID → cross-chain replay\nA signature valid on Ethereum mainnet shouldn't work on Optimism, Base,\nArbitrum, etc. If `chainid()` not in the signed payload, signatures\nreplay across chains:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE\nbytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amount, deadline, nonce));\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE — EIP-712 domain separator includes chainid\nbytes32 h = _hashTypedDataV4(...);  \u002F\u002F OZ helper\n```\n\nThis is especially bad for **bridges** — a signed message intended for\nchain A executes on chain B.\n\n### 3. Signature malleability (ecrecover variants)\n`ecrecover` accepts two valid `s` values for any signed message\n(`s` and `-s mod n`). This means each signature has two valid forms.\nIf your contract uses the signature itself as a uniqueness key\n(e.g., `usedSigs[sig] = true`), an attacker can find the malleable\nversion and bypass:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — uses sig as uniqueness key\nmapping(bytes => bool) public used;\nfunction execute(bytes calldata sig) external {\n    require(!used[sig]);\n    used[sig] = true;\n    address signer = ecrecover(...);\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n**Fix**: use the message hash (not the signature) as uniqueness key.\nModern OZ ECDSA library rejects high-`s` values, but home-rolled\n`ecrecover` does not.\n\n### 4. ecrecover zero address on invalid sig\n```solidity\naddress signer = ecrecover(h, v, r, s);\nif (signer == owner) { \u002F* approve *\u002F }\n```\n**Bug**: if `(v,r,s)` is invalid, `ecrecover` returns `address(0)`. If\n`owner` is somehow `address(0)` (uninitialized!) → any malformed\nsignature works.\n**Fix**: `require(signer != address(0))`.\n\n### 5. Domain separator without chainid\nEIP-712 domain separator should bind to the chain. If a protocol\ncaches `DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` in storage at deployment, hard-forks (which\nchange chainid) break it. OZ's EIP712 handles this; custom code often\ndoesn't.\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — cached at deploy\nbytes32 immutable DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = keccak256(abi.encode(\n    keccak256(\"EIP712Domain(...)\"),\n    keccak256(bytes(\"Name\")),\n    keccak256(bytes(\"1\")),\n    1,  \u002F\u002F ← hardcoded chainid\n    address(this)\n));\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE — re-derive when chainid changes\nfunction _domainSeparator() internal view returns (bytes32) {\n    return keccak256(abi.encode(..., block.chainid, ...));\n}\n```\n\n### 6. Permit signature replay across forks \u002F hard forks\nERC2612 `permit` is meta-tx for ERC20 approvals. If permit doesn't\ninclude the EIP-712 domain separator correctly, it can be replayed on:\n- Forked test chains\n- L2s that copied the contract\n- Hard forks (ETC, ETHW)\n\nThis is mostly resolved by OZ ERC20Permit, but custom permit impls are\noften wrong.\n\n### 7. Replay across function selectors\nA signed payload `keccak256(amount, recipient)` is the same regardless\nof which function it authorizes. If two functions share the same\nhash structure but different effects, the signature replays:\n```solidity\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amt, address to, bytes sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amt, to));\n    address s = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(s == owner);\n    payable(to).transfer(amt);\n}\n\nfunction mint(uint256 amt, address to, bytes sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amt, to));  \u002F\u002F SAME HASH\n    address s = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(s == owner);\n    _mint(to, amt);\n}\n\u002F\u002F A withdraw signature works for mint, and vice versa\n```\n**Fix**: include function selector or unique typeID in the signed payload.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Find every ecrecover\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'ecrecover\\|ECDSA.recover\\|recover(' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. For each call site, verify the payload contains\n- [ ] A nonce (or other per-user unique value, like deadline + msg.sender)\n- [ ] `block.chainid` (or use EIP-712 domain separator)\n- [ ] A function discriminator (if multiple functions use signatures)\n- [ ] `address(this)` (so signature is bound to THIS contract)\n\n### 3. Verify signature validation\n- [ ] Reject `address(0)` return from ecrecover\n- [ ] Use OZ ECDSA library or equivalent that rejects high-`s` malleable signatures\n- [ ] Domain separator re-derived from `block.chainid` if cached\n\n### 4. Look for the dangerous patterns\n```bash\n# Custom ecrecover w\u002Fo OZ — often missing s-malleability check\ngrep -rn 'ecrecover' src\u002F | grep -v 'ECDSA.sol'\n\n# Signature as uniqueness key\ngrep -rE 'mapping\\(bytes' src\u002F | grep -i 'used\\|nonce'\n\n# Domain separator cached at deploy\ngrep -rn 'DOMAIN_SEPARATOR.*=.*keccak256' src\u002F | grep -v 'view\\|pure'\n```\n\n## PoC templates (Foundry)\n\n### Cross-chain replay\n```solidity\nfunction test_cross_chain_replay() public {\n    \u002F\u002F 1. Sign payload on chain A (chainid 1)\n    bytes32 hash = target.getSignableHash(amount, deadline);\n    bytes memory sig = sign(privKey, hash);\n\n    target.execute(amount, deadline, sig);  \u002F\u002F works on chain A\n\n    \u002F\u002F 2. Switch to chain B (chainid 10)\n    vm.chainId(10);\n\n    \u002F\u002F 3. Deploy same contract bytecode to chain B\n    Target targetB = new Target(...);\n\n    \u002F\u002F 4. Same signature should be rejected if chainid is in the hash\n    vm.expectRevert(\"invalid sig\");\n    targetB.execute(amount, deadline, sig);\n\n    \u002F\u002F If it DOES NOT revert → cross-chain replay bug\n}\n```\n\n### Malleability\n```solidity\nfunction test_malleability() public {\n    bytes32 hash = ...;\n    (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = sign(privKey, hash);\n\n    target.execute(amount, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Compute the malleable counterpart\n    bytes32 sPrime = bytes32(uint256(SECP256K1_N) - uint256(s));\n    uint8 vPrime = v == 27 ? 28 : 27;\n\n    \u002F\u002F If target doesn't reject high-s, this also works\n    target.execute(amount, abi.encodePacked(r, sPrime, vPrime));\n}\n```\n\n### Missing nonce\n```solidity\nfunction test_replay() public {\n    target.execute(amount, sig);  \u002F\u002F first call succeeds\n    target.execute(amount, sig);  \u002F\u002F if no nonce check, succeeds again\n    \u002F\u002F Attacker can drain by replaying N times\n}\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Missing nonce + signed withdraw fn: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.8\n- Cross-chain replay on bridge: 10.0 (Critical)\n- Malleability + sig as uniqueness key: 8.0-9.0\n- Domain separator missing chainid: 8.0\n- ecrecover zero-address acceptance: 9.0 (engagement-ending if owner is 0)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Futils\u002Fcryptography\u002FEIP712.sol\";\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Futils\u002Fcryptography\u002FECDSA.sol\";\n\ncontract Safe is EIP712 {\n    using ECDSA for bytes32;\n\n    mapping(address => uint256) public nonces;\n\n    bytes32 constant TYPEHASH = keccak256(\n        \"Execute(address user,uint256 amount,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)\"\n    );\n\n    constructor() EIP712(\"MyApp\", \"1\") {}\n\n    function execute(uint256 amount, uint256 deadline, bytes calldata sig) external {\n        require(block.timestamp \u003C= deadline, \"expired\");\n\n        bytes32 structHash = keccak256(abi.encode(\n            TYPEHASH, msg.sender, amount, nonces[msg.sender]++, deadline\n        ));\n        bytes32 hash = _hashTypedDataV4(structHash);\n        address signer = hash.recover(sig);\n\n        require(signer == owner, \"bad sig\");\n        \u002F\u002F OZ ECDSA already rejects address(0) and malleable s\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Wormhole (Feb 2022): $325M — signature verification bypass (different bug but same family)\n- Nomad (Aug 2022): $190M — initial-merkle-root acceptance bug, replay-adjacent\n- Multichain (Jul 2023): $126M — private-key compromise + over-broad signature acceptance\n- Ronin (Mar 2022): $625M — validator-set takeover via cross-chain replay-like vector\n- Cream V2 \u002F Cover (Dec 2020): infinite-mint via nonce replay\n- Compound c.Token reentrancy + sig-driven liquidations (smaller)\n- ParaSwap (Sep 2021): signature malleability mitigated in ERC1271 wallet integrations\n","# Signature Replay Playbook\n\nEIP-712 signatures, permits, meta-transactions, and cross-chain bridges\nall use `ecrecover` (or its variants). Each has well-known bugs.\n\n## Bug classes\n\n### 1. Missing nonce → replay\n```solidity\nfunction execute(uint256 amount, bytes calldata sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount));\n    address signer = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(signer == owner);\n    \u002F\u002F ... withdraw amount\n}\n```\nA valid signature can be replayed forever — anyone who saw it once can\nre-submit it. **Fix**: include a per-user \u002F per-message nonce:\n```solidity\nmapping(address => uint256) public nonces;\nfunction execute(uint256 amount, uint256 nonce, bytes calldata sig) external {\n    require(nonce == nonces[msg.sender]);\n    nonces[msg.sender]++;\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount, nonce));\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Missing chain ID → cross-chain replay\nA signature valid on Ethereum mainnet shouldn't work on Optimism, Base,\nArbitrum, etc. If `chainid()` not in the signed payload, signatures\nreplay across chains:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE\nbytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amount, deadline, nonce));\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE — EIP-712 domain separator includes chainid\nbytes32 h = _hashTypedDataV4(...);  \u002F\u002F OZ helper\n```\n\nThis is especially bad for **bridges** — a signed message intended for\nchain A executes on chain B.\n\n### 3. Signature malleability (ecrecover variants)\n`ecrecover` accepts two valid `s` values for any signed message\n(`s` and `-s mod n`). This means each signature has two valid forms.\nIf your contract uses the signature itself as a uniqueness key\n(e.g., `usedSigs[sig] = true`), an attacker can find the malleable\nversion and bypass:\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — uses sig as uniqueness key\nmapping(bytes => bool) public used;\nfunction execute(bytes calldata sig) external {\n    require(!used[sig]);\n    used[sig] = true;\n    address signer = ecrecover(...);\n    \u002F\u002F ...\n}\n```\n**Fix**: use the message hash (not the signature) as uniqueness key.\nModern OZ ECDSA library rejects high-`s` values, but home-rolled\n`ecrecover` does not.\n\n### 4. ecrecover zero address on invalid sig\n```solidity\naddress signer = ecrecover(h, v, r, s);\nif (signer == owner) { \u002F* approve *\u002F }\n```\n**Bug**: if `(v,r,s)` is invalid, `ecrecover` returns `address(0)`. If\n`owner` is somehow `address(0)` (uninitialized!) → any malformed\nsignature works.\n**Fix**: `require(signer != address(0))`.\n\n### 5. Domain separator without chainid\nEIP-712 domain separator should bind to the chain. If a protocol\ncaches `DOMAIN_SEPARATOR` in storage at deployment, hard-forks (which\nchange chainid) break it. OZ's EIP712 handles this; custom code often\ndoesn't.\n\n```solidity\n\u002F\u002F VULNERABLE — cached at deploy\nbytes32 immutable DOMAIN_SEPARATOR = keccak256(abi.encode(\n    keccak256(\"EIP712Domain(...)\"),\n    keccak256(bytes(\"Name\")),\n    keccak256(bytes(\"1\")),\n    1,  \u002F\u002F ← hardcoded chainid\n    address(this)\n));\n\n\u002F\u002F SAFE — re-derive when chainid changes\nfunction _domainSeparator() internal view returns (bytes32) {\n    return keccak256(abi.encode(..., block.chainid, ...));\n}\n```\n\n### 6. Permit signature replay across forks \u002F hard forks\nERC2612 `permit` is meta-tx for ERC20 approvals. If permit doesn't\ninclude the EIP-712 domain separator correctly, it can be replayed on:\n- Forked test chains\n- L2s that copied the contract\n- Hard forks (ETC, ETHW)\n\nThis is mostly resolved by OZ ERC20Permit, but custom permit impls are\noften wrong.\n\n### 7. Replay across function selectors\nA signed payload `keccak256(amount, recipient)` is the same regardless\nof which function it authorizes. If two functions share the same\nhash structure but different effects, the signature replays:\n```solidity\nfunction withdraw(uint256 amt, address to, bytes sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amt, to));\n    address s = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(s == owner);\n    payable(to).transfer(amt);\n}\n\nfunction mint(uint256 amt, address to, bytes sig) external {\n    bytes32 h = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(amt, to));  \u002F\u002F SAME HASH\n    address s = ecrecover(h, ...);\n    require(s == owner);\n    _mint(to, amt);\n}\n\u002F\u002F A withdraw signature works for mint, and vice versa\n```\n**Fix**: include function selector or unique typeID in the signed payload.\n\n## Audit steps\n\n### 1. Find every ecrecover\n```bash\ngrep -rn 'ecrecover\\|ECDSA.recover\\|recover(' src\u002F\n```\n\n### 2. For each call site, verify the payload contains\n- [ ] A nonce (or other per-user unique value, like deadline + msg.sender)\n- [ ] `block.chainid` (or use EIP-712 domain separator)\n- [ ] A function discriminator (if multiple functions use signatures)\n- [ ] `address(this)` (so signature is bound to THIS contract)\n\n### 3. Verify signature validation\n- [ ] Reject `address(0)` return from ecrecover\n- [ ] Use OZ ECDSA library or equivalent that rejects high-`s` malleable signatures\n- [ ] Domain separator re-derived from `block.chainid` if cached\n\n### 4. Look for the dangerous patterns\n```bash\n# Custom ecrecover w\u002Fo OZ — often missing s-malleability check\ngrep -rn 'ecrecover' src\u002F | grep -v 'ECDSA.sol'\n\n# Signature as uniqueness key\ngrep -rE 'mapping\\(bytes' src\u002F | grep -i 'used\\|nonce'\n\n# Domain separator cached at deploy\ngrep -rn 'DOMAIN_SEPARATOR.*=.*keccak256' src\u002F | grep -v 'view\\|pure'\n```\n\n## PoC templates (Foundry)\n\n### Cross-chain replay\n```solidity\nfunction test_cross_chain_replay() public {\n    \u002F\u002F 1. Sign payload on chain A (chainid 1)\n    bytes32 hash = target.getSignableHash(amount, deadline);\n    bytes memory sig = sign(privKey, hash);\n\n    target.execute(amount, deadline, sig);  \u002F\u002F works on chain A\n\n    \u002F\u002F 2. Switch to chain B (chainid 10)\n    vm.chainId(10);\n\n    \u002F\u002F 3. Deploy same contract bytecode to chain B\n    Target targetB = new Target(...);\n\n    \u002F\u002F 4. Same signature should be rejected if chainid is in the hash\n    vm.expectRevert(\"invalid sig\");\n    targetB.execute(amount, deadline, sig);\n\n    \u002F\u002F If it DOES NOT revert → cross-chain replay bug\n}\n```\n\n### Malleability\n```solidity\nfunction test_malleability() public {\n    bytes32 hash = ...;\n    (uint8 v, bytes32 r, bytes32 s) = sign(privKey, hash);\n\n    target.execute(amount, abi.encodePacked(r, s, v));\n\n    \u002F\u002F Compute the malleable counterpart\n    bytes32 sPrime = bytes32(uint256(SECP256K1_N) - uint256(s));\n    uint8 vPrime = v == 27 ? 28 : 27;\n\n    \u002F\u002F If target doesn't reject high-s, this also works\n    target.execute(amount, abi.encodePacked(r, sPrime, vPrime));\n}\n```\n\n### Missing nonce\n```solidity\nfunction test_replay() public {\n    target.execute(amount, sig);  \u002F\u002F first call succeeds\n    target.execute(amount, sig);  \u002F\u002F if no nonce check, succeeds again\n    \u002F\u002F Attacker can drain by replaying N times\n}\n```\n\n## CVSS\n- Missing nonce + signed withdraw fn: `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H` = 9.8\n- Cross-chain replay on bridge: 10.0 (Critical)\n- Malleability + sig as uniqueness key: 8.0-9.0\n- Domain separator missing chainid: 8.0\n- ecrecover zero-address acceptance: 9.0 (engagement-ending if owner is 0)\n\n## Defender remediation\n```solidity\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Futils\u002Fcryptography\u002FEIP712.sol\";\nimport \"@openzeppelin\u002Fcontracts\u002Futils\u002Fcryptography\u002FECDSA.sol\";\n\ncontract Safe is EIP712 {\n    using ECDSA for bytes32;\n\n    mapping(address => uint256) public nonces;\n\n    bytes32 constant TYPEHASH = keccak256(\n        \"Execute(address user,uint256 amount,uint256 nonce,uint256 deadline)\"\n    );\n\n    constructor() EIP712(\"MyApp\", \"1\") {}\n\n    function execute(uint256 amount, uint256 deadline, bytes calldata sig) external {\n        require(block.timestamp \u003C= deadline, \"expired\");\n\n        bytes32 structHash = keccak256(abi.encode(\n            TYPEHASH, msg.sender, amount, nonces[msg.sender]++, deadline\n        ));\n        bytes32 hash = _hashTypedDataV4(structHash);\n        address signer = hash.recover(sig);\n\n        require(signer == owner, \"bad sig\");\n        \u002F\u002F OZ ECDSA already rejects address(0) and malleable s\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Known exemplars\n- Wormhole (Feb 2022): $325M — signature verification bypass (different bug but same family)\n- Nomad (Aug 2022): $190M — initial-merkle-root acceptance bug, replay-adjacent\n- Multichain (Jul 2023): $126M — private-key compromise + over-broad signature acceptance\n- Ronin (Mar 2022): $625M — validator-set takeover via cross-chain replay-like vector\n- Cream V2 \u002F Cover (Dec 2020): infinite-mint via nonce replay\n- Compound c.Token reentrancy + sig-driven liquidations (smaller)\n- ParaSwap (Sep 2021): signature malleability 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handshake.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwps-pixie-dust\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JARXE0ZER8P81SFD024YP","wpa3-sae","WPA3-SAE transition-mode downgrade (DragonShift), SSID Confusion CVE-2023-52424, Dragonblood side-channels, and SAE captive-portal credential recovery against WPA3-Personal networks.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa3-sae\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JANJNH8VMR0CK1Y6AM74G","wpa2-psk","WPA\u002FWPA2-PSK handshake capture via targeted deauth + PMKID (no deauth required) + offline hashcat cracking. The most common consumer\u002FSMB encryption mode in 2026.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa2-psk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAFCYR2BAJF7KH0ZCXREA","wpa-enterprise-eap","WPA\u002FWPA2\u002FWPA3-Enterprise (802.1X\u002FEAP) rogue-RADIUS evil-twin for MSCHAPv2 capture, GTC downgrade, and PEAP relay. MSCHAPv2 capture equals a NetNTLM hash — the primary wireless on-ramp to Active Directory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fwpa-enterprise-eap\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":79,"name":80,"nameZh":6,"description":81,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":82,"categories":83,"keywords":84,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JAAQ5T08FR9MY5SFNRWBM","krack-fragattacks","KRACK key-reinstallation (CVE-2017-13077..13082) and FragAttacks fragmentation\u002Faggregation flaws (CVE-2020-24586..24588, CVE-2020-26139..26147) against legacy or embedded 802.11 supplicants with poor patch cadence.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fkrack-fragattacks\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":18},"01M78JA6799JQZE0M9B21HRMGY","evil-twin-karma","Evil-twin rogue AP with KARMA\u002FMana PNL-probe response, captive-portal credential capture, and post-association MITM for PSK\u002Fopen networks. Distinct from wpa-enterprise-eap which targets 802.1X.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdnzengou\u002Fevo-decepticon\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fpackages\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fdecepticon\u002Fskills\u002Fstandard\u002Fwireless\u002Fevil-twin-karma\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]